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ABSTRACT
This thesis is about the politics and administration of community 
development in the Rivers State of Nigeria. Prior.to the creation of the 
Rivers State in 19*5?» efforts had been made by the people to improve their 
lo^al communities; and the people's attainment of political autonomy presented 
enormous challenge in the task of local development. Today, both at the local 
and state government levels, resources are mobilised so as to improve living 
conditions in the state. There are new expectations in a new state.
At the local level, there are different participants in community 
development, namely, planning committees, chiefs, elders, youths and communal 
patrons. However, neither are all participants in community development united, 
nor is there a widespread consensus about political interests and values among 
the people. In some communities, there are political disputes and power struggles 
among the different participants, thus affecting the pace of local development. 
Nevertheless, all the participants appreciate the need for development. At 
the official level, there are planning bodies. Rural Development Officers,
Sole Authorities, Permanent Secretaries and Commissioners who make or influence 
decisions in respect of community development. Of the different participants 
in community development, this work shows that those of the patron class are 
the most eminent, not only in the locality but also in the public service.
Hence the patron is in a position to play a 'linkage role* between the locality 
and Port Harcourt, the seat of administration. The linkage role of the patron 
largely explains the fact that rural polyethnic politics is projected into 
Port Harcourt.
Hence this thesis casts light on: the politics of communalisra, the
activities of the. different participants in community development and the 
emergence of community influentials. One of the main themes of the thesis is 
that, given the general pattern of expectations in a new state, even as an 
administrator, the community influential (the patron) will always protect 
the interestswhether they be real or imagined^ of his people. In short, 
the main argument is that administration has no purpose other than to 
serve the political goals of the different communities in the State.
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POSTSCRIPT
On 29th July 1975» the government of General Gowon was overthrown 
in k military coup. Nigeria's new leader, Brigadier M® Mohammed, has 
appointed twelve new Governors for the States. The newly appointed 
Governor for the Rivers State, Lt. Colonel Z, Lekwuot, has formed his 
own cabinet. However, this work does not cover the events in the 
Rivers State since the coup.
(â/i) .
INFORMATION FOR THIS STUDY
Information for this work has been collected from a number of sources.
The bulk of the material was collected from a number of primary sources: 
interviews, private papers, official documents, minutes of local development 
committee meetings, and general reference works. Secondary sources were 
also used, especially for Chapter 2.
Of the primary sources, interviews were the most challenging and 
interesting. It was a great opportunity to meet and talk with the people 
who have been actively involved in the activities covered by this study.
As far as possible, attempts were made to see most of these local dignitaries 
.and Port Harcourt officials whose roles in community development are of 
primary importance. However, because of certain factors - the poor communication 
network in the state,- my limited time and financial resources - it was not 
possible to meet all those who are connected with the events which I have 
recorded. Besides, some were unwilling to talk about their activities; 
others warned me not to ask too many questions. Naturally, the availability 
of the materials has influenced the shape and nature of this work.
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CHAPTER 1
- i n t r o d u c t i o n.
BACKGROUND.
In recent years, political scientists have shown an increasing concern 
with central-local relationships in African countries. Of great interest 
is the variety of social, economic and political networks which tie the 
locality to the centre. Some writers examine the bureaucratic relations 
between the centre and the locality; others analyse the politics of ethnic 
solidarity and the role of local notables in diverting central resources to 
the locality. Interest has also centred on the pooling of resources by 
each of the local communities for development purposes, and the role played 
by the central government in assisting or directing these processes of 
change in the rural areas.
One major theme running through these works is that both the people and 
the governments are making, or have ma^e, attempts to bring about improvements 
in the rural areas - in different ways, using different strategies. The 
point is that in dealing with these strategies for rural development, the 
different writers analyse different aspects of central-local relations 
in African countries. In general, the aspects they analyse relate mostly 
to the notions of distributive politics, communal particularism and the 
manipulative ability of the politicians and policy-makers. Of particular 
interest to this study are the works of Owusu, Dunn, Robertson, Lamb,
Miller, Smock, UJolpe and (Tlelson which will be summarised in the section that 
follows for the purpose of showing the similarities (and dissimilarities) 
between this work and theirs.
Maxwell Gwusu^ explores the notion of distributive politics in Ghana,
His analysis shows that in a political market, allegiance is determined 
by the goods on offer. He, therefore, explains the ease with which the
1
lYl, Owusu 'Politics in Swedru* in D, Austin & R, Luckham, eds,. Politicians 
and Soldiers in Ghana, 1966-1972, London. 1975, pp 233-260,
Nkrumah regime in Ghana was spiept away by the army when the C.P.P. ceased
to attract widespread approval, apparently because of scarcities in the
market, he concludes that if the distributive government runs out of
benefits needed to keep intact its network of political alliances, the clients,
if they can, will go elsewhere - as happened in Ghana, Hence Gwusu's
description of voters attitudes is one of an 'instrumentalist' view of
politics - governments as instruments of disbursement via an intermediary
elite to the electorate. In his view, the Ghanaian army won great support
not only because of its claim to be a 'righteous government' but also
' *
because it promised a restored world of plenty, Owusu therefore implies
that in Ghanaian politics, the 'profit motive* is of great importance,
especially to the clients. In short, clients will continue to support any
government as long as they profit.
However, writing about political events in Ghana in the same period,
John Dunn^ lays less stress on the notion of distribution; rather he
emphasises the strength of personal obligations, traditional loyalities or
ethnic ties within the constituencies. Furthermore, he emphasises the
indispensability of the role of cultural brokers: roles which are culturally
approved in Ghana, He throws some light on the moral credibility of the
leaders' presentation of themselves as brokers. His conclusions about the
activities of these brokers and the levels at which they operate confirm
2
that the politics of Ahafo have always been"a politics of faction at a
3
lineage, a town, or divisional level, rather than a politics of class;
^Oohn Dunn 'Politics in Asunafo' in D,Austin & R,Luckham op, cit, pp 168-208, 
2
Thera ic an illuminating discussion of factionalism in local politics in 
M,E,Spiro 'Factionalism & Politics in Village Burma* in M.3.Swartz, ed,, 
Local-Level Politics London, 1969 pp 401-20,
3
Kenneth Grundy also discusses how African .leaders have rejected the use of 
class for analysing political, social and economic relationships in Africa, 
See K.Grundy 'The Class Struggle in Africa : an examination of conflicting 
theories' DMAS. Vol, 2, 1964, pp 379-93,
15,
a class struggle between kinship groups and places rather than between
geographically dispersed economic interests"^, Dunn's emphasis is on the
insistent recurrence of 'localist values' in elections - that is, the
politics of ethnic solidarity,
Dunn's account does not of course suggest that compared with clients
in Swedru, clients in Asunafo are less profit-seeking* Rather he examines
another aspect of the 'profit motioe* in politics: in Asunafo the clients
vote for the 'insider' (as against the outsider) who is most likely to
further the interests of the group in the larger political arena.
These works - Owusu and Dunn - dealing with the notion of a political
stock exchange and the brokers have examined only one aspect of central-local
relationships. The other writers focus on (i) policy makihg and aspects of
competitive politics in the bureaucracy (ii) local expectations of the
central government in the distribution of resources, and (iii) ways in which
the centre exercises control over the periphery.
In contrast with Owusu and Dunn, the aspects of central-local relation-
2 3
ships which are of great interest to Robertson and Dunn are the patterns 
of inter-group competition for central government benefits and the functions 
of local councils. Their observation is that in the rural areas the 
vagueness of popular understanding of the structure of the public service 
could be contrasted with the clarity with which its proper functions are
^J,Dunn 'Politics in Asunafo' in 0,Austin & R,Luckham op,cit,
2
A.F.Robertson & 3,Dunn, Dependence and Opportunity : Political Change in
Ahafo, London, 1973, ”
3
In this context I am drawing a line between the two works of the same writer 
Dunn - because different aspects of central-local relationships are examined 
in his two works, I do not, however, suggest that there are two different 
Dunns, except in terms of Dunn's two areas of interest as reflected in his 
works.
16*
perceived: the government should provide the amenities "which have become
the modern requisite of communal aggrandisement"^. They observe that
because the Ahafos are opportunistic, the exploitation of opportunities is
obligatory, the main protagonists (the politicians) are impelled not simply
by personal interest but by communal responsbilities. Their conclusion
is that because of the keen competition for group benefits, the astute
politican in Ahafo is watchful for every opportunity.
It is suggested that competition between groups arises mainly because
the state is the major source of money and opportunities. And in the case
of the Ahafos it is the 'patriotic politician', and not other local notables,
who is watchful for every opportunity to promote the cause of his people.
Regarding the role of the politician in these inter-group competitions
for state benefits, the conclusion of Robertson and Dunn in relation to
2
the Ghanaian situation is by no means unique. Lamb's study of rural 
politics in Kenya complements the conclusions of Robertson and Dunn, Not 
only does Lamb examine the role of the government in the rural areas, but 
points out that politicians have fought over power, wealth and status,
3
He adds that these peasant leaders have influenced the distribution Dot 
only of political power but also of economic resources in the countryside,
ThB conelusion is that at the local level the politicians use their political 
power to influence the distribution of resources. In short, as in Ghana, 
the politicians in Kenya are watchful for every opportunity to advance both 
their interests and those of their people.
^A,F,Robertson & 3,Dunn, op,cit, p,294,
2
G.Lamb, Peasant Politics. Sussex. 1974,
3
For debates concerning the direction of peasant politics in Africa, see 
T.Shanin, ed. Peasants and Peasantries, Harmondsworth, 1971,
17,
“these political aspects of the centre-periphery relationships which 
highlight the role of the important political figures in the rural areas 
are also analysed by lYliller^  in relation to the situation in Tanzania,
However, Miller concentrates on the patterns of communication between the 
various upper levels of the government (TANU) and the people. Most 
important of all, he shows that besides these communication links between 
the government and the people, responsibility for the mobilisation of local 
labour for the building of rural schools and hospitals lies with important 
political figures. Again the rural party organisations have several 
notable characteristics: they are the institutional nerve endings of
I
the national party structure; they are also the local institutions by which
the people are brought into the national political arena and through which
the 'commands* of the governing elite (the politicians) are channelled.
Hence participation in rural institutions, such as the political party, the
local councils and local voluntary associations is fused. In other words,
in Tanzania, both the ordinary people and the politicians participate
actively in matters concerning the welfare of the state and the locality.
But the question is: what factors account for the active participation of
2
people in matters concerning the locality? It is this question which li/olpe 
discusses in relation to the Ibos of Nigeria, UJolpe examines two factors 
which account for the active participation of the Ibos in matters concerning 
the welfare of the primary or larger ethnic group. These factors relate to
3
Ibo organisational adaptability and internal political cohesiveness , liJolpe
^Norman Miller 'The Rural African Party; Political Participation in Tanzania » 
in APSR Vol. 64, 1970, pp 5#B-71.
^H,Uiolpe 'Port Harcourt; Ibo politics in microcosm' in JIYIAS Vol,7, 1969, 
pp 469-93,
3
Ibid, UlolpQ also explains that the pan Ibo movement which preaches Ibo unity 
is a recent creation; that it was created because of the political circum­
stances in which Ibos had to compete with other ethnic groups (the Yorubas 
and Hausas in oarticular) for the control of the central government in Nigeria.
I.
18,
shows that among the Ibos there are deep fundamental unities at the village 
level, and so, even in the urban areas, Ibo immigrants identify themselves
I
strongly with their kinsmen, and see themselves as local ambassadors. In 
short, the Ibos do not forget their rural heritage. Hence communal identities 
comprise the most convenient mode of social and political categorisation. 
Besides the politics of communalism among the Ibos, lilolpe further 
examines the relationship between communalism and modernisation. His view 
is that the Port Harcourt experience suggests that there is no a priori reason 
to assume that "as economic development accelerates, the creation of new 
functionally specific, social identities will eventually undermine the
\ i
organizational bases upon which a politics of communalish tests" * In short,
among the Ibos, communal particularims is still a persistent feature, in
spite of the effects of modernisation, Uiolpe's explanation is that the
2
paradoxical blending of 'civic' and 'primordial' sentiments best defines
the modern Ibo political^ experience, Uiolpe suggests that Ibo communalism^ 
was not made manifest in political patronage alone; the Ibo rank and file
were firmly tied to their respective communal organisations (the organisations
which sponsored development projects) which, in turn, were closely integrated
with the fused institution of party and government.
^Ibid, p, 470,
2
For a clearer understanding of the use of this term, see C,Geertz, ed.
Old Societies & New States, Glencoe III, 1953, pp 105-56,
^A,C, Smock's work (Ibo Politics, Cambridge, Mass, 1971) throws light 
on the political roles of Ibo ethnic unions in the Nigerian political scene,
^Wolpe gives the example of one Mr. Jumbo (a Rivers man) who was a victim 
of Ibo communalism in issues concerning political patronage, Mr. Dumbo was 
a staunch NCNC supporter, a one time Chairman of NCNC's Eastern working 
committee and Deputy Mayor of Port Harcourt, Yet in spite of Dumbo's 
prominence within the Port Harcourt municipal council, because he was not 
an Ibo, he was repeatedly denied the local party's nomination for office as 
Mayor, a key post which the Ibos reserved for their kinsmen. See H,Wolpe; 
op, cit, pp 483-84,
19e
SmocU^ has buttressed the arguments of UJolpe, demonstrating the
omnipresence of the ethnic factor as a major determinant in Nigerian politics'*
Of particular interest is the political dimension of micro political ethnicity,
as it has been reflected in the relationship between the dominant political
party in a region and the various ethnic unions. Smock shows and stresses
that "the resilience of the primary ethnic groups (in Eastern Nigeria)
resulted in part from the organisational deficiencies of the NCNC and also
2
reflected the strength of the ethnic unions" • Political participation, 
she argues, accentuated the significance of the clans, since the clan was 
the most inclusive ethnic grouping in (Ylbaise (Eastern Nigeria) through 
which economic amenities and political nominations could be distributed.
Smock further shows that when local councils were established in Eastern 
Nigeria in 1956, these council areas, most of which coincided with the 
clan boundaries, became the foci for certain kinds of communal activity - 
such as development schemes. Hence she concludes that because of the 
resilience of the primary ethnic group, both the politicians and the people 
are deeply committed to furthering the interests of their people.
?*or A,C,Smack's analysis of the omnipresence of ethnic factors in „
Nigerian politics, see her work 'The NCNC and Ethnic unions in Biafral
in DMAS Voi; 7, 1969, pp 21-34,
She focuses attention on a) how the different ethnic unions in Mbaise
operated to further the interests of their members and b) the issues 
on which the NCNC came into conflict with the ethnic unions as a result 
of the politics of ethnic solidarity. For example unions rejected the 
party's nominees at elections, rather they nominated and voted for their 
own candidates who would protect their interests in parliament,
^Ibid, p,21.
20,
THEME,
The primary focus of this work is the central-local relationship 
in the Rivers State of Nigeria. Port Harcourt, the administrative capital 
of the state and the main centre of decision making, represents the centre, 
while four communities^ in the riverine bloc, namely, Kalahari, Nembe,
Bonny and Okrika; and two communities in the hinterland bloc - the Ogbas 
and Ogonis - represent the localities. This thesis explores both the 
political dimensions of micro political communalism in the Rivers State, 
as it is reflected in the relationship between the State government, the 
major distributor of resources, and the six communities, and the dynamics 
of intra communal politics in community development matters. Hence great 
emphasis is laid on the omnipresence of the communal factor as a major 
determinant in Rivers State politics* Therefore, because of the omni­
presence of communalism in Rivers State politics, this study tends to focus
more on the politics of communalism and less on formal structures (the 
2
bureaucracy) and roles of the officials.
Having identified the major interests of this study, it will be shown 
how far some of the works already cited fit into our investigations.
Maxwell Owusu's work is related to this study in certain respects. Like 
Owusu's, the present study explores the notion of distributive politics. 
Because of the limited economic resources of these communities and their 
desire for development, every community in the Rivers State is interested 
in the 'national booty* since the Port Harcourt administration is seen as 
the distributor of state resources; and it is the patron who sees himself,
^In terms of population, the riverine and hinterland blocs constitute 
about 67^ and 33^ respectively of the total state population,
2
In the context of the developing countires, H. Bretton, Power and Politics 
in Africa, Aldine - Chicago, 1973 p, 285, has also pointed out that attempts 
to "draw sharp distinction between —  public and private interests may
21,
and is seen by his people, as a cultural broker and as a member of an elite 
of intermediaries. As the case study on Tsaro UJiwa in Chapter 3 shows, 
when patrons run out of political goods, there is usually a shift of 
loyalties: the clients shift their loyalties from the fallen hero to those
they believe can better satisfy their needs.
The role of the government in the rural areas, as Dunn and Robertson 
have ably described it, is also made clear especially in Chapters 4 and 7, 
Given the distributive character of the Port Harcourt administration, there 
is tense inter-community competition. Every community desires that the 
government should both provide amenities and assist enterprising communities 
wishing to mobile local resources for development. Hence, at the Port 
Harcourt level, inter-community competition and communal aggrandisement 
arise largely because of the hunger for governmental assistance. Inevitably 
it is only a government which promises and offers a 'world of plenty' that
is popular in the eyes of the people - of course, the promise of a 'world
of plenty' as a major factor influencing voters preferences is by no means
unique^ to the Rivers State,
The accounts of John Dunn and Smock also provide us with a background 
for understanding the politics of communal solidarity. Rivers State 
politics is invariably factional at the community level. The factional 
bases of politics will be seen not only in the competition for benefit at 
the Port Harcourt level, but also in the elections which are discussed 
in Chapters 5 and 6. However, unlike Dunn's accounts, the factions in the 
Rivers State politics will be seen mostly at the community level and in 
communities such as Okrika the community is split into more factions.
Similar electoral preferences exist in European countries. For a 
perceptive analysis of voters attitudes in Britain, see R.L. Leonard, 
Elections in Britain, London, 1968,
22.
More important is the fact that in the Rivers State, factional solidarity 
does not stretch to the divisional or provincial level (the larger units), 
as seems to be the case in the area studied by Dunn#
1
Regarding the status and manipulative skills of the patrons and politicians 
vis-a-vis their clients, the analysis of Dunn and Robertson, Miller and 
Owusu provide an insight into the dynamics of patron-client relationships 
in the Rivers State* Not only are the patrons brokers as these writers 
have shown; in the Rivers State the patrons are the most senior policy­
makers in the public service (See Chapters 3-6), As senior policy-makers, 
they are expected to perform important roles in the distribution of
amenities to, and in the administration of, the local areas. By virtue of
2
their senior positions in Port Harcourt, Rivers State patrons have also 
become local notables; hence they are leaders both in their localities and 
in Port Harcourt, They have also become community spokesmen in Port 
Harcourt, They see themselves, and are seen by their people, as benefactors; 
and the people (most of whom are clients) have become the beneficiaries.
Yet as benefactors they distribute public, not private, resources. It is 
clear, therefore, that there is a conversion of public service positions to 
political currencies at the local level. However, in terms of roles, the 
official expectations are that the patron, an official, should be impartial 
in the implementation of policies, and should also act as a bridge between 
the people and the government for the transmission of official policies.
The patrons and politicians described in this work are the political 
leaders whom R.L. Sklar & C,S, Whitaker have described in their work 
(in 3.S.Coleman & C,G*Rosberg, eds. Political Parties & National Integration 
in Tropical Africa. Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1964 pp 597-654) as 'communal 
heroes', while the elders and chiefs - see Chapter 3- are referred to as 
'traditional notables',
2R, Sklar has suggested that : it is less frequently recognised that tribal 
movements may be created and instigated to action by the new men of power 
in furtherance of their own special interests. See R, Sklar 'Political Scienoo 
and National Inteoration - A Radical Aooroach' 3JÏIA_S_ Vol.5. 1967 p,7.
il
23,
Yet the local expectation is that the patron should keep the government 
actively devoted to his people's interests - as seems to be the case in 
the area (the Ibos in Port Harcourt) studied by Uiolpe, Here lies the 
divergence between official and local expectations.
The conversion of official positions to political currencies at the 
local level is facilitated for certain reasons which will be explained in 
greater detail in Chapters 3-7* The local area is often a pedestrian 
society; there is general poverty and the ordinary citizen haà no direct 
contact with the government - this is analagous to the plight of the peasant 
in Kenya, as analysed by Lamb. Movement to, and contact with. Port Harcourt 
is necessary for those who wish to improve their life styles. Hence, for 
most rural individuals, the world is in essence a microcosm with the 
community as the centre. Since the chiefs and elders are merely 
traditional notables, they can not influence policies in Port Harcourt. 
Therefore considering the official position of the patron and the great 
expectations of the people, it is the patron who is called on to satisfy 
the people's expectations by influencing policies in Port Harcourt to the 
advantage of his community. The patron, therefore, combines the role of 
administrator and politician and in these two capacities he brings benefit 
to his people.
Of course, the intrumentalist view of politics - of governments as 
instruments of disbursement via an intermediary elite to the people - is not 
peculiar to the Rivers State, Owusu has given a similar account of this 
phenomenon in Ghana, No doubt, clientage and brokerage are age old. The 
major argument in this work is that in the Rivers State, such 'trading 
relationships' between the State government and the local centres of power 
have become the prime matrix of political life.
24.
From the foregoing it is clear that the relationship between the patrons
and clients is one between benefactors and beneficiaries.. At this point
one would ask whether it is purely an exchange^ relationship - one of
reciprocity between equals - or is one party always giving while the other
party is always at the receiving end. The discussions in Chapters 3 and 6
explain the ethics of this relationship. It would not be unexpected that
patrons who are benefactors would desire to have large followings of clients
at the local level, because while in office the patrons need the goodwill
and support of their clients so that their *good image* would always be
protected by the clients.
Obviously, among the Rivers people, as elsewhere in Africa, becoming
a big man (patron) represents one of the highest goals to which ordinary
people in the society can aspire. Therefore since there are many aspirants
for the big man status in the community, those who are successful in
attaining this status must inevitably strive to build up the size and strength
of a personal following, and vie; with one another to win the favour of the
elders, chiefs and the various marks of prestige acknowledged in the rural
society. As Epstein has rightly observed, the attainment of big mai status
is ---"the outcome of a series of acts which elevate a person above the
common herd and attract about him a coterie of loyal lesser men —  leader-
2
ship is a creation - a creation of followership”. Besides, when patrons
For an elaborate discussion of the nature of this exchange relationship 
see (l) 3,D. Powell 'Peasant Society & Clientelistic Politics' AP5R Vol.64, 
1970, pp, 411-425 & (ll) P« Blau Exchange and Power in Social Life, N,Y.1964
2
A,L,Epstein 'Power, Politics and Leadership : Some central African & 
Melanesian contrasts' in M.3. Swartz, op, cit, p,61.
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compete among themselves at the state level for the control of t:,3 machinery 
of government, each patron is bound to mobilise^ his command organisation 
behind him for support. The fact is that in Nigeria, the patrons make 
appeals to the most easily mobilised communal loyalties. And since patrons 
advance the interests of their respective nationalities at the state level 
and offer their people political protection, any patron soliciting support 
must first of all count on his beneficiaries (his people) before appealing, 
perhaps unsuccessfully, to the outsider. Nevertheless, the ambition to 
gather a large following is fraught with problems, for the more successful 
the patron is, the greater the size of his following, the greater his 
influence and prestige in relation to other contestants, and the greater 
the expectations and the range of the needs of the followers which must be 
met*
For their part, the subordinates (clients) who receive, or expect to 
receive, both political protection and material assistance from their patrons 
are expected to be loyal and remain indebted to render certain services - 
such as the formation of fan clubs for protecting the 'good names' of the 
patrons - to the patrons, in appreciation of the benevolence of the latter; 
one good turn deserves another. Besides, because the patrons and their 
clients are usually from the same community (see Chapters 3 and 6), clients 
are expected to support the cause of the patrons since failure to do so is 
looked upon as a violation of ethnic obligations. Therefore it is evident
It is emphasised that the patrons greatly depend on their communities 
of origin for support. Indeed, aspirant politicians and the leaders 
of the N.C.N.C,, N.D.C., A.G,, & N^P.G, greatly mobilised this kind of 
communal support - See Chapters 5 & 6, Nigerian politicians, especially 
the successful ones, are also known for organising large followings.
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that there is an exchange relationship in clientelism; an interchange of 
non-comparable^ goods and services. In short, the exchange relationship 
is one which takes some account of the position, status and resources of 
the parties involved*
CONCEPTS.
Having discussed an intrumentalist view of politics as it affects the
2relationship between patrons and clients in the community , I shall at this 
stage introduce some clarification of the notion of the community. Such an 
investigation is important for purposes of; (l) ascertaining the levels - 
such as the village or town which are the units of political action - in which 
patrons and clients operate, (ii) identifying the scope of the community in 
our study of the relationship between the locality and the centre and (iii) 
understanding the nature and political significance of unity and/or conflicts 
at the local level.
0,D,Powell argues that in the relationship between patrons and clients, 
an interchange of non comparable goods and services is of profound importance. 
See 3.D.Powell, op, cit. p, 412,
2
The names of the communities - Bonny, Okrika, etc, - refer to both the 
people and their respective localities. In this section, a discussion on 
the community will be made for purposes of greater clarity in relation to 
the 'units' which constitute the locality or community. In later pages it 
will also become apparent that the concepts of developmental and protective 
communalism are related to the theme; 'benefit for the community',
3
F or some notion of the community which is applicable to the modern 
metropolitan world* see R.L.UJarren, 'Towards a reformulation of community 
theory' in Human Organisation Vol. XU, 1957,
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At the core of the Rivers State rural society is the village (liiioama).
comprising a group of patrilineal, and sometimes matrilineal, kin,Kinship
ties play a crucial role in the social and political relations of the
villagers. Thus the unity of these kinsmen and the stability of the
village^ is always proclaimed by the elders as village ideals. The village
has its own chieftaincy, and 'national god', the latter symbolises the
togetherness of the village; and in fact this togetherness is a goal shared
by virtually everyone without regard to political differences among the
villagers. Beyond the village, there is the town (Ama) which is made up
of either a group of villages or of descendants of a common ancestor. The
2
citizens speak the same dialect. And beyond the to^m, there is the clan
(Se) or county, comprising the villages and towns which speak a common 
3
dialect of Xjaw , It is at this level that the cultural differences between 
4
groups of people in the Rivers State assumes the greatest significance.
Thus one can differentiate between say, a Kalahari and an Ogoni; and the 
county.' council administration discussed in Chapter 4 is organised on this 
basis.
The patterns.of village settlements in the Ijaw Delta area are well 
discussed in (i) E.D.Alagoa A History of the Niger Delta, Ibadan. 1972 
(ii) K.O, Dike. Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1855, Oxford,1956 
& (iii) P.A.Talbot Peoples of Southern Nigeria, Vol,l London, 1926,
?he village, town and clan are not only significant social units; they 
are physical discrete entities with established boundaries. Again, each 
unit has a distinctive name, usually known by the name of an ancestor*
3
The Ijaws are typical riverine groups which form the cream of the Rivers 
State society. They may therefore be used as models of analysis for other 
groups in the State,
^An ethnographic analysis follows in Chapter 2,
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Every has certain basic structures and institutions such as 
Amanyanabo chieftaincies (See Chapter 5), Iria ceremonies and Oru 
traditional shrines and festivities^. Besides, the ^  has a common god; 
for example Fenibeso is the Okrika god while Akaso is the god of the 
Kalabaris; and beyond these gods are a number of 'primal forces which were 
there before the gods camé' , These include Amatemeso (city creating 
destiny) and Amakiri (city earth). All citizens of the are also expected 
to observe other prescribed taboos of the group. In fact these religious 
and traditional beliefs and practices represent the notion of the permanence 
of the _Se. Indeed, they represent the very character or living spirit of 
each group, while the destiny and aspirations of the group may be said to 
depend on them.
But although these traditional symbols, shrines and spirits are the
basic unifying forces at the clan level, yet as a community, the clan is
not a homogeneous unit, as my previous discussion has shown. Besides, each
unit has its own interests - both political and economic - though sometimes
there might be a convergence of interests among the units, depending on
their needs at any point in time (See Chapter 5), In this respect, the
average Rivers State citizen belongs not to one but to three communities of
origin (the village, town and clan). That is, there are 'communities'
within the community; there are concentric circles of communalism. Therefore 
communal ^
^identities based on the clan, town and village exist side by side; the
^Festivities in which the group strengthens itself against the hazards of 
the future and those of other groups,
2 *
Version of the elders and chiefs,
3
A.C. Smock 'The NCNC and Ethnic Unions in Biafra' op, cit, offers a 
stimulating discussion of the different levels of communal identities in 
(Ylbaise, and the competition among groups for development and patronage.
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village being a more primary 'ethnic group* than the town, and the town 
more primary than the clan.
As a consequence of the superimposition of inclusive communal identities 
on more primary ones, the ordinary citizen or patron could at any time 
identify himself or his interests as belonging to one of three levels of 
'ethnic* communities. In some- situations, however, villages and towns join 
together in defence of some common political commitment (see Chapters 5 & 6)., 
In others, they organise to protect and promote the interests and prestige 
of villages and towns (See Chapter 7), It could therefore be argued that 
the people's perceptions of the content of politics matters a great deal at 
any given moment. Similarly, as the discussions in Chapters 3, 4 & 7 show, 
age grades and development committees contribute money for and execute 
development projects at one or all of the three levels where community unions 
exist. Again, because of these multiple identities, patrons organise their 
followings and carry out their activities at any of these three levels, 
depending on their interests at any point in time (See Chapters^S & 6),
Hence Rivers State politicians depend a great deal on communal solidarity 
to ensure their political survival. No doubt, in terms of political support, 
sentiments are most easily mobilised at the village and town levels, given 
the deep fundamental unities at these levels.
At the state level too, for both the patron and the average citizen, the 
relative political salience of each communal reference shifts according to 
the changing political situation. Hence though the political conflicts
^Tha Fiberesima/Kiri/Oamabo and Biriye/Oamabo rivalries explain the 
factional bases of politics in the locality.
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between the Konijus and Tubonijus in Okrika (See Chapter 5) are expressed
in direct personal attack and erupt into physical violence, at the Port
Harcourt level, they present a common front to complain about Kalahari
and Nembe domination. The point is that this goal of clan unity emerges
clearly when the citizens of the clan perceive themselves as facing the 
2
outsiders and the larger Port Harcourt world around them. Obviously, in 
the Port Harcourt world where several communities comnete for political 
rewards, it becomes necessary for the patron to protect his clan identity
3
and interests. Hence though the factional bases of politics may be strong 
at the home front, at the Port Harcourt level, there are realignments in 
factional membership. Therefore it is clear that the stability of the 
Rivers State political system lies in ad hoc, ever shifting alignments at 
different levels of the society.
COMMUNALISM,
Besides the relationship between patrons and clients, and the application 
of the concept of community in this work, there is another important theme, 
extensively discussed by both Smock and liJolpe in relation to the Ibos, which 
will be reflected in this work. This theme has to do with the politics of
Spiro makes a different remark about factionalism in a smaller community, 
Yeigyi. He says that despite the bitterness which characterised the 
relationships between factions in Yeigyi, it never erupted into physical 
violence; rather it was expressed in withdrawal and avoidance. See IY1,E* 
Spiro 'Factionalism and Politics in Village Burma' in (Yl,3,Swartz op,cit, 
pp 401—20,
2
U/olpe, op,cit, argues that the Ibos seemed particularly adept at closing 
ranks and combining against the outsiders,
3
For a comparative work on the attributes of factions, see R,W.Nicholas, 
Political Systems and the distribution of power. Association of Social 
Anthropologists. Monograph 2* Tavistock.London, 1966,
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communalism at the centre and the locality. Since the concept of
communalism will be discussed later on in this chapter, it will suffice at
this stage to stress that among the Rivers people, as among the Ibos, there
are deep fundamental unities at the community level.
Having referred to the works of Smock and liiolpe in relation to
communalism, and shown that the concept is useful for an understanding of
Rivers State politics both at the local and state levels, I shall now discuss
how the concept will be applied in this work.
In this study the concept will be applied largely in the same way as
Melson^ and lUolpe applied it in their study of Nigerian politics,
2
Communalism refers to the political assertiveness of groups which have
three salient characteristics. First,their membership comprises people
who have a common culture, language and identity. The members are bound
together by felt ties of kinship^ or contiguity; and so they communicate^
more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of their
group, than with the outsider - as discussed in relation to the community.
In short, in terms of identity and communication at the state level, members
5
of the group constitute a distinct 'cultural section* • Secondly, as (Ylelson
^See R.Tflelson & H.Uiolpa, 'Modernisation and the politics of communalism:
A theoretical perspective^in A PS R Vol.64 1970 pp, 1112-1130,
2
In their studies, U/olpe and Tflelson referred mostly to the larger ethnic 
groups such as Yorubas, Ibos and Hausas, But in this work, the groups 
referred to,are the Ijaw ethnic minorities (Rivers people) in the former 
Eastern Nigeria.
3The kinship factor is also important in Smock's definition of the ethnic 
group. See A,C,Smock, Ibo Politics Cambridge, Mass, 1971. p,4,
^For a discussion of the "complementarity of communication" see Karl Deutsch, 
Nationalism and Social Communication Cambridge. 1953, p,71,
^In their book, Structure and Conflict in Nigeria 1960-1966 London. 1973, 
K.Post and M,Vickers use the term 'cultural sections' for the Ibos and 
Yorubas, I have applied this term in a more elastic sense.
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and Ulolpa have described it, their membership encompasses "the full range 
of demographic divisions within the wider society and provides for a
network of groups and institutions extending throughout the individual's
1 ‘ 2 
entire life cycle". Thirdly, within the group there are differences
3in wealth, status and power. Thus depending on the position occupied by 
the individuals in the group, some are more functional to the welfare of 
the group than others.
In order to understand the means by which groups become politically 
assertive, as shown in the characteristics of such groups, certain points 
should be made. In Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, the levels of 
identification of the individual in the society are well known. First and 
foremost, an individual belongs to a native place - the village,town or 
clan. In the native place, some particular cultural practices help to 
strengthen the individual's ties with the community ~ these ties which 
Clifford Geertz refers to as having an 'unaccountable absolute import' and 
the'primordial sentiments'^. Even immigrants^ in Nigerian cities are known
^R.Melson & H, Wolpe, op,cit, p,U12,
2
In this work, differences in the group based on wealth, status and power 
will not be discussed in terms of the concept of class, largely because of 
its association with Marxism and the inherent sharp conflicts in society, 
What this work suggests is that there are 'social divisions' in the Rivers 
State arising out of common social, economic and political conditions that 
definitely determine or at least influence each individual's status and 
position in the society,
3
For example, compared with the chiefs and elders, the greater role which 
the patrons play in community development (See Chapters 3-6) could be traced 
to the fundamental differences in status and power,
^ See C,Geertz, op,cit, p.109,
5
H,UJolpe has described the strong attachment of Ibos in Port Harcourt to 
their communities of origin, hence the formation of Ibo improvement unions. 
See H.Wolpe. op.cit.
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to have strong ties not only with their kinsmen in the new towns, but with 
their native places, Busia's analysis of the individuals ties with hi:s 
'kinsmen* aptly summarises the strong bonds which unite the group; - 
the solidarity of the group has deep foundation"^. Indeed, this solidarity 
has a deep foundation, hence the emergence of numerous local improvement 
and welfare unions in Nigerian cities is attributed largely to the interest 
which Nigerian migrants have taken in the welfare of their native territories. 
It is this consciousness of, and close identification with one's membership 
of the group, and the exertion of political pressures through the group
2
for its benefit which this study refers to as communalism, not tribalism ,
(Yly argument is that the manifestation of membership of this group is not 
just an emotional one, and if emotional, not naively p o . It is natural 
because it is a logical derivation of man's affection for his native place.
If what I have discussed as natural is parochialism it appears to me 
a 'parochialism of interest and need*. This is particularly applicable 
to Rivers people, and some of the reasons for this attitude are not hard 
to find, as later discussions in this work will point out. Rivers people 
have been minorities. They have learnt through a painful process to look 
at the development of their native territory as their primary responsibility: 
primary because in the past, their dépendance on the Eastern Nigerian 
government for the improvement of their underdeveloped and swampy communities
turned out to be a disappointment to them. This is the Rivers man's
3
version of self-reliance based on the community as a unit - that is, the 
community as the centre of development activities,
1
K,A. Busia, Africa in Search of Democracy, London 1967. p.11.
2
It is common for writers to refer to this kind of loyalty as tribalism,
3
It will however be discovered that in spite of the Rivers peoples belief 
in self-reliance, there is great dependence on the State government for 
benefits.
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MANIFESTATIONS OF COMMUNALISM,
Communalism, therefore, may be understood as a political strategy in
which the interests of the community, as defined and seen by the group,
are identified and protected by members of the group.
Since communalism is about the protection of group interests, I shall
at this stage discuss the different reflections or shades of communalism
in the Rivers State. For purposes of this work, two shades^ of communalism
may be identified, namely developmental and protective communalism; the
first shade manifests itself in the locality (community) while the second
is manifested at the centre (Port Harcourt). The two shades will now be
discussed in greater detail.
2
Developmental Communalism
Communalism, as applied in this context is the form which is principally 
responsible for propelling group action by helping to promote loyalty to the
Nelson & liiolpe, op.cit. identify several shades of communalism. For 
example, their term 'competitive communalism' is similar to my term 
'protective communalism'. They have also listed fourteen propositions 
which link communalism with modernisation.
2A greater part of the discussion in this work deals with protective 
rather than developmental communalism.
communal group. It is this driving force which accounts for the 
zeal underlying community development work. It motivates the different
individuals in the community (the village, town or clan) to harness their
1 2resources for the good of the community. Similarly, as community
3
councils at the three levels, or other associations thereof, service 
their respective constituents, the citizens develop a vested interest in 
their communal identities. As the local saying goes 'charity begins at 
home*, and so the members of the group accept the challenge that first and 
foremost they must develop their own community in oroer to make the 
community a more attractive place. *
In this situation, communalism is purely internal. Indeed, it is 
communalism on the home front. Therefore internal conflict is minimal, 
and, where there is conflict, appeals for unity are r.mde (see Chapter 5), 
not merely for the preservation of group culture, but because of the need 
to create an atmosphere conducive to community development. Both in 
internal and external relations, patriotism, based on the community, is the 
key note because it is at this level that the solidarity of the group has 
the deepest foundation. The local philosophy of 'one people, one destiny' 
is upheld. In brief, then, developmental communalism provides the basic
In Chapter 3, it will be seen that age grades (Setari and Ilaye Ilame) 
in the community have contributed money for the development of Okrika, 
while patrons such as Tsaro UJiwa, have also donated money for launching 
development projects in their communities,
2
H.Wolpe, op,cit, p,484 described this interest as the 'significant 
neighbourhood stimulus to community development*.
3
For an insightful discussion of the contributions of such communal 
associations in community development in west African states, see K.Little, 
West African urbanisation: A study of voluntary associations in social change, 
Cambridge, 1963, K,Little also observes that these para-communities 
(voluntary associations) are concerned with achievement and social welfare 
not only in the cities but also in the rural hinterland. In the Rivers 
State, though communal associations - for example Ilaye Ilame- serve mainly 
social and economic functions, they soon became politicised, acting as 
communal pressure groups and so led delegations to the government in matters 
concernigg’^ ®  interest of the community.
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answer to the query: why must a people unite to initiate development work,
and for what purpose?
Protective Communalism*
Given the desire of every community to promote its own development 
and given the limited economic resources of the communities in the Rivers
State, it might be expected that the people would more or less regard the
government as a distributing agent, as elsewhere in Africa, Since the 
different communities will see the Public Service as the principal arena for 
sharing public benefits, understandably, every community will seek to have a 
fair share of the state resources. Hence different communal pressures would 
be exerted in the public service arena; a public service which represents 
'Santa Claus*, It is in this respect that the centre becomes the arena for
every community to compete^ with the others for state benefits and political
rewards. Because of the different needs and interests of the different 
communities - especially at the clan level - each group must protect its 
interests not only in the locality but also at the centre.
Nelson & lUoIpe, op. cit, also argue that in a culturally plural society, 
the competition engendered by social mobilisation will tend to be defined 
in communal terms. Such competitions often lead to conflicts; and in 
Nigeria, communal conflicts, arising from inter group competitions, are 
frequent occurrences. In R, Nelson & H, i/olpe, eds, Nigeria : Modernisation 
and the politics of Communalism, East Lansing, 1974, 3, Paden 'Communal 
competition, conflict and violence in Kano' offers an excellent analysis 
of such conflicts in the former Northern Nigeria,
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Truly, because of the creation of a new state and public service, 
the people's aspirations and expectations have changed. They want and 
demand more goods (perhaps goods denied them in the former Eastern Nigeria),
It is not surprising therefore that because all the communities (the clans, 
in particular) desire precisely the same scarce resources, they are bound 
to compete for these resources^. In these competitions, the groups are bound 
to attribute one group's failure to another group's success - since the 
goods are scarce; hence the ordinary people tend to perceive their 
competitive world through communal prisms#
Conceiving the Rivers State political system in transactional terms 
in this work, the patron is the policy maker concerned in the authoritative 
allocation of benefits, while the ordinary citizens (most of whom are clients) 
are the 'spectators'. It would therefore follow that the patron who is seen
For purposes of sharing political profits in the Nigerian federation, 
it is a common experience that every ethnic group regards the other as 
an outsider. Prior to military rule in 1966, the Yoruba-Ibo-Hausa 
rivalries and conflicts would be seen largely in this perspective.
For discussions on these patterns of inter-group rivalries, see 8.3. 
Dudley, Instability and political order; Politics and Crisis in Nigeria, 
Ibadan, 1973,
3W,
by his people not only as their ambassador but as the embodiment of their
aspirations, would be expected to protect local interests in the Port
Harcourt decision-making bodies. For communalism in Port Harcourt imoinges
1 2mainly on issues related to communal interests and patronage - issues 
upon which the prestige and welfare of the competing groups depend -
3
and rarely affects routine administrative matters , It is because of this 
kind of expectation - that the patrons must maximise returns to their 
people - that the Rivers State patrons, most of whom are astute politicians 
are portrayed in this work as "parochial", "vindictive" and "arch-communalists". 
As arch-communalists, they are alleged to exploit the opportunities in the 
new state, hence communalism becomes a matter of opportunism.
Problems and Implications,
Generally, public service administrative units arc commonly accepted 
as structures in which politics is nominally absent. In short, it is 
expected that communalism will not be reflected or reproduced^ in the 
bureaucracy since the norms of the public service specifically exclude
AuWolpe 'Port Harcourt, Ibo Politics in Microcosm' op, cit, p,484, has also 
used this factor (protective communalism) to explain the apparent incongruity 
between Dumbo's (an Ijaw) political prominence in Port Harcourt on tnn one 
hand, and his political impotence within the local party (IMCNC) executive 
on the other. That is, because Dumbo was not an Ibo, in a predominantly Ibo 
settlement, he could not translate his influence into the kind of communal 
backing required in contests for higher office. In the Rivers State it will 
be seen - in Chapters 5 & 6 - that such communalistic considerations were of 
great importance in elections,
2See Chapters 5 & 6, Rivers State politicians - Biriye, Damabo and Fiberesima- 
also mobilise their different communities behind their candidacy, and their 
people view their candidacy as expressions of the group aspirations.
Electoral victories are therefore viewed as indicators of group recognition 
and power,
3For example, the routine decisions taken by Sole Authorities do not provoke 
inter communal jealousies and rivalries. Similarly when all communal 
interests are satisfied, there are no local complaints with regard to the 
arch-communalistic practices of the patrons - see Chapter 4,
^3, La Palombara has however argued that the dispute in the political system 
will be reproduced in the bureaucracy. See his work on "An Overview of 
Bureaucracy and Political Development" in Bureaucracy and Political Development 
ed, Princeton, 1965, p,15.
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political activities within the organisation.
Therefore, the official is expected to pursue one of two courses of 
action. The first is to act strictly according to public service norms.
In short, the protection of the state's interests should be the officials 
sole concern. The second course is to participate in political activities 
designed to protect his people's interests. It is true that official 
life carries with it certain kinds of organisational imperatives which 
inevitably are designed to make the official appreciate the primacy of state 
interests, as opposed to communalistic interests. Yet in the. Rivers State 
context, I have argued that the rural heritage of the official must be the 
starting point for our analysis of Port Harcourt political life. Constant 
pressures exist upon the official to use his good offices to the advantage 
of his people, hence the official norms are bound to be neglected or given 
secondary importance. Obviously, that the official norms do not count for 
very much - at least in the eye of the people - in part shows the mythical 
character of the claim to be 'above politics' which most public services 
are prone to put forward either in self-delusion or in self-defence.
The indifference to rules of political neutrality is however aggravated by 
the virulence of communal particulaisms in new states, such as Nigeria,
Curbing these communalistic particularisms appears to be a major problem 
facing new public services (see Chapter 4), Yet in the Rivers State, one 
of the key problems facing the government is that the government at local 
level is suffering the throes of general economic disenchantment following 
the high hopes of the people prior to the attainment of new statehood.
The government, it will be seen, claims to be doing its best in order to 
develop the rural communities. Yet in spite of governmental efforts and 
claims, most of the lofty expectations of the people are unrealised. On
4U,
the shoulders of the patron rests the responsibility to champion the cause
of his people. No doubt, the patron has the ability to create the
administrative universe within which he functions to meet his people's
needs. Hence in the eyes of the people, the implementation of most of
the policies pertain to conmunalised instead of impartially determined
universes - a price the patron pays for his close identification with his
community. Consequently, a dual^ system of legitimacy results - two
administrative universes, one in which the ethics of the public service are
2
kept, and the other in which these ethics are overshadowed by communalism • 
In the case of the latter, the 'completeness' with which the public service 
has bean really or allegedly politicised is not necessarily due to some 
unique quality of Rivers State politics. It stems rather from the fact 
that the centre possesses resources which eminent local political actoBs 
(patrons) want to control for the benefit of their communities, and from 
the fact that, given the particularism in the Rivers State, there are few 
or no effective ways in which either senior administrators or commissioners 
(the cabinet ministers in the military regime) can insulate or protect these 
institutions from such political incursions.
H,Bretton, op,cit, p.19 remarks that in new states, distinctions between 
public and private interests, legality and illegality, and legitimacy and 
its opposites tend to become obliterated. He adds that public service 
ethics have not yet been codified nor are they sufficiently entrenched or 
established to serve as guidelines or clear reference points of evaluation 
of public and private behaviour,
2R.Sklar offers a list of devices that the Nigerian ins used to keep power 
bribery, corruption and communalistic practices, ■ See R.Sklar 'The Federal 
Republic of Nigeria* in G,M, Carter (ed) National Unity and Regionalism in 
Eight African States, N,Y, 1966,
f/
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CHAPTER 2
THE RIVERS STATE AMD ITS PEOPLE
The community development schemes that have been launched in the 
Riyers State since the creation of states in May lp67, perhaps rank 
among the most striking events in the political history of the State*
It is significant that communities, local unions, and age sets have 
initiated (or have been encouraged to do so) such projects. The State 
Government and other arms of it have also been deeply involved, and have 
played very significant part^in directing and managing these processes of 
community change. In the six communities chosen for this study this 
aspect of development is particularly well marked because little less 
than a decade ago the Rivers people and more especially the Riverine 
people were little known. They were generally unlcnovm largely because of 
their geographical isolation (island-dv/ellers); and even the few places 
which were known because of their nearness to the hinterland were 
believed not to be involved in the processes of community change.
The neighbours of the Rivers people, the Ibos,who were unaccustomed to 
the aquatic conditions of Riverine territories believed generally that 
it was impossible to develop swamps and creeks- - the areas believed to 
be inhabited by the Rivers people. It therefore followed that because 
of these severe geographical odds, rural life -and conditions in these 
places would remain unchanged; that is, the areas were doomed to remain 
perpetually undeveloped in spite of what efforts and resources are 
mobilised in fighting against these forces.
The Rivers State is a society divided geographically, politically, 
culturally and socially, thus giving rise to all forms of cleavage of 
which the dominant are political (mostly sub-communal and communal) 
and cultural, let because of the new statehood which has thrown up new 
challenges and has instilled some feeling of unity among certain groups 
which hii^to had remained disunited, both the communities and the
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(^ .-■v'ox'iiment have tried to redouble their efforts in developing the rural 
communities, Nevertheless, the geographical and economic difficulties 
still remain even though they are reduced in number and size because of 
couscientious efforts on the part of the people. These are the forces 
in combination with other political, historical, and cultural elements 
which this chapter will discuss in some generalised context*
GEOGRAPHICAL
The Rivers State^ of Nigeria created by a Federal Government Decree
No. 14 of 27 hay 1967, and with a population of 1,544,314 (1965 Nigerian
Census) occupies an area of 7,000 square miles. This territory is a part
of what is usually referred to in very broad terras as Nigeria's Niger Delta;
2
that is, as part of the Niger water-zone, A recent study established
that this Niger water is discharged to the sea through only a limited number
of Nigerian coastal Rivers, namely: the Nun River, 26%; the Ramos River,
24/; the Sengana River, 13/; the Forcados River, 13/; the Brass River, 8/;
and the Dodo River, 6%, Following this map of water discharge, the present
extent of a large part of the Rivers State territory (excluding parts of the
hinterland,areas), as part of the Niger River zone, lies between the Forcados
River on the West and the Brass River to the East. This coastal region is
3
the heartland of Ijaw settlement; and it is also the area occupied by four 
communities - Okrika, Kalahari, Bonny and Nembe - out of the six major ones 
with which this study is concerned.
In broad terms the entire Delta Zone is divisible physically, into 
three belts, namely:
»^See map overleaf,
2Nedeco, The Waters of- the Niger Delta : Report on an Investigation, 
the HaguCy 19Sr7"p7ll«
3
A name come;only used to identify these Riverine people.
^Nedeco, Report on Niger Delta Development, the Hague, I96O. pp. 6-10
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(i) the sandy beach ridges 
(ii) the salt water swamp and 
(iii) the fresh water swamp area.
But ecologically the State as it is constituted at present (1975) can be 
divided into four zones;
(1) the sandy beach zone - such as Bonny area;
(2) the fresh water swamp zone
(3) the salt water swamp zone - for example, the Kalahari,
Okrika and Nembe areas;
(4) the dry land zone - the two hinterland groups; the Ogbas 
and the Ogonis.
In the 1970 Administrative structure of the state, there were five divisions 
in the state - Ahoada, Port Harcourt, Brass,Ogoni and Degeraa. The hinterland 
communities are the principal inhabitants of Ahoada and Port Hartcourt 
divisions and each of these occupies an area of 1,977 and I7 square miles
respectively while the typical Riverine communities inhabit Brass and Degeraa
divisions, each occupying an area of 3,330 and 1,230 square miles respectively. 
The Ogonis who inhabit Ogoni division with* an area of 404 square miles are 
largely^hinterland but partly riverine. The zonal and divisional (sub divided 
into 17 counties) demarcations Correspond to, and largely reflect, differences 
in the nature of the riverine water (hinterland soil conditions, as well as 
types of occupation and the vegetation in the area). Similarly, they ore 
also the major belts along which different (sub-cultural units) patterns of 
community lives could be identified.
The villages which lie in the sandy beach zone consist of a number of 
small coastal islands which lie on a higher and drier piece of land. They 
vary from less than 100 feet to about 3 miles in width; and they are about 
the youngest settlements. Because of the presence of fresh water ponds 
(originating from rain) in most of these villages, it is not uncommon to find 
fresh water vegetation. These isolated villages were, and are, centres of
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high population density and in fact in the 19th century these were the _ 
settlements (especially benny ) wliicri grew in fame and importance as they 
were .placed at strategic points for internal and external commerce* On 
the other hand, the ‘red angrove‘ communities in the salt water swamp zone 
form a wider belt of between 20 and 23 miles. These areas are predominantly 
low-lying and population density is lowest here* In terms of commerce, 
these settlements did not enjoy the advantage which their sandy beach 
counterparts did*
Nevertheless, in spite of the contrasting picture given between these 
two regions, they share some similarities* A large part of these two 
Riverine divisions inhabited by four of the communities to which reference 
has already been made, constitute about 66/ of the total territory of the state, 
These stretches of land and water form a compact area of mangrove swamps, 
estuaries, creeks and waterways which break through to the sea and rivers*
Being riverine, their surroundings are damp and humid. Perhaps the following 
late 19th century account by Mary Kingsley, even though exaggerated, gives a 
more vivid picture of this mangrove region which in earlier times was 
notorious for its unliealthiness;
"I believe the great swamp region of the Bight of Biafra 
(referring to the Niger Delta) is the greatest in the world 
and that in its immensity ^nd gloom it has a grandeur equal 
to that of the Himalayas,""
Most of the bank'^  of these waterways are often flooded at high tide,
especially those in the' salt water swamp zone. In times of such flood most
of the neighbouring land areas are inundated. Therefore communication in
these areas is exceedingly difficult, and small canoes which are not well
designed for negotiating surf are used by villagers for their everyday
^The area in particular became an important navigable waterway*
It therefore controlled the volume of Atlantic commerce.
^Quoted in K. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta (I85O-I883) 
London. 1936. p. 19®
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fishing and transport needs* These seasonal floods occur with very- 
devastating results - such as rendering people homeless and destroying 
swamp crops. The condition in the hinterland areas will now be examined« 
I It is difficult to argue that in comparison with their riverine 
counterparts, the geographical conditions of "khe hinterland regions are 
substantially better. Excepting the big towns, such as Port harcourt 
the state capital, where fairly modern and convenient transport routes 
and systems are in operation, in most of the rural areas the transport 
network is poor as there are only small feeder roads which connect the 
different villages and other main transport centres. In describing the 
poor transport network, and in comparing these with the general transport
system in western countries, Sir Harry Johnson wrote. "Hiero are hardly
■ 1. ■ .any roads existing in the Delta." ’ It is within this complex communication 
framework that the markets and resources of both the hinterland and Riverine 
communities are linked with one another.
These geographical differences with the consequent cultural differences 
and transport difficulties between the different parts of the state have 
affected movements of the people from one community to another. Inter 
village mobility (of people and goods) has been severely limited and 
especially among the islanders each community has to a considerable extent 
developed separatist tendencies - a kind of communalistic feeling typical 
of island dwellers. Hence to the average villager, the development of the 
village is 'the primary responsibility of the people and every citizen, 
particularly those highly placedjj^ i^n the Public Service, is expected to use 
his position and resources to bring benefits to his people*' Therefore almost 
every community - including those which speak the same or identical dialect - 
sees itself as distinct^ from the other and the interpretation* of
^F.0,-84/1882, Memo on the British Protectorate of the Oil 
Rivers, Part 11.
2 m..#-
Communication with the elders and chiefs.
For details refer to Chapter 5, 3 and 7.
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government programmes and policies (with special reference to the
allocation of government projects to communities) is done within these local
horizons. It has become a common practice for local people to assign
'profit and loss'^ values to central government decisions; that is, projects
which are located in any community (the community which is receiving the
profit) are seen by others (the non-benefiting communities) as a loss either
in the short or long run. Therefore almost every issue apart from being a
bone of contention, provokes local rifts and rivalry, (See chapters 6 and 7),
Much of local politics operates within this nexus.
Nevertheless, these isolationist and separatist tendencies have also been
partly responsible for generating and stimulating a spirit of competition
among different sections and communities for embarking on separate local 
2
projects. Consequently this politicking, has been a kind of disunity which
3encourages some measure of diversification in the type of projects sponsored
by different groups or communities. To take an example, since 1972 (the rural
development year) communities which are interested in executing self help
projects have competed for state government grants. Between 1972 and 1973,
many communities which qualified for state government grants spent their money
on town hall projects (see Chapter 7) largely because the town hall was
regarded as a status symbol for the community. In short, because most of
the communities had a sense of 'showmanship', only communities of culture
and distinction could build town halls. However, in 197^ some villages in
4
Ogoni area decided to build markets and libraries on the grounds that the 
two projects represented the new status symbol. Since 1974, the Kalabaris
^Ibid.
^See Chapters 3, 4 and 7
3
Interview with members of the local planning committees.
September 1973 and September 1974.
^In Chapter.4, it will be seen that the Ogonis in particular attach 
great importance to building local markets, partly because of its 
economic value and partly because it was, and is, a local prestige 
project.
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and Okrikans have competed with the Ogonis, and it is the ash;' tion of 
almost every community to build the new prestige projects. Hence todcy 
there is rarely any other thing that ’fills the heart of the average Hivers 
raan^’than building either a library or a market for his commuai by.
On the administrative side, because of these harsh goorpapvslcal 
conditions there are tremendous difficulties in the establishment of 
administrative organs in the very remote villages, Similarly, the 
poor communication and inadequate transport facilities render field 
administration and the establishment of other government-sponsored projects 
a difficult task (as will be shown in Chapters 4 and 7). Yet these problems 
do not invalidate the fact that communication will also determine the extent . 
and practicability of decentralisation (and the management of community 
development projects) irrespective of whether the government wants it or not*
And under these conditions the tendency is to over-concentrate government 
projects and offices in those towns such as Port.harcourt, and the old 
divisional headquarters of Ahoada, Degerna, Bori and Brass - where transport 
and communication links are less hazardous. Indeed, because of these facilities 
in the urban and quasi-urban centres, these centres have become the homes or 
the permanent residential places of most of thé educated people (senior public 
servants and company executives) in the state. It is therefore increasingly 
felt in the state that much of the government expenditure is concentrated on 
such projects that satisfy the interests of the elite in the cities^ and 
consequently while urban development is being accelerated, the development 
of the rural areas has been remarkably slow.
However, a crucial factor - geographical hazards - retards the general 
, social and economic development of the State, Hwæiip and creek development is
1Prestige projects like television, electricity and hotels are either 
located or earmarked for siting in the cities.
See the 1st Development Plan *1970-1974’ of the Hivers State,
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by no means an easy task and this in itself is a serious constraint on 
development; yet those geographical hazards necessitate the mobilisation 
of resources for general development.
The Rivers State is predominantly rural. Apart from Port Harcourt,
the Stat,e. capital, and perhaps two other divisional headquarters (Bori and
Ahoada), the remaining are rural communities. All these rural areas, covering
.over two thirds of the state territory and inhabited by over two thirds of the
state population need massive development. Furthermore, two factors of
production - capital and labour - are in short supply largely because of the
ravages of the last civil war in Nigeria, Yet the two- factors of production
are necessary for the acceleration of extensive economic and social changes.
To talce an example, the launching of development projects in largo numbers
poses a serious problem. Many of the riverine townslike Oporoma and Ilembe 
1are very distant, and the routes are winding and tortuous from the State 
headquarters'. The distance between Port Parcourt and Hembe is about l60 
nautical miles and the tidal waves are often rough and so constitute a serious 
threat to small canoe paddlers. In the.absence of adequate and fast sea 
transport, transportation costs'of project materials to such places are 
exorbitant and inevitably far higher than similar transportation on land routes, 
ECONOMIC
31 3The major occupations of the local people are fishing and farming.
People in the riverine areas, like Okrika, Nembe, Kalahari and Bonny are
1
It is a two-day journey from Port Harcourt to Nembe, by hand-pulled 
canoe; and to several Ijaw villages it is a longer journey.
deduced from reports of an occupational survey of Pastern Nigeria in 
I96O; allowance being made for the increased employment of Rivers 
people in their own public and private sectors since I967, See also 
Tilman and Cole, eds., The Nigerian Political Scene, London, 1962 
pp. I7I-I76 for particulars about tic Economic and occupational 
breakdown of L'astern Nigeria, No corresponding survey has however 
been carried out in the Rivers State,
In a 1950 assessment, about 7.9/^ and 77K of the tax payers in Kalahari 
and Okrika respectively \/ere fishermen. See G,G, Robinson, Report of 
the Incjuiry into the Okrika-Kalabari ■ Dispute. Lnugu. 1930, pp. 22 6 24,
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predominantly fishermen, while those in the hinterland areas ~ the Ogbas 
and Ogonis - are farmers. Only about 7-10/0 of the people are employed in
the public and private sectors. From this occupational break-down, it is
/
cle|ar that the geographical location of the different communities has
considerably influenced the types of occupational practices in the state.
In the hinterland communities, especially in Ahoada division where
farming is the main occupation of the people, the farm products - including
food and cash crops such as yams, plantain, oil and kernel, cocoa, rubber,^
timber, etc., - account for approximately one-third of the farm harvest of
the state. In Brass division there is some rice farming in the Abobiri
and O|,oibiri ai’eas. The bulk of these farm products are internally consumed
(within the State) and there is not much commercial value for these products,
as the farming is neither done on an extensive scale nor is production high
because of the subsistence practices. These poor and subsistence occupational
practices more or less confirm the old impression that the Delta has a soil
too poor 'to produce a ton of oil';^ there are however varying degrees of
soil fertility ranging from moderate to poor. Nevertheless, some smoked
2fish and salt are exchanged with the people of neighbouring states for bulk 
foodstuff and agricultural tools.
In spite of its economic value there is still not much fishing in the 
open sea, the bulit of the fishing being carried out on the bars of estuaries 
and creeks. Like the revenue from farming which is slim, the small catch 
from the government owned fishing trawlers does not really earn sufficient
3
revenue for the state. In terms of revenue, government reliance on fishing 
and farming is therefore bound to be of little significance. Notwithstanding
As Macgregor put it in I832. Quoted in K, Dike. op. cit, p. 19.
2
G.J, Jones. The Trading Btates of the Oil Rivers. London, 1963* p« 3<
3
See Chapter 7 for details of state revenue and expenditure.
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these poor a y'ècultura.1 (fishing and farming) conditions, about 80/b of 
the labour force in the state is still engaged in agricultural activities. 
Agriculture - including new prospects for mineral oil - constitutes about 
75t' of the source of the State's contribution to the .national G.D.P.
The heavy .reliance on these sectors makes it almost imperative that the 
economic growth of the State will depend largely on improvements in 
fishing, farming and oil prospecting. Yet because of three primary factors) 
namely, the poor soil conditions, and the prevalent fishing and farming 
practices, the prospects for increased revenue and higher agricultural 
productivity are not very encouraging. And as long as the revenue yielding 
prospects are not very i)romising, the tools of deficit financing had (and have) 
to be used by the State government ..in meeting its needs. In recognition of 
these factors, government budgets (votes for community development projects) 
had to be ’cautious’ in the early years of the State’s existence.
The third factor, historical and political, which has contributed heavily 
to the state's importunate economic conditions, was the civil war in Nigeria, 
The civil war of 196? coincided with the time when the state had been newly 
created and was_ in its years of survival. The war broke out in July I967, 
barely two months after the state had been created. Because of economic and 
administrative difficulties, worsened by the political uncertainties of the 
time which threatened the existence of the State, the State administration 
operated in Lagos (outbade its Port Harcourt headquarters) under ’exile’ 
conditions. In such war circumstances, an ’on-the-spot’ planning of the 
State economy was an impossible task* These factors also led to an increased 
dependence of the State on Federal revenue and facilities. The war period, 
above all, vastly disturbed and damaged the economy of both the Rivers people 
and their government. Yet the ruins of war needed a tremendous amount, of 
resettlement of persons, as well as a reactivation of economic and social 
services - all these tasks required much money which neither the government 
nor the people could afford at that time. The problem therefore was to find
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a balance between needs and resources without which a realisation of 
state objectives (econoüiic, social and political) was difficult.
The grim economic portents have, however, been offset by new economic 
dimensions. Today, there are several oil fields in the state (discovered 
sometime in 1957 in OloiU/i regions; and the recent ones in Ogoni and 
Ahoada divisions) and at present the Rivers State is the richest oil State 
in Nigeria, producing about 60^ 1 of Nigeria's mineral oil.^ The State 
therefore derives substantial revenue from these sources through the federal 
government. The tax proceeds from industrial and commercial activities 
which have been revived since the end of the v/ar have reinforced the 
revenue from oil. It could be argued too# that the recovery of people from 
the ruins of the last Civil War and the resultant increased employment (which 
would enable people to pay more tax) in the state have improved the sources 
of private and state revenue. The recent establishment of a Pan-African Banlt 
(started with a capital of £0.5 million in 1971) a lottery Board and commission 
and such other commercial enterprises, have as their major objectives, .the 
stimulation of sufficient capital for development projects. It is probably 
premature to probe the results of these investments.
Against the foregoing background and conditions, the state government 
is looked upon as the prime mover, initiator, and stimulator of many local 
and state development schemes because as in almost every developing country, 
government is believed to have resources which are almost unlimited or. at 
least richer than the local communities. There are virtually no limits to 
the services which the State governncnt is called upon (or expected) to 
render or encourage. Yet the economic resources of the State government are 
limited. It will therefore be difficult for the state govorncicnt to provide
^In 1973, oil accounted for about 80^ of the total value of 
Nigeria's exports. See West Africa, 8th April 19?^H p» 399-
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for the communities the range and quality of social and. economic services 
required by contemporary conditions of rapid change especially in a society 
where the peoples demands and appetite for the 'good things of life' have 
increased.
In such situations of scarce or limited resources, the tendency has 
been for the different communities, such as the Kalabaris and Okrikaagto 
compete intensely using all kinds of political and administrative manouvres- 
for getting more of these resources. In this network of competition, local 
dign&taries - whom we shall call 'communal patrons’^  in this study - have 
been involved (or believed to be involved) using their positions and influence 
in the public service for diverting public service resources to benefit 
their respective communities. It is in this respect that cbmmunalism in a 
Public Service context could be seen as a significant factor in, and as a , 
pragmatic instrument for, developing the different communities in the state. 
CULTUML AMD LINGUISTIC
Until the recent Administrative Reogranisation Edict of May 1973 which 
divided the Rivers State into l8 Administrative units, the State was made up 
of five divisions. namely^Ahoada, Brass, Degerna, Ogoni and Port Harcourt.
Each of these divisions, peopled by gi’oups with different cultural backgrounds, 
represented the broad framework of ethnic divisions*, even though within this 
very framework a fui'ther subdivision is still permissible. While Brass and 
Degerna divisions are inhabited by people of the typical Delta (Riverine) 
communities who ai'e commonly referred to as Ijaws, the principal inhabitants 
of Ahoada divisions are the Ikwerres, Engonxiis, Ekpeyes and Ogbas. At the 
other pole, Ogoni division is principally inhabited by the Ogonis and Eleraes 
(Mbolij; vdiile Port Harcourt division by virtue of its cosmopolitan status’-is
'The concept of patronage will be discussed in Chapter 3*
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inhabited by people from all ethnic groups in the State. However, its
(Port Harhourt) principal inhabitants are the Ikwerres and Okrikans who live
in the outskirt villages and towns of Port Harcourt city.
Therefore, the Rivers people do not constitute one ethnic group,*
Like other similar groups in Africa which live together as a result of
sheer geographical and political necessity (other than reasons of cultural
similarity) the Rivers people are not very easy to define or categorise in
cultural terms. Using language as the major cultural criterion of definition,
the Ijaws come closest to being the largest ethnic group in the state.
However, language as a unit of definition has severe limitations^ in this
context because it is with some difficulty that one can identify a language 
2
called the Ijaw • Secondly not all who are beiievod to be speaking Ijaw do
3admit that they are Ijaws - this is the claim of Okrikas and Kalabaris in 
particular, A basic question therefore is: How can the Ijaw language be
identified? What is perhaps more appropriate is to refer to groups of 
dialects within the larger network of what is usually called the Ijaw since 
most of the Riverine people identify their speech^ as a dialect of Ijaw, 
the degree of mutual intelligibility between dialects varying widely.
There are also some sub groups such as those on the fringe regions 
of the East, West and North of the Delta who consider themselves 
Ijaw (more on historical than ethnic basis) but at present speak 
non-Ijaw languages. See Kay Williamson's work on Ijaw dialects,
2
The Ijaw language is also spoken by groups outside the Rivers State,
Some Kalabari-Okrika debates on (a) 'Who are the Ijaws?' and (b) 'We 
are not real Ijaws in manners and outlook'.
For summaries of these debates, see the following:
(i) Nigerian Tide (The Government Newspaper) Hlay-Duly 1974 editions 
(il) Morning Star, Port Harcourt. July-August 1974 editions,
^E.J. Alagoa. A History of the Niger Delta, Ibadan, 1972, pp 14-17 
Compare with Kay lUilliamson's work ("Language of the Niger Delta" 
Nigerian Magazine, No,97, 1968, pp 123-30) on Ijaw dialects.
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Although the Ijaw language has probably not been carefully and
painstakingly studied^ by many African linguists, the materials available
confirm a linguistic heterogeneity within a broad circle of the same ■
2 ■language ™ a kind of diversity in imity. According to Greenberg , the Ijaw
language forms a group within the Kwa branch of the higer-Congo family of
African languages. And while earlier ethnographers, such as Talbot^ divided
the Ijaw into three groups; Lower, Western and Kalahari, contemporary ones 
4
like Horton have divided them into Western, Némbe and Eastern, In-all these, 
the classifications are apparently based on linguistic criteria (the major 
dialects being Okrika, Kalahari, Ibani, Brass and Kolokurna, and even within 
these there are several sub-dialects within each group) and these do not 
even correspond exactly with the present administrative division in the State, 
In more recent times the complexity of tlie language map has been further 
recognised. For example, Professor Kay Williamson increased the linguistic 
classifications' into seven sub-groups: SouthfV/estern, North-Western, North
Central, South Central, South-Eastern, North-Eastern and North-Eastern-Central. 
In these there are some dialects which serve as intermediate bridge dialects 
between sub-groups. These classifications on the Ijaw alone, which is just 
one out of many other languages in the state, complex and multiple as they are, 
do not exhaust the possibilities of further break-down. Therefore even if it 
were possible to.agree that there is the Ijaw language, some kind of hetero­
geneity would still be identified. Besides, there arc a].so other major 
dialects in the State: Khana, Mboli and Goka.ua (in the Ogoni group) ;
Ikwerre and Engenni^. Yet all these do not limit the possibility of
1-E.J. Alagoa, however, writes of the antiquity of the Ijaw language 
and calculates it to be at least 500 years distant from Ibo, Yoruba 
and Edo - a calculation which accords with the geneological age of.the 
Niger Delta itself,
^J.H. Greenberg. The Languages of Africa. Bloomington, I963
In G.I. Jones, The Trading States of the Gil Rivers, London ,1965• P* H'
4
In a work on Ijaw Art,
5Belonging to the Benue - Congo branch of the Niger-Gongo,
6  T- 4- "I* 1 j  ^ t   ^ T 1 . . "1 1 ^  r;
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the existence of more dialects^ and indeed of more sub-dialects.
These factors of language complexity and heterogeneity lead to 
several political issues and questions which this study would attempt to 
spotlight and possibly answer. The state may require able and diplomatic 
administrators - military and civil - who are capable of reconciling the 
tension and antagonisms which would ensue from the diverse ethnic and 
community demands. Such demands take three major forms: (i) local petitions
for separate local administration; (ii) each group asking for a 'fair' 
share of social and economic projects (sponsored by government) to be 
located in its area; and finally, there is the awareness on the part of 
administrators that they are different people from different ethnic or 
language groups*»who are at Headquarters to administer the affairs of the 
State. In managing the affairs of the state, a crucial question is then posedr 
Where does the loyalty of the administrator go - to his people or state or 
both - and in what circumstances, and with what consequences?
SOCIAL PRACTICES AHD CUSTOM
By modern standards, the population of the Rivers State is largely 
illiterate. For example, in 1955i only about l6f; of the population of 
Eastern Nigeria (the Rivers state being a part of it) was literate - literacy 
understood as the completion of a basic primary school education. Of the 
literate population, only about one twentieth had acquired an education 
equivalent to or higher than the secondary school level. In the same year 
only a quarter of.those aged between ?-l4 years were enrolled in primary 
schools. These figures when compared with the administrative unit known 
today as the Rivers State do not give a true reflection of the situation 
because there was an imbalance between the Ibo areas and those of the 
minorities - the Rivers State and South Eastern State were popularly known 
as the minority areas. The Ibo areas were far more educationally
1advanced than their Riverine and other minority neighbours. Tlie Riverine 
geographical problems which helped to frustrate social imd economic 
development, and the poverty of the people made it difficult for both the 
pecjple and the government to establish many schools to enable people to 
acquire education on a large scale.
In an earlier v/ork on the Rivers State, 1 had outlined some of these 
factors as follows:
"the establishment of educational institutions (schools and 
colleges) in large numbers poses a serious problem. Many of 
the Riverine towns like Hembe are very distant from the major 
cities. Teachers and students are therefore not likely to be 
attracted or lured to teach or attend schools in these areas 
because of inadequate and unsatisfactory transport on the 
rough seas and the absence of social amenities in most of 
these townsT^
With the creation of a separate state for the Rivers people, the 
educational backwardness has however been slightly improved because of a 
redoubled and conscientious effort by the people and the government in 
three major directions: (i) the establishment of more schools (see 
Appendix 1) and a liberal education policy which reduces the school fee 
burden on parents; (ii) the award of more scholarships to indigenes as 
a kind of incentive to people (see Appendix 2).and (iii) the intensification 
of public campaigns on the need and value for more education.
For example, until the creation of the Rivers State there was only 
one government owned post primary institution sited in the state 
and there were only a few mission and other voluntary agency 
.schools compared with many in the Ibo areas. There is also a 
strong local belief that the Eastern Nigerian Government 
deliberately neglected the Rivers areas in matters of 
development - as a kind of reprisal measure for the political 
■support which the majority of the people refused to give to the 
government. The matter is however^ debatable,
2
L.A.B, lyagba. "Establishing the Rivers State Public Hervicc, 
1967-71" (11A dissertation at the University of Ife, Nigeria). 
February 1972, p. 5*
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However, though there has been a shortage of supply of functional 
high level manpower (see Appendix 3) in the state, old politicians, senior 
administrators and the local mass of the people have been aware that both 
human and physical capital are indispensable for the economic growth of the 
state. In 'support of this, ÿhere is also a long standing tradition tunong 
the Rivers people to prize and honour educational attainments in every 
community; and several communities like the Kalabarisand Okrikans refer 
to themselves as superior to others (for example superior to Bonny, the 
Ogbas and Ogonis) if they have more of their people educated and so 
occupying distinguished posts in the public and private enterprises.
This partly explains the Kalahari and Okrika claims for superiority
and also the strong belief among tho other groups that the Kalabaris,
1Okrikans and Nembes who hold most of the prominent posts in the Public 
Service are using their positions and influence to secure more state 
benefits for their, people in situations where several groups and 
communities are competing for limited resources. As far as these complainw^Is^ 
are concerned, the use of such influence for such purposes is an exercise 
of protective communalisra. On the other htmd, these factors of educational 
imbalance among groups (as they affect inter-community competition for posts 
and projects) and the great premium placed on education (because of its 
attendant advantages) do. at present help to stimulate the interest of the
different communities in schemes of general development.
^For example, the Military Governor is a Nembe; the Head of the
Civil Service a Kalahari, and more of the Permanent Secretaries
and senior officials in government are Nembe and Kalahari people.
' ' f/gI'N _ '
2
Double standards. When a decision is in favour of a community, 
there are usually no complaints; if not, there are allegations 
of parochialism and nepotism.
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There are also some other social and cuetoraary practices which have 
affected development efforts at the local level» Many communities in the 
state (especially in some parts of Ogoni land where the institution of 
clan headship is still highly respected by the people) could reasonably 
be described as republican and more or less egalitarian in nature. In 
such places local administration is principally carried out through 
locally organised family and clan Councils, hence traditional power is 
diffused among elders and Councils whoso decisions and sanctions could 
hardly be enforced throughout tho. territory without the consent and 
approval of the majority of the people. This is not to deny, however, that 
there are local chieftaincies or councils as in Kalahari and Ogb&Aland 
which exercise some considerable control over the lives of their respective 
villages in terms of the authority they exercise; but basically in these 
places the liberty of tho individual to organise, plan and think for himself 
has not been sacrificed for the saisie of the larger group or Council, 
r Primacy has therefore been given to the contribution of every individual 
(as against people of ascribed'status) to the political and social life 
of the community. *
In essence then, paradoxically, both the community and the individual 
function as two separate units and yet they are not exclusive of each other. 
The individual maintains his independence, while the community still retains 
and enforces strong sentiments of community solidarity among its members.
Both the individual and the community play their part in such an atmosphere 
so that each is given sufficient opportunity to develop and strengthen itself 
for the benefit of both. This is a result of the maximum advantage which 
each makes use of in situations of limited economic resources. Therefore, 
the willingness to work for the benefit of the group stems largely from • 
these two mutual reinforcements. Furthermore, there is that general 
Rivero philosophy of group cohesiveness and pride in the vitality and 
strength of traditional institutions. This philosophy is also reinforced
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by the Rivers peoples belief in the immediate good of the community even 
where such a belief involves sacrificing some of the interests of the 
individual for that of the community, such as when the individual disagrees 
with the development objectives of the larger community.
There are also local beliefs that the ’national spirits and gods' 
of the different communities {for example, Ogidiga for Nembe^ Ikiba for 
Bonny; Fe&ibeso for Okrika; and Akaso for Kalahari) are constantly 
protecting and helping 'good citizens' to make progress in all endeavours of 
life. Obviously, good citizens are those who work for the good of the 
community; and by implication the 'bad citizen' (the qualification is 
self-evident) would never be blessed, and in extreme cases they may be 
struck by thunder or by some evil forces invoked by the city deity.
All these beliefs have a considerable impact on the life and attitude of many 
people including the highly educated. Hence in the state and provincial 
capitals where most of the educated people have migrated to, many people 
from the different communities irrespective of their status*,, still retain 
their strong bonds of togetherness. This has resulted in the formation 
of community unions and age grades, prominent among these are the Opu Nembe 
Union, Abonnema Improvement Union, Ilaye Ilame age grade, and Setari age 
grade of Okrika. Some of these Unions under the influence of their communal 
patrons have contributed heavily (as will be examined) towards the 
development projects of. their respective communities, and members who have 
learnt new ideas and philosophies still graft these new elements onto 
their■fe'aditional custom of working for the development and benefit of the 
community. By contributing heavily for, and by being largely responsible 
for the wave of enthusiasm in local development, these Unions of 'sons 
of the soil abroad' have challenged their respective local Councils (often 
accused of incompetence and corruption) to live up to the expectations 
of the present day by being more positively involved in local development.
It is in the light of these that manv citizens of the dJiicrent 
communities still use and maintain traditional institutions and practices 
not simply as romantic relics of the past but for performing modern 
development functions to surmount the difficult periods tliroudi which their 
communities pass in the development process. From the traditional background 
given, a major conclusion which could be drawn is that in most parts of the 
Rivers State the social system and practices are favoural.ilc to community 
development, and this atmosphere in which people are predisposed to 
community development schemes would be (indeed, it is) regularly exported 
by group leaders for group benefits - and occasionally for individual 
benefits too.
POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
Before the advent of Europeans- in the' coastal areas of the Rivers
State (and until contemporary conditions prevailed) the communities in the
Rivers State divided broadly into two main political groupings: the
Monarchies and the Republics. The petty monarchies and ÿ^publics (and other
political groupings) which are not easy to define,^  ^fall between these two
main typologies. Bonny and Kalahari best illustrate the petty monarchies,
while Brass, that is Nembe, represent the replublics. Chile the monarchies
exercised considerable political authority over all villages and settlements
within their domain (the SE)hence earlier writers^ referred to them as
despots or autocrats, the republicirconstituting the majority were essentially
mono-trading 'states' with divided political authority. Among the monarchies,
2Bonny was about the most significant economic and political centre in tho 
19th century.
1A European observer, Adam, in 1790 referred to the King of Bonny 
as an abso'Jute ruler. And as far as can be ascertained, Bonny 
had from very ancient times been a monarchy, obviously having a 
monarchy o-.der and more respected than the others.
2
An important wholesale market for slaves and a centre of 
commerce in the Atlantic trade.
In the language of the political anthropologists the republics were 
the stateless organisations where the ^  was more of a cultural than 
political unit. The component parts of the SE were bound together by. 
cultural and ethnic similarities. The SE was therefore a reflection of a 
loose political organisation.
In matters of central administration, especially in the monarchies, 
the highest authority in these communities was the Amanyanabo (owner of 
the town, otherwise called King)^ who took precedence over the other 
chiefs in central administration and in social and ritual affaii^ -.
Speaking strictly in terms of division of labour, the Orualabo (supreme 
commander of Ritual affairs, that is, the High Priest) performed the most 
significant rituals although he liaised with the Amanyanabo, But political 
matters of prime importance to these communities were discussed by the 
General Council (on which representation v;as made by the Wan^Chiefs, Priests 
of Cults and other local dignitaries) over which the Amanyanabo presided.
On the advent of the Europeans, the Amanyanabo represented his kingdom in 
external relations (matters of peace and war) and negotiated trading treaties*
In every SE, there were other forms of more localised administration.
The tradition of larger communities like Okrika, Kalahari and Bonny clearly 
indicate a division into wards which were more or less similar to little 
villages or quarters with component households and househeads. To a large 
extent, these wards were groups of patrilineal kins. But in all these 
political groupings, and basic to both monarchies and republics, the 
smallest political and social unit was the EARI (House) system which 
comprised those who lived together as a corporate group.
1
L. Mitchison in Nigeria: Newest Nation, London. I96O. p. 56
remarked that these were only eider chiefs whom the English' 
traders by way of flattery called Kings, However.,. Ijaw oral 
tradition confirms that they were real Kings.
2Corresponding with the corporate kin group which among the Ibos 
is referred to as the family or lineage.
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An important trader, his slaves ar.d his fa.iily formed the nucleus of a 
house; hence on grounds of economic and military necessity the bond 
and free could become members of one House, In political terms, the VJARI 
which was primarily the unit of local government was also a kind, of 
democratic unit in which the Head or Chief had to consult with other 
family sub-heads, all of whom were elected to office by the majority 
of the house members. But when rivalry became intense, the strength and 
status of each V/AEI were measured largely by its 'active' numerical strength, 
by the wealth of its members, and by the fighting might of the household* 
Similarly, with the intensification of trading activities in the late 
•l8th and Igth centuries, political turbulance and rivalry among sub-chiefs, 
chiefs and communities became cormnon. The Hembe/Kalabari/Okrika wars of 
1858 and 1865 serve as examples of inter-community feuds; these 
confrontations arose because of clash of interests among the communities 
with regard to the use of trade routes and new markets for the trade in 
palm oil especially. Consequently, many communities and house chiefs 
blocked commercial sea route passages against their rivals, such as Nembe 
blockading Kalahari sea passages in I865. Not only were there.inter­
community feuds but there were also internal conflicts' among chiefs 
especially at Bonny v/her(@iin economically weak houses were merged with 
stronger ones after bitter squabbles. This trend also gave rise to more 
wealthy men and their households seceding from their parent houses to establish 
their own independent households.
Such a period of intense warfare, and the primary concern for each 
house or community to survive on its own economically, ushered in the 
•Canoe House system' which was a modification of the traditional House.
The Canoe House was a compact and well-organised trading and fighting unit,
and to survive as a unit it had to be capable of manning and maintaining 
%
U war canoe. So strong and deep rooted was this House system.that it was
1' It was customary for houses to have 10-20 war canoe chiefs depending 
on the size of house; the royal.house usually had greater strength 
over the others.
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a common practice particularly in Bonny that on a chief's election to 
office, his confirmation by the Amanyanabo was dependent on his being 
found capable of equipping and manning a war canoe. Furthermore, the Chief
was to have sufficient resources to maintain the house. In short, a chief
I
was expected to be both a war leader and the manager of the House's trading
and economic activities. Partly because of these new economic dimensions
of the time, and partly because of the other political and military
circumstances, the qualifications needed to found a house or succeed to
the chieftaincy of an existing house were changed. They ceased to be based
1on royal or chiefly descent from the line of the free born' citizen as was
the case before, and were rather based on economic and military prowess alone.
Hence even those of slave origin could have the rare honour of becoming
house or community leaders, including being free from the stigma of slavery.
Indeed, the wealth produced by slaves liberated them from that stigma of
slavery if they gave proof of their leadership qualities by being able to
man and maintain war canoes.
As Kingsley put it, one of the very interesting things about this House
system "is that it gives to the poorest boy who paddles an oil canoe a chance
2
of becoming a King," It was under this changed social and political order 
that Jaja who started his life as an energetic Bonny slave later became the 
Amanyanabo of Opobo (Opobo is believed to be founded by those of Bonny origin). 
Thus one of the real factors which appears to have weak.enec^the cohesiveness
Kenneth Dike argues that at this time, because of the slave trade in 
which mostly people in the hinterland, the Ibos, were sold as slaves 
ih the Niger Delta, in the peopling of the Rivers communities, the 
slaves most of whom were Ibos outnumbered the free born. Dr. E, 
Alagoa and several other recent writers and historians have since 
rejected Dike's submissions,
Kingsley, \*est African Studies, London, 1899* P- 427 
Until the present day, this still persists.
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of the trading house or group was the displacement of a more communal
organisation by the rise of individualism* This spirit of individualism
was fostered by the now era of economic and social conditions. Essentially
then,.economic strength and perhaps military might therefore dictated
which chief or community was superior to the other because it was the
primary interest of every house or community (or settlements of other
kinds) to promote and increase the trade and status of its people. '
1Other historical' factors and connections between these communities 
have most probably been significant in shaping or influencing their 
present day political and administrative relationship. The I865 and I865 
military confrontations which have already been discussed form only a 
part of these confrontations. For example, in 1877 Okrika and Bonny had allied 
to fight against Kalahari in matters connected with sea route passages; in 
1876, 1880/81 Bonny also had similar encounters with Kalahari *- these leading 
to the October 1877 and November 1879 peace treaties between Kalahari Eind Bonny, 
The Bonny-Kalabari rivalry had been particularly intense for three major reasons:
(i) Bonny lay directly to the south of Kalahari and both shared 
common territorial waters.
(ii) Sonny's advantageous position in her proximity to the coast in
the overseas trade (more ships called at Bonny and so she had
more trade with Europeans) provoked the jealousy not only of 
Kalahari but also Okrika^and
(iii) Kalahari's resolution to bar most direct routes which Bonny 
took to the hinterland for trade.
The Okrika-Kalahari antagonisms also predate modern times. The 
first serious clashes were in late 17th and l8th centuries and even as recent
Fomho (a respected and renowned local historian at Bonny) and 
Dr. E,J. Alagoa (an authority in oral tradition of the Rivers 
State) provide most of these historical data.
Interview with Fomho and Alagoa, August 1973* Bee also
E,J, Alagoa. op. cit.
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as 1950 these two groups had fought bitterly over the use and ownership 
of fishing territories. In the l8th and 19th centuries Bonny had also 
on several occasions barred Okrika from coastal outlets. Similarly, 
because the Ogonis are at the immediate north of Okrika (the distance 
between Okrika island and Eleme, an Ogoni territory, is 4 miles on sea, 
and Okrika is about 10 nautical miles to most Ogoni settlements) the 
Okrikans and Ogonis regarded each other as a threat to each other's 
settlements and economy,^ Each group sought to bar the other from the 
use of fishing ports, and for communities whose major occupation is 
fishing, these hostilities adversely affected their economy. Often the 
results of these threats was war. In commercial terms, the Ogoni territory , 
provided Okrika its markets for food (the Omono and Ikpuruba markets) and 
other products because the Ogoni practised a more extensive farming and 
their soil was more fertile than Okrika's. Most of these encounters 
strained their relationships and often led to feuds. In these feuds Okrika 
had always been believed to have had the protection of its national god, 
Fenib’eso, whose supernatural prowess is also believed to be stronger than 
any of the other national gods. In fact, inter community feuds of this 
nature are legion, some of which are either beyond comprehension or have 
escaped the records of oral tradition and written history.
The relationship between these communities has not only been on 
economical and political bases. In ancient times these communities did 
not have equal status, Bonny had more claim to fame and glory and because of 
the advantages she enjoyed in the slave trade and in the overseas trade, 
these increased her wealth, status and power in relation to other groups.
She also has had a dynasty older and far more respected than any other.
These factors have largely accounted for Boimy's present day insistence to
1Both groups use the same fishing waters and live together in
fishing settlements.
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be given her old place (at least as first among equal communities) - 
something which other communities have refused to concede to her because 
of the changed political and economic circumstances whereby other
communities have surpassed Bonny both economically and politically.
I
In the present day, the Kalabaris, Okrikans and Nembes have produced most
of the educated men and administrators in the Public Service, and secondly
their representation in the Executive Council (the supreme political body
of the State) is stronger than Bonny's. Besides, among the educated class,
respect for traditional chieftaincies has not only been diminished but the
power they enjoy has been considerably reduced. At present each community
struggles for its own good, mobilising every possible political 'consensus'^ -
such as reconciling factions in the community to achieve rapid development.
2
This brand of politics has been more common in Okrika which has more of these 
internal political divisions' than their neighbours. Yet in uniting these 
different factions for the good of the community, it is not uncommon for each 
community to reassert two basic things:-
(i) the past glory and achievements of its ancestors which could 
still be preserved and improved upon by the present-day 
generation;
(ii) the historical inter-community antagonisms, and therefore 
the need for each group to surpass the enemy communities.
From the background given, it is difficult to conceive how these 
historical situations and the kind of political relationships which they 
have helped to foster between these communities cannot influence the 
policy-making machinery of the administrators, who to a considerable extent, 
are both representatives of their communities and the state. In such 
traditional societies the memories of old antagonisms may not, and in fact 
1The desire for unity.
2
"The TubonijU“Koniju factions over Chieftaincy matters.
The chieftaincy disputes will be discussed in Chapter 5*
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do not, fade away so soon, for in spite of recent political and social
chajfiges which have enhanced the educational attainments of the State
Administrators and other elites (modern and traditional) it is true,
although paradoxical, that among the former Eastern Nigerian communities
the Rivers people while changing the most f'tave to some extent changed the 
1
least. And even if these memories do fade or have faded, the desire for
2the people and their respective administrators from the different communities 
to improve (in terms of local development projects) on their past or present 
may not be given a secondary place so easily in spite of existing local 
political, social and economic differences even within the same community.
The presumption^as I argued in Chapter 1, is that the administrators are 
social beings, and so despite their reputation (real or assumed) for impartiality 
and inscrutability, they are susceptible to a variety of human weaknesses.
Some of these weaknesses and foibles relate to, and are derived from, their 
cultural environment. It therefore follows that the administrators in the 
Rivers State would entertain community loyalties to some degree, or would 
cherish the political values and interests of their people in local development.
As long as these considerations influence their official judgements, the 
interests of their people cannot be very secondary - more especially because 
the traditional political and administrative rivalries and tensions have also 
helped to fan the embers of factionalism in the state.
In summarising this chapter, it is necessary to qualify my account and 
analysis. In terms of what issues have been discussed I have rather been 
selective for two major reasons. In the first place this is a study on 
community development, and so I have examined three key areas (instead of 
dealing with the whole structure of the environment and the people);
]
"The military Governor,#realising this has often appealed to the 
different communities to forgive "uid forget*the past.
See Take off Stage, Port Harcourt, I969. pp. 20-24.
2.Twelve out of nineteen permanent'Secretaries and eight out of
twelve commissioners in the State did-say that even though they
strive hard to administer the affairs of the State as impartially as
possible, it is difficult to deny that policy matters connected with
their communities are also given primary attention, (Interviews, August 1975)
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geographical, economic, and political; because the conditions here apart 
from being interdependent could almost be described as the principal factors 
which generate the 'felt-needs' of the Rivers people. Therefore, these
form the axis around which issues on community development are generally
I
seen and discussed in the state. Here I am also applying the principle 
of 'felt-needs* as a major explanation for the ’why' of local development. 
Furthermore, the conditions generated by these three have brought together 
both the communities and the central•government into a concerted participation 
in improving the existing harsh physical conditions in the State, In this 
respect, these factors constitute parameters to political and administrative 
action. Secondly, these three key areas largely explain the influenc--.- of 
the ecological and historical setting on the nature of local development 
projects and the reaction of both local and central government administration 
to these problems,
I have also looked at some aspects of custom - as applied in this study - 
and community practices for two major reasons. The featxu’es here also 
encourage the communities into taking action for improving the communities. 
Therefore it is hereby argued that custom (when tuned in this way) stimulates and 
strengthens the will of the people in pooling their resources together for 
the good of their communities. An inevitable conclusion from this is that 
where people believe strongly in, or have strong attachment to (or respect Ivr) 
a particular custom or philosophy, contemporary trends of social and economic 
changes do not severely alter their basic attitudes and beliefs. At best 
tradition may in such circumstances be modified (not altered) to suit modern 
ends (such as for local development). In such circumstances, those ends and 
goals would be pursued more by the communities because they are more felt at 
the local level and less at the central government level. Central government 
is led to intervene when these aspects of local politics and practices, 
including pressures from local dignitaries, eat deep into the framework of 
central administration. Generally, this trend is part of the rationale and
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philosophy for most community development schemes in the Rivers State. 
Several examples will be given in this study and possible conclusions drawn 
to elucidate these contentions and arguments.
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CHAPTER 3
LOCAL PARTICIPANTE IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
The primary objective of this chapter is to trace the paths to power, 
influence (including manipulative ability) and the leadership of people 
as they affect policy-making in matters of local development. These paths 
are both traditional and modern in their levels of functionality. The 
relationships involved in these are twofold;
(i) those between local dignitaries whom I shall call Bipiberelapu
1(literally meaning those whose 'mouths* are important and 
so deserve respect) and the ordinary citizen,
(ii) those between different types of local dignitaries - especially 
the relationship between the traditional elites and the 
leaders of recent (modern) creation. In the two types of 
relationship, the central issues relate to the manner in which 
either the ordinary people or those who are less important locally 
are influenced by local dignitaries in the task of achieving the 
goals of local development.
There is a special method or an art in the relationships between 
these dignitaries and the local people in the task of community development. 
This chapter will analyse this art. It is in this respect that I shall also 
be concerned with the analysis of the goal-getting mechanisms of the local 
dignitaries.
My analysis will also show in some detail that the distinction between 
some categories of local dignitaries and central government officials is 
very thin. So also is the distinction between local and central because 
some of those I shall identify as the big men in the locality are central 
government officials v/ho act in this context as local people, and not strictly 
in their capacities as government officials. Yet in a sense, if they are a
^In Okrika dialect the 'mouth* in this sense refers to the 
entire personality of the individual. The important 'mouth' 
is the important personality.
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kind of local ambassador (as I maintained in my last two chapters) at
the centre, and are involved with community development matters both at
the State level and in their localities^ then it is difficult to see them
strictly in either a local or national (State) context. At best they may
represent both. This will be the major line of my argument in this chapter.
In this chapter, and the next, I shall try and establish that it is possible
for these dignitaries to perform both roles (local and state) almost
simultaneously; and that a workable pattern of relationships in this
"role and status differentiation* will necessarily take into account the
effective use made by these local dignitaries of the local and state
government resources at their command. This is the point where it will be
very appropriate to discuss manipulation, the use of influence and pressures
in local as well as central politics and administration. I use manipulation
in the sense that in their relationships with the ordinary citizens and the
junior state government officials - those officials v/ho are responsible for
community development matters at the local level - those dignitaries are
able to establish a respectable image of themselves both in Port Harcourt
and in their localities. They achieve this skilfully and there is a method
in doing this. In establishing their local images, some of the methods they
apply rest on their ability to draw on the traditional respect which the
average villager and junior government officers have for the educated and
for those highly placed in society. I also refer to * influence and
2
pressures' because all that is achieved by these dignitaries in these 
relationships is not entirely based on people's willingness and cooperation. 
Some of these achievements are induced. The-dignitaries are -successful in 
some respects partly because of the changed nature of their traditional
^As members of their community development unions and their active 
participation in local community development meetings.
2
A discussion of their achievements will follow later.
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societies where there are now some core power centres (a situation which 
admits that some people are more powerful and influential than others) and 
partly because the machinery for central and local decision making is not 
ideally Weberian; but rather comes closer to the conditions prevalent in 
a 'live and let live bureaucracy.' This is the kind of bureaucracy in 
which both the governors and the governed concede that the loyalty of 
the policy maker to his community is not necessarily subordinate to that 
of the State. This probably fits into some of the conditions in what Riggs 
calls administration in the 'transitional m odelwhere the rules of the game 
may be modified or altered as the need arises. In this context it is the 
administrator who determines the need and how it may be met.
As will become clearer later, since the horizons of the local dignitaries 
and the ordinary citizens are different because of their different social 
and cultural backgrounds^this will lead to some differences in what both 
or each of the different groups in these communities consider as models of 
local development#. The bases for these differences and the method for 
reconciling them will also be discussed in this chapter. The kind of 
differences which arise may be seen as concerning issues of strategy and 
priority, in the sense that these differences are primarily not so much about 
fundamentals as about whether the different gruups consider the type of 
projects to be undertaken as necessary.
I shall now look at the network of social and political relationships 
as they affect community development in the rural areas. In these six 
traditional societies which #?e rapidly subjected to recent economic, 
political and social changes, it is possible to identify certain social and 
political action groups in the sense that in the execution of community 
development projects, some groups assume a greater responsibility than others.
1A discussion of this model will be found in Fred Riggs. 
Administration in Developing Countries; The Theory of Prismatic 
Society. Boston. 1964,
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Similarly, the responsibility for achieving these goals does not fall 
squarely on all persons or groups in the community; hence some groups 
are more functional than others. Therefore, some bear or are expected
to bear a greater responsibility than others by virtue of the roles
I
they play. In examining the links that bind these local communities 
to the central machinery for decision-making at Port Harcourt, the group 
basis for influencing decisions becomes much more evident. Port Harcourt 
is definitely the arena in which the forces of communalism penetrate the 
administrative fabric. Hence it will be discovered that when local 
dignitaries who are also state government officials at Port Harcourt 
take active interest in executing the development projects in their localities, 
the social and political dimensions of assuming responsibility in these 
matters become much wider. This may be explained by the fact that the 
influence of these 'official* local dignitaries is stronger - for reasons 
to be examined later - than those of their counterparts at home.
Viewed from these perspectives of differential influence, leadership 
and participation in the execution of local development projects, four 
categories (or groups) of people may be generally identified in each of 
the six communities under study. These are:
(i) the Chiefs (Alapu)
(ii) the Elders (Seniapu)
(iii) the Youtt^ (Asemeni) and
(iv) the (fommunal Patrons (Bipiberelaapu)
These are the four groups that may be referred to as the back bones of each 
of these communities.
Each of these groups plays some distinct roles in community affairs.
Their status, roles and functions will now be discussed separately, and 
I shall start with the chiefs.
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Chiefs, in the Rivers State, may be defined as persons duly selected 
and appointed under customary law and practices, by a household, ttfard, quarter, 
village or village groups for the purpose of performing administrative and
political duties as heads of those units. They are also such persons vested
I
with certain traditional powers and functions according to customary law.
By this definition, an important question arises. Are there unrecognised 
or false chiefs as distinct from real chiefs? Though this is arguable, if 
the question were thrown open to these communities, an obvious answer is 
a 'yes'. Some chiefs in Kalahari areas who acquired their titles by virtue 
of their wealth or by some other means of social distinction are therefore 
excluded from the category of real chiefs (as against false or unrecognised 
chiefs) because they are entitled to no traditional allegiance from any 
section of the local community. Neither do they command the traditional 
respect accorded to the other chiefs. As may be implied by the foregoing 
distinction, the difference between a real chief and the other lies in the 
fact that the fort^er is by tradition vested with powers and functions 
customarily recognised and accepted by the people; whereas the letter's 
powers and functions do not have a traditional base. However, as will be 
demonstrated soon, it is misleading to argue that chiefs are only cultural 
brokers performing traditional functions alone.
In discussing the real chiefs it could be said that in the Rivers State 
the institution of chieftaincy has deep roots. In ancient times there were 
different classes^ of chiefs, especially among the monarchies, some superior 
to others by traditional classification. Such superior categories of chiefs, 
excluding the ritual or war chiefs who officiated only in special circumstances, 
therefore exercised greater powers and were more politically significant
^The terminologies are derived from the Ükrika dialect.
It may however be observed that in these terminological usages, 
the emphasis may differ from community to community; yet the 
model of application is broadly the same.
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in their communities. Broadly, these were the Amanyanabo (King of city
state or town), 0puiwomaalabo (big village head), Wariyanaalabo (House head)
and Odoalabo (Compound head). These categorisations correspond with a
tripartite classification of chiefs which existed under the House system of
the' Coastal States; Opumumbu alapu (Senior grade chiefs such as the
Amanyanabo) Og^birimumbu Alapu (middle grade chiefs such as village heads)
and Kalamumbu Alajsu (junior grade chiefs). The status, influence, and powers
exercised by these chiefs were in that descending order. In general, chiefs
combined different political, judicial and social functions. In judicial
terms, they organised the native courts (including private sessions in their
premises), and dispensed justice and order. In this respect, they acted as
the custodians of public order, hence they helped to create a political
atmosphere conducive to local development. Politically and socially,
they were the leaders of their communities or some part thereof. It was
largely in this respect that colonialism affected in several ways the
institution of chieftaincy. For example, the Amanyanapu^ of Okrika and
Nembe fought against colonialism by being actively engaged in leading the 
2
campaign against the colonial form of government. These political
involvements of these highly placed traditional rulers culminated in the
British deportation of the Amanyanabo of Okrika in I896 and the withdrawal
of recognition (deposition) from King Koko of Nembe in the same year.
From oral sources, it is believed that in these incidents these Amanyanapu
had. the support of both their junior chiefs and the people. Even in recent
times, these traditional elites have played leading roles in the agitation
for the creation of the Rivers State. The 1957 London conference in which
3
Chief Harold Biriye of Bonny participated and the special representations
^The plural form of Amanyanabo
^Okrika: *3t^iary of Events' (Political and Historical) 19th and 20th 
centuries,
^See Chapter 6,
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to the Willink^ Minority Commission (1957) on similar state issues also
2
exemplify the high esteem for, and the significant role of, chiefs#
RECENT CHANGES ON STATUS AND ROLE OF CHIEFS
Though the traditional importance of chiefs and the respect which
)
they earned among their people is receding in recent times (see Chapter 2),
most chiefs are still able, and are asked, to play an important role in
the present day development affairs of their communities# In carrying out
these tasks, they have mobilised some elements of the past traditional
sentiments - respect, dignity and obedience - accorded to the institution
of chieftaincy. The different communities still appreciate the importance
of chieftaincy, as a case study will soon illustrate, and in recent times,
the Rivers State government recognition of the chiefs role and importance
also reinforces the people’s faith in this institution. Here I shall
quote some of the important remarks and addresses of the Military Governor
of the State which outline the government's impressions of the Institution,
"Respected Chiefs and traditional r%l^ers" "Fathers of the State" •••
"Guardians of all the virtues that the Rivers man is reputed for -- honesty,
purposefulness and hardwork"^ About its functions and significance, the
Governor said as follows;
"the institution of chieftaincy is rooted in the tradition and 
usages of our people ••• the institution will ever remain a 
cherished institution in our midst •.. it is in this regard 
that I expect the maximum contribution from you.as natural 
rulers of this St ate.'*3
These extracts identify the significance of the institution, and even
if some flattery* or exaggeration surround them, the salient fact still remains:
^Henry V/illink: Report of the Commission to inquire into the Fears 
of Minorities in Nigeria. London. 5^, HMSÔ
2
The Government of the former Eastern Nigeria also recognised their 
importance; hence it agreed to establish a House of Chiefs in 
1957, comprising 80 members, 7 of whom were chiefs from the 
present Rivers State.
3
Address by His Excellancy, Commander A.P. Diete-Spiff, Military 
Governor of the Rivers State to the Chiefs Conference.
Friday, iBth May, 1973» Municipal Hall, Port Harcourt.
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chiefs occupy significant positions in these communities as distinct from 
other groups.
In the light of the changed circumstance (Chapter 2) today, it is 
now necessary to examine the functions and duties of chiefs in the community 
in accordance with the wishes and attitude of the communities towards 
chieftaincy. Okrika will serve as a case study. Materials from oral sources 
confirm that Okrika people still cherish the Institution and want it to 
continue to perform certain functions in matters concerning community 
development. Local people have always cited the case of late chief Oju- 
Daniel Kalio^, paramount chief and Amadabo (president) of Okrika, through 
whose guidance and inspiration the St. Peter's Anglican Church (valued at 
over £l80,000 at that uime) of Okrika was built by community effort.
It is told by the elders that the chief personally supervised the entire 
building process which involved contribution of local labour, house levies, 
and negotiations with building companies. It is highly possible that in 
the first quarter of this century w%ien there was forced labour and slave 
trafficking, the chief might have resorted to some arbitrary means in the 
way he was reported to have compelled people to contribute labour and money 
towards the project. Oral tradition which credits him as being despotic and 
high handed, yet energetic, of a disciplined character, and patriotic, might 
have had this background (the church project) in arriving at these conclusions 
and impressions of him.
Nevertheless, even in most recent times, Okrika chiefs are still labelled 
the fathers , guardians, and leaders of their houses and communities.
In short, they are of the people and live with the people. In matters of 
community development however, the chiefs do not generally initiate self 
help schemes, except in isolated circumstances as in the case of chief
1Died 1928. An unofficial and uncrowned Amanyanabo during the 
colonial interregna that followed after Amanyanabo (King)
Ibanichuka had been deported by the British Authorities in I896.
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Allison Ibuluya^ who initiated the building of a motor park at Ibuluya 
village, Okrika. If chiefs do not generally initiate self help schemes, 
what then do they or can they do to promote community development?
This question revolves on the issue of house (V/ARI) organisation
I
in Okrika as well as in other coastal areas. A chief does not hold office
or title 'in v a c uoevery chief has a house or a unit of the village or town
of which he is the leader. Contributions - labour and money - for community
development projects are usually organised on the house basis. The usual
practice is for each house to be asked to contribute its own quota as
the general assembly of the town (presided by chiefs) decides. Proclamation
concerning any local project is usually made to people through the town-crier
(Ekere) and it is the chief, and only the chief, who must authorise the use
of the town-crier for such purposes. It is therefore an offence under customary
law for anyone to communicate to people, through the town-crier, without the
chief's consent and permission. Even in very recent times, this tradition
is still strongly upheld. To confirm this, Mr. Dada of Okrika, aged 35i
2a former councillor recalled how he was arraigned before the chiefs and 
elders because he made public proclamation, through the town-crier without 
obtaining permission from the chiefs. It is also true that with regard to 
labour and levies (money) for local projects, it is the chief who is 
responsible for ensuring that the quota for his house is contributed and 
only he may authorise the imposition of sanctions on any person who may 
refuse to cooperate in the execution of projects. Such sanctions often 
involve the seizure of property belonging to these non-conformists; 
albeit arbitrarily, yet unquestionable because these sanctions are bemÉ&y
^Ibuluya Development Committee, 1973<
He was also reprimanded for equating the office of councillor 
to that of a chief, something regarded as insulting to, and 
a spite on, the chieftaincy institution.
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hardly challenged by any in the locality. Such property confiscated at 
the order of the chief may only be released if and when the victim pays a fine, 
Unclaimed property is usually auctioned and the proceeds are treated as 
the house or community fund.
A recent case in Okrika will throw more light on the role chiefs play 
in local development. In 1973» the Setari Age group (comprising mostly 
people of the patron class, prominent among them were Messrs Ateli, a 
permanent secretary and Oruene, a civil commissioner of Cabinet rank) 
suggested that a Girls' Secondary Grammar School be built in Okrika by 
community effort. In principle, this was accepted and popularly acclaimed 
by the Okrika Community, and in fact the idea was regarded as a grand plan 
and a challenge to other age sets and groups who are interested in the 
progress of Okrika. In October,^ -1973» the contributions of Setari towards 
the project amounted to about £1000. The Setari Age group promised to spear­
head the building of the school in the hope that the entire Okrika community 
would contribute labour and cash to execute the project successfully.
Yet despite the goodwill and enthusiasm which followed this project, 
present developments indicate that the project may never be completed unless
certain procedures are followed. Setari are either unwilling to go ‘through
1 . .the chiefs or they have refused to recognise the importance of the chiefs
in the whole process of execution. This is the conclusion of the chiefs, 
and the greatest exponent of this view is chief Jamabo, the President of 
the Okrika Council of chiefs. The Okrika community is therefore not fully 
involved in the project because apart from a few individuals and one other 
Age grade that have donated money for this project (for example, the Ilaye 
Ilarne Age set had donated £100 as at October 1973)» there has been very
Personal talks with chief Jamabo of Ogoloma, and chief 
Rowland of Ogbogbo.
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little response from the community. The general assumption, especially 
among the illiterate population, is that Setari will single-handedly build 
the school for the community. By implication, the understanding is that 
the school will be gift to the community by Setari.
The Setari want community participation (in money and kind) in the
scheme as they do not have the resources to execute the project alone.
Yet Setari cannot impose levies on houses or on the town without going
through the traditional procedures and channels. Setari have been repeatedly
reminded by the citizens that even though the majority of their members are
modern (educated) elites, they belong to houses and they are therefore
1
subjects of the chiefs.
In short, whatever their status and attainments, Setari must go through 
the chiefs. This is the message to them. A^mst this background, almost 
every citizen of Okrika expects Setari to fulfill their promise to the
town unassisted. The argument is that if Setari cannot carry on the project
alone, they should go through the chiefs in order to enlist cooperation from 
the community. Because of this insistence on following the traditional 
procedure, there has been no contribution from houses or the community as the 
Setaris have not yet conformed. The chiefs wait anxiously for Setari to make 
atonement for the neglect, and until this is done the Girls' School project 
may never be completed by community effort. There is however no guarantee 
that if Setari make amends, the chiefs will compel their prople to 
cooperate^but what is obvious is that the traditional administrative machinery 
for community work will be set in motion.
Nisbet has also drawn attention to the crucial and pervasive 
nature of authority in the traditional community. He argues 
that "authority is closely woven into the fabric of tradition
and morality ..." See R. Nisbet The Sociological Tradition,
London. 1967* p. 107,
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The issues involved in this case study do not merely centre on 
•power conflict, though there is an element of it between communal patrons 
and the traditional elite. Neither is it necessarily an attempt by chiefs 
to sabotage programmes of local development. Nor is it a mere case of a 
particular tradition opposed to accelerating the pace of community development, 
Perhaps the issues embrace elements of the tv;o views, but beyond these they 
are also primarily connected with the importance of certain traditional 
practice and customs which must be enforced by the traditional elite.
The issues in this case encompass the whole area of why certain traditions 
should persist in particular circumstances, and how these very traditions, 
if upheld and respected, can help to hasten and lubricate the machinery for 
local development. It also explains the necessity for cooperation between 
traditional and modern elites if they are to work towards achieving the 
same goals - goals on which they are all agreed in principle.
Beyond these customary functions, the chief is still an important 
rallying point in the community because he also represents the medium 
through which the people can express their feelings of local dissatisfaction, 
or satisfaction, with what the communal patrons or other privileged groups 
in the communities are doing in respect of local development. The average
fisherman or farmer is closer to the chief than he is to either the elders
or the communal patrons, because in theevery-day administration of the hous^; 
it is the chief who is often the centre of consultation. The house meetings
are usually held in his premises. A chief can thereforeuse this and other
media to mobilise the support of his people for any project. Some of the 
local conflicts over the execution of plans stem from this background.
In matters of local development, the chiefs - especially the illiterate 
ones “ are sometimes suspicious of the aims, objectives and strategy of the 
privileged (education) men. They entertain fears that the dominance of 
the privileged class, accentuated by the high status and offices which 
these people occupy, may lead to the overthrow of their chiefly class
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or that it will lead to the diminution of their powers, prestige and 
influence. In these circumstances, they consider it dangerous to allow 
members of the privileged class to carry on community projects without 
going through the traditional channels,stipulated. Perhaps if there is 
nothing more the chiefs can do to reduce the influence and dominance of 
this privileged class, they can at least enforce the traditional ethos 
which requires other classes to work through traditional elites so that 
the individuals to be associated with the successful completion of projects 
will embrace both the traditional and the modern.
It is therefore evident that these chiefs who are of the people are 
much more than ordinary local dignitaries. They are also agents, though 
not sole agents, who may assist in the community development programmes 
because chieftaincy among these communities is a kind of sacred office, 
an office in which the local people place a high premium on such traditional 
circumstances. In this sense, if chiefs do not initiate development projects, 
it appears they are important persons to be consulted as fathers and 
leaders of their people in matters of local development. They command 
considerable loyalty among their people. They and the elders are regarded 
as the most competent in the telling and interpretation of oral tradition, 
history, and custom. As long as their people have confidence in them in 
these respects they will instill in their people the need to respect chiefs, 
and if the people respect and listen to their chiefs (as this case illustrates) 
it is difficult to see how any local project can be successfully executed 
if the chiefs are either ignored or are given a place which underrates their 
traditional status.
In concluding this section on the chiefs, I am reminded of one local 
Okrika proverb which says; Alapu na wengi bo alabo e, meaning "he who 
associates with a chief deserves to be treated as a chief." The significance 
of this saying is that a chief is important and that others, not of their 
class, may and do aspire to belong to their class.
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THE ELDERS
I use the term Elders in a sense slightly different from its traditional 
usage in West African literature where reference is usually to the most 
senior and oldest members in the community. I am rather applying it to 
indicate the significance of certain persons in these communities who 
occupy key positions in their houses (Wari), not as chiefs, but as 
'unofficial' deputy chiefs. They are unofficial in the sense that there 
are no officially appointed deputies, yet certain persons, by virtue of 
their wisdom in local affairs, do act for, or deputise as, chiefs on
certain occasions. These are not necessarily the oldest or most senior
members of their houses. On the other hand, they are not usually very 
young people but they are persons who are believed to be very knowledgeable 
in the oral traditions of the community. The elders are usually people 
who are capable of inspiring the younger generation and instilling in them 
a civic pride.
In Okrika, the type of Elder I am referring to is known as the Ikasi 
Olobo, literally meaning 'holder of the chair.' The elder is the leader 
of a section (Wari Kubu) of the house. Among members of the house, he 
is regarded as the chief's Councillor and as a member of the chief's 
executive council. In a house where the chief is either too old^ (as at 
Dikibo village Okrika)'or he is an absentee chief (contrary to local 
’^ £\ditions that chiefs must live with their people) the leadership and 
day-to-day administration of the house devolves on one of the elders in 
the house. This situation has arisen because in recent times, many chiefs 
are literate and are government officials who reside at Port Harcourt 
(away from their homes) where they are employed. In other cases they are 
resident in Port Harcourt, and are engaged in private business of their own.
In Dikibo village, Okrika, where the chief is over 85 years of age.
He (the chief) is only a chief in name, not in deed; the bulk of
his job is done by the elders.
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They choose to live there because Port Harcourt is the major centre of 
industrial and commercial activities in the state. In these cases of 
'absenteeism', deputies are needed to perform, the role of the chief hence 
the elder has come into prominence in recent times. The primary function 
of the 01der therefore is to provide a link between the chief and other 
members of the house. Because the elder provides that vital link (especially 
in houses which are too large for any effective administration by only one 
chief), other members of the house who have ideas on how to develop or 
improve the house or the community must approach him in the first instance 
and convince him that they have useful ideas or guidelines to offer.
It is this link which the elder provides that gives him the advantage 
of being nearer the people than the chief. The elder in this respect is 
very influential because to a large extent he determines what to tell the 
chief, how to tell it convincingly, and whether it should ever be told at all 
especially in instances where he disagrees with the views of the younger ones. 
Again whereas a chief may live away from his people, as I have already 
illustrated, and will not therefore maintain effective communication with 
his people, the elder is always with, and by, the people because his 
occupation (fishing) is almost invariably practised within the locality. 
Generally, the elders are so frequently in communication with their people 
that the most energetic and diplomatic among them can overshadow the image 
and status of their chiefs as is evident in the Dikibo village case. Even 
in a situation where an elder does not constitute a threat to a chief, it is 
the duty of the elder to advise the chief in general matters concerning the 
interests of the house. In situations where the chief is very young or 
inexperienced, the advisory role of the elder assumes a greater dimension.
In the house meetings, the common practice is for the elders to introduce 
the subject of discussion. Hence the elders can select what items should be 
included on the agenda for discussion. Similarly, in summarising the views of 
the house on any subject-matter (more especially if they too share these views),
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they use their privileged positions as spokesmen to appeal to members of 
the house on the desirability, of embarking on specific development projects 
in the town - the house as the basis for collective action. These appeals 
are usually directed to the younger ones v/ho may be recalcitrant or 
insubordinate to constituted authorities. In mobilising labour, or in the 
collection of money, for local projects, the elders are also the principal 
agents (with permission from the chiefs) v/ho enforce the decision of the house. 
It is they who take the pains to go round from ’door to door’ appealing to 
people to cooperate and where they meet with hostility or opposition they 
remind people of the wish of the ancestors saying "let everyone seek the 
success of this project for the sake of our ancestors and the city deity."
In performing these functions, it will be seen that for a successful 
execution of any decision or project, a chief should be able to count on the 
cooperation of the elders. Where there is any disagreement between them, 
as happened between Chief Allison, Ibuluyu and his four elders in June 1973» 
a house may be unable to contribute its quota to local development and will 
therefore be fined by the general town assembly. What is evident from this 
report is that the position of the chief is strengthened by the cooperation 
of the elder. Secondly, although a chief is the popularly accredited leader 
of the house, yet in comparing the role and status of the elder with others 
in the house, the elder is at least first among equals and perhaps his 
position is much stronger than this description implies.
THE YOUTHS
The term 'youths’ is being used here in an all-purpose sense. It does 
not necessarily refer to young people.
So many categories of people are called, or prefer to be called, by 
this name. Some of those who are addressed or wish to be addressed as 
youths are chiefs who are in their prime of youth (late thirties). Others 
are public servants of all ranks and employees in the private sector. The 
rest who constitute a fairly negligible minority live in their localities and
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are employed as fisherman, farmers and petty traders. But, whatever their 
professions or ages, they share two main attributes. They are people who 
consider themselves young, and so their understanding of ’youth' is not 
purely in terms of age. Youth to them refers to all those whose ways of 
thinking and attitude to life are characterised by modern (as distinct from 
the traditional) styles of speech and dress. In fact, all those who do not 
think or act like ancient or uneducated men ai'e youths. Youthfulness,then, 
is an attitude of mind. The second index refers to such people in the first 
category who are articulate and therefore take an active part in promoting 
the welfare of their localities. They are a kind of local pressure group 
who project the interests of their community both in the locality and in 
Port Harcourt, the seat of the state administration.
As discussed above, the youths constitute a complex body of people who 
could be found both in the local communities and in the big towns. They 
are neither a completely disorganised group - because they are to some extent 
cohesive in terms of their unity of purpose in promoting the interests of 
their fatherland; nor are they a very well organised group because they are 
scattered in the rural and urban areas, and they are found in all walks of life, 
Yet it is that common purpose which unites them and thus makes it possible for 
them to take active interest in local development.
The primary function of the youths is demonstrated by the activities of
1
one of the ^ ge grades in Okrika. The following articles of Association of 
the Ilaye Ilame (meaning: what affects one member of the community affects 
the other) age grade illustrate certain major objectives and functions of 
the youths.
^Okrika features prominently in most illustrations because 
there are similar reflections of these case studies in the 
other-three riverine communities.
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(i) To bring about unity in Okrika
(ii) To protect the interests and rights of the Okrika people.
(iii) To educate the citizens on the need for concerted action in
 ^ matters concerning the fatherland*
(iv) To hasten the pace of development in Okrika and assist any agency 
charged with, or interested in, the improvement of Okrika.
It should be observed that the last article, by implication, assigns 
to the age grade the responsibility of helping the local government machinery 
(in the area) in planning local development.
The political situation in Okrika is a somewhat peculiar one which is
not commonly found in other communities. Okrika is torn by chieftaincy 
1disputes between two factions; the Konijus (the fisherfolks) and the 
Tubonijus (the trad^Vfolks) ; each faction claims it has the right to provide 
the Amanyanabo of Okrika. These sectional rifts with their attendant 
political disturbances and riots have resulted in the death of several people 
in the town. Though the Nigerian Supreme Court judgements of 1965 and 1972 
gave the right of Amanyanabo to the Tubonijus, the dissatisfied Konijus, 
embittered by these memories of old antagonisms, are unwilling to cooperate 
with the other faction even in matters concerning the execution or promotion 
of local development projects.
These facts on the political conflicts underlie the major objectives 
and Articles of association of the Ilaye Hamo age grade. They recognise that 
local development projects cannot flourish amidst such political turbulence, 
and that unless Okrika was united she would stand to lose, as no other 
community will do for Okrika what her citizens cannot do for themselves.
They also recognise and emphasise what Okrika has lost in the field of local 
development because of the attitude of her citizens who do not cooperate in the
^These disputes will be discussed in Chapter 5* I shall, however, 
ignore the Nembe (Bassambiri-Ogbolowpbiri) chieftaincy disputes 
because compared with Okrika, the Nembe disputes are less 
politically significant.
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execution of local development projects. What could be deduced from all 
these is that while other communities were making progress in local development, 
Okrika was lagging behind,
Ilaye Ilame is in these respects acting as the conscience of Okrika 
and it has recently become a propaganda unit educating people in the need for 
development through the principle of unity. Like many other organisations, 
such as the Nembe Senocratic society, Port Harcourt branch, it has therefore 
become a pressure group at home. Its contribution to the proposed Girls' 
Secondary School for Okrika is perhaps an eloquent testimony of its intentions 
and ambitions. Among several other roles, as a pressure group, it has also 
led delegations (in 1971 and 1972) to the Military Governor on issues 
concerning Okrika's claims in the.ownership of Port Harcourt. In these 
ownership claims it expects some compensation from the state government on 
the use of its (Okrika) land for administrative purpose.
In the light of these activities eind objectives, it may also be said 
that generally the youths are among others, the 'watch dogs' of community 
interests. As has been shown, their part in local development is not always, 
and not necessarily, through financial contributions alone. It is the 
pressure they exert and the influence they have over the ordinary citizens 
through their enlightenment programmes (on uniny, peace and progress) that 
make them significant and distinguish them from other groups. Their 
distinction therefore lies much more in two things: their influence as a
pressure group and their particularly active role in matters of local , 
development. Their power and influence have no traditional base (unlike 
the chiefs and elders) but stem from their experience of present-day social, 
political and economic developments, such experiences which demand a change 
of the old order (some of which are appeals for progress and unity) for 
the new.
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THE COMMUNAL PATRONS
This last group is about the most complex to analyse. As their name 
suggests they are the patrons of the communities, while the ordinary 
citizens are their ’clients*, the clients in 'want'. They constitute a 
fairly large body comprising mainly: some chiefs of the Amanyanabo class,
senior military officers (especially in an era of military government in 
Africa), civil commissioners of cabinet rank (as members, of the Executive 
Council), top public Servants, more especially of the Permanent Secretary 
cadre, and business executives. These constitute the cream of their society 
by virtue of their educational attainments (thus forming part of the 
Intelligentsia), the eminent positions they occupy in their respective jobs, 
and the influence which they wield at local and state levels through these 
positions.
They are popularly known, and like to be addressed, as the V.I.P.s 
(Very Important Persons) or at the least as local dignitaries of the first order; 
but they prefer the former to the latter title. As their title implies, those 
who are not of their class are either unimportant or not as important as 
they are: this is one of their claims to prominence in their localities.
They are usually the chairmen of important public gatherings or committees 
who usually occupy the special seats marked 'V.I.P.s' These are some of their 
status symbols.
Yet of the V.I.P. class some are more important than others; if not 
more important, some are 'more equal' than others. This distinction shifts 
the focus to the three main ranks among them. First, the senior military
officers. These are men who have attained prominence because of military
rule, and in an age where the men in 'uniform' occupy key posts in government 
(such as the Military Governor of the State who is a Nembe citizen) have 
displaced former civilian politicians. These are the men who are believed to
have made fortunes from the last civil war in Nigeria and from the high
salaries and other perquisites which accrue to them by virtue of their posts.
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Because it is locally believed that they are 'men in money' and are in
big positions, they are the focus of attention in their localities - in
such localities where there is abject poverty and very few men climb to senior
posts in government.
I
The case of the Military Governor, Commander Diete-Spiff, provides an 
interesting example. In Nembe his home town, he is addressed as the 'first 
citzen' - as a mark of high esteem. In Port Harcourt, beside his array 
of official cars, he owns three private cars, including an expensive special 
Citroen car which bears the plate number^ RNl, understood as first citizen 
of Nembe. In Port Harcourt the plate numbers ranging from 1-10 are reserved 
for very important persons, the first number is almost exclusively reserved 
for the most prominent man in the locality. These car numbers attract 
attention in Port Harcourt because of the kind of special men who own them; 
and in the case of Diete Spiff, even if he were on a private mission, all 
other cars on the road are expected to give way to his special car.
In Nembe too, Diete-Spiff's mansion^ built after he had been appointed 
Governor, faces the Nembe Waterside on which most of the houses of Nembe's 
prominent citizens can be seen. It is this waterside which first attracts
the attention of visitors to Nembe, and of course the best houses for the
number one citizens are situated there. As I found out, it is not unusual 
to see official boats used to carry building materials and other goods for 
the Governor's use, even in his unofficial capacity.
In three respects therefore, the military men, as exemplified by Spiff's 
case, are the focus of attention. Beyond these foci of attention, Diete^piff 
is addressed as 'His Excellency', even in his private dealings with people at 
Nembe. Who else could attract greater attention in the locality?
In the ranking of these V.I.P.s, the Civil Commissioners come second. 
These are the men who have been chosen by the military men to run the affairs
^The letter 'R* stands for Rivers State, and 'N' for Nembe.
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of state in partnership with them. They constitute, with some of the 
military, the Executive Council which is the highest policy-making body 
of the State. They have therefore risen to such eminence as their 
ci-vjilian predecessors (the ministers) enjoyed in those circumstances where 
the local politician^ (now his counterpart) who represented his people in 
the larger political setting was the envy of many in the locality. As 
policy-makers they are believed to control the destiny of many, especially 
in the locality, where central government benefits are expected as of 
right (as they say) at all times. The civil commissioners, whose salary 
is about £3100 per annum, are also believed to be rich people and are 
therefore usually expected to contribute larger sums of money than the 
ordinary man for local development projects. The Permanent Secretaries, who 
follow the two groups of 'political men* (political, because they perform poUticaL 
functions at the state level)^ come last; but they are by no means inferior 
to the others. As civil servants of the highest class, they are also the 
envy of many in their communities where a Civil Service career is generally 
the ambition of many educated people, because in the same localities most 
parents dream of the day when their sons would become such eminent 'government 
workers' (as they are popularly called to distinguish them from those in the 
private sector). The background to the attitude is not hard to find. These 
are communities where even the illiterate man understands that a government 
worker is more influential than workers in other professions - more influential, 
because most of the things which touch the life of the average citizen are 
demanded from the government, and it is the man who works for that body that 
may be looked to for procuring those services or amenities for his community.
1Politicians from the community who represent their constituencies 
at the Regional (now state) level. I do not refer to the local 
councillors.
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It could be seen from this outlook that in the final analysis this is only 
a question of the predominance of one career pattern over the others. In 
the localities, it is also commonly known that the highest grade of 
government worker is the Permanent Secretary (or such other officers o^ 
contiguous grades) who deals directly with, and participates in, the 
bureaucratic labyrinth. And as local ambassadors (Permanent Secretaries) 
at the centre, they occupy positions as leaders or representatives of their 
communities. It is in this sense-as mediators and ambassadors-that they 
are major channels of communication between the state government and their 
local communities.
In discussing these communal patrons as local ambassadors at the centre 
it will be found that there are certain major issues in local and state 
politics which really invite these patrons into taking certain decisions or 
actions at the Port Harcourt level. It is their participation in these 
that they become more significant and important than other personalities.
These are the issues which I shall now mention to clear the background for 
further discussion.
In the Rivers State almost every act of the State government is a 
political issue from the greatest to the smallest - the location of projects 
in agriculture, subsidies eind loans to farmers and fishermen; the location of 
transport, education and health projects; rural water supply and electrification; 
and awards of all types of government contracts. The list is nearly endless. 
These issues, as minor and unimportant as they may appear - especially to 
the man in the Western world - to observers, mean almost life and death to 
the average Rivers man. They are the issues which are also of great concern 
to the patron because they affect the interests of his community, and the 
competition for these things is more intense at the Port Harcourt level where 
the desire of all communities to benefit from the State government's 
resources is most positively expressed.
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The hunger for government assistance should be seen in the context of 
a low level of average income and of general poverty, the underdeveloped 
infrastructure of the different communities, and the common environment of 
scarcity in which people live. Anything which the average citizen thinks 
will minimise or eliminate his suffering as well as improve his standard of 
living and that of the community is of fundamental importance. There is 
also the problem of inter-community competition and rivalry and the desire of 
every public servant (the big man or patron) who may perhaps live in a 
situation of affluence in Port Harcourt. to appreciate this background of 
his people. In the first place, as an ambassador of his people these issues 
also mean 'life and death' to him because he might lose the goodwill of his 
people if he fails to show sufficient interest in their economic and political 
survival. Secondly, the development of his community depends largely on his 
efforts, because there are very few 'big men' like him in the locality who can 
be looked to for the improvement of local conditions so that in the long run 
his community may be given an advantage over others in the overall scheme of 
development.
Beyond these issues and their scales of importance, the general economic 
framework is also important. The private sector is weak and the local 
councils have few funds - a situation worsened by the crisis of 1967-70.
To a large extent these Councils depend on State government subsidies and 
grants^. For each community to develop itself, unassisted by government, 
is an impossible task. Hence every community has only one major reliable 
source of help: the state government. It is the patron who is regarded as
the local agent at the state level and it is he who is expected to defend and 
protect the interests of his people. It is in ^his respect that the people 
and the respective communities inevitably see politics as the surest way of 
improving, through government action, the very many aspects of individual ’
^See Appendix 4.
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and community life. Considering the prevalence of such attitudes, it is 
to be expected that most government decisions will be affected by local 
political influences or at least that attempts will be made to influence 
them in two ways - by pressures and by administrative manipulation
If there are important persons in these communities then the point has 
come at which to suggest or deduce that the Rivers State (as represented by 
its communities) society is certainly something besides a completely open-ended 
network of social, political and economic relationships. In arriving at this 
conclusion, one factor is evident: that for each community to define itself
(and its wants) and protect its interests in relation to the bigger administrative 
world of Port Harcourt, the different communities recognise certain important 
persons who must or should be largely instrumental in the achievement of these 
objectives.
If these are important persons and they can bê- distinguished from the 
rest of the ordinary people, then they must play a significant role in local
development affairs to justify their distinguished positions in the lives of
r&te.
their communities. How do they play that^and why do they play it with a 
large degree of success? Are there consequences (at local and state level) 
of playing such parts? These are the major issues I shall turn to now, 
choosing a case study for illustration - the 'patron-client' relationships. 
PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS^
2One thing is clear at this point. It is the factor of need that 
predisposes the individual or the community (or both)to accept and recognise
^It is necessary to give this case study in order to understand some 
aspects of the politics of parasitism. In order to understand these 
f\spects of politics, some repetition of some of my earlier findings 
in this chapter (particularly, the eminence of the patrons)*, is inevitable.
2It will be recollected that the basic determinants of eminence in the 
Rivers State are: (a) position in life - especially in the,public 
service. A big man in the locality must necessarily occupy positions 
of power and influence in the government and (b) wealth - which may 
also be derived from that position. The wealthy man is also expected 
to contribute the highest amount.in executing self-help projects; 
he should also feed his hungry 'brothers' in demonstration of his 
affluence and charity.
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the importance of the communal patrons,^ These are the needs which are 
expected to be satisfied mainly by the government. I repeat, it is because 
the average patron is a highly placed public servant - either in a political, 
quasi-political or administrative capacity-that he is instrumental in 
satisfying these needs. Added to this is the fact that the patrons are 
regarded as the saviours of their people and are therefore expected to satisfy 
these that they command power and influence in the locality. Essentially, 
to achieve local power and influence, the patrons need and gather local 
followers around them by making the best use of the State Government's 
resources and facilities at their disposal.
The case of Tsaro Wiwa, a former Civil Commissioner of cabinet rank 
who represented the Ogonis, illustrates the patron-client relationship 
(and dependence) in these communities. A discussion of the general attitude 
of the Rivers man to, and their impression of, an Ogoni (and vice versa) 
will help to explain the circumstances in which Tsaro Wiwa held office.
In the Rivers State, the Ogonis are believed to constitute the most 
backward communities. It is often claimed by the Ogonis that their 
representation^' in the administrative givres of the Public Service is inadequate 
and that, because of this, Ogonis have 'no voice' at the policy making level in 
the State, In local parlance, "having no voice" is synonymous with the absence 
of 'spokesmen' (ambassadors) for a community. In terms of their personal 
and physical surroundings, other communities regard the Ogonis as dirty and 
underdeveloped. In the other cultural dimensions, it is generally felt in 
the State that the culture of the Ogonis - their style of dressing, speech 
and manners - is inferior to those of others (though there does not exist, 
even in these localities, any generally acceptable yardstick for measuring 
cultural superiority). Ogonis are regarded as unrefined, timid and servile,
1The patrons are, to some extent, a meritocractic, not just a 
self-reinforcing elite. Their people believe they are 'men of ability'.
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Most of these impressions^ of the Ogonis are however highly contestable.
For their part, the Ogonis are silent on the cultural claims of other groups, 
but they believe very strongly that other groups (especially the Nembes-v. 
Kalahari8 and Okrikans) are interested in dominating them in the Public 
Service distribution of personnel and in the distribution of amenities to 
groups.
During the Nigerian civil war, Bonny was the first Rivers State town to 
be liberated by the Nigerian federal navy from the Biafran secessionists.
The Rivers State Government appointed Tsaro Wiwa as the first Administrator 
for Bonny in November 196?» later he relinquished the post of Administrator 
and was appointed one of the first Civil Commissioners of cabinet rank in 
January I969, Among the Ogonis, these two appointments of Tsaro Wiwa were 
significant - considering the fact that they were held in low esteem by the 
others. Tsaro Wiwa was Ogoni's first representative in the Executive Council, 
Besides this, he was the first Rivers State citizen to be offered a political 
appointment as Administrator for Bonny at a time when Bonny was the seat of 
the Rivers State Government - apart from Lagos where the government operated 
under exile conditions. Most of the refugees from the war-affected areas in 
the three Eastern States were also resettled at Bonny, The town served as the 
Eastern headquarters for distributing national and Red Cross relief materials 
to the victims of the civil war.
It was Tsaro Wiwa’s administration that was responsible for handling all 
the work of administration in the Rivers State, including making contacts with 
foreign organisations, such as the International Red Cross, Therefore, at 
the State, national and international levels, Tsaro Wiwa was widely known.
Many of those who needed resettlement and rehabilitation from the ruins of war 
turned to him for help, partly because it was believed that he understood the 
needs of poor^ people and partly because his official assignment was to minister
^The Okrikans and Kalabaris are foremost in holding these opinions,
^It is argued that the son of a poor man understands the problems of 
poverty more than the rich*
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to the needs of the war victims. Among the Ogonis in particular, it 
was generally felt that an Ogoni (despised by others) was in a position 
to help his people in need.
At this stage it is necessary to give a background picture of Tsaro
I
Wiwa in order to understand the nature of demands when he was in office,
Tsaro Wiwa, aged (in 197^) was born at Bane, in Khana, Ogoni, He is
of poor parentage. His father was a clerk in the local government service 
until he retired, while the mother is a petty trader. According to Tsaro 
Wiwa, he might have had a low level of education if he did not get scholarships 
for his secondary and university education. Many of his primary school 
colleagues who were less fortunate in getting scholarships for higher education 
are farmers and fishermen at present. He might have become a farmer if the 
opportunities for modern education were not open to him by accident.
Between 1954-19&1, Tsaro Wiwa attended one of the well known secondary 
schools in Eastern Nigeria: the Government College, Umuahia. Between 19&2
and 1969 he attended Ibadan University and took an Honours degree in English,
In the University, he took a keen interest in politics. In 19&4 he was elected 
Chaifman of his hostel, Mellanby Hall, and President of the University Dramatic 
Society,
Prior to his political appointments in the Rivers State he had taught 
at Stella Maris College, Port Harcourt, from June to December 1965; and 
shortly after this teaching career, he went back to Ibadan University for 
a research degree. He later abandoned postgraduate work because he lost 
interest in it, and took up University teaching appointments, first at 
Nsukka University (January-September 196?) and later at Lagos University 
until his appointment as Administrator,
Tsaro Wiwa says that because of his political interests and appointments, 
he has made many contacts with people from all walks of life: farmers,
fishermen, businessmen, teachers, clerks and senior administrators in both 
private and public sectors. It is also true that because of these connections.
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while in office, the demands on him were great. As will be shown later,
these connections helped to increase his clientele.
One thing is clear. By I969, Tsaro Wiwa was an important man, and
in fact he was generally regarded by Rivers people as a V.I.P, But to the
Ogonis, he was more than a V.I.P* Indeed he belonged to the modern elite
class in his area. If one were to discuss the different status sets of
Tsaro Wiwa, it should be said that first and foremost he belonged to the
highly educated class. Secondly, he was a patron, having occupied one of
the highest political offices. He was therefore expected to be Ogoni's
distinguished ambassador at the national level. It was natural that by
virtue of his high level of education and position in government, he was
expected by his people to project their image and culture, a people generally
believed to be inferior and backward. How could he have failed his people?
It was in order to fulfil these objectives that he wrote his pamphlet
captioned Ogoni Nationality, Today and Tomorrow - a book dedicated to Ogoni's
cultural richness, and rejecting the old impression about the Ogonis. As he
1said, he had promised his people when his administration was based at Bonny 
and Lagos that he would restore the 'dignity of the Ogoni'; he v/as to restore 
what had been lost as a result of the inferior status which others assigned to 
his people,
IN OFFICE
While he was in office, Tsaro Wiwa commanded considerable influence and
power among his people. He was always an.advocate of distributing State
2scholarships on the twin principles of merit and need, believing that the
communities which are educationally backward should be encouraged to catch up 
- 1
Interview with Tsaro Wiwa, 7th September 1974. Port Harcourt,
It is necessary to add that Tsaro Wiwa's pamphlet was widely read 
in Nigeria, and it was given wide publicity by the Nigerian press 
and radio. He has a list of other publications, including the following:
(i) Tambari (Longmans, 1974); (ii) Two plays entitled: 'Transistor ^adio' 
(Heineman, 1973) and 'Bride by Return' (B.B.C. 1974)
2Scholarship Division, Ministry of Education, Port Harcourt,
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with the more advanced ones. This policy earned him considerable fame and 
respect among his people. He also had a large following among the literate 
people in his area, such people who sav/ in his policy a solution to their 
problems.
Again, Tsaro Wiwa's people praised him for the location of the following 
government projects in Khana in 1972: & poultry farm at Baen, a health centre
at.Nonwa, and a canoe carving factory at Kalaoko, In my discussions with
Tsaro Wiwa, he did not accept sole responsibility for influencing his 
government in the siting of these projects. Nevertheless, he agreed that, 
whenever it was necessary, he discussed his people's problems with his 
colleagues in the Executive Council. Fortunately, he said, some of his 
colleagues in the cabinet appreciated the needs of the Ogonis, Tsaro Wiwa 
asked me: 'What is wrong if a Commissioner presents his people's problems to 
the government*?
As Commissioner for Education his people also believed^ that he did a
lot for them by stimulating an awareness of the great value of modern education.
At that time, it was rumoured in his ministry that Tsaro Wiwa carried 
2
communalistic attachments to his people too far. It is often cited among
several other cases that in 1970 most of the UNICEF equipment (mostly school
furniture and science apparatuses) for schools in the Rivers State were 
distributed to the Birabi Memorial College, Bori, (a first class college in 
Ogoni), Though Tsaro Wiwa often refuted such contentions, a majority in his 
ministry and in the State^ held strongly to these impressions,
^Discussion with Bane (Tsaro Wiwa's village) people,
August, 1973•
2Discussion with the Senior Inspectorate Staff,
Ministry of Education, Port Harcourt, September 1973»
2(a) Okrika 67 Club; 1970-73;
(b) the Nembe Senocrats, and
(c) Abonnema Union, 1973»
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RECIPROCITIES IN CLIEHTELISM
Apart from Tsaro Wiwa's ministerial position which enabled him to
minister to his people's needs, what other aspects of the Ogoni political
environment (and culture) strengthened the formation of clientelistic ties?
What special benefits could be derived by a patron in his relationships with
the client partners? Or does the patron get nothing in return for his
services to the clients?
The basic social and economic relations of the ordinary Ogoni man are
directly related to an environment characterised by extreme scarcity (as
elsewhere in the Rivers State)# The rural Ogonis are predominantly an
agricultural people (see Chapter 2), their economic productivity is extremely
low due to limiting factors such as capital (including credit) and technology.
Only a few outlets for productive labour employment are available to the
Ogonis (in both private and public sectors) because of the high : rate of 
1illiteracy in Ogoni society.
2Besides, several Ogoni fables feature themes of vulnerability and
helplessness; the ordinary man is depicted as a victim of poverty and
misfortune. The Ogonis are therefore inclined to believe that though, the
3
good things of life do exist in abundant quantity, only the big men can have
^No official survey has been conducted in the Rivers State to 
determine the rate of literacy. But Tsaro Wiwa's personal 
assessment (September 1974) is that about 90^ of the Ogonis 
have received no kind of formal education. It will also be 
recalled that even for jobs in which unskilled labour is 
required, most advertisements emphasise that applicants 
should be literate.
2
The titles of well known Ogoni fables which feature these 
themes include (i) 'God created Poverty' ; (ii) '.Blessed are 
the Rich'; (iii) 'What a Difficult World!'
3Compare with George Foster's point about how peasants generally 
view their environment as one in which all of the desired things 
in life (such as land, wealth and respect) exist in finite quantity 
and are always in short supply as far as the peasant is concerned.
See Potter, Diaz & Foster, eds. Peasant Society : A Reader 
Boston. 1967. p* 304.
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direct access^ to the available goods* For the Ogonis, differences in
wealth and position in life are obvious forms of social differentiation.
In comparing the rich with the poor, many Ogoni people say that social 
2inequality is largely a natural phenomenon. Inequality, they say, is
ordained by God and there is very little they can do on their own to
modify or alter this fate. It is therefore clear that even in the Ogoni
fables, there is a recognition that the wealthier class (the big men) have
certain advantages (social and economic) over the poorer class. Inevitably
it is not surprising that the poorer class of people (the clients) adopt a
kind of fatalistic attitude to life.
It is evident therefore that the association (a personalised^ relationship)
which develops between the patron and the client is a special one. As
4
Powell puts it, there are certain basic factors which "define and 
differentiate it (clientelism) from other power relationships which occur between 
individuals or groups." Firstly, the patron-client tie develops between
For an interesting discussion about the social arrangements by which 
people attempt to build some security in the face of their perceived 
environmental threats, see J.D. Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelistic 
Politics." APSR. Vol. 64. 1970. pp. 411-423.
2For a discussion of the Yoruba view of social inequality, see P.O. Lloyd. 
Power and Independence : Urban Africans' Perception of Inequality.
London. 19"^
3
In their paper, "Political Clientelism and Development : A Preliminary 
Analysis" in Comparative Politics. Vol. 4. No. 2. January 1972, Rene 
Lemarchand and K, Legg provide a similar definition of clientelism: 
a personalised relationship "between actors or sets of actors, commanding 
unequal wealth, status or influence based on conditional loyalties ...."
It will be observed that in relation to the factor of inequality, this 
definition fits with Powell’s model as seen below.
In Powell’s analysis, there are three factors (i) inequality in status, 
wealth and influence; (ii) reciprocity in the exchange of goods and 
services, and (iii) face-to-face contact between the two parties.
See J,D. Powell, op. cit. In this chapter I shall discuss the first 
and the second factors only because the third factor is an obvious fact.
Ibid. p. 412. However, though Powell argues that the patron-client relation­
ship is between unequal partners, he stretches the ai'gument byladding that 
patron-client ties are different from other ties which might bind parties 
unequal in status and proximate in time and space, but "which do nob rest 
on reciprocal exchange of mutually valued goods Euid services - such as 
relationships based on coercion, authority, manipulation ,..."
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two parties unequal in wealth, status and influence. For example, the 
patron is either a Commissioner or a permanent Secretary (or officials 
in contiguous grades) who possesses tremendous powers in the Port Harcourt
administration - as will be seen in Chapter 4. On the other hand, the
I
client is either a farmer, a teacher or a junior officer in the Port Harcourt 
Service. Since it is the patron who is the principal negotiator for the 
goods which the client requires for his welfare, the client is subordinate 
(socially and economically) to the patron. It is therefore obvious that 
in the relationship between the patron and the client, the former is the 
senior partner —  jg. "a lop-sided friendship".^ Secondly, in maintaining the 
relationship between the two unequal partners, it is inevitable that both
parties would expect some benefits from each other - in Powell's terminology,
2 3 .an interchange of goods and services. This element of reciprocity is
important since any association (between two parties) will collapse unless
there are 'tangible profits' which accrue to both parties. In short, the
patron client relationship is based on reciprocity, yet by virtue of the
different positions (in the use of power and influence) of the two parties,
while the client partner is a low status actor, the patron is a high status actor
1
Julian Pitt-Rivers, The People of Sierra. New York. 1954. p. l40 
2
Powell argues persuasively that in the relationships between the 
patron and the client, an interchange of non-comparable goods and 
services if of profound importance. His argument is that this form 
of relationship is important not only because it has consequences for 
the particular political system; it also provides the premises for 
the understanding of a wide range of political behaviour - behaviour 
which some political scientists consider to be either pathological 
or deviant. See J.D. Powell, op, cit.
3
However, I realise that since the relationship between the client 
and the patron is an unequal one, the reciprocity expected is one 
which should be compatible with the statuses of the parties involved. 
In short, 'complete reciprocity’ in exchange cannot be expected.
Yet'I have tried to discuss and 'measure' what is exchanged because 
. ill the local areas it is common for people to talk in terras of 
'balance of profits' in any kind of association.
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In Ogoni society, the eminence of the patron -- as a high status actor —
predates the %saro Wiwa era* Of importance is the manner in which the
Rivers State administration^ operated after the liberation of Port Harcourt
in May I968. As already shown in Chapter 2, the Rivers State administration
faced enormous problems of rehabilitation and resettlement of the victims
of the civil wat. Hence in June I968, the military authorities in Port
Harcourt established the Interim Emergency Administration. Lt, Colonel
Abubakar was appointed the Sole Administrator for the State* Partly because
the army was unaccustomed to civilian administration and partly because of
the need to establish a bureau for civilian complaints (complaints such as the
molestation of civilians by the soldiers),Lt. Colonel Abubakar appointed a
2six-man advisory committee of civilian controllers to administer the six 
3quasi-ministries in Port Harcourt.
1
The Bonny administration was succeeded by the Interim Emergency 
Administration based in Port Harcourt.
2
In this quasi public service, there was an administrative 
partnership between civilians and soldiers. Junior military 
officers (Warrant Officers) liaised with the Controllers in 
matters(if routine administration, but decisions involving high 
level policy were taken by the Sole Administrator or his Deputy.
In fact, the Sole Administrator was the first unofficial 
Military Governor of the State.
3
At that time the ministries were called "Services". The six 
ministries were: (i) Health and Social Welfare;
(ii) Communication and Information; (iii) Public works and 
Transport; (iv) Education; (v) Food and Agriculture;
(vi) Labour Exchange, During the interim administration period, 
the functions of these ministries covered the basic social and 
economic needs of the people.
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The Controllers (later replaced by Permanent Secretaries) acted as
political and administrative bosses of the ministries. As would be expected
the major responsibility of the Controllers was to restore basic social and
economic services to all parts of the State. Besides their ministerial
responsibilities at Port Harcourt, the Controllers were also responsible for
reactivating essential economic and social services in their communities - in
liaison with their people.
An Ogoni, Mr. L.L. Loolo was appointed-the Controller of Public Works and
Transport. As Controller, Mr. Loolo liaised with the Ogonis in restoring
electricity and water works (services which had been disrupted by the civil
war) in their area. In Ogoni areas the rehabilitation materials were
distributed in liaison with the Loolo administration. In short, Mr. Loolo
was the Ogoni representative (and a mini patron) in the interim administration.
Therefore when normality returned to Port Harcourt and an Executive Council
was formed, (as a minister of cabinet rank) merely replaced Loolo in
high office.^ Tsaro Wiwa also inherited the responsibilities of Mr. Loolo
in terms of what services Ogonis expected of their patrons. Besides, the
2local-central relations established under the Loolo regime were maintained by 
Tsaro Wiwa.
But the needs of the Ogonis are not periodic. Rather, since the
establishment of a normal administration, they have competed with other
communities in order to get their share of the state resources. (See Chapters
4 and 7). Like other communities, the Ogonis want to develop their area.
5
Hence, in 1972, when the 'Bomu explosion' caused considerable damage to 
crops and property in Ogoniland (resulting from the operations of oil
^In discussing offices, I have described Loolo as a mini-patron in 
order to distinguish him from other patrons who have been offered 
higher political appointments in the post-war administration in 
Port Harcourt.
2
These relations concerned the rehabilitation problems and other 
normal administrative linkages in the Tsaro Wiwa era.
%
Bomu is the name of the village in which the explosion occurred. 
Therefore Ogoni people often refer to the incident as the 
'Bomu explosion*.
107.
prospecting companies), the Ogonis negotiated with the Shell BP and AGIP oil 
companies for compensation for damages. Tsaro Wiwa, as an Ogoni patron 
and their representative in the Executive Council, was one of the people 
who negotiated with these companies on behalf of his people and the
government. In these negotiations, Ogoni villages received about £50»000^
from the oil companies as compensation. Part of this amount was, and is, 
reserved by the Ogonis for general development purposes in the 1973-80 Rivers 
State development plan period.
Therefore both in the periods of rehabilitation and the post-war era, 
the most valuable patron was neither the elder nor the occupant of high 
chieftaincy office, but i._e one who had the capacity and position to 
negotiate effectively for the Ogonis in Port Harcourt. In the process of 
getting their benefits, it is also evident that the Ogonis were forced by 
circumstances to look up to their patrons for providing the leadership in
the negotiations with outside parties;
From the foregoing, it is evident that Ogoni patrons (Tsaro Wiwa in
particular) have been community assets. One is therefore inclined to ask
2
whether the clients have reciprocated the gestures of the patrons. What 
have been the obligations of the clients in these relationships with their 
patrons? What reciprocities have been, and ax’e, involved in clientelism in 
the Port Harcourt administrative setting?
Though in an informal sense, certain things are expected of the clients 
by the patron. The clients are under some moral obligation to hold the patron
An account is kept by the Development Committees in Khana and Gokana. 
The records of these committees show that no specific projects have 
yet been earmarked for execution.
2
A kind of reciprocity related to Powell's discussion of an 
'interchange of services and goods’. In Alex. Weingrod "Patrons, 
Patronage and Political Parties" Comparative Studies in Society 
and History. Vol. 10, July 1968, pp. 376-400, can also be found 
an interesting discussion of corruption (in machine politics) as 
an element of reciprocity.
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in high esteem (see Chapter 7) and to shower praises on his name - even 
though the norm of reciprocity is somewhat indeterminate in terms of what 
it implies in totality.
It is significant that even under a military government, the community 
(GE) has remained an arena in which the patrons build their network of 
supporters and friends - in the struggle (among patrons) for power in the 
Port Harcourt administration. Again, in the competition among communities
1
for state benefits, there still is, and has always been, a political cleavage 
between individuals in the community. These arguments will be pursued in 
chapters 6 and 7. Hence as an ambassador, thf patron can expect some support
p
or services from his people. For example, there exists a Tsaro Wiwa *fan-club’~ 
which protects the 'good name' of the patron. Members of the club also profess 
loyalty to the patron in time of crisis.
When it was alleged that, as Commissioner for Education, Tsaro Wiwa 
was communalistic in the distribution of scholarships and UNICEF equipment,
Mr. Nado, President of the fan club, described Tsaro Wiwa as an Ogoni patriot.
In short, Tsaro Wiwa was not communalistic. In Bane, Tsaro Wiwa's village, 
most of the local people I talked to in September 1973* spoke about Tsaro Wiwa's
1
To some extent,in this chapter I have emphasised on the integrative 
model of the community. For a discussion of this model, see Max 
Gluckman, Custom and Conflict in Africa. Oxford. I963
2  -tNado, an Executive Officer in the Government Service, is the 
self-styled President of the club. There are no elected officials 
of the club. Nado, an Ogoni, claims that membership of the club 
is about 800, comprising mostly teachers and junior officers in the 
government. In September 1973, Hado spoke to me about why he 
organised the club: to protect the good name of their big men who
may be blackmailed or despised by others - more especially as 
Ogonis are a despised people. He argued that the Kalabaris,
Nembes and Okrikans had always protected the good name of their 
big men - even when these big men were corrupt. Nado described 
Mr. V/.P. Dan-Kalio (a former Head of the Civil Service) and 
W E. Tienabeso (the present Head of Service) as communalistic, 
but he argued that the Okrikans and Kalabaris often dismissed 
these accusations (of communalism) as baseless - apparently because 
Dan-Kalio and Tienabeso hail from Okrika and Kalahari respectively;
In short it was necessary to protect Tsaro Wiwa's good name because 
the Kalabaris and Okrikans had set a precedent.
IS a. f pen nanieLj
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efforts to quicken the pace of local development. I was informed of
Tsaro Wiwa's contribution of £200 for the proposed Bane library project
and his proposal to launch a Scholarship fund for the education of the Ogonis.
also
To put it precisely, Tsaro Wiwa was^described by his people as one of the 
foremost Ogoni patriots. Therefore, to some extent Tsaro Wiwa's people^ 
could be described as members of the fan-club.
The fan-club is still in existence. What generalisations or conclusions 
can one draw about the formation and the activities of the club?
2
In the Rivers State, there are areas of compatibility between traditional 
and modern forms of clientelism - even though it is misleading to overstress
1
In this chapter, I am not suggesting that there are 'client communities'. 
Rather my argument is that an able patron will have a large personal 
following and extrabureaucratic connections among his people partly 
because his people see him as a benefactor and partly because his official 
position is a kind of client creating asset. Again, even if many people 
in the community are seen as clients - as this discussion suggests - 
one could still draw a distinction between the "core and the periphery 
of a patron's following" (See James Scott "Corruption, Machine Politics 
and Political Change". APSR Vol. 63. 1969, pp. 99-100.)
As will be shown later in this chapter, changes in the political tide - 
such as dismissal from office - are very likely to be reflected in the 
size of the patron's clientele. As clients would always look for a 
promising leader, most of the patron's clients are likely to be 
"peripheral clients". This chapter covers mostly these peripheral clients,
2
According to Cohen, even in recent times, patron-client
relationships are still of great importance in the Emirate system 
of Northern Nigeria, and people continue to utilise their associations 
with important 'superiors. See Current Anthropology, 8, 1-2, 1967, p.103*
In discussing the differential impact of colonial policies on traditional 
forms of clientelism, Rene Lemarchand also argues that "feudal clientelism" 
was preserved in Northern Nigeria because the European officials regarded 
it as a necesary adjunct of Indirect Rule,
(See APSR, Vol. 66, 1972, p. 78)
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the compartnientalisation between the two forms of clientelism* In 
the traditional setting, the chiefs commanded considerable respect from 
their people; they had a large following, comprising mostly the poor and 
under-privileged subjects. Therefore it could be argued that when the 
traditional patrons were the most eminent persons in the locality, situations 
were congenial to the maintenance of 'dependent clients'. By virtue of 
their 'political ability' in the Port Harcourt setting, when the modern 
patrons emerged, to some extent they also sought a homage of popularity 
(and dependence). The poorer classes showed deference to the big men who 
enjoyed it.
Conditions of recent social, political and economic changes must have 
intensified the clients needs (and desire) for something or somebody to 
depend on. It is not unusal that for the clients to get ahead in life, they 
need 'god-fathers', who would 'push forward' their case. In order to maintain 
the goodwill and support of the patrons, the clients must have considered it 
important to render certain services to the patron. Such services include 
political support and the formation of fan-clubs for projecting the image of 
the big man. Thus 'the large following which the chiefs commanded by virtue 
of their eminence created the conditions for a similar following for today's 
patrons.^ Therefore there were precedents that the big man has always desired 
to have a large following.
It is also suggested that clients are under some kind of moral obligation 
to patronise their patrons even v/hen the latter are dismissed from office.
As will be discussed later, when Tsaro Wiwa was relieved from office, some old 
clients patronised his business.
^Because some of the people think that the patron works "consistently in 
the interests of the poor" and focuses "attention upon their concrete 
needs" (Murray Edelman. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana. 1964 
p. 118) one could argue that compared with the traditional patron, 
the present day patron commands a larger following by virtue of his 
position in the administration. Since clients (like patrons) are 
profit seeking, they would be attracted to those patrons who distribute 
the state resources. Besides, because most of the patrons nurse 
political ambition, they would need a large: following so as to 
achieve victory at the polls.
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The picture of patron-client reciprocities so far presented does not 
fit with the postulate that the patron ought to expect some more concrete 
material benefits from the clients - since the patron offers concrete 
benefits to his clients. Are we then to do away with the concept of 
reciprocity in patron-client relationships? The answer is that one ought 
to examine their relationships in a slightly broader perspective: the
association is indeed a 'lop-sided* one. In the process of 'give and take', 
the high status aqtor gives more to the clients (in the materialistic sense) 
than he receives from them.
In these lop-sided relationships, besides the material benefits, it is
also necessary to investigate what other social^ and political benefits the
2
clients get. The benefits derived in any association are not necessarily, 
or purely, materialistic,
Mr. Nado was very proud that Tsaro Wiwa was, and is^an Ogoni patriot*
As it also appeared to the chiefs and elders, Tsaro Wiwa projected the image 
of the Ogonis in Port Harcourt. The people were confident^ that, as a 
superior, Tsaro Wiwa would also offer political protection to his people.
^In these relationships, it is argued that because there is a
difference in the locus of power, and one partner is wealthier
than the other, the poorer partner will gain more from the association.
I am also assuming that it is more beneficial for the client to continue
to maintain this association because of the greater advantage he derives, 
I do not, however, deny the fact that both parties derive some 
advantage from the association.
2
I have implied that in the relationship between the patron and the 
client, one could gauge - even if arbitrarily - the exchange involved 
in reciprocity. As I have said before in this chapter, I am aware that 
the statuses of the client and the patron are not comparable, yet in 
most relationships between two parties, there is a natural tendency 
for the parties concerned to gauge their share of benefits from the 
association.
3
Interviews with Nado, Chiefs and elders. September. 1973*
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In launching Ogoni Nationality, Tsaro Wiwa appeared to have fulfilled 
one of the major political objectives of the Ogonis: the projection of
Ogoni culture.
 ^ The expressions of Nado, the elders, and the chiefs about the good 
works of Tsaro Wiwa also suggest that they derived some psychological 
satisfaction from their association with Tsaro Wiwa. One gets the impression 
that in their association with Tsaro Wiwa, the clients were offered a 
chance of becoming important, and therefore "of being lifted from the 
ignominy of a commoner’s life into the sphere of rank and importance."^
In fact, while speaking to me, Nado and the traditional patrons were confident 
that Tsaro Wiwa would always 'listen' to their complaints and help them 
whenever necessary. In short the people expected, or had,some psychological 
rewards^ - some kind of externalisation of the super-ego. This observable 
externalisation of the super-ego is strengthened and supported by the common 
Ogoni saying: 'there is dignity in associating with the - a saying
which originated in the colonial times when the D.O* was the highest 
government official in the locality.
What is clear or may be deduced from the Tsaro Wiwa case study is that 
he enjoyed considerable influence at the local level because of what he was 
believed to have done or would be able to do for his people. He was high in 
the local rspiking system because he was a big man, and as a big man he had 
a large following.
Siegfried Nadel, A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria* 
London. 1965» P* 123.
Writing in a similar vein, Rêne Lemarchand ("Political Clientelism 
and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing solidarities in Nation- 
Building" APSR. vol. 66, 1972, p. 71) observes that "whether the motive 
happens to be a quest for protection, for material assistance, or for 
personal mobility, integration at this level stems from an exchange of 
psychological and material rewards between a superior and a subordinate."
2
The question of some other affective components which enter into the 
patron-c&ie^^relationships is persuasively discussed by Abner Cohen in 
Custom and Politics in Urban Africa. Berkeley & Los Angeles. I96I. p. 91
^Translated into English by Chief Kpago of Bori, 10th September 1974.
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But Tsaro Wiwa was dismissed as Commissioner in March 1973* As he 
put it, he was dismissed because he often criticised the government for 
maladministration,^ He recollected that prior to the formation of an 
Executive Council, he had been appointed a member of the Rivers State 
Advisory Council, He had resigned from that council because of frequent 
disagreements with the Governor over policy matters. Tsaro Wiwa was 
therefore, surprised that in spite of his earlier disagreements with the 
government, he was later offered the more important posts of Administrator 
and Commissioner.. According to him he did not reject these later 
appointments because 'there was no time to show dissension openly',
Nigeria was in a state of emergency and loyalists were expected to help 
build the nation from the ruins of war.
Tsaro Wiwa further observed that the Executive Council had no powers.
The Council was impotent, and the Governor often exercised his veto powers 
in many policy matters. A Council agreeable to him (the Governor) was needed. 
It was unfortunate that Tsaro Wiwa should belong to such an impotent council. 
These are Tsaro Wiwa's recollections.
At present there are two Ogonis in the Executive Council. These are 
Mr, Edward Kobani and Chief Nzidee, In relation to these three men (Tsaro 
Wiwa and the present two Ogoni Commissioners) there has been a considerable 
shift in the ranking among the Ogonis as regards which personalities control 
greater power, prestige and influence. According to ministerial sources, in 
1970, when he was Commissioner for Education, Tsaro Wiwa attended on to, 
on average, about twenty visitors per day in his office, most of whom were 
poor Ogonis who wanted his help either in his official or private capacity. 
Most of these clients were people he had known prior to his appointment as 
a Commissioner. These were mostly school mates, kinsmen and friends employed
^Maladministration was neither defined nor discussed by him because 
he considered it a confidential matter.
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in both the private and public sectors. After his dismissal as
Commissioner, the calls at his house for such help fell to the barest
minimum.^ The present two Commissioners from Ogoni have taken over the 
2
lead from Tsaro Wiwa in local calls for help. Chief Nzidee (who did not
I
complete a primary education) and Kobani (who holds a University degree) 
have become Ogoni dignitaries and patrons.
An explanation can be offered for Tsaro Wiwa's 'loss of clients' and 
his apparent fall in Ogoni social rankings today. There has been a change 
in the political fortunes of Ogoni big men, a change in the favour of the 
present two Commissioners, Throughout my discussions (August to September 
1973) with the Ogoni communities (for the purpose of this research), only 
very few talked of Tsaro Wiwa. The names commonly on the lips of the
average Ogoni are their present two Commissioners. Tsaro Wiwa is more or
less a name from the past. He has become a forgotten hero.
At present Tsaro Wiwa is self-employed - a business man. Since April 
1974, he has been engaged in the 'supply and retail trade* selling manufactured 
goods and food items. In his trade, he is still patronised by some of his 
former clients and colleagues. In his present business he offers employment 
to about a hundred people in his offices .at Port Harcourt, Bori and Eleme. 
According to him, he is happier and richer today than he was as a Commissioner,
admitting that he makes a profit of at least N 4000per month compared with a
Commissioner's annual income of about N 6200.
1Tsaro Wiwa. Personal communication. September 1974.
2
Ministry of Rural Development and Social Welfare, Port Harcourt. 
(This ministry was 'bossed' by Chief Nzidee at the time this 
information was received).
3
However, at present there is no fan-club for any of the two 
Commissioners.
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Why is Tsaro Wiwa a forgotten name today? He is no.longer the person 
who negotiates terms and treaties with the oil companies whenever there 
are damages to land, crops and other Ogoni assets affected by oil company 
operations. The present two commissioners are the key negotiating 
personalities. In short Tsaro Wiwa is no longer in a position to attend to, 
or satisfy, the private and public needs of his people. Ogoni people talk 
of what their present commissioners should do for them, and also of what 
they have failed to do (the usual economic and social services which Ogonis 
think they are entitled to from the State Government),
The shift in the ranking system (Tsaro Wiwa, Kobani and Nzidee) is 
probably best illustrated with the following statement made by one of 
Ogoni's prominent chiefs, "My pickin, we no de talk of Tsaro Wiwa. Him 
time don pass. Na Kobani and Chief Nzidee we fit sabi today, Na dem de 
for goment", meaning: "my son (in reference to me), we do not talk of Tsaro Wiwa 
at present. His is a forgotten era, Mr, Kobani and Chief Nzidee are those we 
know and can count on because they are our representatives in the government,"
Five main features may be deduced from the changed statuses of these 
three Ogoni men in relation to the concepts of power and influence. First, 
the occupants of cabinet posts have changed. Secondly, a communal patron 
commands greater local respect, prestige and following while he is in office 
to minister -to the needs of his people, and that a fall in the political or 
administrative fortunes of a patron corresponds with a fall in the local 
ranking system. Thirdly, that the big man in the locality is not 
necessarily the most educated. This is demonstrated by the fact that Chief 
Nzidee who now ranks high in Ogoni political circles (as this discussion 
suggests) has lesser academic achievements than Tsaro Wiwa, While one has 
fallen (Tsaro Wiwa), the other has risen (Nzidee) because the state 
government has elevated Nzidee by the new Cabinet post. In this context, 
the local people elevate whomsoever the State Government elevates. Promotions 
in Port Harcourt therefore correspond with 'promotions' in the local area.
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As the press and radio carry nev/s about new official appointments, the
local people make adjustments in their local rankings to reflect events
in the Port Harcourt arena.
(xlso
It can^be observed that the wealthiest man is not necessarily the 
biggest man. Perhaps this is difficult to understand in a society so 
obsessed with money. The point is that wealth, though important, is not 
the only index of ranking in the locality. A wealthy man is ranked high 
if he has power and influence as well, especially in government circles.
At least nothing in the life patterns of Chief Nzidee (and probably Kobani) 
and Tsaro Wiwa suggests that Chief Nzidee is richer^ than Tsaro Wiwa.
It is also significant that a man’s academic attainments such as 
Tsaro Wiwa’s, ai'e more functional in so far as he occupies a position in 
which he is of greater help to his people. Hence in spite of Tsaro Wiwa's 
academic attainments which are highly prized in the locality, his fall from 
power has led to a fall in the local assessments of his educational 
achievements. It is not argued that Tsaro Wiwa is less educated today than 
he was as a Commissioner but that he is less noticed at present in his 
community. His educational attainments are seen to be of greater use to his 
immediate family than to the community. Such achievement (education) is more 
significant if it can be of immediate and direct use to the people.
The fourth point which is a corollary of the third, is that men with 
the same basic educational attainment (such as between Tsaro Wiwa and Kobani, 
who are both first degree holders) or others who occupy the same social status 
in the traditional setting do not necessarily enjoy the same social status in 
the overall ranlcing system of the local people. What is rather of paramount 
importance in the local overall.ranking system is the dominant position 
which the individual occupies in the Public Service or related enterprise,
^Compare the incomes of the two.
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Fifthly, these communal patrons are centres of power and influence because 
of what they can do at the local level; and in this respect their social 
and political relationships with the average citizen are like those between 
the elephant (the patron) and the grass^ (the average citizen).
DIFFERENTIAL STATUS AND PARTICIPATION 
SUMMARY
In examining the participation of these four major categories of 
people (and even within each of these there have been subdivisions) certain 
facts and conclusions are outstanding. Each category plays a distinct role 
but in attempting a division of these into role or functional categories 
it is necessary to malie some generalisations. Either some categories are- 
subordinate to others, or some are more central and functional in the parts 
they play in local development.
In matters of traditional and customary procedure, at the core of the 
local communities are the chiefs, followed by the elders without whose 
consent and sanction the general machinery for executing local development 
projects may either be frustrated or come to a halt. They are therefore 
at the apex of 'functionality' and are at the core of local influence in 
these matters. But enough has been advanced to prove that in the domain 
of politics, certain personalities other than those deriving their power 
from the traditional base are of greater importance in getting benefits 
to their people. This is more true when there are several competitors at 
the state level and at a level where the significance of traditional 
authorities recedes. Then follow^nthe youths who constitute another 
significant point of pressure, besides initiating and arousing local 
interests in development. Because most of their characteristics - such 
as pressure group tactics-are similar to the last category (communal patrons), 
I shall treat this group (the youths) together with the latter (patrons),
3
'Considering the power assymetry. in' these patron-client 
relationships,it is evident that the client partner is 
often at the 'receiving end'.
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The communal patrons are of recent creation, people who take
advantage of recent social and political manipulation techniques at the
local level. The creation of a new State and the establishment of a new
Public Service have brought them into prominence partly because of their
senior positions in government and partly because these positions have
been converted into political currency at the local level - a 'conversion'
which Huntington^ would perhaps have referred to as corruption. The basis
2of their eminence is understandable for three reasons: the local people
recognise their importance as government officials; there are very few of 
their kind in the localities and so they constitute a powerful and 
privileged group; and the patrons themselves are aware that their communities 
are status conscious and so they (the patrons) have happily accepted the 
status assigned to them by their people.
This state of affairs is also indicative of the fluid character of 
relationships between local communities and the state government. It 
further stresses the political nature of state government administrative 
machineries which are to some extent responsive to local political 
idiosyncrasies. This responsiveness arises partly because the government 
is interested in building a good image of itself in the eyes of the local 
people and partly because it is inevitable that since the policy-makers =
In discussing corruption in Brazil politics, he argues that it is 
most prevalent in states which lack effective political parties, 
in societies where the interests of the individual, the family, 
the clique or the clan predominate.
See S.P. Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies.
Yale. 1968. pp. 99-100. ""(in the case of the Rivers State it has 
already been argued that the interest of the community is of great 
importance.)
behind these reasons is the obvious fact that at the local level, 
the distinction between tradition and politics (making and influencing 
decisions at the state level) has of recent become very faint or 
non-existent. Therefore, much prominence has been given to the 
patron as a faster goal-getter, more so as the process of getting 
government benefits has become a very sensitive and highly political 
affair.
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are both local and official dignitaries, their loyalties will be divided 
between satisfying state and local interests. It is the milieu in which 
most of the local dignitaries who are also high government officials have 
either a control of, or greater access to, the central administrative’ 
machinery. Perhaps it is this factor above all which leads to the 
conclusion that the man who is nearer to the seat of government decision­
making bodies and may ultimately influence or manipulate these decisions 
more positively (positive if his community .is a beneficiary) is a greater 
dignitary than the others. Hence the patron ranks the greatest of the four. 
CONCEPTS AND TYPOLOGIES - REDUCING AMBIGUITIES ■
The four groups (chiefs, elders, youths and patrons) exist though I 
have reduced them to two types of important personalities - one traditional 
and less functional in the Port Harcourt arena, while the other is more 
recent, highly privileged and more politically influential both in the 
locality and at Port Harcourt. Yet another theme is evident from my 
classification, I have attempted a generalised two-fold typology of local 
people as benefactors and beneficiaries in local development - in some 
sense similar to Bailey's description of a 'lord' and his 'dependent'. In 
this I have both implied and suggested that there are patrons (big men) 
and clients (small men) in the Rivers State.
The following explanations are offered to clarify the patron-client 
typology. This patron-client relationship is not easily definable and perhaps 
the term may not be legitimately applied except in a loose sense. I do not 
use the word client to describe a typical and highly feudal^
1
"The basic relationship in the Criya political system", argued Bailey, 
"was between a lord and his dependent," In a context
from mine, Bailey added that "the Kingdom continued in existence .... so 
long did the King have the power to compel (coerce?) allegiance from 
his feudatories." See E.G. Bailey, Tribe, Caste and Nation : A Study of
Political Activity and Political Change in Highland Orissa, 
Manchester, 1966/ " My analysis of the situation in the
Rivers State does not, however, cover these feudalistic relationships 
between master and servant. I refer to the patron as a lord in order 
to illustrate his position in relation to the commoner.
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'master-servaiit’ relationship* There are no hereditary 'patron classes' in 
the Rivers State. The term is not indicative of a political or social 
protection offered by a dignitary (patron) to his inferior (the client).
In the situationsdescribed, no party contracts^ an agreement with the other 
to become a patron or client. These are political and social conditions in 
which people find themselves because of the accidents of differential 
opportunities and status in life. Most of these conditions are generated 
by the circumstances of new statehood which have brought the patrons into 
the political and administrative control of the affairs of their locality 
and the State. It may also be observed that in the Rivers State the basis 
of power and prestige lies around them, the patrons. -Both groups accept 
and recognise this unequal relationship because it is believed that it is 
in their interest if only this mechanism enables the community to compete 
with the others favourably. It is probably immaterial to both groups whether 
this relationship is justifiable or will continue; what they consider is 
important is that it forms one of the bases for getting individual or 
community benefits - with every community seeking to act directly on the 
'centres of profits'. But there are no institutionalised or clear cut 
'rights and obligations' of either party, except such as arise from the skill 
with which the patron makes use of his official position in manipulating 
people and events in his locality. Indeed the patron-client 'contract' is
1
Eric Wolf also makes a similar point about the “^ informal nature 
of the contract; he however stresses the point that this 
relationship can "occur in dealings which border on the illegal 
or the extra-processual".
See Eric Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship and Patron-Client Relations 
in Complex Societies" in M. Banton., ed.. The Social Anthropology 
of Complex Societies. New York. 1966. p. 10.
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an unwritten and informal^ one - a situation of private, personal
accountability.
The 'Big Man - Small Man* conceptions which the patron-client
relationships represent are deeply rooted in the local communities, and some
of these attitudes which recognise the power and position of each group are
partly or totally explicit in the traditional system in the sense that the
local man expresses some of these very consciously. They are mostly observable
2attitudes which are indicated by the deference shown to the big man class.
The current usages of the following words from the Okrika dialect 
illustrate the context in which I use the terms. 'opubo' means the man who 
is worthy of respect, capable of inspiring and influencing others and a 
benefactor - he who also receives personal service^ (for example, deference) 
from the poorer class. These are the patron class I refer to. On the other 
hand 'Papatombo' means not only a commoner or a poor man but those who are 
less fortunate, less privileged and therefore more dependent on a dignitary 
for getting things done for the community. These are the people covered by 
the term 'client' and they are those locally seen as subordinate or inferior
1
Eric Wolf also argues that the relationship between the low and high 
status actors is private, informal and unwritten. See Eric Wolf 
"Kinship, Friendship and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies" 
in M. Banton. ed. The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies.
New York. 1966. p. 10.
2
In discussing the existence of social classes in the 'new nations'
(Africa, Asia and Latin America) Peter Flynn criticises writers 
(such as Alfred Stepan and Philippe Schmitter). who neglect class 
analysis as a key to understanding political processes in these countries, 
Flynn stresses that "far from being an alternative to class analysis, 
an approach to dependent economies which emphasises clientelism can 
greatly help to understand some of the mechanisms of class control which 
help to maintain dependency." See Peter Flynn "Class, Clientelism and 
Coercion: Some Mechanisms of Internal Dependency and Control".
Conference Discussion Paper (Dept, of Politics, Glasgow University, 
November 1972. p. 2) In this chapter considering the eminence of the 
patrons, their manipulative techniques, and the mechanisms of dependency 
(Kince the poor people are greatly dependent on the big men) it is 
suggested that a class analysis could be made of the political and 
social relationships between patrons and clients.
3
There is an illuminating discussion (of personal service) in Peter Blau, 
Exchange and Power in Social Life, New York. 1964.
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to the big man. Therefore I refer to the people who are either politically 
and socially (and by implication economically) subordinate or inferior 
to the dignitary (patron) as clients on two main grounds. First, the
inequality in political and social positions suggested in their relationships
I
with the patrons; and secondly, but primarily, the role of the patron as 
the major benefactor (among other benefactors) of the community while the 
others are more or less the beneficiaries from the craft and 'benevolence' 
of the patron. My conception of the client as a beneficiary draws its major 
elements and logic from a popular Okrika saying which asks: if one is a big
man, is it not necessary or fitting for the ordinary man to draw advantages 
from the big man's position. The local answer to the question is 'yes’ 
though it cannot be argued that this kind of expectation is exclusive because 
there are other expectations of the other classes of chiefs and elders.
But in grading these expectations, greater demands are made from the 
patron class^ - an account somewhat similar to Landds^ concept of leaders 
in Philippine politics. This is explained by the fact that the inequality 
of the different groups considered covers the three realms of politics 
(power and influence), economic (money) and social status - areas in which 
the patrons outclass the others and these are the relations which constitute 
the main texture of social life in the Rivers State.
^Scott (James Scott: "Patron-Client Politics and. Political Change
in South€S5ajst Asia" APSR. Vol. 66. March 1972, pp. 91-113) 
also notes that patron-client structures are commonly found in 
Latin America and in Africa - in the sense that the big man 
(Opubo) is a key figure in the society. Yet Scott plays down 
the relevance of class for an understanding of clientelistic 
politics.
2
My concept of Opubo could be properly understood in Carl Lande*s 
account of Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of 
Philippine Politics. New Haven. 1964.
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In this context, even those of the traditional chiefly class, 
in spite of their local status and power, are included in the client 
terminology because in recent times the balance of power has shifted more 
to those who take or influence^ major decisions at Port Harcourt,
This has already been argued. These are decisions which have a very 
important bearing on the fate of the majority of the local people who are 
heavily dependent on the sharing of state benefits. Nevertheless, the 
patrons are only one class of personalities out of several other people.
Even if the four groups are examined separately, the patroi%^ll constitute 
a very powerful and influential class. These aspects of the power they 
wield, the position they occupy, and what they do with these assets strongly 
suggest the use of the title ’patron',, at least in a flexible sense.
For a stimulating discussion (and a similar study in Thailand) 
and the impact of^clientelism and factionalism in decision-making, 
see Fred Bigg’s study of Thailand: The Modernisation of a
Bureaucratic Polity, Honolulu. 1966.
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CHAPTER 4-
OFFICIAL PARTICIPANTS AMD POLICY MAKERS
It will be seen in this chapter (as in the last chapter) that some 
categories of local dignitaries - notably, the patrons - are participants 
in the decision-making processes and machinery in Port Harcourt. These 
patrons are not only ’participants' in decision-making, they are the key 
■policy makers who are at the apex of the policy-making body.
Though there are key personalities in the decision-making body in 
Port Harcourt, this chapter will discuss three main things, namely:
(i) the major official participants in community development (this part 
deals with government functionaries, both in the rural areas and in Port 
Harcourt, who are responsible for the administration of local affairs and 
community development projects); (ii) the relationship between these 
officials, and the lines of command in official matters, and (iii) official 
and local assessments of policies, especially with regard to the 
administrative performance of the officers in the rural areas,
CATEGORIES OF OFFICIALS AND FUNCTIONS
In broad terms, there are four categories of official policy makers and 
participants in the development affairs of the localities. These are the 
(i) Rural Development Officers, (ii) Sole Authorities - recently called 
Divisional Officers, (iii) Permanent Secretaries eind (iv) Commissioners,
Other official participants whose role will be discussed in later pages, 
work through, or liaise with, these four main categories of officials.
In order to ensure effective planning, implementation and management 
of local development projects, the Field Administration and Rural Development 
Division of the Military Governor's office (which in April 1973 formed the 
nucleus of the newly created Ministry of Rural Development and Social Welfare) 
is responsible for the general execution and coordination of community work 
at three levels through its agencies:
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a) Village or Town Development Planning Committee;
b) County Development Standing Committees, and
c) Rivers State Rural Development Standing Conference.
Local representation on the village or toivn planning committees is 
on a geographical basis. The geographical area is either the ward, quarter, 
or a section of the village or town. Their functions,^ among others, include:
i) the selection of local projects;
ii) laying down priorities (of projects) in relation to popular wishes;
(the popular wishes as expressed through the village or town assembly) and 
initiative,
iii) examination of the economic implications of projects - such as 
availability of funds and land; and the consideration of these 
factors vis-a-vis government policy.
Beyond the village or town Committees are the County planning committees 
comprising the following officers:
a) The Sole Authority and/or the Divisional Officer,
b) The Divisional Rural Development Officer and his Assistants,
c) The Divisional Agricultural and Fisheries Officers,
d) The Divisional Cooperative Officer, and
e) A Representative of each local government unit in the area.
The functions of these Committees^which are carried out under the direct 
supervision of the Divisional Rural Development Officer, include the following:
i) interpretation, dissemination and coordination of government policy in 
respect of community development programmes affecting rural communities; and
ii) the determination and provision of financial and technical assistance^ and
to ensure effective utilisation of all available resources for successful
I
implementation of plan projects,*
I
Policy Paper on Community Development: ('Guidelines and Objectives') 
Military Governor's Office, Field Administration and Rural 
Development Division. Port Harcourt. March, 1973#
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While the functions of the village or town planning committees are 
carried out under the supervision of the Rural Development Officer in 
charge of the County, those of the County Councils are supervised by the 
Divisional Rural Development Officer, Because of inadequate personnel,
Senior Rural Development Officers are located only at the county head­
quarters; while under them, the Rural Development Organisers oversee 
community work at the village level. And in order to ensure an even 
distribution of postings of Rural Development personnel - arising from 
personnel shortages in the higher professional cadres - the counties are 
at present, divided into seven zones,^ each zone having its own zonal officers.
At the last and highest layer is the State Rural Development Conference,
which is principally an inter-ministerial rural development committee. Its 
2
composition shows that almost all the 'professional ministries' are 
represented by senior officials - to ensure that in its discharge of official 
functions, the Conference is advised by competent 'professionals' whenever 
matters concerning their departments arise. As would be expected, the 
conference is 'directed' by both the Permanent Secretary and the Commissioner 
responsible for field administration and rural development.
The main functions of the Conference cover the following:
a) to advise the Commissioner responsible for rural development and 
field administration on all rural development matters;
b) to provide the liaison between government and rural development projects 
and other relevant agencies on community development, and
c) to deal with all matters of procedure on rural development training 
and other matters that may be referred to it for determination from 
time to time,^
/
^See s^iafee overleaf (Postings)
^See Appendix 5 
%
'Policy Paper on Community Development', Op, cit,
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MINISTRY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL 
\\TELFAiffi, ' RURAL IjlT/LLOPMENT DIVISION
P O S T I N G S
A. HEADQUARTERS STAFF
NO. OFFICERS DESIGNATION RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Mr. J.H. Wright C.R.D.O. Head of Division
2. Mr, J.V/, Owhonda Ag. P,R,D,0. Personnel Matters, 
General Administration 
Division. Matters 
concerning Zones and 
Divisions including 
Planning Committees,
3# Mr. G,N, Nwala Ag, S.R.D.O. Self-Help Projects, 
Works Service Unit,
4. Mr, P.E.A, Kuromierna R.D.O, Training Officer 
i/c Zone 'D'
Rivers State Young 
Volunteers,
3. Mr. L,T,S. Pepple Ag, R.D.O, Rural Water Supply, 
Transport Officer,
6. Mr, J.KeD, Briggs A.R.D.O, Community Industries 
and Craft Centres.
7. Mr, W, Decker R.D, Org, - ditto
8. Miss N, Bob-Manuel R.D, Org. Women Activities,
9# Mr, A, Jinn Asst, Works 
Superintendent,
Works Service Unit,
10. Mr, W,A, Akaninwo Senior Plant 
Supert^gOF
ditto -
11. Mr, L, Harry Store Keeper in-charge Rural 
Dev. Stores,
B. FIELD STAFF
ZONES OFFICERS 'PRESENT POSTING' NEW POSTING
ZONE 'A1 Mr. E,A, Abrakasa 
(A.R.D.O.)
i/o Brass Div, Nembe i/c 
Zone 'A'
Brass
Division
Mr. J, Daniel 
(R.D, Org,)
i/o Nembe C,C, Twon i/c 
Brass Div,
Oporoma
Division
NIL NIL Oporoma i/c 
Oporoma Div,
Kulama
Division
Chief J,B, Bazigha i/c S. Ijaw 
(WEST)
Ukubie i/c 
Kulama Div•
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FIELD STAFF CONTINUED
ZONES OFFICERS 'PRESEîiT POSTING* NEW POSTING
ZONE ’B' Mr. M.W. Wejinya 
(A.R.D.O.)
i/c Ikwerre C.C, Yenagoa i/c 
Zone ’B*
Yenagoa
Division
Mr. E.K, Igbe 
(R.D, Org.)
i/c S, Ijaw 
(EAST)
Yenagoa i/o 
Yenagoa Div,
Ogbia Mr, A.D, Okrinya i/c Ogbia C.C, Ogbia i/c 
Ogbia Div.
' ZONE 'C Mr. G,I, Amoni 
(A.R.D.O)
Headquarters i/c 
Craft Centres
Degema i/c 
Zone *C*
Kalahari
Division
Mr. G.G.J, Igani 
' (Ag, A.R^D.O.)
i/c N, Ijaw C.C, Degema i/c 
Kalahari Div,
Bonny
Division
Mr. C, Nwauzi i/c Bonny C.C, Bonny i/c 
Bonny Div,
ZONE 'D'
Ahoada
Division
Mr, S.E, George i/c Eîtpeye/
Engenni C.C,
Ahoada i/c 
Ahoada Div,
Ogba/
Egbema
Division
Mr, G.S* Princev/ill i/c Ogba
Egbema C.C,
Omoku i/c
Ogba/Egbema
Division
Abua/Odual
Division
Chief T.F.G, Deezim i/c Abua C.C. Abua i/c Abua/ 
Odual Division
ZONE 'E' Mr, U.S. Sangha 
(R.D.O.)
i/c Ogoni Div, Bori i/o 
Zone *E*
Tai/Eleme
Division
Mr. J, Sibor 
(R.D, Org.)
Headquarters Nchia i/c 
Tai/Eleme Div,
Bori
Division
Mr, M, Ighor i/c Gokana C.C, Bori i/c 
Bori Division
ZONE »F* Mr. G.K, Gbarabe i/c ^ egema 
Division
Isiokpo i/c 
Zone *F'
Ikwerre
Division
Mr. G, Ogbondamati i/c Ikwerre 
(NORTH)
Isiokpo i/c 
Ikwerre Div,
Etche
Division
(WEST)
Mr. T,A, MacPepple i/c Etche C.C, 
(WEST)
Okehi i/c 
■ Etche Div,
Etche
Division
(EAST)
Mr, B, Igwe 
(R.D. Org,)
i/c Eleme C.C, Eberi i/c 
Etche Div. 
(EAST)
FIELD STAFF CONTINUED:
130.
ZONES OFFICES ’PRESENT POSTING* NEW POSTING
ZONE 'G' Mr, G.W. Kalagbor 
(A.R.D.O.)
i/o Obio C.C. Rumupgba:i/c 
Zone *G*
Okrika Mr. V/oluchor i/c ‘Etche C.C, Okrika i/c
. Division (R.D. Org.) (EAST) Okrika
Obio
Division
Mr. B, Elemele 
(R.D. Org.)
i/c Okrika C.C, Rumuogha i/c 
Obio Div.
P.H. Mr. D. Whyte i/c Kalahari P.H. i/c
Division (R.D. Org.) County Council P.H, Div,
Source: Ministry of Rural Development and Social Welfare.
Port Harcourt. April, 1973•
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The composition and functions of these development committees 
show that direct governmental participation in local development is 
broadly at two levels and through two types (or grades) of government 
functionaries. There are the village (or town) and county levels of 
participants - these constitute the agencies responsible for accelerating 
the pace of rural development. The other is the Port Harcourt level of 
decision-making - the level at which very important decisions are made and 
communicated to the plan or policy executors in the rural areas. At each 
of these two ends, two types of government functionaries feature distinctly.
The Sole Authority and the Rural Development Officer represent the first type. 
These are the officers who represent, and are the embodiments of, the 
state government at the rural level. These are also the officers who 
supervise and coordinate community work in the interest, and on behalf,of 
the State government. All other government or local officials and 
Committees work through, and are subordinate to, them functionally and in 
status. The second type comprise^ the Commissioner and the Permanent Secretary 
who are the symbols of the state government, and from whom emanate key policy 
decisions. That precisely marks the formal hierarchy of function, power and 
prestige in decision making. It will soon be established that this is indeed 
the pattern of decision-making in the Rivers State rural development affairs,
I shall turn now to examine the emergence of the divisional and county bosses 
and their role in local administration and community work,
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
In the Rivers State, two factors made it imperative for an establishment^
of local administration responsible for effecting change in the rural areas.
2
The first is the unique problem of communication, a problem which made the 
interpretation of government policies to the people difficult. The second
^Military Governor's Office, Political Division, Port Harcourt,
^See Chapter 2,
derived from the first, is a consideration based on political control. 
The fear of local antagonism to the state government in Port Harcourt,
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which might result if the government policy had been indifferent to the
2people’s problems, was to be averted by a governmental decision to 
establish a local administration system which would, among other things, 
convince the people that a new government v/as in existence. These two 
facts and considerations will be made clearer soon*
THE DIVISIONAL AND COUNTY ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM: 1969-73
Basically local administration in the Rivers State is both an 
adaptation and a modification of the system which prevailed in the former 
Eastern Region of Nigeria, prior to the creation of states in Nigeria in 
May 1967* Changes which have taken place since I967 have placed an 
increasing emphasis (at least in the eyes of the government) on community 
development through local participation even though both the local people 
and government officials are members of the development committees. The 
government officials act as 'managers of change'. It is clear therefore 
that the introduction of local planning (development) committees has 
increased only the supervisory role of government officials in community 
development. The officials are not the initiators of development schemes.
In 19691 seventeen^ interim county councils and five divisions were
if
created. These councils were to exercise two main functions: assuming
responsibility for local administration, and supervising community development 
work in the council areas. In the former Eastern Nigeria, local councils
^Political control? This will be discussed later.
^Captain E. Araadi, Permanent Secretary, Military Governor's Office.
Port Harcourt, July 1971» 'Why we introduced the Sole Authority System.' 
(A Communique). See also F.J. Ellah, The Duty of a Sole Authority,
Port Harcourt, 1971*
%
Prior to military rule, there were 17 County Councils in the present 
Rivers State territory.
^Edict No. 3i 1969» Councils were to perform those functions contained 
in Local Government Law, I96O (Cap 70, Laws of Eastern Nigeria) and 
were empowered to make bye-laws in accordance with Section 83 of the Law.
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exercised the former function (local administration) while the latter 
(community work) function was mainly the responsibility of local people; 
government officials were not county council bosses as in the present 
Rivers State Administration. In the Rivers State, military rule had made 
it imperative for government officials to assume greater responsibilities 
in local affairs because when the former councils were abolished and new 
ones created, neither Presidents nor Councillors were appointed to direct 
the management of the councils. Obviously,, the tasks previously performed 
by local politicians fell on government officials.
Initially the councils were handicapped by an acute shortage of suitably 
qualified personnel, a problem which was aggravated by two main factors.
First of all, the state government deployed some former local government 
staff into the main stream of the Public Service - as a temporary measure to 
combat staff shortages in the general administrative cadres. At this period, 
the government had also just transferred from its exile base, Lagos, to its 
Port Harcourt headquarters. Following this, administrative priorities were 
obviously in favour of establishing and consolidating a Public Service in 
Port Harcourt. Therefore the establishment of divisional administration was 
not given a priority. Secondly, as a result of the disorganisation and 
destruction of the Nigerian civil war, there were neither staff records nor 
other documents to serve as guidelines in the deployment of staff in the 
right places and jobs. In fact, technically, it may be argued that almost 
nothing was bequeathed to the Rivers State government by the former Eastern 
Nigerian government.- this was conditioned by the peculiar circumstances of 
the civil war and its aftermath. As a result of these factors, the 
administration of County Councils faced tremendous difficulties and presented 
enormous challenge.
At that time, faced with these personnel problems, government officials 
in the localities were the four Divisional Officers in each of the divisions, 
excluding Port Harcourt which continued to be administered by the resident
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government as a municipality. Besides serving as the Sole Administrator 
in their areas of jurisdiction, the Divisional Officers were about the only 
officials who were given limited powers mainly in the fields of executing and 
administering minor social and economic projects - such as the construction 
of local market stalls and feeder roads. Yet in a strict sense, considering 
the size of territories under them, the Divisional Officers were far too 
removed from the centre of social, economic and political activities. For 
example, while Ahoada division alone constituted about 73 per cent of the 
Rivers State territory, Brass division accounted for GO per cent of the State
i
population. The riverine communication problems contributed significantly 
to these administrative difficulties. In this respect, it was difficult to 
describe the Divisional Officers as county officials, much less was their 
presence felt in the villages which were the main centres of community 
development work.
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS AND REORGANISATION
Partly because the problems of personnel shortages were reduced in 
later years - as a result of a more intensive staff recruitment policy and 
the establishment of more schools in the State - and partly because the old 
local administrative arrangements were found unsuitable for purposes of 
close and effective local government in the administration of local 
development projects, a new phenomenon in the administration of local 
councils was introduced in April, 1971» For the first time in the Rivers State, 
Sole Authorities (most of whom were administrative officers) were introduced^ 
as the Sole Administrators of their county councils. Seventeen county councils 
were created. Sole Authorities became council bosses and were vested with 
powers and functions of the council. In principle and practice, these 
officials were responsible for the day-to-day administration of their councils.
^The new 'Interim Local Government Councils’ Edict No. 4, 1971»
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In the words of the Rivers State Government, the objectives of introducing
this new system were threefoldj namely:
i) to bring government very close to the people;
ii) to strengthen the staff position of the county councils by
providing them with responsible staff of very high calibre, and
iii) to improve the performance and efficiency of county councils.^
The reasons for the changeover to the Sole Authority system of local
administration were therefore related to the inherent weakness (and problems)
of the old local government system which was not only unsatisfactory because
it v/as too removed from the local people it served. It could not also
serve as an effective machinery for accelerating the pace of social and
economic development in the remote villages and towns.
However, at the time this new local government system was introduced,
the name Sole Authority was somewhat vague and artificial to the uninitiated
in the real sense of what the name meant and the functions of the officials
though in every day communication most of the people understood both the name
and the function of the official to mean ’close and good public administration.'
But the Sole Authority v/as (and is) in practice the embodiment of the council,
local government, and indeed the State government as he was the clo^^st
representative of government at the local level. The government also expected
2
Sole Authorities to be more efficient, than the erstwhile local councils and 
councillors who,it was believed, placed too much preminum on politics and 
therefore neglected, to some extent, the primary objective of their existence - 
the improvement of the welfare of their people. It was also hoped that since 
such administrative heads of the councils were the politically neutral civil
^A memorandum on 'Local Government Administration in the Rivers State’, 
Military Governor's Office. Field Administration and Rural Development 
Division, Port Harcourt. September 1972.
2
Induction course by the Head of Service to Sole Authorities*
"Outline of Duties and Functions", (Section 13) May 22, 1971.
Port Harcourt.
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servants, the new system would - if given a fair chance - attract almost
all citizens in the county who had hitherto been excluded from participation
in local government, and in the planning committees because of their
diverse political persuasions.^
This expectation of 'mass involvement' in community projects and
local administration was a reasonable one in the eyes of the government
because of the military government's belief that issues in local politics
2often divided the people, and therefore local political differences were
obstacles to community development. But as events in Chapter 5 will show,
this expectation was too optimistic because even under military rule in
which county council administrators are civil servants, it has been difficult
to unite the people by official intervention (appeals for unity), not even
the promulgation of an edict. This turn of events discussed in Ciiapter 3
demonstrates one obvious fact: that only a people's willingness to unite
can bring about unity, assuming that unity is always necessary to foster
community development.
However, like their predecessor^in Ihe 1940's. Sole Authorities were
invested with wide powers in the administration of their county areas to
enable them to carry out their task of local development as effectively
as possible. That they were (and are) given wide powers is demonstrated
in this policy paper which is quoted below: ■
Though Sole Authorities were expected to contact the various 
ministries in policy matters which concern them (the different 
ministries) it is the Sole Authority who usually takes the 
first step by deciding on a course of action (sometimes through 
bye-laws). The Sole Authority may thereafter contact the'
Military Governor’s Office which is the supreme administrative 
organ in the State ... Such decisions which affect the local 
communities are, at this stage, conveyed in writing either by 
the Military Governor's office or the Sole Authority (or both) 
to any ministry which may be concerned in the matter.^
^Ibid. Section 19.
^See Chapter 3*
3At that time, the Sole Authority for Port Harcourt was named 
'Local Authority'.
Office of the Head of Service, Military Governor's Office, 
Sneech extracts. Tndnn-h-1 nn Cnn-ncc.. t nnn
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It could be seen from this policy that major decisions’ of local interest 
are taken either by the Military Governor's Office or the Sole Authority 
before they are communicated to the different ministries for their 
^idance and implementation.
Furthermore, the status of the Sole Authorities, and the wide powers 
they exercised in matters of local development, are demonstrated by one 
major administrative decision they could take - indeed a rare step allowed 
in administrative procedures. Usually in the administrative service, 
junior officers are expected to route their decisions, or recommendations, 
to their immediate superiors in the administrative hierarchy ^ for approval
or vetting. But in the case of the Sole Authorities, they were empowered -
1 2 though in exceptional circumstances only - to communicate directly with
the Head of Service, thus by-passing other ministerial heads both in the
&
field and in Port Harcourt. In exceptional cti^ es, they were also empowered 
to deal directly with, and advise, the highest political authority in the. . 
state, the Military Governor. This procedure was aimed at limiting the 
bureaucratic delays inherent in routing decisions through many superiors: 
delays which were believed to have frustrated^Sole Authorities in 
accelerating the pace of rural development.
^To a large extent, the Sole Authorities determine these circumstances, 
as such circumstances are not usually formally laid down.
2
Induction Course to Sole Authorities by the Head of Service,
Op. cit. (section 13).
^Ibid, (Section 15)
4
Sole Authorities for Nembe and Ogba/Egbema. 
Interviews. August, 1973*
13».
SOLE AUTHORITIES AS ASSETS 2  FOR WHOM?
Sole Authorities, it has been seen, enjoy certain administrative 
privileges - such as direct contact with the Governor - and exercise wide 
powers and discretion so that rqpid results could be expected in the new 
local government system. Therefore it is necessary, at this stage, to 
evaluate their performance.
In doing so, it is clear that one of the greatest' assets of the new
local government system is its closeness to the local people and the
'satisfaction* the people derive from the direct presence of these state 
government officials - in contrast with the former divisional officers 
who were not close to their counties and villages. This assessment was 
very evident in my interview with local people at Nembe and Bonny.
The Nembe chiefs I met expressed their satisfaction in this way*. 'Our 
Sole Authority is everything to us. He is our government, capable of 
representing the Governor, Please tell (pleading with me) the Port 
Harcourt Government that we are very happy with him (the Sole Authority) 
because Nembe has turned to be a city as a result of improvement he has
brought to us'.^ Nembe people al^jettile references to their new town hall,
the new community School and th^jetties as the significant contributions 
of their Sole Authority. Almost every community project was attributed to 
the efficiency of their Sole Authority.
As regards official communication, some of the bureaucratic delays 
in communicating official policies to the people have been limited because 
as soon as official policies affecting the county councils are made, these 
decisions are transmitted to the Sole Authorities through the 'Telex Service 
System* in the Governor's Office. 'Telex Sets ' were recently installed 
in most of the county council offices so as to facilitate communication
^4y assessment of community work will deal more with the performance 
of the officials, than with the mechanics of community development. 
This line of approach will be seen not only in this chapter, but 
throughout this work.
^Interview with Nembe Chiefs. September, 1973«
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between Sole Authorities and the Port Harcourt government. Sole 
Authorities have therefore become the torch bearers of government policy 
which affects the local people.
In assessing this new system in terms of 'administrative gains and 
losses', the comments of some of the Sole Authorities provide a useful 
guide. These comments^ are summarised as follows. Our presence in the 
locality has helped to reduce possible local antagonisms to the state 
government, especially when government grant^ (for community projects) 
to some communities is considered by the people as either unfair or inadequate.
The Rivers State is under military rule. The rulers are not elected. 
Agreed. Yet from the above account of the Sole Authorities, one wonders 
whether Sole Authorities are not being used as instruments of political 
control. It is difficult to erase this impression of political control, 
because even if it is argued that military rulers are not answerable to 
the people as civilian governments are, it could also be argued that every 
government - civil or military - is keen on building a good image of itself 
before the people. Generally, governments would prefer averting any possible 
local uprising (or riot) to quelling it. Generally, apart from the problem 
of mobilising troops to deal with such uprisings, there will be local 
dissatisfaction with a government that resorts to using force on defenceless 
civilians* It m»y therefore be argued that the good relationship between 
the people and the government is fundamental to the existence of any 
government - the-Rivers State Government cannot be an exception.
3
It can also be argued that Sole Authorities have facilitated a more 
direct and quicker interpretation of local feelings -to the state government, 
and vice versa. Sole Authorities have also served as channels for developing 
and stimulating increased understanding, cooperation and participation
^A synthesis of interview responses by Sole Authorities.
September, 1973*
2
See Chapter 7* ,
For evidence and examples, see the later sections of this chapter -
"Take-over of county council roads."
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(in the relationship between the local people and the State government) 
in the diverse state programmes of economic and social development.
This is evident in the typical riverine areas where, among other factors, 
the harsh geographical conditions do frustrate the execution of some of 
the local development projects. In situations where almost everything 
is of political interest to the local people, the importance of the successful 
execution of local development projects, attributed greatly to the efforts of 
the Sole Authorities, cannot be overemphasised.
In terms of revenue^ collection, most of the councils, especially the
Port Harcourt Council, have been able to raise revenues by way of levying
market dues, licences and other fees. This matter of revenue collection is
important because an essential criteria, in creating a local council is its
viability and ability to provide basic social and economic services for its
people. The councils have therefore been less dependent on state funds, than
their predecessors; and in this respect they have been able to accelerate
the pace of economic and social development of their county areas. The State
government has, however, assisted these councils in the discharge of their
functions, by increasing its grants. For example, in the 1971/72 financial
year. State government grants to all councils totalled &350,000 - an amount
which reflected an overall increase of &50,000 over the previous year's grants,
2In accounting for the numerous self-help projects which have been recorded 
in the State in recent years, it can be established^ that part of the 
financial encouragement and stimulus has been provided by these government 
officers and their councils.
^See Appendix 6.
^See Chapter 7*
3An overall assessment - an assessment which is also supported by 
the Rural Development Officers,
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1It may also be added that in an attempt to improve on the 'sole 
authority experiment', the former 17 county councils were dissolved in the 
1973/74 administrative reorganisation in the State. In the place of 
the old councils, I8 new divisions and I30 town/community councils,
(excluding Port Harcourt which was given a city status) were created.
Official propaganda^emphasises one point - that the new councils will 
be given a large measure of responsibility to facilitate the rapid 
development of the rural areas.
While it may not be necessary to query what truth there is in the 
official propaganda about the responsibility of the new councils, the 
question is: how are the capacities and resources of the councils being
strengthened? Two things are significant in answering this question.
Firstly, even in the reorganised councils, the Sole Authority is still 
the Sole Administrator, Secondly, the old official expectations still 
prevail: that the Sole Authority should collect more local revenue to
help the councils finance more social and economic projects.
The final question about the Sole Authorities is: are they real
assets? Obviously they are assets to the government, because of the 
character of official expectations concerning their functions. They are 
also assets to tne people because the local people associate almost every 
local project with the efficiency of their Sole Administrators. There is 
also that psychological satisfaction which the people derive from the 
presence of these officials in the rural areas, a satisfaction which is 
taken into some account in local assessments of the popularity of their government.
1Both the V/ey's Commission which was appointed to examine the 
possibility of an administrative reorganisation in the State, 
and the State Government's terms of reference to the Commission 
use this expression 'improve'.
^Edict No. 3i 1973. In spite of the edict which calls the new 
divisional bosses 'Divisional Officers', most of the official 
circulars and the local people still refer to these officials 
as Sole Authorities. Moreover, no edict has defined the powers 
and functions of the new councils. In the circumstances, I shall 
call these officials, Sole Authorities.
See Nigerian Tide (the Government newspaper), Saturday, 3th May, 1973* p-1*
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If it were really necessary to assess the Sole Authority system in 
pure mathematical terms of 'plus and minus', the general feeling in the 
localities is that, considering the records of past civilian local
9
government councils which were believed to be stinking in corruption 
and little concerned in promoting local development, the presence of 
state government officials at the very local level has helped considerably 
to reduce corrupt practices in the award of local contracts and in the 
execution of development projects. Perhaps it could be argued that 
generally Sole Authorities are rarely bribed because of local fears that 
military governments and their officials do not accept bribes. Moreover,
Sole Authorities have no councillors in their councils, though they were 
supposed to have Advisory Councils which have not yet been formed, and in 
fact there is therefore no problem of dealing with corrupt councillors or 
councils, except the corruption of Sole Authorities if that arises. And 
the big question is-: who deals with a corrupt Sole Authority when he is
a local boss and where there are very few local people who can ever probe 
his conduct critically?
On the credit side too, the difficulties of local councils in respect 
of funds and personnel could be more easily transmitted to the Port Harcourt 
government official who has immediate access to the bureaucratic hierarchies 
in Port Harcourt. Furthermore, the mere fact that in the history of local 
government in Nigeria, this is the first time that central (or regional) 
government officials are being used directly to administer and supervise 
the affairs of local councils gives some psychological satisfaction to the 
people that^is a government 'in the interest of the people'. This is 
strengthened by local belief that a state government official is better - less 
corrupt and more efficient - than the local councillor type of officials. 
COMPARATIVE STATUS AND ROLES
In reviewing the role and performance of the Sole Authorities, certain 
facts may be reiterated at this point. Before Rural Development Officers
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were appointed and posted to serve in the rural areas, it was the Sole 
Authority who performed the dual roles of a local administrator and a 
rural development Official. The administrative officer was the first to 
arpive in the field; and under him local development projects were initiated 
and executed. The post of a rural development official, created in 1971, 
in the Rivers State is in this context. of recent creation compared with 
their administrative counterparts.
With the appointment and posting of rural development officials in the 
rural areas, both officials (the Sole Authority and the Rural Development 
Officer) work as a team in the field. While the Sole Authority assumes 
responsibility over local government administration, the Rural Development 
Official assumes responsibility over community development projects in the 
locality - as the professional head - though he operates under the 
administration of the Sole Authority. However, the Rural Development Official 
occupies a position more distinguished than any of his other professional 
counterparts because he is believed to be a greater expert in community work 
than the others. Again, the Rural Development Official is closer to the people 
becaufee hag-is often an adviser to the community on community work. He is 
therefore well known in the locality. His status is improved because in the 
eyes of the people, he is the direct local representative of government in 
the allocation of grants to communities*
But there is team work in the field. In this team work, the Sole 
Authority is at least 'primus inter pares'; and in actual fact he is much 
more than that because of the special distinguished position of .the 
administrators in the Public Service. The eminence of the local administrator ■ 
the Sole Authority - is largely derived from this background. If one were to 
examine the status and role analogy (in local administration and development 
affairs) between the Sole Authority and the Rural Development Official, it is 
obvious that the Sole Authority enjoys greater powers and prominence.
In terms of services and developments - social and economic - required
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or demanded in the local areas, there are invariably no limits to what
the local people expect the State government to do as the sole or major
instrument of accelerating social and economic changes. These expectations
are rife principally because of the alleged (how genuine?) accusations that
the parent region (Eastern Nigeria) from which the Rivers State was created 
1neglected the social and economic development of the ethnic minorities who
form the present Rivers State, Hence the state government’s objective^- as
expressed in government policy papers referred to in earlier sections of
this work - in this respect have centred on assuming responsibility for the
direction and utilisation of high level manpower and natural resources with
a view to creating and maintaining a climate conducive to widespread economic
and social wellbeing, particularly in the rural areas. In administrative
terms, it is however argued that the success or failure in the realisation
of these objectives (of local development) will depend greatly on the
efficacy of the common denominator of administration, or rather the personnel
deployed in the management of these services and projects. It is further
argued in general administration, that in an age of rapid change and increased
responsibilities of central government, if the Public Service is to be efficient,
it should be staffed by people whose qualifications, experience, outlook and
training fit theiii for the planning and management involved in government,
THE PERMANENT SECRETARY AND THE SOLE AUTHORITY
The status and role differences between the Sole Authority and the
other senior administrators (especially the Permanent Secretaries) will be
examined against this foregoing background. In spite of the fact that the
Sole Authority is equipped with wide powers in the administration of his county,
generally the Sole Authority in the Rivers State is a junior administrator
2
compared with officers of the Permanent Secretary cadre. The postings of
^See Chapter 6,
^See a) Rivers State of Nigeria, Staff List. No. 1. April 1972
b) Rivers State Office and Quarters List. No. 13. April-June 1974
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Sole Authorities, as in May 1973i clearly demonstrate this fact: of the
seventeen officers, twelve were in fact the most junior grade of administrators 
(excluding the officer for Port Harcourt who was the most Senior of them all -
a Group 8 officer) while the rest were in the executive officer cadre; these
I
Executive Officers are in the grade of general duty administrators who are 
usually considered junior to the most junior administrative officer. The 
Sole Authorities for Kalahari and Okrika counties belonged to this most 
junior category of officers. In administrative assessment, this meant that 
in terms of qualifications (not necessarily academic), outlook and experience, 
a majority of the Sole Authorities were inferior to other senior administrators 
in the planning and management work covered by their administrative duties.
It therefore follows that these officers are subordinate to other senior 
administrators; and in the administration of their county councils, they 
must take a reasonable number of policy directives from senior officers at 
the Port Harcourt headquarters. This procedure is usually followed to 
ensure greater success in the realisation of state development objectives.
The major reason behind this order of procedure lies in the assumption that 
the Senior Officers can take higher level decisions with less risk (and 
greater certainty) yet with greater success because of their superior 
qualifications and experience which enable them to examine decisions in 
greater details.
This problem of the right relationship between a junior and senior
officer is aggravated in the Rivers State by the peculiar situation in
which most of the civil servants found themselves quite unexpectedly
I
(because of personnel shortages) in relatively senior positions without 
adequate training and experience. The new statehood was attained without
1 ’ \  
See'L.A.B, lyagba, 'Establishing the Rivers State Public Service 
1967-71. ' M.P.A. dissertation. University of Ife, Feb. 1972, 
Chapters IV and V in which the Public Service personnel problems 
ai-e discussed in greater detail.
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sufficient political and administrative preparation on the. part of the 
citizens. Creation of states was effected in Nigeria in the wake of 
the civil war - generally, the war conditions and circumstances made 
planning very difficult.
In spite of general administrative contentions about the relative 
efficiency of the senior administrator as against the junior administrator, 
it cannot however be argued convincingly that the decision making capacity 
of a senior officer is greater (and more successful, by implication) than 
that of a junior officer at all times, because seniority does not always 
carry with it superior intelligence and wisdom. It could also be argued 
that the administrative capacity of some senior officers may decline in 
the later years of their career especially if they receive no further 
adequate professional training to cope with their increased and complex 
responsibilities; or old age may render them redundant. It is, however, 
equally difficult to assess decisions and management capacities in terras 
of negatives and positives - in view of the value judgements involved in 
making any such assessments. Similarly, while a particular administrator, 
senior or junior, may succeed in a particular circumstance and locality, 
he may fail in other situations even if his administrative capacities remain 
constant. Failure or success in such circumstances may depend not only on 
factors of seniority and experience, but on the particular administrative 
problems and issues involved, and such other forces extraneous to the officer. 
Some problems are perhaps less or more difficult to tackle than others.
As McGrath^ contends, first and foremost the Administrator must be a problem- 
solver; in this context, it may be argued that the better or more successful 
administrator is the one who takes decisions with minimum delay and costs, 
but with maximum results - input and output measurements - in terms of the 
number and type of problems he solves.
F.D. McGrath, 'The Role of the Administrator' in 
Readings in Public Administration, Institute of 
Administrating, University of Ife, 1971, p. 6.
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LINES OF COMMAND AND EXPECTATIONS
However, whatever problems or difficulties are inherent in assessing
administrative efficiency or in determining whether a senior officer is a
better and more competent problern-solver than the junior officer, there
are clear lines of command in the Rivers State Public Service. Two factors
determine^ who is subordinate to the other: seniority and experience;
hence the Sole Authority is subordinate to the other senior officers in
the administrative hierarchy, and especially to his Permanent Secretary.
In the official relationship between the Sole Authority and his
Permanent Secretary, the role of the former is therefore advisory.
Ultimately, it is the Permanent Secretary who takes final decisions and
accepts responsibility for these decisions. Even though the Sole Authority
is a boss in his county council, it is this factor of inferior and junior
status which mainly accounts for the limited powers and influence exercised
by the Sole Authority in the Port Harcourt administration - a situation
which demands that the county council boss must talce directives from his
Port Harcourt bosses.
Besides this factor of differential status between the Sole Authority
and other higher officials, it is the policy of the Rivers State government
2
that in the postings of field administrators, no Sole Authority will be 
appointed to serve in his county or community of origin. The main reason 
underlying this policy is to prevent Sole Authorities from identifying with 
the interests and local politics of their people, and also to make these 
officials more amenable to higher officials in Port Harcourt. The official 
assumption is that while defaulting Sole Authorities could be disciplined, 
it will be difficult for these officials to be detached from the politics
^Official policy.
^See Port Harcourt Office and Quarters List. No, 12, 1973, p.83,
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of their native communities if this policy were not pursued. Besides, 
it is argued that this question of communalistic attachments of the official 
cannot be resolved by official disciplinary action, and so ’preventive actions’^  
are better than 'punitive or disciplinary actions*' Furthermore, the official 
expectation.is that Sole Authorities who serve in places other than their 
native areas will be more impartial and less sentimentally involved in 
dealing with the problems of their counties*
It could be deduced from this policy that the State government recognises 
the fact that it is difficult for officers serving in their localities to be 
divorced from the politics of their people because, of the traditional loyalty 
and obligations to one's native place (see Chapter 1). Yet there are other 
social and administrative problems which may be associated with this matter*
The office of Sole Authority in any community or county is not a permanent one* 
They could be transferred to any locality, or posted to a ministry in Port 
Harcourt, at any time* In such circumstances, government may perhaps 
succeed in weakening or reducing the natural ties which bind the Sole Authority 
to a particular native community. But on the other hand, the office of a 
Permanent Secretary - or Commissioner - in Port Harcourt is a more permanent one. 
Though a Permanent Secretary could be transferred from one ministry to another, 
he is the key official who will always be intimately involved with important 
state decisions and policies - decisions and policies which affect the inte^^sts 
of all communities, including his own. In effect then, a Permanent Secretary 
has some advantages over the Sole Authority and other junior officials.
First of all, he is senior to them and he will therefore be responsible for 
giving and enforcing most of the 'administrative directives'. Secondly, he 
is more intimately linked with the making of important state decisions.
^As reflected in the official policy on postings.
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Thirdly, by virtue of his seniority and experience, it is believed that 
he is a more effective instrument for accelerating local development - by 
the type of mature decisions he is capable of taking at Port Harcourt, before 
he may delegate his responsibilities to the field officers.
THE PERMANENT SECRETARY AND THE COMMISSIONER
The permanent Secretary is no't, however, the most senior in the lines 
of administrative command in policy making on community development. This 
point is particularly significant when one examines the highest policy making 
body in rural development: the Rivers State Rural Development Conference.
Though this Conference is headed at the administrative level by the Permanent 
Secretary, it is the Commissioner who is the political boss, and is accountable 
only to his colleagues in the Executive Council and the Military Governor.
Above all, a 'Commissioner can request the Head of Service to transfer a 
Permanent Secretary to another ministry, if the Permanent Secretary's 
administrative leadership of a particular ministry is not in the best interests 
of the ministry. It is the Commissioner who ai.so decides when it is not in 
the best interests of a ministry to retain a particular Permanent Secretary.
Beside these status differences between the Permanent Secretary and the 
Commissioner,whereas there is no standing committee of Permanent Secretaries, 
the Rivers State Executive Council could be described as a standing committee 
of Commissioners because this council meets regularly and is responsible for- 
taking final decisions on applications for community grants. (See Chapter ?). 
By the principle of collective responsibility, the Executive Council also 
accepts responsibility for the general administration of rural development. 
Therefore, the Rural Development Conference is subordinate to the Executive 
Council, and the role of the former is advisory.
It is also evident, from these different roles and positions of the 
officials that at the highest state level, the officials who are primarily 
responsible for rural development affairs are those in the patron class, 
even though those who directly administer these affairs in the rural areas
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are not necessarily the patrons. The direct administrators are the Sole 
Authorities and the Rural Development Officials. An interesting question 
can therefore be asked: how powerful can the Rural Development Conference
be if these patrons occupy positions of power superior to the Conference?
The answer is an obvious one. Firstly, the Conference is powerful in so far 
as these patrons accept its advice, subject to agreement between the Conference 
and the patrons on policy matters. Secondly, the Conference is powerful if 
the interests of the patrons do not supersede overall state interests. 
Ironically, the patrons determine what constitutes an overall state interest.
The following administrative case-study on the take-over of county council 
roads by the State government elucidates the political and administrative 
relationship between the Conference and those of the patron class (notably, 
the Commissioners of cabinet rank). As will be shown in what follows, for 
certain reasons, the case-study is important for an understanding not only 
of the political and administrative relationship between the Conference and 
the patrons, but also of the relationship between the local authorities
and the Port Harcourt administration.
Firstly, the case-study shows that at the official level, there are 
certain inconsistencies in policy-making. Though the initial policy of the
Rivers State administration was to strengthen the capacity of the local
councils, yet because of local pressures for an increased participation of 
the central government in the development of the county councils, the Port 
Harcourt administration abandoned its initial policy.
Secondly, communities in the Rivers State are powerful ’pressure groups' 
in state politics. The communities can effectively threaten the government 
to redeem their promises to the people. Indeed, a promise is a debt to be 
redeemed.
Thirdly, in policy-making, the field officers (notably the Sole 
Authorities) serve as effective links between the local authorities and the 
state government. In spite of the junior status of the field officers and
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the high premium which the government places on ’seniority’ in the
administration, the government greatly relies on junior officers for
advice regarding the social and economic conditions in the County Councils,
I Furthermore, it is clear that in spite of the administrative
decentralisation^ in the state, there are,and must be, areas of cooperation
(in community development) between the field officers and the other senior
2administrators in P^rt Harcourt. A sound partnership between the field 
officers and their superiors in Port Harcourt is necessary for an 
effective administration and management of local affairs.
TAKE-OVER OF COUNTY COUnCIL ROADS 
BACKGROUND
During the rainy season, most of the roads in the county council areas 
are marshy. The roads are also impassable during this season; and even in 
the dry season', the condition of the roads is very poor. (See Chapter 2). 
On their own initiative, the local people therefore mobilise labour for 
clearing these roads both in the dry and rainy season. In Obuburu area 
(Ogba) the people work on their roads twice in a year - during the local 
festival in August (rainy season) and in the Christmas period (dry season).
1The concept is well analysed by Ronald Wraith in his book. 
Local Administration in West Africa. London. 1972. pp.13-26.
2
The concept of partnership is fully discussed in the 
déport of the Committee on Decentralisation of South Eastern 
State Governmental Functions. Calabar, 1973. pp. 20-51
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Generally, the poor communication network has harmed the economy 
of most of the rural areas. To take an example, the villages in 
Northern Khana (Ogoni) and O^ba produce the bulk of the palm oil, yams 
and palm fruits in the Rivers State, There are market days for selling 
these products; and local trade between these agricultural communities 
and the other communities in the State is extensive. But during the rainy 
season, trade among the different communities is disturbed because the 
roads are impassable - the local markets are closed for.some weeks in the 
year. In short, the exchange of goods is disturbed at certain periods 
of the year.
Therefore, in 1971, most of the villages in Ogoni and Ogba areas 
(particularly, Baen, Luubara, Akabuka, Obuburu, and Omoku),petitioned the 
Rivers State Government to improve the condition of t^ese roads, arguing 
that "the existence of a good transport network forms a vital part of the 
basis for a worthwhile economic activity in any country". These villages 
further argued that "besides making communication easier, the construction
of good roads will help to increase the size of existing markets and create 
new ones" , It was implied in these petitions that the community councils 
could no longer provide adequate resources (money and labour) for the
Interviews with farmers in Ogoni and Ogba areas, 15-20th Sept. 1973 
In Ogoni areas I discovered that three villages - Baen, Duboro and 
Luubara are 'trading partners'; there is a central market at Luubara, 
Most of the farmers use bicycles for carrying their goods to the market. 
But during the rainy season, most of the farmers and traders in Baen 
find it difficult to travel to Luubara (a distance of 2 miles) to sell 
their food crops, Most of the farmers complained that, on the average, 
the market is closed for about 4 weeks during the rainy season - because 
of the poor communication network. There are similar problems about the 
use of the market at Obuburu which serves the three villages in Egi Test,
^R.S.G. file - MGO/LG/C/25,
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maintenance of these roads. The government was therefore invited to 
assume responsibility for the maintenance of these roads. Had the government 
the resources to assume this responsibility?
In January 1972, the Field Administration and Rural Development division 
of the Military Governor's Office delegated the Sole Authorities to examine 
the complaints of these communities. The Sole Authorities and the Rural 
Development Officers inspected roads in all county council areas and sent 
an interim report to the Military Governor's Office. Thereafter, the 
Military Governor's Office advised the cabinet: county council roads were
in a deplorable condition and government should take responsibility for the 
maintenance of these roads as soon as possible. Therefore in March 1972, 
the Cabinet "decided in principle that government should take over all such 
(county council) r o a d s . I n  April 1972, the cabinet appointed a 4-man Committee 
(representatives of the Rivers State Rural Development Conference) to study 
and make detailed recommendations on the take-over of council roads. The 
composition of the Committee was as follows:
i) The Permanent Secretary, Field Administration and Rural Development -Chairman 
ii) The Controller of Works - Member, 
iii) The Surveyor General - Member 
iv) The Chief Rural Development Officer - Member.
In May 1972, the Committee instructed all the Sole Authorities to provide 
more detailed information regarding county council maintained roads - 
(i) the general condition of roads (for example, whether the roads are sandy, 
water-logged or tarred); (ii) the social and economic importance of the roads 
and (iii) recurrent expenditure in the maintenance of council roads.
^Cabinet Division, Military Governor's Office.
Executive Council Conclusion EC.7(72)3*
i j  ^
Generally, the reports^ of the Sole Authorities confirmed that the condition 
of the roads was poor (most of them were water-logged and marshy) and so 
inter-village trade was declining. The reports further confirmed that most 
of the roads were of economic importance to these communities,
LABOUR COSTS.
For its part the Committee found that the sixteen county councils
2
(excluding Port Harcourt) maintained about 1635 miles of road. The total
3
labour force for the maintenance of these roads was 824, while the councils 
spent about £118^711 annually on recurrent expenditure for the maintenance 
of roads. On the average, six councils (Khana, Ikwerre, Etche, Ckpeye, Ohio 
and Kalahari) spent about three-quarters of their budgets on the maintenance 
of roads, while the other councils, spent about three-fifths of their budgets 
for the same purpose. In particular, Khana and Kalahari councils were in 
deficit in their road budgets, .
Considering the social and economic importance of the roads, the 
Committee^ found that neither the labour strength nor the recurrent expenditure 
(for labour) was adequate for the maintenance of the roads. The economic 
resources of the councils were inadequate because the revenue of the councils 
was derived chiefly from motor park and market fees, but market fees had 
declined because most of the markets were closed during the rainy season.
The committee felt that, on the average, it was necessary for councils to 
deploy one labourer per mile of road, if the councils were to ensure a 
maximum utilisation of the labour force to optimum advantage. The committee 
therefore recommended that at least 1635 labourers should be deployed for 
maintaining 1635 miles of road.
1
m.M. Awi, 'Report of the Committee on the take-over of county council 
roads', (Annexure 1) Military Governor's office. Port Harcourt,
2577 miles of road were maintained by the six communities covered in this 
study and about two-thirds of these road mileages were maintained by the 
hinterland communities. See table overleaf,
3 'See Table 1 overleaf,
^ Cabinet papers - RSG/CM/72)62 of Duly 1972,
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TABLE I
PARTICULARS OF COUNCIL MAINTAINED ROADS
County Number 
of Roads
Combined 
Length 
of Roads
I'kmiber of 
Labourers
Total Cost 
of Labour
(Miles) £ : s: d
1. El erne 6 42 42 5,388: —
2. Gokana 5 25 27 4,676:13: 4
3. Khana 34 271 104 20,991:17; 4
4. Okrika 11 28 28 3,963: -
5. Bonny 4 23 20 2.851:
6, Kalahari 16 103 78 12,885: -: “
7. Ogba/Egbema 18 106 47 5,806: —
8. Ogbia 2 38 16 2,268: - ,
9. Northern Ijaw 15 63 7 959: -: "
10. Southern Ijaw 9 88 15 2,129: -
11. Nembe 4 31 11 1,496: —
12. Ikwerre 35 279 125 18,057: 7: 4
13. Etche 40 238 101 14,749:10: -
14. Ohio 12 51 94 6,476: -: -
15. Ekpeye/Engen#/ 38 205 88 13,608: -I —
16. Abua 11 44 21 3,057: -: -
Total: 260 1,635 824 118,711: 8: -
Summary:
Number of Roads: 260
Combined Length of Roads: 1,635 miles
Number of Labourers: 824
Cost of Labour: £ll8,711î 8: -
Source: Field Administration and Rural Development Division
Military Governor's Office, Port Harcourt. September 1973. 
■ . (R.S.G. File MGO/LG/C/25 p. 5). (
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On recurrent, expenditure, it was the view of the comniittee that the 
councils would require about £257,508 (based on the existing wage rate of 
b/9d per labourer per day) for the maintenanco of the roads. If this sura 
wore incurred on recurrent expenditure, an increase of £138,7^7 would he 
required in council budgets to meet the operational cost of road labour - 
considering the fact that at that time the recurrent expenditure on road 
services was £118,711 (see Table 1), Purtherraore, it was the opinion of the 
committee that £257,508 was inadequate for maintenance purposes. Members 
argued that about £503?626^ was the minimum amount required to maintain 
1924 miles of road (including 289 miles of what the Sole Authorities referred 
to as 'feeder roads'),
COST OP MATERIALS
The Committee maintained that the cost of materials should be related to
the condition of the roads in each county council. Therefore’the cost would 
2vary from one coimcil area to another. It was decided that the work of 
assessing the cost of materials (for maintaining the roads) should be 
assigned to expert engineers. Hence the Committee recommended that a firm 
of engineers and staff of the Ministry of Works and Transport should be 
commissioned to carry out a survey of the roads - a job which involved both 
the assessment of the cost of materials and a classification of major and 
feeder roads.
As an interraim measure, the Committee recommended that for each raile,^  
the sum of £150 should be provided for the purchase and maintenance of
In the maintenance of the feeder road, the Committee took 
into account a similar wage rate of 8/9d per labourer 
(for 2B9 miles of feeder roads.)
2
For example, consider the condition of roads in the riverine 
areas where the roads are. generally swampy during the rainy 
season while roads in the hinterland areas are a little better 
- by virtue of their geographical location ~ than those in the 
riverine areas.
1%,
materials - in accordance wj.th the conven'bional practicefj in the former 
Eastern Mgerieaj Civil Service. If this interim recommendation were 
accepted, about £245?250 would have been required annually for l6j>5 railGs
(excluding feeder roads).
I
But shortly before the Committee held their last meeting, they were 
under pressure from two villages - Baen and Bane* In a joint petition^ 
sent to the Committee, these villages remarked that "the government only- 
paid lip service to the policy of maintaining and reconstructing roads in 
the State" - apparently referring to the official decision to take over 
roads 'in principle'. These villages declared: an effective take over
should be done soon, and "soon must be soon". In summarising their demands, 
the villages further declared that if the decision to take over roads (not 
only in principle but in practice) was not taken soon, the government would 
have itself to blame for whatever actions they (the villages) took to 
ventilate their grievances. Was this a threat?
Shortly after the petition had been received by the Committee, the
2
Committee made their final recommendation to the cabinet. They recommended 
that all the major roads in the councils should be taken over by the 
government, - that is, the government should assume full responsibility 
for the maintenance of the roads both 'in principle and in practice',
X
On the question of expenditure, it was recommended that about £503,000-' 
would be required for maintenance services (labour and materials) o n  
major county council roads.
^The petition entitled "Soon must be soon" (dated 15 June 1972) 
was signed by ten chiefs from the two villages,
^R.S.G. files - (i) MGO/Lü/G/25 pp. 5-10 and (ii) HGO/EA 242 Vol. 11.
^This amount included £257,508 for labour and £245,250 for materials. 
At that time, considering the current annual expenditure (£118,711) 
of the councils, and their current labour force (824), it was 
necessary to increase both expenditure and the labour force by 
£384,289 and 811 respectively - if £503,000 was recommended for 
the regular maintenance of the roads.
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In the 1973/74 financial year, the cabinet accepted the recommendation^
of the Committee and took over the maintenance of major county council roads.
The amoimt (£503,000) recommended for the maintenance of the roads was also
approved - as an interim measure. Furthermore, county council roads were 
Xupgraded to 'Trunk B' roads and the Ministry of Works and Transport 
was instructed to determine the cost of materials and machinery required 
for upgrading the roads,
No doubt, by transferring local council responsibilities to the 
Port Harcourt government, the latter would incur considerable expenditure 
in the maint finance of the roads. Besides, when the new local govemraent 
administration introduced the Sole Authorities, it was the intention 
of the government that these officials should be largely responsible 
for the development work in their councils. Sole Authorities were 
expected to perform the functions of 'development administrators'.
Two major questions arise at this point. -Thy did the government 
accept the recommendations of the committee in the light of the 
foregoing implications (particularly in matters relating to increased 
expenditure) of such a policy? Didn't this decision on take over 
of roads detract from the government's policy that Sole Authorities 
should become 'development administrators'?
^See Rivers State of Nigeria ; Budget Speech. 1973/74»
Port Harcourt. p. 3»
^Executive Council Memoranda - (i) RSG/CM/(72) of July 1972, 
and (ii) RSG/CM (72)37-A.
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Five possible answers are suggested. Firstly, local demands 
for a take over of these roads were persistent; and these demands 
stressed the economic importance of these roads. It was difficult 
for the government to ignore these demands; more so as the direct 
représentât!V05'(Sole Authorities) of the government in the councils 
confirmed - in their report to the ministry - that council revenues 
were declining because of the poor conditions of the roads.
Of greater importance v/as the fact that without good roads, the 
markets could not function.
Perhaps, ono would also imagine that the petition from Bane and 
Baen ("soon must be soon") might have forced the government - to some 
extent — into taking immediate action in taking over these roads - 
more so as the government was accused of not redeeming its promises. 
Therefore one could speculate^ that the decision to take over roads 
might have been an attempt by the government to tighten its 
'credibility base' - to show that it v/as interested in redeeming 
promises.
Secondly, the economic and manpower resources of the councils 
were inadequate: this fact was emphasised by the Committee in their
recommendations.
^After the take over of the roads;Sole Authorities were 
instructed to assure their Councils that the government 
would always listen to local demands.
(Interview with Sole Authorities, September 1974)*
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Therefore in view of the economic importance of these roads, it was 
necessary that the Port Harcourt administration which had more resources 
should take over the maintenance of these roads - in order that as a long
term measure the councils could become more self-reliant if they derived
I 1
adequate revenue from the use of these access roads.
Thirdly, the 1972/75 financial year had been declared a "Rural Development
Year" (See Chapter 7) by the government. In that year, the government voted
W 2 million for rural development projects. It was therefore implied that
the government, was prepared to meet increased responsibilities in rural
development matters. This policy v/as outlined (by the government) in the
budget speech that year:
"it (rural development) will be pursued with still greater vigour 
this year. Development in these commL[^ %']^ 5 will be extended, 
diversified and consolidated so that, side by side with the
urban areas .. a happy, prosperous and virile state may be 
achieved."
Fourthly, for the first time in the history of the state, in the 1972/75
financial year, the government budgeted for a surplus of N6,306,000.
Furthermore, in the following year,-1973/74, the expenditure for recurrent
%
services totalled N43 million - a level of expenditure which was 25 per cent 
higher than that of the previous financial year. Considering these brighter 
economic prospects, the government could afford to meet up increased 
responsibilities.
1
Revenue from market fees. It has already been argued that market 
fees constituted a significant portion of council revenue.
Of greater importance was the fact that the markets were closed 
whenever the roads were impassable.
2
Rivers State of Nigeria Budget Speech. 1973/74. Op. cit. p. 12.
3
In 1973/74, revenue collection achieved an increase of 25 per cent 
over the previous year’s figure. However, in spite of the 
improvement; in the state's revenues, the estimated recurrent 
expenditure indicated a deficit.of N3 million (on the recurrent 
budget). In 1974/75 there v;as an estimated total revenue of 
NllO,668,830-- N2 million higher than that of the previous year,
See Rivers State Budgets- 1973/74 and 1974/75.
loO,
Fifthly, it was the intention of the government to strengthen the 
capacity of the councils in the development of their counties. Yet it 
appeared that because the economic resources of the councils were slim, 
the councils could not have assumed major responsibilities in community 
development. What could have been done by the government when local 
demands for a talce over of council roads were persistently made? If council 
roads were not taken over by the government, the conditions of the roads would 
have depreciated since the councils did not have adequate resources for 
maintaining the roads. On the other hand, if the councils were given adequate 
grants by the state government for maintaining these roads, in the long run 
the councils would probably become more 'management oriented' - assuming 
that there was an improvement in their revenue collection.
One would imagine that the government was faced with a dilemma. However, 
the decision to take over council roads did not appear to be consistent with 
the official desire to strengthen the capacities of the councils - even though 
it appeared that the decision to take over council roads was talc en not only 
because of the economic importance of the roads, but becase the economic 
resources of the councils were slim*
Although the decision on the take over of roads was not consistent with 
the official plan to strengthen the capacity of the councils in community 
development, yet the relationship between the Dole Authorities, the Conference 
and the Cabinet is clearly defined. The Sole Authorities are important agents 
of the government in the field, and though Sole Authorities are junior officials 
compared with officials in the patron class, both the Conference and the 
Cabinet rely on them for information in matters pertaining to their counties. 
This fact suggests that there is a strong delegation of responsibilities to 
field officers and that at the official level there exists some kind of 
pyramidal structure (the councils, the Conference and the Cabinet) in 
community development.
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CONCLUSIONS
From the functions, positions and roles of the different officials 
and committees, one may reach certain conclusions in this chapter. The 
fiyst is a very obvious conclusion. It need not be overemphasised that 
the patron is a very important personality because his position is not 
confined to his locality^ alone. He constitutes one of the key power 
centres in Port Harcourt; indeed the most important power centre in 
rural development affairs. The functional relationship between him and 
the Rural Development Conference bears out this fact. This Conference is 
a supreme body, yet it is dependent on the patron for final answers to 
questions, hence its supremacy is a limited one.
Secondly, it is clear that possible communalistic inclinations of 
the patron and other officials have been recognised by the state government. 
This is reflected by the official policy in posting field officers to 
communities other than their own. The state government's awareness that 
communalistic inclinations of the official are strong inclines one to 
argue that whereas in a military regime, political parties may be banned 
(as in Nigeria), it is doubtful if political practices such as protection 
or advancement of sectional interests in the public service can be banned 
or stamped out. In particular, a patron will remain a patron. My assumption 
in this chapter is that to some extent, even the boss in the field - such as 
the Sole Authority and the Rural Development Officer - is a patron because 
of his superior position in the field, like the colonial District Officer.
If this is true, as I believe, the extent to which the Rivers State Rural 
Development Conference performs its functions at the State level will be 
limited by the nature of interests protected by any official or patron.
There is a further as^unption underlying the second conclusion. This 
is the strong belief in the State that the principle of local interests plays
'^See Chapter 3»
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a significant, part in the decision making processes. Scientific 
data are not needed by local people to prove their belief; not even 
academic philosophies and explanations can dispel these impressions.
This conclusion will be pursued further in Chapter 7*
Thirdly, in matters affecting the interests of all communities (as 
seen in the take over of roads) one is inclined to observe that whenever 
official decisions are favourable to all communities, local complaints 
about the parochialism and the nepotistic inclinations of the officials 
do not arise. For example, the official decision to assume responsibility 
for the maintenance of all county council roads appeared to be satisfactory 
to all the communities. One would imagine that if roads in some county 
councils were not taken over by the government on the grounds that such 
councils were economically viable, local complaints from dissatisfied 
communities (as will be discussed in Chapter 7) would have been legion.
Fourthly, the people believe that administration has no purpose other 
than to serve the political goals of the different communities. This can be 
seen in the people's assessment of their Sole Authorities; the objectives of 
the government in establishing the Sole Authority system also bear out this fact, 
The senior civil servant has therefore come to assume a very important position 
in his localty; he is the government that ministers to the political goals 
of the people. It therefore follows that despite the lure of commerce and 
industry in recent times, the public service, which is the main arena for 
distributing benefits to the people, will have a great appeal to the people.
I arrive at this conclusion because given the uneven level of development 
among the different communities, there will be a basic desire on the part 
of many communities, especially the less developed ones, to see to the
1That other goals such as efficiency and effectiveness are 
sub-goals which are in fact underscored by the political 
goals.
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advancement of their interests in the public service. The local 
rationale that such interest can only be effectively advanced if there 
is some ’communal"^balance^in the public service reinforces this conclusion. 
Finally, two factors may stimulate certain fears of group domination 
in community development. The first is the numerical strength of senior 
administrators and commissioners from any particular community, while the 
second is the position of power and influence exercised by officials from 
any particular community. These two factors,will therefore be the definitive 
facts which will express the personnel imbalance in the senior grades of the 
public service; in fact fears of a political domination may be inflamed by 
related fears that a situation of economic domination may result from the 
political domination of one group.
I 6 G-
A RESUME.
In Chapter If I discussed houi political scientists have shown an increasing 
concern with central-local relationships in African countries* Furthermore,
I examined how the two key concepts - community and communalism- were to 
be applied in this work. In Chapter 2 I dealt with the ecological setting,
I also discussed the circumstances in which the Rivers State administration 
operated in the early years of its existence.
In Chapters 3 and 4 community development in both the local and public 
service gienas was discussed. Of the different participants in local 
development, it was observed that the patron was the most eminent, not only 
in the locality but also in the public service. The two chapters further 
explained the relationship between politics in the local areas and Port 
Harcourt,
In Chapter 5, I shall deal with how far chieftancy disputes have 
affected community development in Okrika, It will also be observed how far 
some of the segments in the community (as seen in Chapter 1) are in conflict 
with one another, thus affecting the pace of local development. It will be 
further observed that even within the community, there is some kind of 
pluralism. The major observation is that the community is not like a folk 
culture in which there is widespread consensus about political interests and 
values among people. In Okrika the congruence is much less perfect, and is 
produced by power struggles; and attempts are made to resolve the conflicts
I
by compromises so that the machinery for community development can function 
effectively. Compromise, it will be seen, was hardly achieve'd, largely 
because of the vicious role of the patrons - patrons who are believed and 
seen to be vindictive.
In Chapter 6, I shall discuss four themes; the agitation for a Rivers 
State; the emergence of patrons from the State movement; the general pattern 
of expectations in a new state; and the agitation for a Port Harcourt State, 
To the Rivers people, a new state was to provide the main platform for 
accelerating community development. In Chapter 7, the main discussion relates
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to the role of the cabinet in the allocation of grants to the communities 
and !ioui far the policies of the Cabinet are acceptable to the people. 
Finally, Chapter 8 provides the major findings and conclusions in this 
study.
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CHAPTER 5
CHIEFTAINCY DISPUTES AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT
Okrika, Nembe and Bonny are the three riverine towns where chieftaincy 
disputes, and other connected political rivalries have seriously affected 
development efforts at the local level. - However, of the three towns the 
Okrika disputes have been most violent in the sense that more human lives 
have been lost in these disputes. Regional and state government involvement 
is more noticeable in the Okrika troubles. Also behind these chieftaincy 
disputes, there are several other local political controversies (with 
historical and contemporary bases) which have given wider dimensions to the 
nature and significance of these disputes. In Okrika there has also been 
more material destruction - houses burnt and looted - as a result of 
these disputes.
Yet basically, in each of these three towns, the nature and causes of 
the disputes and their effects on local development are the same. The 
disputes differ only in magnitude. But since the political dimensions of 
the unrest at Okrika assume the greatest significance at the local and state 
level, I shall concentrate on Okrika in this chapter to give an insight into 
how such political problems and issues hinder local development efforts in 
these riverine towns.
Till] INSTITUTION OF AMANYANABO : HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES f 
WHY DOES AMANYANABOSHIP MATTER?
If chieftaincy disputes have persisted, and have been associated with 
intensive political rifts, in Okrika for so long, it is necessary to ask why 
the Institution of Amanyanaboship is of fundamental importance to the people, 
Okrika - speaking people comprise over thirty villages and nine towns.
Each village or town has its own head chief, and even within the village or town, 
there are several house or compound chiefs who are politically subordinate 
to the head chief. But an Amanyanabo is the supreme commander; all other 
chiefs, including the head chiefs, are subordinate to him. He is also
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regarded by the people as the living embodiment both of the ancestors
and of their successors. In ancient times, the political supremacy of
the Amanyanabo * s council v/as demonstrated by tv/o facts. The Amanyanabo's Council
v/as responsible for the general administration of the clan - settling land
disputes and other political disputes between villages and towns. It was
also his Council which negotiated^ trading treaties with foreign merchants
and vessels. As I have shown, the Amanyanabo was undisputedly superior to
the other local chiefs and therefore he v/as entitled to greater power and
respect in the clan,
DIRECT AND INDIRECT RULE,;
Even under both Direct and Indirect rule in Nigeria, though the office
2
of Amanyanabo lost some political value to both the government and the people 
(because the District Officers exercised some of their executive powers) the 
power of the Amanyanabo vis-a-vis the ordinary chief was not greatly diminished. 
The Amanyanabo was a member of the local government council; and comey duties 
were still paid to the Amanyanabo (as in the past) if he was the powerful 
political head in the locality. The Amanyanabo in his judicial capacity still 
presided over the Native Courts where so many local disputes were settled and 
fees paid. Besides these areas of influence, under the 'Warrant Chief System',
3
the Amanyanabo was responsible only to the colonial government, and those who 
elected him had little or no power to de't^Vone him even if he lost popular 
support. In this sense, even if his powers were diminished by the colonial 
government he exercised as much power as he could in his area, more especially 
as those who elected him could not dethrone him at their will. The role of 
Chief Daniel Kalio who mobilised community labour in the building of St. Peter's 
Church, Okrika, testifies to this fact - as it was reported^ that the Chief did
1
See Chapter 2.
2
For a discussion on their loss of power, see G.I. Jones 'Chieftaincy 
in the former Eastern Nigeria' in M. Crowder and 0, Ikime, eds.,
West African Chiefs. Nev/ York. 1970. pp. 312-324
*^ For example, the case of the deporation of King (Amanyanabo) 
Ibanichuka of Okrika,
4
Version of the Okrika elders.
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apply some force, compelled even the unwilling to contribute towards 
the church building project,
THE POST-COLONIAL PERIOD
in the post-colonial period, the office of Amanyanabo did not lose 
its importance altogether. In 1956 when the Eastern Nigeria government 
created the House of Chiefs, there was an official categorisation of 
Chiefs, ranging from first class to fourth class Chiefs, The Amanyanabo 
was not only a first class Chief and so superior to the other c^hiefs; 
he v/as a member of the House of Chiefs - a House which v/as symbolic of 
prestige, and most members, especially the Presidents of County Councils 
(the Amanyanabo) became salaried officials. Later, when a Ministry of 
Chiefs and Customary Courts v/as created, the government was also responsible 
for grading and recognising Chiefs, In this respect. Chieftaincy became a 
highly politicised matter in which government was believed to have manipulated 
Chieftaincy appointments by recognising mostly those Senior Chiefs who were 
NCNC party supporters. Clearly, the impression was strong in the local areas 
that Chieftaincy appointments had become matters of regional political rackets. 
In Okrika in particular, this period coincided with Chieftaincy disputes and 
rivalries.
It is against the foregoing background th^the importance^ of the Okrika 
Amanyanabo stool could be understood, as well as the interest shown in the 
disputes over succession to the throne. Because an Amanyanabo is, and was, 
a Supreme political leader, and he could influence political events, almost 
every family, village or town has become an interested party (as will be shown 
later in the chapter) in recent Amanyanaboship disputes. Furthermore, the 
local understanding is that Amanyanaboship brings with it both political and
For a discussion on the importance of Chiefs, see Chapters 3 and 6.
The Institution of chieftaincy has also become more important In recent 
times because of the creation of a Rivers State Conference of Chiefs 
-which is considered the nucleus of a House of Chiefs on return to 
civilian rule. Many chiefs are therefore eager to be elected Amanyanabo 
in order to become first class chiefs - a matter which is believed to 
have intensified chieftaincy rivalries in the state.
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economic benefits to the incumbent and his supporters. Who does not desire 
to ascend the throne (even if one has no genuine claims) given the chance, 
especially when the matter of its recognition in the past has become highly 
politicised? In fact recent economic and political changes in the Rivers State 
have also helped to give Chieftaincy disputes wider dimensions and 
complexities in the issues involved.
■QUALIFICATIONS FOR AMANYANABOSHIP
The question arises as to the nature of qualifications for Amanyanaboship. 
If the qualifications are well defined, why do succession disputes arise?
The office of Amanyanabo is an elective one within the ruling house or 
lineage. It is also hereditary, though it is not passed on from a father 
monarch to a son or daughter, but in the sense that only members of the ruling 
house or lineage are eligible to be elected. Yet within the ruling house, 
candidates for the office must also be descendants of the free-born line (as 
against those of slave descent); they must also trace descent from 
particular ruling sections.
In spite of the foregoing specifications about the rules of succession, 
the major problem about the qualifications for Amanyanaboship is that the rules 
of recruitment^ to the office do not appear to be very clear. There are also 
difficulties in assessing the credentials of the different contestants to 
the throne. Because of these difficulties, the election of an Amanyanabo has 
iDecome both problematic and highly political.
RECENT AMANYANABO DISPUTES^
In spite of these succession, problems, until about 1958, the Ado house 
was generally regarded as the ruling house. Kings and rulers of local
""I -
'See Appendix^. 'The Pattern and Rules of Succession i:o the Throne'.
2
Most'of the accounts given are the versions of the elders and chiefs 
from both the Ado and Oputibfiya families. (Personal Communication 
.with Okrika elders and chiefs. September 1975)*
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historical fame, such as His Highness, King Ibanichuka, and Paramount Chief
Daniel - Kalio, were all members of the Ado house. It is believed in Okrika
that successions to the throne were also peacefully done in the past. Those
who hold this view attribute recent political unrest (arising from the
Amanyanabo disputes) to the political machinations of some of Okrika's
communal patrons,Indeed, from 1958, an Amanyanabo 'palaver' started in
Okrika. The Oputibeya family and house, regarded by the Ado's as the next
most influential house to them, started to challenge the previously exclusive
right of the Ado house to the throne. At that time, the head chiefs of Ado
and Oputibeya houses were Chief Ogan and Chief Oputibeya respectively,
2
The major claims and arguments of the Oputibeyas were as follows.
Firstly, that in the past they too had their own Amanyanabo, such as Oputibeya 
and Ibopo. Secondly, that in the light of these historical records, they 
had as much right as the Ado's to the throne. Thirdly, whether they or the 
Ados could lay distinct and legitimate claims on their exclusive rights to 
the throne, the office of Amanyanabo could be rotated between them and the Ados,
In essence, then,and by implication too, the crux of the Oputibeya 
argument was that the Amanyanabo throne does not (and should not) really 
belong exclusively to either of the two rival families; or if it dic^ so, it 
was not the Ados whose claims and right had not been questioned for a long time.
For their part, however, the Ados did not admit that any Amanyanabo of 
Okrika had even been associated with, or hasadled from, the Oputibeya house, 
Amanyanabo had always been Ados, and Ados alone. All other chiefs and 
citizens of Okrika were (and are) therefore subjects of Ado kings.
^Their roles will be discussed later.
2
There are also 'Oputibeya Amanyanabo plates' which show a brief 
history of the Oputibeya dynasty. These 'plates' are found in 
their Amanyanabo shrines at Okrika.
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These Ado and Oputibeya arguments and counter arguments have two 
different sources. Whereas the Ados (of the Tuboniju faction) have 
always cited both Tuboniju oral traditions and local history books written 
by eminent historians^ of Rivers State origin to give greater support to 
their claims, the Oputibeya claims appear to be solely based on oral tradition, 
the authenticators of whom are Koniju (Oputibeya's faction) elders.
The Ado's interpret this as Oputibeya admission of weaker claims to the 
throne because the Oputibeya versions are mainly oral (an oral version which 
is rejected by the Ados) and without strong support from written sources.
Yet the Ado and Oputibeya versions and claims are credible within 
their different sections. Though the credibility of local history books and 
oral traditions are often questioned in Okrika, two things stand out clearly 
in these claims. Since 1958 the Amanyanabo issue has permeated the politics of 
the entire town, and indeed the politics of Okrika clan. While in ancient times, 
an Amanyanabo of Okrika town ruled mostly the Okrika town and its environs 
because there were very few village settlements outside Okrika islandj 
in recent times, the Amanyanabo's influence and power as a supreme political 
leader has spread to all Okrika - speaking people in the clan. The Okrika 
clan (as distinct from Okrika town) which comprises the nine towns.of Kirike ^  
(Okrika town, being the biggest in size and population) Ibaka, Ogbogbo, Cgu- 
Abuloma, Bolo, Isaka, Ogoloma and Ele is therefore the area where the 
Amanyanabo rules. Though each of the other eight small towns has its 
paramount chief or ruler, the fact that the Amanyanabo is the greatest 
political authority has involved the whole clan in the disputes and the 
Amanyanabo issue has become the focus of Okrika's politics. The Amanyanabo is 
in these respects associated with all community development efforts in Okrika,
^See E. Alagoa. A History of the Niger Delta. Ibadan, 1972.
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It is clear that though the Ajnanyanabo politics involvej-'all Okrika 
speaking people, there are two main families or houses whose interests 
are directly affected by the disputes. But these two families belong to 
two divisions or factions in Okrika town: the Tuboni.jus (the traders section)
and the Koni.jus (the fishermen section). The Tubonijus are the trader folk 
and as their name implies, in ancient times, the principal occupation of 
majority of their ancestors was trading; while the Konijus are the fisher 
folk whose occupation was fishing. While the Ados belong to the Tuboniju 
stock, the Oputibeyas are of the Koniju stock. At present, every Okrika 
citizen is identified with, or traces descent from, either of the two factions, 
depending on the occupation of his ancestors. This pattern of family (and 
house) identification along factional lines, inclines one to describe the 
political chieftaincy disputes as the "Tuboniju-Koniju" crisis,
3RI0TS, COMMISSIONS AND CORONATION
Since 1958, this chieftaincy dispute has become the major political issue
in Okrika, and almost all families have been deeply involved in the disputes.
There have been several political disturbances, resulting in riots. The first
and second major political disturbance occurred around March I96I and
December I96I, the latter lasting for about eight days. These two disturbances
took the form of riots in which people from the two factions attacked each
other with knives and guns. Several houses belonging to people from both
factions were also looted and burnt,^ In the second riot, which was more
2
severb than the first, about three people were reported killed, while several 
others were severely wounded. These victims were talcen to Port Harcourt General 
Hospital for treatment, A fev/ months later, because of the same issues, similar
^In December I96I, the estimates of the Okrika PolicePost showed that 
100 houses were damaged. Property looted could not be assessed 
because of unreliable and conflicting valuations,
2
Source: Police Post, Okrika, January I962.
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disturbances took place in Okrika, Casualties in these later disturbances 
were also considerable: as usual several houses were looted and burnt.
As a result of these political disturbances, rooted in the chieftaincy 
disputes, the former Eastern Nigerian Government instituted the Graham 
^bmmission of Encjuiry in I962 to inquire into the nature and significance 
of the political unrest » an enquiry into its ’why and how'. The Commission
was also to advise the government on the merits of the claims of the
different contestants (the Ados and the Oputibeyas) to the throne.
1The major finding of the Commission was that the Ados (and, by Okrika
political implication, the Tubonijus) had the sole right to the throne. The
government agreed with and accepted these Graham findings. As a sequel to 
this, chief Uwakwe Ogan, of the Ado family (Tuboniju) was crowned the 
Amanyanabo of Okrika on Z4th April 1964, followed by a religious coronation 
on 26th April 1964 at Saint Peter's Anglican Church, Okrika,
Later on, the Artianyanabo selected his council, as was customary, 
comprising a committee of some elected Okrika town chiefs and other local 
dignitaries. The local dignitaries in the Council were as follows:
(i) the Chairman of Okrika County Council, At that time the Chairman Mas 
Mr. J, JarPiabo, an Ogoloma man; (ii) Dr, 11 Fiberesima, a Tuboniju, and 
M.P. in the Eastern Nigerian House of Assembly; (iii) Mrs V, Egecnq (a woman 
representative)^a Tuboniju; (iv) Mr, Joe Fiberesima (as legal adviser), a 
Tiiboniju and Dr, Fiberesima's cousin.
1
HT Graham, Report on the Okrika Chieftaincy Disputes, Enugu. 1964,
It is reported that the Graham findings were based on interviews 
mostly with chiefs and elders from both factions in Okrika, In 
addition to these, the commission also received written evidence 
from other groups of people, mostly Efik a n d c h i e f s  in the 
former Eastern Nigeria House of Chiefs, The commission's findings 
were, and are, however rejected by the Konijus.
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Understandably, the Koniju reaction to these selections and appointments 
was that the most important and influential members of the council - especially 
the parliamentarian and the legal adviser - were either of the Tuboniju faction 
or they were people who had much sympathy for the Tuboniju cause. As would be 
expected^too, the coronation of an Ado Amanyanabo from the Tuboniju faction*, 
was not talc en in good faith by the other contenders from the Koniju faction 
because the choice of a Tuboniju Amanyanabo meant that the Oputibeya and 
Koniju claims to the throne were baseless. If this was so, there would never 
be a Koniju Amanyanabo for Okrika. This in effect also implied that it is 
onl; a Tuboniju Amanyanabo who would always rule and take political decisions 
for all sections and factions in Okrika. Above all, it Was understood by the 
Konijus that a Tuboniju ruler would always be more inclined to protect the 
interests of his faction; and that embittered by the memories of the Tuboniju- 
Koniju rivalries, he and his influential councillors might take reprisal 
measures against the Konijus. In Okrika politics, one thing that is greatly 
feared as a political reprisal is discrimination in the location of all or 
major development projects in a section. Another is a calculated policy or 
practice whereby people from one section are denied access to senior government 
jobs. A third, which is similar to the second, is discrimination in offering 
jobs (mostly unskilled and semi-skilled jobs) to people in general. Of these, 
the first and the second were Koniju's main fears if Tuboniju hegemony was 
left unchecked or unchallenged.
LOCAL FEARS AND THE .SEARCH FOR PEACE
The fears and suspicions which arose from the above incidents have been 
expressed in several political undertones in recent times. Since the 
Rivers State administration was established in Port Harcourt in I968, there 
have been rumours^ at Okrika that the Konijus would attack the Tubonijus as an
^In October I968, June I969, September 1971 and March. 1973, 
these rumours were widespread at Okrika and Port Harcourt,
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expression of their‘dissatisfaction with the decision of the former Eastern 
Nigeria Government on the chieftaincy matter. There have also been counter 
rumours that the Tubonijus were planning to attack the other faction in order 
to demonstrate their political superiority over the Konijus. Such an alleged 
attack would also subjugate and silence the Koniju people for ever, so that 
there would be no further political rivals and rivalries. Whenever such 
rumours were peddled, it was characteristic of Okrikans to remove their valuable 
property at Okrika for safe keeping in Port Harcourt. After t^at, each party 
usually showered abuse on the other and threatened to overrun the other 
militarily.
It is pertinent to point out at this stage that whatever may be the
elements of truth or falsehood in these rumours, several other communities in
1the Rivers State believe that the political unrest in Okrika is now a perennial
problem, and that riots (or threats of riots) have become a common feature of
Okrika's political history. In short, riots are now part of Okrika's custom
and 'festive occasions'*, Okrika people ai’e therefore generally described by
other Rivers people as the warriors of the Rivers State, They are easily
irritated and ready to fight at the least provocation. At the State level,
records of Okrika's quarrels and wars with other groups - they fought the
KalabariJS' in 1950 - are indeed numerous. Though offenders in these quarrels
and wars are rarely named, yet the fact that Okrika is always a party in th"se
disputes inclines people to believe that Okrika people are war-mongers. Even
within the Okrika clan, the natives usually refer to their love of riots as
2the 'pugnacious spirit of our people', Mr, Oforiokuma, whose name will be 
mentioned in later sections of this chapter, also refers to the Okrika people
The Kalabaris and Ikwerres on (a) 'Riotous Okrika' and (b) 'Okrika and 
its Troubles', These opinions have also been expressed in local 
newspapers - the Nigerian Tide (June-October 1973 editions) and the 
Morning Star (May-November, 1973 editions)
Edmund Orupabo's contribution in the 'Oforiokuma Unity Talks',
This theme recurred in almost all. speeches made in the talks.
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1as the most 'politically disorganised' in the Rivers State, The local
and state government attempts to bring about peace in Okrika also demonstrate 
that both the local people and the state government realise that political 
disturbances have adversely affected the pace of community development at 
Okrika,
In recognition of Okrika's political problems, several efforts have also
been made in recent times to identify and solve these problems. In 1971
Captain E. , a Permanent Secretary in the Military Governor's Office,
Port Harcourtsummoned prominent Koniju and Tuboniju chiefs and other
prominent Okrika citizens to a 'peace and unity' conference. In that meeting,
the Permanent Secretary had appealed to both factions to forget their past
political differences, and work together for the good of their community.
In the same year, and in 1972, the Okrika Students Union, consisting of
college and university students from both factions, also summoned chiefs and
Okrika citizens to unity conferences. Such unity conferences have been
?frequent, the most recent is the 'Oforiokuma' Unity Conference' held in 
the Court Hall, Okrika, on l4th and 15th July 1975* In all these conferences 
the theme has remained the same, and the Oforiokuma group aptly summarises 
it as;
(a) Unity through propaganda and enlightenment - a programme of 
enlightenment for the average citizen,
(b) Okrika's progress (development) through reconciliation and unity.
The outcome of these meetings and appeals in pursuit of peace and unity
still remains to be seen; but the general speculation in Okrika about these
^Oforiokuma's address to the Okrika Divisional Council of Chiefs, 
Okrika Town Hall, 7th July 1975*
2
Mr, Oforiokuma holds a University degree in Arts. He later 
qualified a.s an Accountant, He is one of Okrika's distinguished 
businessmen. Because of his elite status and success in business, 
he is very well known and respected at Okrika. Besides, he claims 
attachment to neither the Koniju nor Tuboniju faction,-.
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efforts is pessimistic because in the past several peace talks had been 
held without much success. In 1971 and 1972 Okrika chiefs and elders had 
assembled at the Okrika market square to take traditional oaths for keeping 
the peace. That was in keeping with traditional rites. Representatives of 
both factions had also made declarations of non-belligerency. To the Okrika 
people, these were (and are) the highest and most sacred traditional pledges 
chiefs and elders could malce. It is believed that failure to keep these 
pledges will result in the sudden death of the violator.
However, it could be observed that in the search for peace, there were 
two motives. First, there was the <jirgument by peace-loving Okrika people that 
Okrika's riotous history is a barrier to effective and organised community 
development. Secondly, through prophecy and native occultism, the chiefs 
understood and feared that the souls of the dead^ (who were peace lovers in
their days) at Opuama (Okrika's main cemetery) were angry with the Okrika people
for the incessant conflicts at Okrika, The souls of the dead therefore needed 
to be appeased. Yet despite these vows and pledges, in later months there 
were several threats of riots; chiefs, elders and members of the elite were 
believed to be inciting their people against those of the other faction. It 
was therefore a disappointment to peace-loving Okrika people that these 
dignitaries of whom had participated in earlier peace talks and oaths -
should fan the embers of factionalism,
A new interpretation therefore emerged: that each faction had used the
search for peace as an opportunity to label the other as uncompromising.
The peace talks had also been avenues for scoring more political points. 
Assessment of present peace efforts have been subjected to comparisons with 
the past. Hence, except in the composition of 'peace f|Æ(ütïîs' comprising
more distinguished participants such as Civil Commissioners and Permanent
^Chief Afib,ulu on the 'Ofonèkuma Peace Talks', 
15th July 1975. Okrika Court Hall,
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Secretaries, there is really nothing new or unique in the recent unity ta]ks. 
Like their predecessors the objectives are basically the same: the search
for peace and progress in Okrika. There is no disagreement of any nature that 
both factions want peace; rather the areas of disagreement concern two 
questions: (i) Vdiat are the ways and means of achieving lasting peace and
progress? (ii) Which faction should make the greater contribution and 
sacrifice in the search for peace and progress? Indirectly, the second 
question also asks: If there should be peace, at whose expense should it
be achieved? In political arithmetic it is evident that the major problem 
here is who loses or gains if the right of Amanyanaboship is conferred on one 
faction, and what would be its political and economic implications? Therefore, 
in the negotiations, what has created the greatest obstacles to peace revolvGB 
on fears expressed as 'why must the Tubonijus or Konijus gain or lose in the
search for peace?' It is obvious that no section wants to lose. It has become
a battle of profit and loss.
THE PRESENT NATURE AMD DIMENSIONS OF THE CONFLICTS
The Tuboniju-Koniju conflicts and their divisions in the Amanyanabo
chieftaincy affair have certainly become a serious political problem for Ok]ika
people. Yet these conflicts cannot be understood purely in the context of
native politics. Though the institution of chieftaincy is highly respected
and valued by the local people, native people do not destroy themselves or
riot just for the love of it. Neither do they riot for the salce of acquiring,
or being associated with, chieftaincy titles. A logical argument therefore
follows that when local conflicts assume such bitter proportions for so long,
there are complex issues which underlie them, I will nov/ turn to an analysis 
1
of these issues,
ELECTIONS I
The first such issue to complicate the climate of local rivalries is 
election to the two former parliaments - the Eastern Nigeria House of 
Assembly, Enugu, and the Federal House of Representatives, Lagos,
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The most recent electioneering experiences in Okrika were the I96I 
and 1964 elections to the former Eastern Nigeria and Federal parliaments 
respectively. There were two major contestants in the I96I Regional election.
One was Mr. Kalada Kiri, aged 50, and a graduate of an American university.
The other contestant was Dr. Fiberesima, aged 5^, He was a medical practitioner 
and a graduate of Dublin University. Mr. Kiri is a Koniju, while Dr. Fiberesima 
is a Tuboniju; both were (and are) very important personalities in their 
respective sections in Okrika.
Prior to the I96I elections, Mr, Kiri had represented Okrika in the 
Eastern Nigeria House of Assembly. He also represented Degema East constituency. 
As a member of the NCNC which was the dominant political party in Eastern 
Nigeria, Mr, Kiri had been an M.P, for about eight years (prior to I96I). He 
was a regular nominee of the NCNC. It was locally believed that Mr. Kiri was 
specially talented in politics - as if politics was his profession - and that 
he was indispensable as Okrika's parliamentary candidate. Furthermore, because 
he studied in America, it was believed that he was versed in American politics.
In short, in the locality it was difficult to question the superiority of his 
political talents.
The results of the I96I elections showed that neither the NCNC nor its 
official candidate, Mr. Kiri, v;as indispensable. The other rival. Dr. Fiberesima, 
who contested the elections as an independent candidate, was elected in the 
place of Mr, Kiri and the NCNC party. To the average Okrika man, this result 
marked the collapse and unpopularity (or declining popularity) of all 
personalities, factions and political parties which identified themselves with 
the old political order represented by Kiri and the NCNC party. It was 
therefore a victory for the new order^ and all those personalities and factions 
associated with it.
Dr. Fiberesima chiefly represented the new order. It was a new order 
in the sense that the old NCNC brigade had been rejected at the polls.
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In the 1964 Federal elections, the pattern of victory for Degema East 
Constituency (Okrika constituted about three-quarters of the population of 
Degema East) was similar to the results of the I96I regional elections.
There were tv/o contestants. The first v;as Mr. J. Jamabo, an Ogoloma man
I
from Okrika clan, Mr, Jamabo was fortunate that Ogoloma was not directly 
involved in the sectional conflicts of the Okrika Amanyanabo politics,
.Mr. Jamabo was (and is) a pharmacist by profession) and a one time chairman 
of the Okrika County Council, At that time he was comparatively new to the 
main Okrika political scene. He was also new to regional politics.
The other contestant was Chief Harold Dappa Biriye,^ a Bonny man and 
leader of the minority based political party, the Niger Delta Congress,
That party is the oldest political party in the present Rivers State and 
it has been in the forefront of the campaign for the creation of states for 
the Eastern Nigeria minority ethnic groups. Chief Biriyels participation 
and involvement in the Nigerian political scene dates back to the early 1940*s. 
He is popularly acclaimed as one of the most talented - and in fact the most 
distinguished - politicians of Rivers State origin.
In the 1964 Federal Election, it v/as Mr. Jamabo who won. Chief Biriye, 
despite his political experience and maturity, lost.
Since these new political victories were recorded at Okrika, certain 
questions have been asked and discussed at Okrika. Both the elite and the 
fishermen have participated in the debate. Why and how did Dr. Fiberesima, 
and Mr. Jamabo, who were less politically experienced, win the elections?
Why and how did their rivals lose? Was anything surprising or unique 
about their victories? Who were their supporters and followers in the 
match to victory?
1 *Chief Bild^ 'e’s political profile will be discussed at length in 
the next Chapter,
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Several explanations' and answers appear tenable. First of all,
there was a general complaint (particularly among the Tuboniju people)^*that
Mr. Kiri had been too long in parliament, without achieving anything.very
significant for his people. If a politician or M.P, secured no material
benefits for his people, it was (and is) usual for Okrika people to refer
to such a candidate as a 'good for nothing' politician, -Such were 'political
scraps'. The most important needs of Okrika at that time were a General
Hospital and a Girls' College. Mr. Kiri had not been able to influence his
NCNC government to site such projects at Okrika. This led to conclusions
that Mr. Kiri had achieved nothing for Okrika in his political career.
Mr, Kiri's 'nil returns’as a politician were also associated with, and
interpreted as, the unpreparedness of his NCNC party to cater for the
2political and economic interests of Okrika. The general accusation 
was that the NCNC, which drew the bulk of its support^ and members from the 
Ibo-speaking people, was much more interested in, and concerned with, the 
economic development of the hinterland Ibo communities;■ therefore, the NCNC 
was bound to treat their minority neighbours as stranger communities. As 
stranger communities, they were bound to receive less government benefits 
than the Ibo communities.
In such circumstances it was not surprising that the people rejected the 
NCNC and its candidate, Mr. Kiri was the victim of anti-NCNC sentiment at 
that time. Therefore any candidate, other than an NCNC sponsored, v/as to 
be preferred,
1A pre and post election observation. These explanations are
particularly tenable in Tuboniju quarters,
2
a) Chief Rowland, an influential NDC member.
Personal communication. August 1975*
b) Interview with fishermen at the Okrrka Market Square. August 1973*
%
Chief Biriye's views on this will follow in the next chapter.
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It is necessary at this stage to digress a little to deal with the 
case of Mr, Jamabo, Whereas this explanation of the Okrika ’Kiri - NCNC 
rejection may hold good for Dr, Fiberesima's victory in the Regional
elections, it is striking that Mr. Jamabo, the NCNC candidate in the 1964
I
Federal elections was preferred to chief Biriye. Four factors account for 
this change of political attitude on the part of the Okrikans.
The first was that in Eastern Nigeria, loeal people usually preferred,
(and voted for) native candidates rather than ’stranger contestants’ (people 
from outside the particular! community) because it is believed that native 
politicians are more likely to bring greater government benefits to their people. 
Inherent in this is the assumption that the loyalty or attachment of a native 
politician to his people is stronger than that of the stranger contestant - 
that is,' an M.P. would be comrnunalistic as already discussed in Chapter 1.
Of the two contestants, Chief JSiriye of Bonny, was the stranger contestant; 
while Jamabo, though an NCNC candidate, was an Okrika man. He was therefore 
most likely to have a greater political following among his people. Secondly^ - 
at that time, there was speculation about the prospects of an NCNC/NPC 
coalition at the federal level. It was hoped that, if that coalition materialised 
(and luckily it did),an Okrika politician - who would be a partner in the 
coalition - could represent Okrika’s interests in the central government,
Okrika would, thus, be placed on Nigeria's political map in keeping with the 
ambitions of all local communities which desired to have ambassadors at the 
federal level. In terms of political profiteering, it was therefore senseless 
for Okrika to vote for a candidate who suffered two disadvantages: his
stranger nationality and the fact that he would not be an influential partner 
in the main coalition government in Lagos. Thirdly, Mr. Jamabo was much liked 
by Okrika people because of their impression that when he was the Chairman of 
the Okrika County Council, he worked tirelessly in the interest, of Okrika.
It was assumed that as a federal politician he would also work relentlessly
185,
and do 'good things' for his people. Above all, he was acceptable^' to the 
Okrika Claji Council of chiefs, as Okrika's only candidate. The chiefs 
therefore appealed to their houses to support Jamabo*s candidature.
Fourthly, Mr, Jamabo, an Ogoloma (a minority and neutral group in Okrika's
I
Amanyanabo politics) was believed not to have taken sides with any of the 
two factions in the Amanyanabo disputes. In fact Jamabo was preferred to 
any other candidate from either of the two factions whose political neutrality 
would have been doubted. These considerations about Jamabo's minority status, 
and political■neutrality made him acceptable to the majority of Okrika people. 
Hence Jamabo was triumphant when Koniju-Tuboniju political tensions were high 
because he was the stabiliser. It was also assumed by the people that in his 
political career, neither Koniju nor Tuboniju interest was to be neglected 
as would have been feared if any candidate from either of the factions was 
elected.
In these circumstances, if the interest of either faction was seen to be 
neglected, it was most likely to be pardoned, as it would probably be 
interpreted as inadvertent. Things worked well for Okrika, Mr, Jamabo was 
appointed a junior minister in the 1964 NPC/NGNC coalition government.
However, Mr. Jamabo did not stay long in ministerial office, because of the 
1966 military coup, to confirm or repudiate his people's impressions and 
expectations.
I shall now come back to the main issue of the Kiri/Fiberesima political 
tussles. Of the warring factions at Okrika, the Tubonijus were in the majority*
2In terms of population, they constituted about one-third of the clan population, 
outnumbering their Koniju counterparts whose population was about two™thirds 
%
Chief Uwakwe Ogan, ex-Amanyanabo of Okrika,
Personal Papers,
^Based on the I963 Nigerian Census figures.
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of the Tubonijus, This gave rise to a new awareness that a candidate 
from the smaller Koniju group should not represent Okrika in the regional 
parliaments. The question was: how could the minority represent the 
majority/^majority who were also the ruling section. These two 
considerations: their numerical superiority and royal status: therefore
conferred on one section the right to political representation. If the 
Koniju minority ruled or their candidate was chosen, this was regarded as 
a disgrace and insult to the Tubonijus who also thought of themselves as more 
enlightened^ and educated than their rivals.
It could be concluded from the foregoing analysis that the Amanyanabo 
disputes and the K & T rivalries/jealousies of the 1960*s were making an 
impact on parliamentary representation at Okrika, It is evident that 
Mr, Kiri's continued stay in parliament could therefore be interpreted by 
the Tubonijus as disturbing the political balance at Okrika, in fact a 
balance which the Tubonijus had for some time seen as being in favour of the 
Konijus because Kiri was a Koniju,
However, Dr, Fibeeesima who was Kiri's rival had some other advantages 
over Kiri. These were advantages which were not directly connected with the 
K & T factional rivalries. Dr, Fiberesima was Okrika's first medical 
practitioner; during his practice as a doctor his name had become common 
and popular in ii.any households. In a rural community where it was (and is) 
a rare achievement to qualify as a doctor, he had attained an almost impossible 
feat. His case was also unique because he had graduated at about the age of 
forty five, an age when many rural people would not have ventured into 
academic life. Having graduated at a late age, it also meant to the peop3e that
^See later analysis of the conflicts/jealous/gs within the elite 'class',
2
From henceforth 'K & T' will be used to refer to the Konijus (K) and 
Tubonijus (T), This has come into recent political usage at Okrika,
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he was a man of exceptional^ talents. To the local man, he was the
’healer' believed to be capable of healing or diagnosing every illness. 
Therefore what he had been reputed for as a medical practitioner could also 
be credited to him as a politician. Some of the Konijus and other political 
opponents were swayed by these exceptional considerations which helped to 
pave the way for his political success.
The third most important factor has already been scantily dealt with in 
reference to other discussions. This is the overwhelming support which the 
Tubonijus gave to Dr. Fiberesina, their son. The Tubonijus also formed the 
nucleus of Fiberesima's campaign team. This version is strongly believed by 
the Konijus; the Tubonijus do not deny it either. Whereas the Konijus 
interpret this as Tuboniju parochialism, the Tuboniju see it as patriotism.
In this sense, what is a patriotic act to a Tuboniju is parochial to the 
Koniju (and vice versa). Here lies the conflicting political values of the 
K & T.
Considering the political situation in Okrika at that time, the 
interpretation that Fiberesima's victory was mainly due to Tuboniju support 
is difficult to reject. The Amanyanabo issue had divided Okrika sharply 
along the K & T axis. Local people thought and spoke along factional lines.
At the Okrika Market Square, people from the two factions occupied different 
sections whereas in the past all local traders had transacted business together 
and at the same place. But from the 1960’s market women organised themselves 
into factional camps and occupied different sections of the market. With 
the intensification of factional politics the Iria ceremony (a traditional 
ceremony which girls must go through on reaching puberty and adulthood before 
marriage) which was also formerly organised on Okrika group basis was conducted 
along the same factional lines.
1Kiri, his opponent, also respects Dr. Fiberesima for his exceptional 
achievement in qualifying as a doctor at such an age. Kiri made this 
clear when Okrika students met him in 1972 for a discussion on peace 
efforts at Okrika*
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Besides, there emerged different welfare and improvement unions for 
the two factions, each charged with the political and economic development 
of its faction. Many prominent Okrika citizens, such as the Amanyanabo of 
Okrika, His Highness, Chief U. Ogan, Dr. Fiberesima and Kalada Kiri were 
members of their different factional unions. Young men were encouraged to 
join these Unions. Sectional identification became the politics of the day.
It was also observed that prominent NCNC supporters such as the 
Amanyanabo of Okrika, preferred Dr, Fiberesima to the NCNC official candidate, 
Kiri. It could be argued, from these instances, that when political party 
supporters reject their party's official candidate, the reason for their 
rejection of such candidates must be traced to fundamental issues ~ such as 
stronger attachment or loyalty to an ethnic group, town or any section thereof.
Hence one may also ague that if it was possible for people to riot and 
destroy themselves (such things as mark the climax of local conflict) because 
of the Amanyanabo issue, several other things could be done by such people 
in support of their political candidates, especially when the political and 
economic development of their different factions was linked with the 
political fortunes of the different politicians and MiPs» .
Finally, the records of chief U. Ogan, ex-Amanyanabo of Okrika, some of 
which are quoted below, help to confirm these impressions of Tuboniju support 
for Dr. Fiberesima.
187.
(i) Despite your (referring to Dr. Fiberesima) overthrow by Mr.
Kalada Kiri on. the NCNC nomination table, yet I was vocal in assuring you
'( fof success at the polls against Mr. Kiri who was the darling of the NCNC-, '
(ii) 'X (chief U. Ogan) and other Tuboniju notables, including you,
entered into an agreement with ovX political colleagues of  ....
that we the Tubonijus will recognise the identity of the minority sections 
named above and shall from time to time allow them due chances to top 
political scene in the Okrika clan and outside . . *
(iii) I (chief Ogan) bluntly told chief Akomas, Deputy Ma^br of Port
Harcourt - and also Divisional Chairman of the NCNC in Port Harcourt - that
my people and I were bent on throwing out Mr, Kiri for his ignoble role in 
the Amanyanabo dispute, against the Royal family.^
THE ELITE AND PATRONS
There is another major issue which has deepened the differences among 
Okrika people. This is the issue of elite patronage. The Okrika concept 
of the elite refers to the highly educated people (mostly university graduates 
and others who have obtained the equivalent of a college or university diploma) 
who have distinguished themselves in politics, the civil service or private 
business. These are the men who can entertain .visitors on a lavish scale with 
a large quantity of beer, whisky and other drinks. They are the people who 
are expected to donate generously when local development schemes are launched. 
They are also identified by their high standards of living and by their flowing 
'jumpa’ and ’dona’, the local dresses which the affluent possess.
Chief U. Cgan’s Personal Papers entitled "A Chronicle of Retrospection 
into our (chief U, Ogan and Dr. Fiberesima) Relationship."
Dated l8th July 1973* It may be recalled that after the civil war in 
1970, the relationship between the ex-Amanyanabo and Dr. Fiberesima was 
strained because of allegations that Chief Ogan v;as on the Biafran side 
during the civil war, while Dr. Fiberesima was on the federal Nigerian 
side. Chief Ogan was dethroned as Amanyanabo because of these allegations 
and Chief Ogan believed that Dr. Fiberesima whom he had once helped to 
political victory was instrumental to his (Ogan) dethronement. The portions 
qust quoted are part of an epistle written by chief Ogan to Dr. Fiberesima 
in recollections of the past. Copies of these were distributed to some 
eminent Okrika men*
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The common saying is that the majority of Okrika patrons and elite are 
Tuboniju. Their proliferation is traced back to the early settlement patterns 
and occupational categories at Okrika. The Tubonijus were in ancient times 
the trader folk, while the Konijus were the fisher folk. At the time of the 
Delta trade in palm oil and slaves, the trader folks were believed^ to have 
made more money than their fishermen counterparts, because, compared with 
fishing, the palm oil trade was a more prosperous one. It is not disputed 
that the economic and social history of the Okrika fisherman has been that 
of abject poverty and inferior social status. Hence over the several decades, 
the trader folk became wealthier and more aristocractic in their life styles. 
Subsequently, their children and descendants were afforded greater economic 
and educational opportunities. Politically too, though chieftaincy disputes 
have disturbed Okrika in recent times, the Tubonijus claim that from time 
immemorial, the Amanyanabo and Royal families hailed from their section.
Therefore the Tubonijus claim to be politically superior to the Konijus - despite 
the fact that the politically sensitive Konijus contest these Tuboniju claims.
These claims of inequality or superiority in the K & T relationships are 
based on three premises: the political, economic and social. They are
the claims which have inflamed the existing tension regarding chieftaincy, 
yet the Tubonijus repeatedly make such claims to irritate the Konijus.
The historical argument about the origin and bases of inequality are 
not generally convincing to the majority of Okrika people because no very 
reliable or extensive data are available to support them though there is no 
dispute about the occupational classifications of the K & T. That the average 
Okrika trader is richer than the average fisherman is also not contested.
X
Chief W.W, Nyenengiye ’Occupational Divisions in Okrika Clan’.
(Lecture delivered to members of the Okrika Students Union in 
December I965). The chief who supports these claims is a well 
known local historian whose views are highly respected. Until 
his death in 1974, he was the chairman of a local committee 
responsible for translating the English bible into the Okrika 
dialect.
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Rather it is the historical linkage between occupational patterns on 
sectional lines and the present-day proliferation of the elite and patrons 
that is the subject of controversy at Olcrilca, Yet these do not invalidate 
the original argument and assertion that the majority of the elit0 and 
patrons are Tubonijus. Ibth factions admit this,^
In Okrika politics, the fear which is expressed by both the K*s and T's 
is that the patrons will always use their political and public servie positions 
and influence to the advantage,of their people. It is also significant that 
in recent times, it is the faction (K or T) which constitutes a people, not 
the town. Tubonijus and Konijus are therefore ’different people’; Olorika 
island, in this sense, consists of these two political divisions which exist 
in the minds of its citizens. These arguments are also strengthened by the 
fears and suspicions of each faction. Okrilca people express the fear that 
the factional interests of the patrons will be supreme. These fears are 
associated with the bitter Amanyanabo disputes which have divided the town 
into the two political blocs.
THE PAROCHIAL PATRONS ATTD ELITE
There are two main factors which account for the manner in which fears 
about factional elite domination are expressed. The first is the numerical 
strength of the elite from the Tuboniju side. Of the nine people referred 
to in the table, six are of Tuboniju stock. To the Konijus, this in effect 
suggests that in any political or public service matter concerning them (the K) 
there are at least six people who will either kick against or refuse to 
protect their interests. This may result into Koniju victimisation.
Tuboniju fears are the same. These fears are in consonance with Olcrika local 
fables about the tortoise who never forgave his enemies; if anything, he 
always sought vengeance.
^See Table overleaf for evidence.
TABLE 2
KOi^IJU AND TUBONIJU PATRONS AND ELITE
(A) KONIJU
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NAME ACADEMIC OR
PROFESSIONAL
qualification
r, Mr. Kalada Kiri
2. Mr, S.N. Dikibo
3, Mr, V/ariboko 
Oruene
(B) TUBONIJU
4. Dr. Chief I. 
Fiberesima.
3. Mr. V/.P.
Daniel“Kalf (5
6. Dr. W.T. 
Vi/akaiiîa.
MB.BS.
Ph.D.jB.Sc.
OCCUPATION 
AND CAREER 
(Past & Present)
(Ecors)
B «Ij*
MP, Eastern 
Nigeria, 
Senior Civil 
Servant, 
Rivers State,
Legal
Practitioner. 
Politician in 
the Biafran 
Regime - 
Administrator 
for Degema 
Division,
1967-69.
Former Nigeria 
Tobacco Company 
Executive. 
Rivers State 
Commissioner 
for Works and 
Housing.
Medical 
Practitioner,
HP, Eastern 
Nigeria.
Former Chairman 
Rivers State 
Development 
Corporation.
Civil Servant,
Former Secretary 
to the Rivers 
State Military 
Government and 
Head of the 
Rivers State 
Civil Service.
Former senior 
civil servant.
Former Civil 
Commissioner *
At present
Principal Lecturer 
at the College of 
Science & Technology 
Port Harcourt.
( I O V ^ .  T M T  -v-1 ^
BASES OF EMINENCÎ
The most distinguished 
Okrika politician 
before I96I.
Okrika*s first Lawyer 
and Biafran 
Politician. Liaison 
officer between 
Okrika and Enugu in 
the Biafran regime.
Okrika’s only Civil 
Commissioner in the 
Rivers State Cabinet 
(1973-present)
Okrika's first Medical 
Practitioner, First 
Tuboniju HP. Leader 
of Thought, Rivers 
State Movement.
The most senior and 
distinguished Civil 
Servant in the Rivers 
State (1970). Son of 
Chief Dan-Kalio, late 
Paramount Chief of 
Okrika.
One of Okrika's most 
highly educated men. 
First Okrika 
Commissioner in Rivers 
State Cabinet before 
his resignation in 1973'
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NAME ACADEMIC OR
PROFESSIONAL
QUALIFICATION
OCCUPATION 
AND CAREER 
(Past & Present)
BASES OF EMINENCE
7. Mr. F. Ateli B.A. Permanent The only Okrika
(an Ogoloma Secretary Permanent Secretary
but associated
with the
Tubonijus)
8. Mr. L.A, B.A.,LL.B., Legal Okrika's most
lyagba B.L. Practitioner. distinguished lawyer
At present in the Civil Service.
Rivers State Chairman, Rivers
Director of State Government
Public Lottery Commission.
Prosecution.
9. Mr. J.A,Jamabo Dip, Former Chairman Respected as one time
(an Ogoloma, Pharmacy. Okrika County local politician.
but in Okrika Council. Okrika's first
politics of A Pharmacist, Federal MP.
today, he is MP, Federal
associated House of
with the Representatives.
Tubonijus.
He has many
Tuboniju
friends).
NOTE
(a) On the column 'Academic or Professional Qualification' only 
university degrees and equivalent diplomas are recorded.
A dash (i.e. — ) indicates qualifications lower than a 
degree or Diploma.
(b) The table is not a very comprehensive one. It is drawn for 
purposes of a sketchy illustration only; and only those 
whose careers and occupations have a direct bearing on 
politics and the public service have been included.
This is in accordance with some of the submissions in 
Chapter 3 which testify that influence and position in 
state politics and in the public service are of primary 
importance in these communities. Outside these, there 
are several persons (mostly from the Tuboniju -j&iction) 
who are successful and well known as business executives. 
Such names are not included in the table.
(c) I use the term elite to refer to a category of persons - 
not to mean that they act together all the time.
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The average Okrika elite is in local understanding like the tortoise.
In everyday understanding, what this implies is that the pattern of local 
disputes and the K & T misunderstanding in Okrika will always be implanted 
in the public service where these elite are both officers and officials.
Each faction will therefore seek to destroy the other with all the available 
political and public service weapons.
The second is the local belief that some of these patrons and elite are 
more influential than others; and in political assessments the more 
influential ones, numbering four, are those of Tuboniju stock. In Okrika, 
the first in these ratings is Mr « W.P. Daniol-Kalio, son of a one time 
Paramount Chief who is both an aristocrat and at one time (I968-70) was the 
most senior and distinguished Civil Service executive in the Rivers State,
His powers as Head of the Civil Service, and chief Civil Service Adviser to 
the Military Governor of the State, were almost unlimited. The Konijus believe 
that while in office he threw the weight of his official position to secure 
more amenities and positions for the Tubonijus, He is cited as having been 
instrumental in the appointment of Dr. V/akama as commissioner. The Konijus 
drew their inference from two related considerations. Dr. V/akama was a senior 
civil servant, an Under Secretary, when W.P. Daniel-Kalio was the Head of the 
Civil Service; both people became familiar and friendly at that time. When 
Dr. Wakama resigned as Under Secretary in I969, he was almost immediately 
appointed Commissioner, which was taken to imply that he had been advised to 
resign his civil service appointment for a higher and more profitable political 
post. Since the two (Walcama and Kalio) were friends, Kalio was believed to 
have been the brain behind Wakama's new political appointment.
In the same way, Daniel Kalio and the Governor were also close associates, 
each working with, and consulting, the other in their official capacities. 
Normally, a Governor would consult his Head of Service in making cabinet and 
other political appointments. This is especially true in a military regime
where the Governors are less familiar with.local customs and personalities
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and will therefore consult their aides who know more about these localities.
It is therefore highly probable that the Governor sought Daniel Kalio*s advice
in this matter. Hence, in the opinion of the Konijus, Daniel Kalio was the
man who influenced his Governor to appoint Walcama as Commissioner. They
often argue that whatever were V/akama's merits, there were several other
Konijus who could also have been appointed, if factional considerations were
nor primary at that timd.
An important question arises at this point. Under what circumstances
were these Koniju beliefs nurtured?
In 1970, both the Konijus and Tubonijus^ petitioned the Governor about
Okrika's representation in the Executive Council. Prior to that time, Okrika
was not represented in the Executive Council, In their petition to the
Governor, the Tuboniju chiefs nominated Dr. V/akama as a suitable representative
for Okrika, The Tubonijus considered Dr. V/alcaraa as the most eligible for the
post of Commissioner because it was felt that V/akama was the most learned
Okrika man at Port Harcourt - apparently because of Wakama’s academic
qualifications. Besides,it was felt that intellectually Dr. Wakama would
compare favourably with other members of the Executive Council most of whom
2
were highly educated people. In a personal memorandum, Mr. Daniel Kalio also 
3
nominated Dr. Wakama for the post.
In their petition, the Koniju^ chiefs nominated Papabo^. V/hy was
Papabo nominated by his people? In their petition, the K ’s argued that Papabo
^Chief Ngeri Rowlands. Personal Papers. The petition was signed by 
ten prominent Tuboniju chiefs*
2For example, in the Executive Council, Dr. Graham Douglas (PhD),
Dr. Ekpebu (PhD), and Dr, Obi V/ali (PhD) represented the Kalabaris, 
the Northern Ijaws and the Ikwerres respectively.
3
Ministerial papers entitled "Appointment of Commissioners: Internal 
Memoranda." (November 1969-February 1970) Produce House, Port Harcourt
^Chief Oputibeya (Leader of the ’K ’ chiefs) Personal Papers,
The petition was signed by eight prominent 'K' chiefs.
^He holds a B.A, degree. P(xj><x.Uo  ^ m ,
194,
was sociable, educated and intelligent. At that time, Papabo was a senior 
civil servant - a senior assistant secretary.
Dr, WaJcama is a Tuboniju, while Papabo is a Koniju. It was
therefore clear that both the K's and T's nominated people from their own
f
faction. But of the two nominees, Dr. Wakama was appointed Commissioner.
The Konijus were therefore angry that their nominee was rejected, Mr. Daniel
Kalio, it was said, was instrumental in the rejection of Papabo - apparently
because Mr, Daniel Kalio took sides with the T's in nominating Dr, V/akajna.
It is a.'known fact that commissioners are not expected to possess superior
academic qualifications (such as a PhD degree as Dr. Wakama has) before they
are eligible for such political appointments. It is, however, expected that
commissioners should be literate persons. Therefore one could argue that
both Dr. Walcama and Mr. Papabo possessed the basic qualifications for
appointment - literacy. Besides, even if one of the prerequisites for
appointment was political experience (for example, former parliamentarians
and local councillors could claim to have had political experience) neither
Dr. Wakama nor Papabo had any advantage over the other because neither of
the two men had had any previous career in politics. Both men were senior
civil servants when they were nominated. In view of these facts, it was not
1 'surprising that the K's complained about the rejection of their candidate - 
particularly because though both Dr. V/akama and Papabo were considered 
suitable for the post, the former who is a Tuboniju (and a friend of Daniel 
Kalio) was appointed. It is against this background that one can understand 
how and why the K's expressed their feelings about Dr. Wakama's appointment.
1
After the appointment of Dr. V/akama, the'K' chiefs and youths 
petitioned the Governor's office to express their dissatisfaction,
(MGO file “ SM/TAB/Vol. II). In these petitions, Mr. Daniel Kalio 
was named as the enemy of the Konijus.
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It is in the Executive Council that Commissioners decide on state policy 
matters as chief executives. As the observations in Chapters 3 and 4 show, 
commissioners and permanent secretaries are very powerful people, at least as 
the political and administrative bosses and as the highest officials.
Dr. Wakama and the other 'T* patrons (notably Mr. Ateli, a Permanent Secretary, 
and Dr. Fiberesima, the former chairman of the Development Corporation) are 
therefore named and rated as superior patrons. In fact the appointments of 
Dr. Fiberesima and Mr. Ateli are also believed to have been influenced by 
Daniel-Kalio because both Daniel Kalio and the two men are Tubonijus. Hence 
these appointments have also excited Koniju fears of Tuboniju domination.
The Konijus further argue that these public service executives Eire 
capable of 'moving mountains'. In particular, the K's believe^ that Dr; Wakama 
moved all the 'Rivers State mountains' to his Tuboniju side when he was 
Commissioner for Rural Development in the Governor's office. For example, 
the Konijus believed that in the location^ of a government health centre at 
Wakama pillage and a market at Obuworima/Opuado in the 1972/73 financial year, 
Dr, Waltama, as Commissioner for Rural Development, influenced his government 
in these locations. Coincidentally, these projects are located in the Tuboniju 
quarters of Okrika. Though Dr. Wakama denied these Koniju allegations and 
described these projects as 'Okrika projects' (as against K & T), Koniju 
views about his use of influence are still strong.
However, very little is said about the appointments of Oruene and others
%
of the Koniju group because the Konijus ai’gue that these constitute a minority
1
The alleged communalism of Dr. Walcama is contained in a 'K' petition 
dated 10 July 1972, entitled 'We know our enemies' (MGP File - LOC/RDD/ 
Vol. II).
^ h e  chief exponents of these views are Chief Oputibeya and i#-. Papabo, 
While on a peace mission, representatives of the Okrika Students Union 
called on these dignitaries in 1973 and 1974. In their meeting with 
the students, the dignitaries expressed these views - these views are 
recorded in the Okrika Students Union Minutes Book, 1970-74
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of the appointments, and that these appointments were made either from 
considerations of exceptional merit or the appointees wore only lucky.
It is also speculated that the enemy (Tuboniju) might have influenced
these-few appointments on second thought in order to appease the angry Koniju.
Once more one may argue that it is difficult to see anything unusual 
abour promotions or appointments to senior political civil service posts.
In every society, certain people must occupy such positions if and when 
vacancies occur. The same applies to the Rivers State; yet the fact is that 
because the Rivers State is a very status conscious society, the people place 
high premium on promotions and senior political appointments. The people also 
love the appurtenarr s of office. Besides, high political or civil service 
status is closely associated with power and influence. The patron is also 
regarded by others, who may not benefit from his office, as self-seeking, 
parochial, selfish and vindictive. Furthermore, the political boundaries 
between rural communities and Port Harcourt are very thin; activities and 
influences in one influence the other. It is this aspect of rural-urban 
politics that makes the local man vulnerable to Port Harcourt politics, 
especially when the major participants in Port Harcourt administration and 
politics are the local vindictive patrons and elite.
Similarly almost every political or civil service appointment is a subject 
of local gossip. Interpretations are often made that nominations or 
promotions to senior positions in Port Harcourt are seriously influenced by 
some political "god-fathers", and that those without "god-fathers" can never 
or rarely be so lucky as to benefit from such appointments. In local gossip, 
names must always be associated with certain appointments. No evidence may 
be required to give credibility to a tale or story. To a large extent, the 
personality and the status of the informant determine the credibility of the 
tale or story. For example, if the informant is a well known chief or a 
senior government official, many people ai'e likely to believe him. The 
informants in this trade start their stories by asking and answering such question
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in the usual question tone; Have you heard that Gogo is now a Commissioner?
Do you know that Daniel-Kalio is instrumental in this latest appointment?
Do you know that Daniel-Kalio likes his people? In this way, rumours and 
tales spread fast.
At Okrika, it could hardly be imagined or argued that people can ever be 
appointed to senior posts, or projects allocated to villages or quarters, on 
merit or that sectional inclinations do not influence appointments or project 
allocations. There must always be vested interests. After all, local 
political battles at Okrika are waged in terms of sectional interests and 
those with a higher and■stronger bargaining power will always make the best 
and highest bargains for themselves,
POLITICAL IMTEHJ1ST.S AND LOCAL INEQUALITIES^
There have been several kinds of disputes and rivalries at Okrika,
The discussions in this chapter have made this clear: the Amanyanabo disputes
and riots; the election rivalries; and the local beliefs about the 
vindictiveness and parochialism of their patrons and elite. It will be seen 
that there are other matters concerning social, political and economic inequalities 
which have helped to create further tension in the climate of political unrest 
at Okrika, It is necessary at this stage to examine these inequalities.
It is clear that those directly concerned with the Amanyanabo disputes 
are the two rival Ado and Oputibeya families; and even within each of these 
families - especially the Ado - there are recognised royal lineages (normally 
of the free born line) whence vacancies to the throne may be filled. These 
groups and lineages constitute less than one-twentieth of the population of 
either the Koniju or Tuboniju section. When both K & T factions go to war, 
it is difficult to find an explahation or justification solely in terms of 
the cohesiveness of each faction - as if it were a 'united nation' at war.
Neither will a faction fight the other simply because it wants an Amanyanabo. 
Privileges, economic rewards, honour and high social status accruing from the 
office of Amanyanabo are rarely enjoyed or shared by a whole faction which is
.  ^ 198.
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a large collectivity of people. Principally, these direct and indirect 
benefits of office are enjoyed by the immediate relations and family of the 
incumbent. In a discussion on the Amanyanabo disputes and riots, a group 
of Okrika fishermen made this point clear when they said; ^ don't thinlt 
(referring to me) we are fools when we fight each other, on factional lines, 
over the Amanyanabo stool. We know that an Amanyanabo will do nothing for us 
■if we are not his brothers. We fight against imbalance (K & T), inequality 
and injustice',^ It is therefore inevitable, to conclude that the Amanyanabo 
disputes, riots and the divisive tendencies which thoy have created in Okrika 
have far greater dimensions than can ordinarily be noticed.
The political conflicts at Okrika tfUte slightly different dimensions at
different times, depending on the immediate issues which generate them. In
times of chieftaincy disputes and riots, when lives and property are destroyed,
the major impelling factor is that each faction feels threatened or dominated
by the other. This feeling or fear is greater on the side of the minority.
Konijus, although the Tubonijus also entertain similar fears. The Koniju 
2
men believe that if the Tubonijus are recognised as the ruling section, 
they (the K ’s) will remain economically and politically suppressed, since the 
ruling section will perpetuate itself by appointing their supporters (who are 
their kith and kin) only to strategic positions in the locality and in Port 
Harcourt. The other attendant feaJk^  Is that mere jobs will be given to their 
loyalists and supporters; these same conditions will apply in the allocation 
of development projects/amenities and other state benefits for the people, 
and that this will widen the already existing factional economic and 
political inequalities. Each faction is therefore suspicious of the other.
^Discussion with Okrika fishermen at Borokiri, Port Rarcourr,
September ci6th 19?4 (Translated into English from the vernacular 
version),
■ ' Okrika Students Union, Minutes Book, 1970--7^»
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The appointments of Dr. \7akama, Dr. Chief Fiberesirna and Mr, Ateli which have 
provoked considerable local gossip have this frame of reference.
The Ado and Oputibeya houses in the T & K factions respectively are 
very influential and highly respected families because each faction regards 
each of these families as the ruling family. Both families have links with 
the dignitaries - patrons mid elite ~ from their own factions. For example, 
though neither Dr. Chief Fiberesirna nor Kalada Kiri is of Ado or Oputibeya 
family/origin, each of these personalities is closely associated with the 
ruling family in his faction. Family meetings in which matters of succession 
to the throne and election strategies are discussed, are attended by these 
dignitaries who act as political advisers* Besides, many local chiefs and 
elders trace descent from these ruling houses in order to establish their 
claims of higher status in comparison with their counterparts of no royal 
descent or association.
Two main categories of 'status-seekers’ may therefore be identified at 
Okrika: the politician and the elite on one hand and the chiefs and elders
on the other hand. It is this connection between ruling houses and influential 
politicians and other dignitaries which is also largely responsible for some 
degree of factional homogeneity in the disputes because these dignitaries 
have a large following in their different factions. The loyalty and service 
of these followers could be of immense benefit and advantage to the politicians/ 
dignitaries in times of local rivalries and disputes,’
There is also another sensitive aspect of the political disputes which 
helps to deepen the conflict between K & T. This is the notion of 'privileged* 
and the 'underprivileged'; in clearer terms it refers to a relationship 
between 'husband and wife'. The Tubonijus think of themselves as the
developed group, Eind by implication they are the Okrika husbands, because the
former Eastern Nigeria government gave the right of Amanyanabo to the Ados
of the 'T' stock. The 'T' dignitaribs are the most voiciferous in making these
claims, not necessarily because they really have much respect for chieftaincy
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( if anything, their respect for it has declined in recent times) but because 
they regard this as an argument on the higher social distinction of their 
group (the dignitaries) as compared with their ’K' counterparts. Also this
is rather used as a machinery for playing on the intelligence of their rural
1
folks who understand and see most claims of superiority along the K & T 
division. The victor is superior to the vanquished; and in this text the 
victor is the T man who is the ‘husband’ and the vanquished is the K man who 
is the 'wife' - a wife who must always lose in any fight with the man while 
the husband remains supreme. That is their (K & T) relationship in Okrika's 
politics and disputes. Koniju argument,^ based on the above, is that the basis 
for unity at Okrika is not there; or it is very badly shaken as long as they 
(the K's) remain, and are treated as, politically underprivileged.
By•implication, the Koniju version of these inequalities makes a demand; 
that the existing political inequality will obviously encourage further economic 
inequality between K & T. The assumption, as I have stated, is that the 
politically privileged - either as a group/faction or as individuals - will 
advance both the political and economic interests of their kinsman and faction. 
They therefore demand an end to these inequalities, an end which the T's 
will obviously not accept because they also believe that a Koniju hegemony will 
produce no better, and perhaps worse, results for Okrika.
Four major conclusions may now be drawn from these factional claims, 
assertions and arguments. Arguments about group/factional superiority are 
always controversial in nature, though in local, national and international 
contexts, these are ^  familiar arguments and claims. Therefore the K & T 
factional claims along this line are by no means new; not even within the 
Fivers State or the Okrika community.
These claims are not new, yet in communities which are 'politically 
2 ‘
explosive', people are generally particularly sensitive to any kind of argument
^Okrika Students Union Minutes Book, op. cit.
2
By the nature of their riotous political history and their degree of 
political super-sensitivity.
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which affects their interests. Arguments need not have a political base 
before they assume political dimensions since politics is one of the few 
effective weapons the local politician who needs support can mobilise against 
the opponents and rivals. In such communities, politics is also one of the 
surest means of inciting one group/faction against the other. Arguments 
about factional superiority are therefore best understood in local idioms.
Secondly, for their part, the Okrika dignitaries understand the 
mentality of the local people. The average Okrika fisherman is very 
emotional; he is also very readily provoked. He can therefore be easily 
incited either to fight or give support to his dignitaries. The Okrika 
dignitaries do not fight among themselves as it is considered undignified 
to do so, but the fishermen who believe in, and support, the dignitaries 
can fight for, and on behalf of, them. The role of the local dignitaries 
is to incite the fishermen, and provide money for the purchase of local arms 
and ammunition.
These characteristics of the fishermen have earned for the Okrika people 
that notorious appelation 'Warriors'. Viewed along this perspective, there 
are mainly three levels at which local political battles are fought.
(i) The illiterates (from both K & T) the majority of whom are fishermen 
and market women - the level at which the issues in local politics are not very 
clearly understood (except in terras of violence) and the reactions are largely 
based on emotionalism,
(ii) The dignitaries who could be described as the men who instigate the 
riots and disputes.
(iii) The people. This is the level at which the forces generated at the 
first two levels meet and the political situation is so tense that outside 
parties^ are invited to take sides with one of the main warring or disputing 
factions. . It is the level at which the appelation 'warrior' is an apt 
description of the Okrika man.
1
People who are neither of K nor T stock; for example, citizens from 
the neighbouring villages and towns like Ogoloma, Ogbogbo, Ibalca, etc,
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Thirdly, the mains^iotor which aggravates these -political conflicts is 
the question of interests. Both fishermen, market women and dignitaries are 
interested parties. Tvliile the main interests of the fishermen and market women 
are the 'benefit they can procure from the Okrika dignitary, the interests of 
the dignitaries are focussed on 'bhe acquisition of higher social status and 
prestige. The rural people whose support and following they cherish, are 
the insturments "by which they achieve these. It is because there are several 
interested parties that there is some factional homogeneity in the disputes 
and rivalries.
Fourthly, in a status-conscions local community where there are many 
*status-seekers' even though the opportunities for social distinction are few, 
there are bound to be several claimants to prominent local chieftaincy titles 
or connections with them. Hence in the absence of acceptable claims based on 
achieved status, an ascribed status is important, and in fact the latter 
(ascribed status) may often be used as a greater political bargaining weapon 
in the locality.
Furthermore, within the locality, an ascribed status^ is highly rated 
because the people recognise^ tlÈjat' the incumbents of chieftaincy offices are
-Tihe importance of ascribed status has parallels in other parts of 
Nigeria and Africa, For example, in discussing the different 
patterns of authority in the traditional Toruba political system,
P.O. Lloyd ("The Traditional Political System of the Yoruba*rn 
P. Cohen and J, Lliddlcton, eds., Cornnarative Political Systems.
New York, I96Y, pp. 269-"292} observes that "the most important 
component parts of.the political structure are the descent groups, 
with their own internal structure and organisation, the various 
forms of age grade ,., with or without an associated grade-of 
chiefs ... the title societies ..., the Council of chiefs 
and Kingship," Lloyd further observes that the Yoruba King (Oba) 
was more than a King.;, he was a divine King and the personification 
of the whole tovm. Realising the importance of ascribed status in 
' West African Societies, Paula Brown ("Patterns of Authority in 
■ , V/est Africa" Africa 21, 1951? pp. 261-78) also discusses the 
governmental role of age grades, titled societies and chiefs 
councils in Yorubaland, Ashanti and Dahomey.
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super ordinate^ authorities. After all every society must have some
systematic allocation of power and authority to malce final political and
administrative decisions. It is this political relationship between the
people and the traditional authorities that reinforces the importance of
2
ascribed status - similar situations exist in other African Societies.
RECENT POLITICAL INFLUENCE/IMPACT ON LOCAL DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
The Amanyanabo disputes, the divisions at Okrika along T & K lines, 
and the other political rivalries have generated much bitterness in the 
minds of the Okrika people. As I have argued before, people are forced 
by these political disputes to think and act along 'factional lines'*
Within these premises it is inevitable for one to conclude that people's 
loyalties will be built along the different political sixes at Okrika: 
the factional division; and loyalty to, and support for, different 
politicians and chiefs. It is only in exceptional circumstances that 
people's loyalties cut across these lines. It is therefore necessary to 
discuss this divisiveness and its impact on Okrika local development schemes. 
Can a politically divided people work together for their county or clan?
1E.E, Evans-Pritchardl-s and M, Fortes's, (African Political Systems. 
London.19^0.) classification of African societies into two types of 
governmental systems makes for interesting reading - even though 
these classifications have either been modified or rejected by 
other scholars, such as P.C. Lloyd, Pritchard and Fortes argue 
that in one type there are superordinate (centralised) authorities 
in which power corresponds with wealth and status (such as the 
kingdoms of the Southern Bantu). According to .then,in the second 
type, exemplified by the Nuer and Tallensi, there is no government 
because there is no centralised authority; besides,in the society 
there are no sharp distinctions in rariic, status or wealth.
It will^however, be observed that in this chapter the governmental 
system discussed fits more into Pritchard's and Fortes's former 
typology.
2
Paula Brown, op, cit.
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Before the political tension in Okrika assumed so great a significance, 
the Okrika people worked together as one people. The evidence in support of 
this claim, which is often given by Okrika people, cites previous instances 
in^which there was 'group solidarity' in the execution of local development 
projects. St. Peter's Anglican Church, Okrika, Okrika Grammar School and 
the Okrika Joint Hospital - just to name a few - were community projects.
These projects have become Okrika's source of pride and achievement. Visitors 
to the island are usually shown these projects or told about them to 
demonstrate that the Okrika people were once a united people.
The projects cited above now belong to history. Either at the local or 
state level, there are no arguments to refute Okrika's claim about these past 
achievements. So present day debates and arguments are therefore focussed on 
Okrika's achievements since 1938 when the politics of disunity and destruction 
wœs{^  vigorously introduced.
Since local planning Committees were introduced in the Hivers State 
(see Chhpter 4) the Okrika county committeeshas never functioned. In the 
words of the Divisional Officer, for Okrika, 'people are rather more interested 
in improving their individual families',^ Indeed, Okrika people have become 
more interested in building their own houses -'more emphasis is laid on 
'cement houses' as against thatch houses - and sending more of their children 
to school. At the group level, people are also more interested in contributing 
njoney for the smallest quarter/village projects (the level at which the group 
political differences are minimised) where the pace and symbols of development 
have greater significance to the rural people. In this sense, the need for 
development at the larger community level has been 'de-eraphasised' while 
greater priority is given to individual and small group development.
These perhaps indicate that Okrika's new belief is that the sum total of 
individual' and small group development efforts is synonymous with the development
^Mr, Deko, Divisional Officer. Interview at the Divisional Office, 
Okrika, 2nd August 1973*
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of the larger Okrika community since the parts (the individuals and the 
smaller groups) make up the whole (the Okrika clan).
Several factors are responsible for this new spirit of individual and
se]parate development. The primary factor is the peoplbs identification 
along the K & T axis, with t?ie attendant divisive tendency which it generates. 
Chieftaincy disputes and other political rivalries are indeed of primary 
importance in the new political history of Okrika. Two important questions 
which most Okrika people ask when the idea of embarking on Okrika community 
projects is mentioned are:
(i) Whom (which faction, quarter or group) will this benefit?
(ii) Where (K or T) will it be sited?
The significance of these tv/o questions can be seen in one, among 
several others, recent development effort. In 1972, some non-politically 
partisan Okrika citizens (the 'Ibisiki' group) suggested a rural electrification 
project for Okrika, All factions and groups in Okrika agreed that it was a 
good and worthwhile project, a project which if implemented would displace 
the use of 'bush lamps' and lanterns on thf^  island,
A chairman and a committee charged with the execution of this project 
were appointed. Money was to be contributed so that work would begin. But 
the major argument which most of the citizens put across to the committee was 
that while in principle the project was a necessary and useful one, it was 
qertain that most of the beneficiaries of the scheme would be the local 
dignitaries and elite ('elite' used in this context to refer to all who Eire 
highly educated). The logic behind this was that these (the elite) were 
(and are) the people who own most of the modern pouses where electricity 
•would be needed. The majority of these probable beneficiaries were also 
identified.as the Tubonijus where a higher proportion of Okrika*s big men 
beD.ong, It was therefore further argued that if implemented, the electricity 
project would be a Tuboniju (rather than an Okrika) project. In those 
circumstances, the committee was unable to persuade the citizens to continue
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with the project. The project was abandoned *
There are also other factors which account for the recent divisiveness, 
and its impact on local development, in Okrika. The chieftaincy disputes and 
othe]' shades of political rivalries are of recent creation. Hence in the past 
the sermons on group solidarity and unity advocated by age groups, the elite 
and other local dignitaries had a stronger appeal to Okrika people. Many 
Okrika people were also resident on the Okrika island, and so local development 
schemes could benefit all residents. But at present about half of Okrika's 
population live in villages and quarters outside the Okrika island. Local 
development which embraces all citizens of the Okrika clan has therefore a 
wealcer appeal to the local people because each village, quarter, or faction 
has its own problems of development —  problems which the Okrika island cannot 
cope with alone. Consequently, sectional and village loyalties, loyalties which 
supersede that to the Okrika clan, have developed; each living in some 
isolation as is typical of island dwellers who are politically divided.
The chieftaincy politics of the Okrika town has also divided the different 
quarters and villages; and even those who were politically neutral in the past 
are compelled to taJce sides with either of the two Okrika town factions. This 
situation has arisen because these factions are regarded as Okrika's super 
powers who have to act as 'god-fathers' of quarters and villages which/are 
their political allies. Therefore, Okrika's divisive politics and the recent 
growth in quarter/village patterns of residence have compelled each village 
or quarter to think of itself as a 'development area' while sharing sympathies 
with one of Okrika's chieftaincy factions. Limited development schemes such 
as building of small bridges and footpaths are therefore executed on village/ 
quarter basis; and in fact since I96O no central Okrika community project hî\s 
been embarked on (except the proposed Okrika Girls School^' by Setari Age group)'.
^See Chapter 3« There is a stalemate in the execution of the project,
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One is therefore inclined to arfjpe that apart from political heterogeneity, 
the main theme of Okrika politics, which has inhibited Clcrika county 
community projects, the new sectional or village solidarities which have 
displaced the larger group loyalties have stimulated the execution of 
smaller group development schemes. It is true however that this same factor 
has also led to separate planning and development at the county council level.
No■ village/quarter or faction wants to be led by the other, each determines 
for itself what it considers good. Hence to some extent the notion of 
priorities on development, has become contextual in Olcrika.
While there are group or factional rivalries in Ola’ika, there is also 
some rivalry in leadership among Okrikas politicians and local dignitaries.
They have produced two main types of rivalries: ’factional' and 'personal',
and these two types of rivalries have resulted in the absence of a leader 
generally acceptable to, and respected by, all Clcrika people. The influence 
of the different leaders are therefore confined to their factions. ICalada 
Kiri and Honourable Commissioner Cruene are as much Koniju leaders as Dr. 
Fiberesirna and Daniel Kalio are to the^Tubonijus, Besides, no one leader, 
even within the same faction, considers himself inferior to the other.
Each leader has his own title conferred on him either by his people to 
credit him for his 'good works' or 'popularity' or it is a chieftaincy or 
political title of distinction. Among these different 'men of titles'
(for example, chiefs, doctors, and the Honourables)^ no one regards the other 
title holder as a superior. Honourable Commissioner Oruone is as important 
as Mr, Kiri because local people are often reminded of the past glories of 
their politicians. The former politicians still live in, and on, their past. .
^An address for commissioners, chairmen of Corporations and 
others v/ho specifically demand that they be addressed as such.
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Within the Tuboniju camp, Pikibo Kalio whose claim to distinction is 
his aristocratic birth (as son of a late paramount chief) and his former 
status as Head of the Fivers State Civil Service, is as important as Dr.
Chief Fiberesirna. All titles are regarded as emblems of distinction.
' ■ 1
Therefore in their own eyes, all are leaders, while no one is a leader of
the other. Okrika is in this sense, a community of several leaders without 
a leader in any local development project. This is part of the price Okrika 
people pay for their status consciousness and the premium placed on titles. 
Furthermore, this is a situation which the political conflicts and the 
degree of political sensitivity in Okrika have helped to foster because each 
faction, in order to frustrate any attempt by the other to dominate, prefers 
to d.eal exclusively with its own leaders. Yet within each camp, some degree 
of absolute power and prestige enjoyed by each leader inclines each of them to 
become an independent lord, a lord who sees himself superior to others; 
and if not superior, considers himself not inferior to any other. This 
situation is best summarised by the questions: who does not desire to lead
the other? V/ho does not desire to be a local lord if he is not one in Port 
Hareourt where there are several lords?
In analysing the political conflicts in Okrika, and their impact on local 
development efforts, it is tempting to argue that the issues involved are 
complex. It is also inevitable to draw certain conclusions or in-fèrences fi cm 
these.
In the Rivers State in general, and Okrika in particular, economic issues 
though important, are less contentious than political ones. Behind these, 
there is that vaulting love for power, status and prestige. The nature of 
political interests and sensitivity also makes politicking unavoidable.
See Chapter 3, the conflict between Setari age group and the chiefs.
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Every matter, however trifling or unconnected, must be closely 
associated with the K & T disputes so that it can have more significant 
political dimensions, K & T are the names and labels which spell the 
'untogethernessof Okrika as well as the essence of Okrika's untogetherness 
in' local development: K & T have become identification tags for leaders and
ordinary citizens alike. The two names (K & T) have become a twentieth 
century political idiom. The names have become the commonest language for 
transacting almost all kinds of business. Like every other language, it has 
become the most effective means of political communication.
Compared with the past, the institution of chieftaincy has also become 
less important in recent times. Its symbolic significance has therefore been 
diminished; yet interested parties and local dignitaries can always mobilise, 
or appeal to, local sentiments on the K & T axis in order to gain their own ends. 
Hence no matter how anachronistic an institution may be, it may be 'functional*^ 
to some people in time of local disputes.
There is some element of class conflict in the T & K disputes, in relation 
to contribution for local development. Disputes in recent cases, such as the 
rural electrification project, clarify this point. The K & T divisions, and 
disagreements on the question about location (either at K or T) of projects, 
no doubt, helped to frustrate project implementation. The question of 
beneficiaries also raises two issues. While one aspect of it relates to K A T 
beneficiaries, the other aspect of it relates to differences between the 'Elite' 
and 'Fishermen' beliefs and values. The Okrika elite and local dignitaries 
are not politically united, no doubt. Yet the fishermen regard all elite, 
notwithstanding their factional identities, as one class; while they (the 
fishermen) think of themselves as constituting another class. The elite, in 
this terminology, are the 'privileged' whereas the fishermen and all others 
of their kind are the 'under privileged'. In local terms, the 'elite-fisheftoan'
^It is functional in so far as some people can achieve their own ends; 
even if this is not in the interest of the larger group.
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distinctions evpo synonymous with 'privileged - under privileged' classes.
Finally, it is clear that consensus of opinion on the need for 
community development is not lacking in Olorika. The major questions relate 
to the strategies, priorities and beneficiaries at any point in time.
It is a reconciliation of the latter (strategies, priorities and 
beneficiaries) with the former (the need for commimity development) that 
is seen to delay or frustrate action in the execution of-clan development 
projects; and it is this which is the pivot of Okrika's local development 
politics.
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CHAPTER 6
'STATISm', EMINENCE-ANO LOCAL DEVELOPMENT.
This chapter is devoted to one principal character, chief Harold.Dappa
Biriye, who is principally identified with the political struggle for
the creation of the Rivers State, To many Rivers people, Biriye is also
the leader of the Liberation Movement' in the sense that the Rivers people
who constituted a minority in the former Eastern Nigeria were freed from 
2
'Ibo bondage* by him. Biriye is therefore the foremost politician of 
Rivers State origin* He is a man very well known both.in Port Harcourt and 
in other localities for two main reasons. First, his eminence arises from 
the part which he played in the Rivers State movement at a time when it 
was not 'politically safe* to champion such a minority cause in Eastern 
Nigeria. As a result of his political involvements, he was labelled a 
saboteur by the neighbouring Ibos, a term which described his agitation for 
splitting Eastern Nigeria into two or more autonomous states. At the time 
of these agitations, the liberation movements were described by the NCNC 
governing party as disintegrating forces. Secondly, Biriye is well known 
because he was given a top cabinet post when the Rivers state was^ . created,
3
If one were to understand political development as the emergence of a 
minority people into new and autonomous statehood as the Rivers minorities 
understand it, the principal character in this chapter would be seen, in 
the broad sense, as the man who has been most actively involved in the 
political, economic and social development of the Rivers State. Yet in 
narrower perspective, he is the man who is also identified with community 
politics because his participation in state politics has a local foundation,
^This is a term commonly used by the Rivers people in referring to their 
former political status as minorities.
They belive they were in bondage befors they were liberated.
^Ibid.
3
This will be discussed in later sections of this chapter.
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The roles played by him in these political struggles aimed at one goal: 
the creation of the Rivers State in which present development efforts are 
made. Claims about his achievements hinge on the same point. In order 
to^avoid repetitions concerning his contributions to Rivers State politics,
I shall discuss the main features of the political struggle without associating 
his name with any specific role. Thereafter, I shall deal with the special 
•part he played before, and after, the creation of the state. In discussing 
these two political phases, I shall also stress the relationship between 
eminence and local development efforts, and as one would expect the main 
arg", ents for political autonomy were directly related to the general welfare 
of the Rivers people,
THEME
Before dealing vrith the Rivers State movement, it is necessary to argue 
why the political background of the movement is important in the present 
Rivers State politics.
First of all, it was through an identification with this movement that 
most of the Rivers State patrons have emerged, notably, Chief Biriye and some 
other important personalities.
Secondly, as a Cabinet, the V.I.P.'s that emerge from this movement will 
be seen to be identified with the development programmes at the state level - as 
against the local level. To the ordinary citizen, this suggests that a political 
leader has the potential for hastening the pace of local development.
Thirdly, it will be evident that people's status, especially the patrons, 
arising from this movement is somehow in conflict with the source of other 
local reputation. Whereas the chiefs and elders are prominent in the localities, 
as I argued in Chapters 3 and 3, the Rivers State movement has only identified 
one principal category of local dignitaries, therc&y relegating other traditional 
leaders to the background.
The fourth is the obvious relationship between the patron and the client, 
especially in Biriye's election contests. The patron, as usual, is very much
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dependent on the client^ for support, at least in electoral victories.
This relationship between patron and client suggests that whereas a patron 
could harm a client if the latter refused to support the former (as seen in 
Chapter 3), whenever the patron is dependent on the client for political 
victories, the client is a kind of 'master' (as against the 'servant') 
because it is the principle of need (who needs the votes?) which determines 
who is master or servant. As Scott put it, with the introduction of popular 
elections, "the client gained a new political resource, since the giving or 
withholding of his vote affected the fortunes of aspirants for office". 
Obviously, faced with other competitors, electoral patrons who flops to 
maintain their local power are bound to offer their clients more attractive 
terms than their rivals. Again, voters have also realised that their 
political resources "could be turned to good account" since their votes were, 
and are, often sufficient to "secure the continuous assistance of a local 
politician"^.
Finally, it is from this movement that has emerged the present division 
of the state into supporters and non-supporters of the Rivers State, This 
has to a great extent influenced internal politics in the State since 1967, 
especially on (i) allegiations that certain V.I.P's are victimising other 
V.I.P.'s who were not supporters of the movement; (ii) demands that State 
benefits should be shared on the principle of contribution to new statehood; 
and (iii) the agitation for a Port Harcourt State,
In his examination of the party states of Test Africa, Aristide Zolberg 
discusses the bargaining character of the parties. He explicitly suggests 
that in order to secure the votes of the people, most of the parties have 
often responded to the electoral demands of the clients.
See A, Zolberg. Creating Political Order: The Party States of Test Africa, 
Chicago, 1956,
2
Games Scott "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in South East 
Asia". APSR Vol,66, 1972. p, 109,
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TI-IE RIVERS STATE MOVEMENT
The struggle of the Rivers people in the creation of their own state 
belongs to the realms of political history, yet it is necessary to recall 
these events because it is obvious that several political struggles led to 
the creation of the Rivei.. State by a decree on May 2?th I967. The military 
had followed the currents of the past political tide.
For a long time, all Rivers people in Eastern Nigeria claimed one 
identity,^ distinct from the other ethnic groups in the same region. Even 
the Ibo neighbours referred to the Riverine people as Mba miri^meaning, the 
inhabitants of the 'water zone’. This name, Mba miri, was an acceptance 
of a separate identity of the 'water people' - a pejorative description.
For their part, claims of a separate identity formed the basis of their
earlier demands by the Rivers people for political autonomy. Rivers people
believed that if they were politically autonomous their economic and social
welfare would be improved. In addition to this, they also believed strongly
that the Ibos who constituted the major ethnic group, and supported the
2dominant political party in Eastern Nigeria, were more interested in 
developing the Ibo communities with government resources. This formed the 
main axis of the politics of self-rule. Rivers people also argued that 
their areas were neglected and it was only a government of their own that 
could be relied upon to correct the imbalance in development schemes between 
Ibo and Riverine areas. As will become clearer later in this chapter, this 
second argument about Ibo domination with its economic consequences (the 
underdevelopment of the Riverine area) was the principal weapon which the 
agitators for a separate Rivers State mobilised in advancing arguments for 
independence from Eastern Nigeria. In the early forties too, the commonest
^They were known as the coastal people. For arguments on this matter, 
see E.D.W, Opu-Ogulaya (J .P,) History 01 the Creation of the Rivers 
State of Nigeria. Primer One, Port Harcourt. 1973*
2
See election issues in Chapter 3, especially the Kiri/Fiberesima/ 
Jamhi>o rivalries.
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pattern of appeal to minority people in Nigeria was based on this concept 
of 'independence and political profits'. Hence, even after the creation 
of the Rivers State, the Military Governor of the Rivers State, Lt. Commander 
A.P. Diete-Spifi, had emphasised this aspect of the argument when he said 
"that inquiry (referring to the Willink Commission of 1937) found the Rivers 
area absolutely neglected by the government of then Eastern Nigeria; the 
Rivers people dominated and oppressed by the Ibos who controlled that government.' 
It v/as implied in the Governor's address that it was only under an indigenous 
government that the millenium could arrive.
Agitations for a separate Rivers State have been many; and several 
important personalities and cultural/ethnic groups have played leading roles 
in these agitations. This is the aspect I shall deal with at this stage,
CULTURAL GROUPS AND THE RIVERS STATE MOVEMENT:
The Ijo Rivers' People League was formed by Rivers people in 1942 to
fight in the first instance for a distinct Rivers province. The League argued
that the problems which arose from the peculiar nature of their riverine
territories were not properly understood by a government based in the
2
hinterland (Snugu). The Presidential address delivered to a meeting of the 
League at Port Harcourt in August 1949 emphasised the same theme: Ibo domination
and the underdevelopment of the minority areas. The demand of the League was 
partially met, resulting in the creation of a Rivers province in 1947 ~ 
from the former Owerri and Calabar provinces. Though the new provincial status 
marked an important administrative landmark, the Rivers people saw no fai' 
reaching improvements in their social and economic welfare. Further demands 
for a larger and more autonomous administrative set-up (a region or state) 
were therefore intensified in later years. The League's understanding of •
^Address of welcome to the British Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Harold 
Wilson, on the latter's visit to Port Harcourt, March 29th, I969*
Bee: Our Case: The Rivers State of Nigeria. Lagqs. 1939* P* 13
2
See Appendix 8.
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a provincial administration was that it was a half way measure since it had 
not the full status, powers and economic resources which a Region or State 
needed to accelerate the pace of local development »
CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES ;
I
From 19331 after the Constitutional conference when Nigeria moved towards
a parliamentary democracy and formal federalism, the fears of Rivers people
about Ibo domination were expressed more bitterly. This led to the formation
of stronger and larger organisations charged with the same responsibility:
agitation for statehood. The Council of Rivers Chiefs was formed in July 1933,
and this replaced the earlier league. In December 193^ -, this Council was
enlarged to accommodate both chiefs and ordinary citizens, and so the Council
changed its name to the Rivers Chiefs* and People's Congress, From July 1933^
the Congress^ became known as the Conference* In the resumed constitutional
conference, 1937, the Rivers Chiefs and Peoples Conference, in presenting their
case, and that of its predecessors, summarised their arguments in detail 
2
as follows:
(a) that the people in this area (i.e. the Rivers territory) shajred 
a way of life dictated by the physical circumstances of the 
country in which they lived, and that they were united by fear 
of neglect at the hands of a Government who did not understand 
their needs, and who in any case put the needs of the interior 
(the Ibo areas) first,
(b) that when the British first came to this area, they made 
treaties of trade and protection with local chiefs; these were 
of a special nature and differed from the treaties made with 
other chiefs inland. The British Crown undertook to provide 
protection and to deal with foreign powers, but the treaties 
did not provide that the chiefs should deal with foreign powers, 
and the treaties did not provide that the chiefs should surrender 
to the British Government a sovereignty which could be transferred 
to any other authority. If Her Majesty's Government sav/ fit to 
end these treaties, then the chiefs of this area were morally 
entitled to their original status.
'Minutes of the Minority Commission, Eastern region and S. Cameroons, 
Port Harcour*tl Sessions,l8th and 20th January, 1938.
CE/b'3C, vol. 7* National Archives. Ibadan.
2
See Our Case, The Rivers State of Nigeria. Lagos. I969. p. 7»
/17.
These arguments of the 1930's in support of separate statehood could 
be examined within the context of Nigeria's constitutional developments at 
the time. This era was identified with responsible self-government in a
federal system. It was also the days of 'regionalism' and in each region
t
there was one dominent ethnic group and political party. The dominant party 
and ethnic group were therefore basically the same, each fused with the other. 
This was also a time of increasing violence in Nigerian politics. In Eastern 
Nigeria the Ibos and the NCNC party which controlled the government were 
instruments of the 'dominant group'. The NCNC was seen by the minorities in 
general, and the Rivers people in particular, as an instrument of political 
victimisation by a dominant ethnic group from which the party drew the bulk 
of its support. It v/as this political set up which reawakened their fears of 
economic and political neglect because of their suspicion that political self- 
interest would incline the Ibos to cater only for their own interests* Under 
such conditions, the interest of the minority people would neither be considered 
nor protected. Hence any confidence which the Rivers people had in the Ibo 
people and.government was further undermined,
THE COR CONCEPT
The minorities, especially the Rivers people, later discovered that with
increasing political violence and victimisation (of non party supporters) in
Nigerian politics, it was difficult for them to agitate for separate states
unless they presented a united front. In December 1933, this appeal for a
1united front, led to the formation of a COR (Calabar, Ogoja, Rivers) movement 
whose membership comprised most of the minorities in Eastern Nigeria,
However, to most Rivers people, the COR movement soon lost its appeal for 
several reasons. It was realised that a minority movement was not likely to 
succeed unless it had a political base and allied itself to one of the dominant
^COR will be discussed briefly - only in relation to its direct 
relevance to the Rivers State movement.
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political parties in Nigeria though not to the NCNC, which saw COR as a 
threat to regional unity and solidarity, COR's strategy therefore was to 
ally itself to the Action Group party in 193^ +, hoping that the A.G. would 
support the creation of a Rivers State. This alliance also sought to frustrate 
the alleged NCNC manoeuvres aimed at stifling support for the new state 
movement. The NCNC saw the alliance as a threat to the political solidarity 
of the East, especially as other Regions were not very much threatened by 
similar minority agitations. This attitude of NCNC led to the victimisation 
of COR supporters, labelling COE men as saboteurs’ because of their withdrawal
of support for the NCNC.
2Dr. Okpara's” election appeal and address to the Calabar minorities, 
in 1961, had this same political overtone. In the regional election campaigns 
he had told the people of Calabar: "I will give you all the amenities you 
require. But you must vote for me. Booty of war is always shared after the 
war." Dr. Okpara's speech also suggested that non-NCNC supporters should 
not expect to be treated as loyalists; if they were not loyalists they were 
obviously saboteurs who deserved nothing other than political reprisals. It 
was also true that only very few (if any) of the minorities were prepared to 
incur the displeasure of the majority party for a cause whose future v/as 
unknown and uncertain.
Under such conditions of political victimisation, and alliances with 
the A.G., which was the only rival opposition party in Eastern Nigeria, the 
COR movement lost some support. Also to most Rivers people, the COR movement.
E^.D.V/. Opu-Ogulaya. op. cit. pp. 6-3.1.
^As NCNC leader.
3J.P. Mackintosh, "Electoral trends and the tendency towards a 
one-party system in Nigeria" in Journal of Commonwealth Political 
Studies, vol. 1, No, ^ Nov, I962, p. 203.
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which lumped together all the Eastern minorities in spite of their separate 
identities, was a threat to their distinct cultural identity. They were 
distinct from the Efiks and Ibibios who constituted a majority within the 
minority. In short, in a COR state, the Rivers people would constitute another 
minority and in competition for public service resources they would stand at 
almost as much of a disadvantage as they were in the Eastern region. It was 
in these circumstances of a waning COR popularity that a separate Rivers State 
movement began to gain more ground in the late fifties, especially when the 
Nigerian Constitutional Conference of 1937 recommended a Commission to 
ascertain the facts and allay the fears and anxieties of the minorities in the 
different regions. Advocates of a Rivers State movement, when COR's popularity 
waned, saw in this Commission (The Willink Commission) an opportunity to 
present a separate case for creating a Rivers State,
WILLINK COMMISSION AND ITS FINDINGS»
Although the Willink Commission was empowered to recommend the creation
of new states only as a last resort, yet Sir Henry's^ stand at the outset
set severe limitations on what the Commission was prepared to do. The 
Commission was neither a boundaries nor a judicial commission. Yet technically 
the creation of nev; states involved both elements# listening to evidence 
(judicial) and adjusting existing boundaries if necessary. In this respect, 
it was the understanding of the minorities that the Commission had ruled out 
the possibility of creating new states. Therefore, only other safeguards
for allaying minority fears appeared to be the major concern of the Commission.
2Yet there was no doubt that evidence given by the minorities to this 
Commission v/as overwhelmingly in support of the creation of new states.
Few people spoke in favour of a COR state, and more were in support of 
separate states within the COR fold.
^Sir Henry's statement at Uyo, l4th December 1937°
p
■January 1938. Port Harcourt Sessions of the Commission. Cmmd, 
(London, iFlSO. 1938)
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The Rivers people were therefore disappointed at most of the
recommendations of the Commission which concluded that it (the Commission)
was ‘unable to recommend any now states in this (Eastern Nigeria) region'^...
arguing, among other reasons, that:
(i) the creation of a Rivers State "would be sharply resented 
by the Ibos of the central plateau" and that
(ii) "to sever themselves (the Rivers people) from the wealthier 
parts of the Region is surely not the way to get the schools 
and floating dispensaries they (the Rivers people) want.
The unwillingness of the Ibos to concede the creation of a Rivers State
is an open secret. Rivers people have always known this and one of the
3
reasons for antagonism between the Rivers people and their Ibo neighbours
originates from this fact. However, besides these conclusions, the Commission
fully recognised the fears of the minorities when it observed that 'the desire
m
for the creation of new states in part arises from the fears of minorities,’
Yet other decisions reached by most of the delegates at the 1937 Conference 
provided little scope for creating nev/ states. The following conclusion 
of the Commission testifies to this fact. "It would be impracticable to 
meet, all these fears (the fears of the minorities) by the creation of new states. 
There are many different ethnic groups and peoples in Nigeria .... it would 
therefore be the task of the Commission to propose other means of allaying these 
fears and to consider what safeguards should be included for this purpose in 
the Constitution."^
The conclusion and recommendations of the Commission did not deny one 
fact - that the Rivers people wanted a separate state. They did n8t want
^Bee Our Case, the Rivers State of Nigeria, Lagos. I969. p.7.
2 üt'Rf :
Ibid, p. 7.
%
^see later parts of this chapter for details.
The Nigeria Constitutional Conference. 1937. 20y.
London, HÎ'ISO, 1937. P« 10.
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constitutional safeguards alone because in their view, it was only in 
the context of a new state tJiat the pace of local development schemes 
in their area could be accelerated.
In the matter of institutional (as against constitutional) arrangements, 
the'most significant recommendation made by the Commission to correct the 
imbalance in local development between these minority and hinterland areas, 
was the establishment of the Niger Delta. Development Board^ (NDDB)• But 
NDDB’s area of operation comprised only the Yenagoa, Degema and Ogoni districts 
and their environs, and the Western Ijos of the Mid West area. Port Harcourt, 
which was the Board's headquarters, v/as outside its jurisdiction, as the 
Rivers people had expected and demanded* Again, a Rivers State, was without 
any real political and economic significance without Port Harcourt which was 
a growing industrial/commercial city. Port Harcourt would also have been 
the only city of importance in the proposed Rivers State, yet.it did not fall 
within the NDDB's area of control. Besides, the NDDB had no authority to 
implement survey plans (.even though it could undertake survey plans) without 
the approval of the Federal, Eastern and Mid Western Regional governments.
Under these circumstances of dissatisfaction with the limited executive 
capacity of the Board, and also its limited area composition, agitations for
a separate state did not subside even after the I96O Nigerian Independence.
2Rather the agitators intensified their demands, as will be seen in the 
narration of Biriye's role.
^In August 1939 an Executive proclamation gave effect to the NDDB, 
yet its Act came into real effect after independence in April,I96I.
I shall not discuss the Boro declaration of a Delta Republic 
because it has no direct link with Biriye's struggles discussed 
in this work.
222.
TES STATISTS AND STATir.M
In achieving this recent political goal (political autonomy) in 
1967, there were some agitators and leaders who became prominent. Those 
who were actively involved in the state movement and have attained eminence 
tlirough it are therefore identified by Rivers people as the statists.
Who were (and are) these distinguished men? What part did they play in 
these movements? How did they play that part? What were (and are) their 
connections and supporters? What is the relationship between their past 
and present status and what have they done in their positions of influence 
in the new State? These are the major questions I shall deal with later. 
BIKIY'E AMD STATISM
As I shall ai’gue later, among those who have contributed significantly 
to the creation of the Rivers State, Chief Biriye is the most distinguished. 
Hence the politics of Rivers State movement has become the politics of Biriye. 
Biriye's background and the bases of his eminence will therefore be discussed 
at this stage.
Chief Biriye (formerly known as Mr. Harold Wilcox) is about 98 years 
old* (in 1974). He is a citizen of Peterside, Bonny. By local standards, 
he is of aristocratic descent. He is the son of the late chief Magistrate, 
R.T.C. V/ilcoxjwho was a school master before he qualified as a lawyer. In 
his youth, there were very few children whose parents had respected professions 
such as l^av; and/Medicine. Therefore being the son of a lawyer, Biriye had
the privilege of attending two of Nigeria’s top public schools.
1
Biriye attended the Bonny Government School, the first government school 
in the Rivers area, for his primary educationJ while between 1937-41 he had 
his secondary school education at Kingb College, Lagos, which was Nigeria's
Personal discussion with Chief Biriye at his residence,
36 Forces Avenue, Port Harcourt. 9th September 19?4.
Most of the details about his personal life were gathered 
in this discussion.
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premier public secondary School» At school, he took an interest in 
those games (cricket and hockey) which appealed mostly to those of upper 
class background. At present, Chief Biriye is married with five children.
His hobbies are music and 'hard work'.^
Biriye refers to the Rivers State movement as a liberation movement;
he believes that the minorities needed to be liberated from the rule of
the major tribos.. This is how Biriye accounts for his staunch commitment
to the political survival of the Rivers people, believing that without him 
the Rivers people might have 'perished*. Nevertheless, he believes that 
for the Nigerian minorities (especially the Rivers people), attaining new 
statehood does not in itself o.mount to a solution to all their political 
and associated problems. He says people must work hard to sustain these 
new states.
The bases of Biriye's eminence in local politics are not, however, 
confined exclusively to the background already mentioned.
In the struggle for creating a Rivers State, Chief Biriye has been 
entrusted with several, responsibilities. These responsibilities illustrate 
more clearly the bases of his eminence. He was either a party leader, chief 
delegate or a key official in most of the early associations and Conference 
which were specifically charged with the responsibility of agitating for a 
separate province or state.
The part played by Biriye in the Rivers State movement can be divided 
into three 'functional categories'. The first category was his role as an 
official in the unions and conference to which mention has been made in the 
early parts of this chapter. The second covers his role as the Rivers people's 
chief delegate or spokesman in the conferences, while the third deals with 
his role as party leader or key official in the separatist political party, 
the NJ3C.
^Biriye's hyperbole.
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I shall now deal with these functional categories in the same order, as 
above, listing the offices he held in the different unions. He was secretary 
of the Ijaw Union in Port Harcourt in 1931j member of the Working Committee 
of the Council of Rivers Chiefs in 1953; Secretary of the Rivers State 
Congress in 1933; and Principal Secretary of the Rivers Chiefs and Peoples 
Conference in 1936.
The objectives and achievements of these Unions have already been 
discussed. Biriye was only an official in these unions, and so it is 
difficult to credit him with any particular achievement of the unions 
because of the collective responsibility which any team work of union 
officials involved.
Besides Biriye’s official role, he was also a delegate or principal 
spokesman in the following conferences or assemblies: chief spokesman
before the Lt. Governor at Enugu on official matters pertaining to the 
inclusion of Rivers State affairs on the agenda of the 1937 London 
Constitutional conference; chief delegate of the Rivers Chiefs and Peoples 
Conference in the 1937 London constitutional conference. When the political 
future of Nigeria was being discussed after the Nigerian military coup in 
1966, Chief Biriye was also one of the principal delegates to the Enugu 
consultative Assembly in August I966. Like bheir predecessors, the main
p
argument of this delegation was that in the light of the tragedies of 
January and July I966 the creation of a Rivers State was one of the bases for 
further political association in Nigeria. Also at the federal level where 
these constitutional debates continued in September I966, Biriye was the 
principal spokesman mandated by the Rivers Leaders of Thought to malce 
representations to the Head of the Federal Military Government on the 
issue of a Rivers State,
^The counter coup of July I966 in which thousands of Eastern Nigerian; 
(both military men and civilians) were killed.
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In the later stages of the Rivers State movement, there was a belief 
in the Rivers area that it was necessary for the leaders of the state 
movement to seek alliance with some major political parties in Nigeria 
such as the A,G, This strategy was also advantageous to the Rivers people 
because at that time the lone voice of the minorities could not make much 
political impact in Nigeria. Therefore in the third functional category, 
several attempts were made by the loaders of the Rivers people to contract 
alliances and coalitions with some major political parties.
It was obvious that the NCNC was ruled out from any alliance because of 
strong allegations that it was opposed^ to the creation of a Rivers State.
The other two major parties were the Action Group in the West and NPC in 
the North. Since the Action Group was a southern basejparty, it understood 
more of the problems of the Southern minorities. The Rivers people therefore 
preferred an alliance with it. In 1954 Chief Biriye was the principal Rivers 
people's delegate in a meeting with Action Group officials to discuss the 
terms of an 'Action Group-Rivers People's Alliance'. This party agreed to 
support the Rivers State movement. It was in this matter of political support 
that the Action Group was introduced to the Rivers province for the first time, 
and Biriye became the party's principal organising secretary in the area.
But the Action Group preferred a COR to a Rivers State because in terms of 
area (territory)., population and natural resources, a COR state would be a 
more viable political entity. Therefore, to most Rivers people, the AG 
approach was unpopular. The idea of a separate Rivers State v/as not negotiable.
The Action Group lost much of its support among Rivers people at this 
stage, and in 1959 the Niger Delta Congress (a political party based solely in 
the Rivers area) was formed. Biriye was elected the President and leader of 
the NDC. In the 1959 contests, the NDC's manifesto ■ was devoted mainly to the
’^See election issues in Chapter 5<
226.
Rivers State question. Nevertheless, it was clear at that time that the 
Northern People's Congress was the most powerful party in Nigeria, An 
NDC-NPC alliance v/as therefore considered necessary in settling the Rivers 
State matter. In August 1959i the NDC-NPC alliance was contracted for the 
same purpose: support in the creation of a Rivers State.
TEN FOUNDING FATPIER?
It is clear at this stage that for a long time the creation of the 
Rivers State was the political priority of the Rivers people; and indeed 
it was an issue of paramount importance to them. Politicians whose careers 
and interests have been centred mainly on this major political issue can 
therefore be seen as the pillars of Rivers state politics. In Rivers 
people's terminology, such politicians are the 'founding fathers' because 
the political foundation of the new State is credited to their handwork and 
patriotism.
In Rivers' State politics, local and central, Chief Biriye is therefore 
generally rated as the founding father of the State, and the doyen of state 
politics. He is also known as the chief commander - that is, commander-in-chief 
of Rivers State politics,
V/hy is Biriye given such a rating? V/hat were his exceptional achievements 
and how did he gain them? These are the questions which will now be answerer.
Biriye is a very sociable man, yet proud. He is interested in reading 
law. His book shelves are filled with books on law. According to him, his 
father's career influenced his career and priorities in life. Biriye is also 
well read. He is a gifted orator and it is often said of him that he can 
'reduce an audience to teai's' by the power of his speech.
Moreover, at the time of his early involvement in politics, there.was a 
common local belief that lawyers, or men inclined to reading law, made good 
politicians. Law was politics and politics v/as law. All these gave Biriye 
the relevant qualifications for politics.
These interests and talents of Biriye were not acquired recently. As
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early as the 19^0's he had built up a good public image. Personally, Biriye 
claims that he was very much instrumental to the creation of the Rivers State. 
He maintains that his political sagacity and talents (as already mentioned)
were (and are) political assets, hence he was very often the people's choice
I
for chief delegate. In those conferences and delegations no Rivers man 
spoke as often and as persuasively as he did. Above all, no other Rivers 
man was granted an audience with Colonial dignitaries as was Biriye. In 
effect, this led many Rivers people to conclude that among Rivers people it 
was only Biriye who could be granted an audience with both the colonial 
authorities and the Nigerian leaders who succeeded them after independence.
The most outstanding political achievement of Biriye can be traced to the 
third functional category. In the Rivers area there were very few politicians 
at this'time; and of the few, there were indeed 'very few leaders'. Politics 
among the minorities was not a very safe game because of the victimisation 
inherent in a political system, like that of Nigeria, where the majority ethnic 
group in any region formed and controlled the majority party and desired to 
rule forever.
All those who did not move along with the political tide of the time 
were regarded as 'enemies' opposed to the system. Politics at that time 
provided only one of two answers to most questions. It was either yes or no. 
Those who said no were the men of opposition who could expect no friendly 
gestures from those who ruled in a system where political tolerance was almost 
totally absent. In those circumstances only men of exceptional courage and 
determination ventured into politics. Most of the minority people who went 
into politics were either reluctant or afraid to lead the minority movements, 
fearing that the axe of the rulers would fall on them. It was under these 
conditions that Biriye emerged not only as a politician but also as chief 
spokesman of his people. His high political rating therefore results not only 
from the fact that he was 'politically minded' but that he was exceptionally 
courageous in championing his people's cause. As the old l8th century
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saying goes, ’he belled the cat.'
Prior to 1954, agitation for the creation of a Rivers State was mainly 
confined to activity at the League level (such as the Ijaw League, Councils 
and Conferences). Though these unions assumed responsibility for political 
matters, they were not real political unions and so they lacked sound 
organisation and tactics to fight for the political issues of the time.
It was Biriye who first solicited support from a major political party.
The Action Group was for the first time introduced to the Rivers area by him.
At that stage the Rivers State affair was formally introduced to the Nigerian 
political party arena. Later, when the Action Group strategy failed, it was 
Biriye who formed and led a new political party, the Niger Delta Congress (NDC) 
an ally of the NPC,
The NDC was the first political party in the Rivers area, and it v/as 
also the first party to be led by a Rivers man. Hence in four respects,
Biriye was (and is) described by most Rivers people as the first 'political 
citizen' of the Rivers State: the first to introduce the state affairs to
party politics (on the Action Group platform); the first to form an 
indigenous political party (NDC) for the purpose of political agitation for 
Rivers people; the first to lead this party; and for political gains, the 
first to contract an alliance of the party with Nigeria's strongest political 
party, the NPC,^ In a society where political achievements are assessed in 
such functional terms, it cannot be contested that there is no other person 
who stands as Biriye's rival. In this context, the 'first man' at four 
different levels also becomes both a founding father and chief commander.
1
The question arises: What did the NPC get from its alliance
with the NDC? Perhaps one could argue that its (NpC) influence 
was further extended to the South at a time when the dominant 
parties were confined mostly to their regions.
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BIRIYE'S }CRITICAL STRATCGIES
It is at the stage of active party involvement in Rivers State affairs, 
especially with the formation of the NDC, that the politics of Biriye can 
be said to have made great impact in the Rivers area. The dynamism of the 
NDC party leader, and the political currents of the time A-ne also interesting 
features of the ’NDC-Biriye’ political strategies. Yet the questions are 
asked: If Biriye was dynamic, was he also successful as a politician?
Is success in politics not a function of dynamism? Lastly, in what political 
circumstances did Biriye operate?
Under Biriye*s leadership, the NDC contested the 1959 federal elections.
The election issue with which the NDC was primarily concerned was the creation 
of a Rivers State, This was the subject of NDC's appeal to the Rivers people, 
and the party's major promise to Rivers people was that if their candidates 
were voted into the federal parliament, the creation of a Rivers State would 
become a reality. The NDC relied on the support of the NPC and as allies of 
the NPC, the NDC was confident of the establishment of a Rivers State, 
against the wishes of the NCNC^ and its predominantly Ibo supporters.
At that time, considering the dee/j.çt\^ o^f most Rivers people (and their 
Unions) to a Rivers State, NDC's appeal to Rivers people was of primary interest 
to many. Considering the Rivers people's political values, a new state was 
synonymous with accelerated development of all the communities, A party 
which promised to champion this cause was therefore most likely to be preferred 
to any other. The political interests (on the state matter) of a majority of 
the Rivers people therefore made NDC's victory almost certain. Above all 
a politician unable to understand the values, priorities and mentality of his 
electorate could rarely succeed in the Rivers State. The NDC leader knew what 
the people wanted: their wants were therefore the main subject of his promises.
^See Chapter 5* Why was Kalada Kiri rejected in I96I as 
an NCNC candidate?
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These were political autonomy and the accelerated development of all 
communities in the Rivers area. But these promises were only to be fulfilled 
if the NDC won the elections. Again Biriye's sweet tongue helped to attach 
great importance to these issues.
In these circumstances, the NDC had expected victory in 1959? but 
victory eluded it. In that election, of the eight NDC candidates who 
contested, only one of them, Mr, M. Okilo^ (in Brass Division), was elected. 
Surprisingly even the party leader, Biriye, lost in the Degema East constituency,
Certain questions are therefore posed by Biriye's failure. How could a 
popular, dynamic, sweet-tongued politician (and party leader) lose in an 
election in spite of the ideals he stood for and promised? V/as Biriye really 
popular and did he stand for a popular cause?
Some of the answers to these questions have already been discussed in the 
previous chapter, the 'Biriye-Jamabo' contest. To understand the pattern of 
political leadership and support in the rural areas of the Rivers State, 
one must take into account certain aspects of the traditional social structure, 
notably the kinship and 'brotherhood* system in the village together with 
local political values and priorities. These are the points I shall discuss 
briefly at this stage.
As will be argued later, in politics (especially in the voting pattern) the 
basic units of interest aggregation and support are found within the village, 
town and ^  (see Chapter 1). Each of these constitutes the local political 
arena, because each of these units (or in combinations) coincides with the 
voting wards in the different constituencies in district, Regional/federal 
elections. In each of these mini-polities, the kinship ties are strong and 
widely extended. Though descent or inheritance in the Rivers State is largely 
patrimonial, matrilineal claims are not uncommon. In recent times, the people's
1
When the Rivers State was created, Okilo was given a ministerial 
appointment as Commissioner. A reward for support of the Rivers 
State movement?
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acceptance of both patrilineal and matrilineal claims has encouraged 
the emergency of double unilineal patterns of descent. The extended family 
system is further sustained by this pattern of descent claims. Beyond these 
kinship ties, within the village or town, virtually everyone is a 'brother*, 
'sister', or 'neighbour' of the other. A philosophy of village or town 
'brotherhood' has therefore developed. In terms of descent, villages are 
linked with towns and towns with the BE. Patterns of political cleavage in 
the locality have therefore been considerably influenced by these kinship ties 
and beliefs in brotherhood. It is in this sense that many communities have 
become mere constellations of kinship groups. In elections, these 
constellations coincide basically with the political cleavages between groups® 
It is not however being suggested that there is no social change in 
these communities (see Chapter 2) but that no transformation completely 
eliminates traditional patterns of behaviour. For example, the arguments in 
chapters 3 and 5 suggest that though the influence of chiefs has declined, 
the institution of chieftaincy is not completely relegated to the background® 
Also, the modern elite have become a dominant group. Their social values 
and outlook have changed; nevertheless, they are still defenders of local or 
sectional interests. These two arguments suggest that the old and new still 
persist side by side. Moreover, the persistence of particularisms and localism 
is still remarkable. Hence paradoxically, Rivers people while changing fast 
have also changed little.
In the former Eastern Nigeria, as in the Rivers State, these political 
particularisms and parochialisms were of two kinds; voting either in the 
interest of the locality or of the dominant party (or both). However, 
voting behaviour was not always predictable though the voteras choice depended 
much on his interest at any point in time. Interests therefore shifted from 
time to time and from one circumstance to the other. Again, the fact that the
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interest of the comiciniity - which sometimes coincided with that of the 
party - was primary was not often in dispute. In situations of political 
competition among different communities, the welfare of each community is
always a matter for primary consideration, even if the community was
I . .  2politically dividede
Biriye's constituencies in the elections comprised Bonny and Ckrika,
Okrika constituting about two-thirds of that constituency. In the localities,
elections are always understood as competitions between candidates (not parties)
3
or communities and each candidate is also a representative of a community. 
Therefore, in any major political contest between Okrika and Bonny, Biriye's 
chances of victory were slim since he was (and is) a native of Bonny, a 
minority unit in the Okrika/Bonn^’ (Degema East) constituency. In their own 
interest, Okrika people would obviously have voted for their own candidate 
(Jamabo - chapter 5) though they believed in the major issue of a new state 
for which Biriye's party stood. The Okrika riots and demonstrations in 
January I967, in support of a Rivers State, confirm that the people were 
committed to the Rivers state issue. Therefore their rejection of Biriye in 
the elections could only be understood in the context of the different Bonny 
and Okrika community interests. The election issues were not centred only 
on the question oR new states. There were also some other important issues on 
local development projects which either the NDC or the NCNC (Jamabo's party) 
was believed to be capable of financing. Okrika and Bonny beliefs about the 
'how and who' of this political development differed. In this sense, it is 
difficult to ignore one fact: that Biriye w^ as a victim of the different political
1
This is subject to how inter-st is understood. Both the individual 
and the community may think that they share similar or irréconciliable 
interests; but in the local communities, the political interests of 
both are often identical.
2
Okrika is an example. See Chapter 5: Jamabo Vs Biriye*
Robert Darhl (l.ho Governs? New Haven. I96I) and Raymond Vfolfinge.r 
("The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting", if
Vol. 59 896-908) have also observed that in sevehal
ethnic factors have continued to make themselves felt in elections.
In short several political systems continue to roly upon 'ethnic strategies'.
y conclude that 
ijority of the
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interests and circumstances of the time. One must inevitalf 
popular and sweet tongued politicians only succeed if the nu 
electorate share similar interests with them. Outside this, the popularity
of a politician is of little appeal to the people because politics is about
I
sharing benefits. Whosoever can be the community's benefactor is the popular 
choice of the people.
On the other hand, considering the limited area in which the party 
contested the election, it is difficult to argue that the NDC sought to control 
the machinery of government in Eastern Nigeria. The NDC was a minority party 
which operated only in the minority Riverine area. In the words of Biriye,^ 
its principal aim in contesting the 1959 election was to establish :its presence 
in the Rivers area and to enlighten its people on the separate identities of 
the Rivers people and the other neighbours (especially the Ibos), contrai-y to 
the NCNC propaganda that Eastern Nigeria v/as homogeneous, politically and 
ethnically.
Furthermore, in the' situations considered, election results were not
necessarily sufficient indicators of support for the parties or candidates.
Dominant or majority parties had a reputation for rigging elections. In the
views of Biriye, the possibility of a rigged election v/as not remote in the
NCNC/NDC rivalries. Politically, too, the NCNC majority party v/as better
organised to contest elections; its 'wooing tactics' were sounder. It could
therefore manipulate local support, no matter how unappealing its policies were.
Above all, to many people the dominant party was the major source of political
Prewards. This was well knov/n. It was also the 'god of the day' “ which decided 
the fate of the communities, and so the NCNC demanded political conformity 
from the people as a condition for rewarding its supporters. In this sense.
1Personal Communication. 9th September 1974.
2
The dominant party.
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Dr, Okpar£3i's address to the people of Calabar during the I96I regional 
election campaign also applied to the Rivers people. Indeed, everyone wanted 
the booty (such as development projects) - far more than was available.
The NDC was a minority party, and for fear of political reprisal from 
the NCNC party and government, a majority of the local people often 
preferred to vote for the party of the day. To most people, voting for a 
minority party meant a wastg^ of vote, even if they would have liked to 
support that minority party. It was better and more advantageous to talce 
sides with the majority. This was the pattern of political behaviour to 
which most people became accustomed in the process of political socialisation.
The poor tax-payers money which the dominant party and government controlled 
must be shared by all communities - but only by the political conformists.
In this need for political conformity, the NDC's defeat could not have come 
as a great surprise to many*even though the extreme desire of the Rivers 
people for separation can hardly be reconciled with the NDC's defeat. Perhaps 
Rivers people wanted both a separate state and profits which the NCNC could 
give - preferably they wanted the latter until the former materialised.
At this stage, three main conclusions must be drawn from the NDC/NCNC
contests in relation to the political priorities of the Riverine communities.
First of all, in local politics the rule of the game is largely defined by
the clients. They define the 'politics of benefits'. Promises are the major
1sources of appeal to the clients yet the clients determine' and decide which 
party or candidate is capable of fulfilling its promises. But since there are 
different prizes or benefits which the different communities aim at, victory 
is more or less the preserve of the dominant party which has a better reputation, 
(real and imagined) and credibility for distributing more prizes. After all, 
in this case, local politics are about the extraction of benefits from the 
central government or party.
'^The client as a 'Master'.
235.
Secondly, the firmer the grip of a dominant party over the electorate, 
the better its bargaining position vis-a-vis a minority party.
Competition in this situation is bound to be unequal because of the 
different statuses of the contesting parties. Hence the struggle between 
two unequal partners results in victory for the stronger party because while 
the majority party can be seen to give political prizes, the minority can 
only make promises. Local people canot, and do not, live on promises which 
are made by a party which has little chances of fulfilling its promises.
Thirdly, politics within and beyond the locality is largely particularistic 
and parochial. This is the basis of protective communalisra which defines the 
politics of self-interest,^
BIRIYE LS POLITICO AND PRESENT DEVLLO'PMENT EVFORTS
Perhaps it may surprise an outsider that a man (Biriye) who was 
unsuccessful as a 'candidate' has come to the limelight in the present Rivers 
State. This is the interesting development I shall now deal with: Biriye's
present political career in relation to development efforts in the State.
Since the creation of the Rivers State, Biriye appears to have been rewarded 
with certain ministerial posts. It is the thinlcing of many Rivers people that
Biriye's cabinet appointments are in recognition of the part he played in the
 ^ 2 
Rivers State movement. In Dr. Okpara's words, (already quoted), the war is now
over and booty is being shared.
Chief Biriye has served in several executive capacities as commissioner
since I969, He has been Commissioner for Agriculture, Fisheries and Natural
Resources; Works and Hgusing; Establishment; and Information, But in late
1974 he had a disagreement with the Governor, Indirectly, Biriye accused^
Again, party ideologies were of relatively little importance in the 
working of the political system.
2
In this sense, it is a war of survival in which the Rivers people have 
emerged triumphant, having been freed from the NCNC/lbo government.
^As will be discussed later, in a.Conference of Rivers Gtate Chiefs,
Biriye spoke against the Governor for ..misappropriating government 
funds. This was considered too direct an attack on the Governor, 
intended to bring the Governor to public disgrace.
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the Governor of corruption and of being, therefore, unworthy to hold the 
high office of Governor. Understandably, Biriye lost the favour and goodwilD 
of the Governor, resulting in his dismissal from the Cabinet in November 1974.
The official reason given for Biriye's dismissal was that 'the loyalty of 
the Commissioner to the government was questionable’.^ Indeed, 'loyalty' 
meant support for a government no matter how corrupt it might be. Considering 
Biriye's political status and outstanding contributions to Rivers State politics, 
many Rivers people are disappointed at his removal from office, though the 
reasons for his dismissal do not come as a surprise, especially when it is 
known that there is very little political tolerance in Nigeria. Vfno can 
ever challenge a god (Governor) in public, without facing unpleasant 
consequences, more especially when a commissioner holds office at the pleasure 
of the Governor?
However, until Biriye's recent dismissal, he was the Commissioner for 
Information. Despite the past failure of the NDC and Biriye in the elections 
and their inability to procure development projects for the Rivers people 
(because of their failure), Biriye in particular and the NDC in general, 
are held in high esteem by many Rivers people. They are often referred to 
as 'the heroâ-S of the Rivers State', believing that they are responsible for 
initiating several local development projects in the State.
However, at an official level, the preparation of development plans and 
the execution of these projects is not credited to any particular group of 
cabinet ministers. The principle of 'collective responsibility' demands that 
the Executive Council should accept responsibility for the making and 
implementation of all government policies and plans. Yet in the local areas, 
as in Port Harcourt, government plans and policies, whether implemented or not, 
are associated with particular regimes. By the same token, there are also
West Africa. l8th November 1974.. p. 1417.
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certain key officials in any regime whoso tenure of office is associated 
with plan/project failure or successes. Local people arc also more 
interested in knowing the names of important personalities or political 
parties in whose regime certain development projects were executed. The name 
'government' is a 'blanket terrn'j even when people talk of government it is 
a government of personalities they have in mind. It is in this sense of a 
government of personalities that many Rivers people talk of Biriye not only 
as a 'founding father' but as the initiator of several road development 
projects in the Rivers State, as listed below.
To many Rivers people, the following road projects in the State First 
Development Plan^ 1970-74, which are either under construction, survey or 
completed, are credited to Biriye and his former NDC party:
(i) Yenagoa - Nernbe Road
(ii) Bonu - Bonny Road
(iii) East - West Road
2
So also is the new Okrika causeway which links the Okrika Gi'ammar School
village and Okrika island, considered as Biriye's brainchild. These four
major development projects link important commercial towns and villages in
the state. In undertaking the construction of these roads, the Rivers State
Government describes them as projects which will ensure the 'quick evacuation
of produce from the hinterland to the ports ; direct road link between the
3State Headquarters and the Divisional headquarters;'
It is pertinent to ask, at this stage, why these four major development
projects are credited to Biriye and his NDC. The answer is not far fetched,
4
In a discussion on what development projects were urgently needed in the
^See Rivers State, First Development Plan, 1970-74. pp. 53“38 
2
“The length of the bridge is estimated at about half a mile and 
its width, 13 yards.
%
Rivers State, First Dovelonment Plan, 1970*74. Page 33*
^Political debate on 'The Rivers People and their Needs'.
Public Debate. Port Harcourt. July, 1932.
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Rivers area, Biriye had in 1952 proposed the construction of the Okrika
Causeway# The other three road projects were also included in the Biriye/NDC 
1
manifesto for the 1959 federal election. Biriye had also spoken about these
projects in earlier debates, arguing that these constituted some of the most
urgent economic and social needs of the riverine people* As a member of the
Rivers State Executive Council, it is therefore felt by many people that he
has influenced his government to accept responsibility for executing these
projects. Fortunately for Biriye, his plans are reaching fruition not only
under a government in which he was one of the chief executives but also in
a state which he has more or less created by himself. Therefore, those tv/o
political circumstances - Biriye's cabinet post and his direct involvement in
the creation of a Rivers State ~ inevitably lead many Rivers people to
associate him with these projects. To most people, what is particularly
impressive is that none of these road projects leads to, or connects, Biriye's 
2
village directly. There is therefore no accusation that Biriye is parochial
in his development proposals,
Biriye himself admits that he had once made these suggestions on
development* He does not, however, wish to accept sole responsibility for
their present plan or execution. Nevertheless, he agrees that he has persuaded
the present government to take sufficient interest in these projects. He is
also proud that these plans are reaching fruition in his regime. Above all,
when asked what he would like to be remembered for in his contribution to
general development in the Btate, he listed the main things he has done,
(i) Fighting for the self determination of the Nigerian minorities 
in general, and the Rivers people in particular, and
(ii) A Rivers State committed to economic, political and social 
development in general, and the development of the transport 
system in particular,
Biriye is very conscious and proud of these two contributions, a consciousness
^Biriye*s personal papers. 'The NDC and the Federal Election Strategy, 1959’, 
2
Though Peterside, his village, is in Bonny county covered by the road network,
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which also suggests t’aat he is aware that many Rivers people hold him in high 
esteem. Nevertheless, he expects no personal reward or gains for these 
contributions0 Yet he asserts that his rewards lie in two things:
(i) the success of these development programmes;
(ii) that 'the Rivers State has corne to stay'.^
INTERNAL STATE POLITICS AMD TlF.t DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES :
At this stage, it is pertinent to ask some questions about the kind of 
internal state politics which has emerged from the Rivers State movement,
Biriye, it is known, fought hard for the creation of the Rivers State.
At the time of his political battle, he did not win the support of some groups 
and people in the state. Have these political differences between Biriye and 
the other non-supporters of a Rivers State movement continued? Since the 
attainment of political autonomy, what has been the politics of distribution 
of resources?
SUPPORTERS AND NON-SijpPORTERS
Even though Biriye did not win any parliamentary seat on the NDC platform, 
in terms of relative support, he named the following groups as political 
supporters of the NDC: (i) Southern Ijaw, (where Mr, Okilo was elected into
the federal parliament in 1959); therefore it is not surprising that Biriye 
considers the Souther Ijaws as the most prominent political supporters;
(ii) Bonny; (iii) Okrika; (iv) Nembe; (v) Ogbia.
Certain things are striking about Biriye's observations on the political 
support of groups. He said he observed that the groups listed above supported 
him. How did he observe these? He claimed to have interviewed most of the 
local people, especially chiefs and young men, prior to the elections.
An expression which has become a popular slogan among Rivers people 
in recent times - this expression defines the Rivers State as a 
political reality, contrary to the wishes of all those^who were 
opposed to the concept of political autonomy for Rivers people.
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The people assured him that they would support him. He had no cause to doubt 
them, he said. Most of the people sang in praise of him and his party.
The local people assisted him by providing canoes and paddlers, tcking him 
from one village to another for his political campaigns. Besides, they 
entertained him lavishly with beer and food; local hospitality was striking.
What else, he asked me, could constitute greater signs of support?
Personally, I have no cause to disbelieve Biriye's account. But the fact is 
that the results from the ballot box were different. Biriye lost the elections, 
contrary to his expectations. Perhaps there was more to political support 
than the indicators used by Biriye,
These elections referred to are over, A Rivers State has been created and 
so it is difficult to examine most of Biriye's claims. Nevertheless, at present 
there ai^ e two political blocs in the state. The supporters of the Rivers State 
movement, which coincide with those communities named by Biriye as NBC 
supporters (notably the southern Ijaw, Bonny, Okrika, Nembe and Ogbia) 
constitute one political bloc, while most of the other communities - the Ogbas 
and Ogonis in particular - constitute another political bloc. Communities 
in the latter bloc are generally referred Lo as the non-supporters^ of the state 
movement because they were not well represented in the leagues, councils and 
conferences which <o^itated for a state. These classifications of supporters 
and non-supporters have, to a great extent, influenced local demands (particularly 
among communities in the riverine bloc) that the profits of political 
independence should be shared according to the proportion of support which each 
group gave to the state movement. What difficult arithmetic to work outi 
The obvious rationale is that those who suffered greatly^, (and were allegedly 
victimised by the governing party at the time) in the political struggle should 
receive proportionate favours in the distribution of political prizes. Some of 
these local' demands will be examined in Chapter 7,
Bee Dr, Obi Wali's case in Chapter 7. His people, the Ikwerres, belong 
to the opposition camp - the non-supporters. The question is: why 
was Obi Wali dismissed as a Commissioner? (See Chapter 7*)
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No wonder, Biriye talked to me at length about certain groups and people 
who now reap where they did not sow - those who played thef^ .i(id.l<2. while the 
supporters ^Inguished in exile® For example, Biriye claimed to have sought
refuge in Lagos when the NCNC party men ran after him. Therefore he asked me
I
why the non-supporters of the state movement should benefit in the new state 
in spite of their opposition at that time.
Furthermore, wiiat is significant about these two political blocs is that 
while the non-supporters of the NCNC party were called saboteurs, the non- 
supporters of the NDC are called saboteurs today. In effect then, the saboteurs 
of yesterday have become the loyalists of today, while the former loyalists have 
become the saboteurs today,
INDIVIDUAL SUPPORTERS
Besides the group level, Biriye named certain personalities as prominent 
supporters of the state movement. These are: (i) Chief Nzidee who was once 
elected Chairman of the Khana County Council oh the NDC platform;
(ii) Chief Alamene Bobai (from Southern Ijaw); (iii) Chief Opurum (a former 
NDC candidate for Etche); (iv) Mr. M. Okilo (Southern Ijaw); (v) Chief William
Onuboji (Ahoada); (vi) Chief S, Adoki (Okrika), and (vii) The Amanyanabo of Nembe, 
Mingi X, Biriye also named the following as sympathisers of the NDC:
(i) Mr, K.B, Tsarc V/iwa; (ii) Dr. Graham Douglas; (iii) Chief Igbetta, and
(iv) Chief Opu-Ogulaya.
It is most striking that of the list of prominent NDC supporters and 
sympathisers,Chief Nzidee, Chief Opurum, Chief Alamene Bobai, Mr. M. Okilo,
Mr, Tsaro V/iwa, Dr. Douglas, and Chief Opu-Ogulaya are ( or were) commissioners 
in the Rivers State, It appears to be a wonderful coincidence that former NDC 
supporters are commissioners in the present administration. These ministerial 
appointments have therefore inclined many Rivers people to believe that former 
NDC supiDorters are the rulers of the State, as a reward for their support of the 
State movement. Many Rivers people have the impression that Biriye influenced 
these appointments not only to reward his former I'-JDC supporters, but also to
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convince his detractors and opponents that even in future - under civilian
rule - Only NDC supporters would become state leaders. In short, even in
future, the NDC would be the only 'party of the people.'
Though difficult to prove, it is Chief Biriye who is believed to have
influenced these appointments because of his close association with the Governor,
After all, the Governor appoints ministers at his pleasure, and has the right
to consult whomsoever he likes for nominations to fill certain vacancies, V/ho
else could the Governor consult, other than his friends and close associates?
However, Biriye denied that he was directly instrumental in these
appointments, arguing that it is possible the Governor may have personal pikes
for those he may wish to appoint to high offices. Biriye'c argument appears to
be a reasonable one, in view of the possible considerations which may influence
the appointment of ministers in any government. But a major question arises.
Is the possibility of Biriye's influence on the Governor completely ruled out,
if both were friends at the time appointments were made? Since Biriye
supports the idea that people should not reap where they did not sow, he is
^^kely to support that only those who sow should harvest - at least by implication.
Besides these ministerial appointments, Biriye is also believed to have
influenced the removal^ from office of one V.I,P, in the State, In 1971?
Mr. Kalada Hart, a Permanent Secretary (from Bonny) was removed from office
2by the Public Service Commission on the grounds of abuse of office (a term 
which, more or less, has little meaning in the Rivers State because it is 
hardly well defined). At that time, Mr, Hart was Permanent Secretary, Ministry
3
of Works and Housing. It was alleged that Mr^ Hart diverted some ministerial 
building materials for his personal use.
It is interesting to ask who influenced Biriye's removal from office, 
if he influenced the removal of Mr. Hart, for if Biriye himself had 
been irremovable, why was he dismissed?
2
The Public Service Commission would normally consult the Governor 
before talcing such major decisions,
3
The Chairman and other officials of the Public Service Commission 
refused to comment on this matter. However, they agreed that these 
officers were dismissed on grounds of abuse of office.
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Whether the allegations'^ are true or false, fïlr. Hart was removed from 
office. It was believed that Biri/O was a party to Mr,Hart’s dismissal.
But the difficult question is: how couJd Biriye influence the removal of
Mr,Hartj his ’brother’, another Bonny patron - given the common protective 
communalistic sentiments I have discussed in this work?
One may, however, trace the conclusions of the public about Hart's
2
removal to three facts', Mr,Hart was not a supporter of the Rivers State 
movement. In Biriye’s NDC campaigns, Mr.Hart belonged to the opposition camp. 
In fact when the civil war ended and Mr,Hart returned to Port Harcourt, the 
Public Service Commission was reluctant in appointing him as a Permanent 
Secretary, because of allegations that he took an active interest in the 
Biafran movement, Mr,Hart was the Fuel Director in the Biafran regime - an 
Important post at the time.
It was understood that Hart was later appointed as Permanent Secretary 
because of the personnel shortages in the Rivers State Service, Besides, his 
wife is an Ibo, hence it is believed that she might have persuaded her husband 
against supporting a Rivers State movement- characteristic of the alleged Ibo 
opposition to creating a Rivers State, Finally, as has been mentioned before, 
Biriye was the Governor's good friend ac the time Mr.Hart was removed from 
office.
It is therefore believed that when Mr.Hart was accused of abuse of office,
3
Biriye might have persuaded the Governor to dismiss Mr,Hart because the old 
political rivalries and bitterness still persisted. The patron is believed,
^Interview with senior officials of the Ministry of Works and 
Housing, October, 1973,
2
These were subjects of public debate at Port Harcourt Municipal 
Hall on 15th October 1973,
3
At present Mr,Hart lives at Aba (in the East Central State) 
as a business man.
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as vie noted in Chapter 3? to be a vindictive man. The question is therefore
often asked: why were other disciplinary actions, other than dismissal,
not taken in the case of Mr, Hart, as was the case when some others (not
named) were guilty of more serious offences, especially when Hr. Hart was
generally considered a very efficient administrator? The general answer
is that Mr, Hart was a victim of political vindictiveness. The general answer
is traceable to the fact that soon after Mr, Hart's removal, Mr. H.H. Jumbo
(a Bonny man), a supporter of Biriye, was appointed Permanent Secretary - as
if Mr, Jumbo replaced Mr, Hart.
Yet in the midst of the communal rivalries in the state, one wonders what
Bonny would have gained if it is really true that Biriye was instrumental in
Mr. Hart's removal. On this question, no answers were given by my Port Harcourt
informants, I shall therefore leave this question open, and draw some
conclusions on it later.
I shall now digress from the politics of Biriye and examine what internal
politics have emerged from the Rivers State movement,
THE DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES
Besides the foregoing issues about support for the Rivers State movement,
there has been a major political development - agitation for a Port Harcourt
State - since the attainment of political autonomy by the Rivers people. It
is this political development which suggests that the political differences
between Biriye and the non-supporters of the State movement have continued.
In September 1974, thirty chiefs and other prominent men from the
hinterland bloc (the non-supporters of the Rivers State movement) agitated '
for the creation of a Port Harcourt State out of the present Rivers State,
In December 1974 the agitation for a Port Harcourt State was intensified,
2
A petition' signed by seventy four local dignitaries (including three cabinet
1
See Nigerian Tide. (Septernber-November 1974 editions)
2
The Case for Creation of Port Harcourt State within the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria. (Petition addressed to General 6Vowon)
Port Harcourt, 1973*
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ministers, notably Messrs. N. Niuanodi, E, Kobani and S.A.O.Wachuku) From 
the hinterland bloc was forwarded to General Gowan in connection with the 
same matter. The petitioners, led by the three ministers, represented the 
complaints and wishes of their people#
There were three major complaints^ of the petitioners. Firstly, that 
in the first development plan (1970-74), most of the projects were located 
in the riverine areas. Secondly, they accused the Governor of parochialism 
and maladministration* Thirdly, the agitators concluded that because the 
administrators from the riverine bloc outnumbered their counterpart from the 
hinterland bloc, the sympathies 'of the administrators from the riverine bloc 
lie with their people. Hence, it is argued, most of the projects are 
located in the riverine area. Therefore since May 1975 the demand for a 
Port Harcourt State has become more uncompromising, especially among the 
three cabinet ministers#
In their petition to General Gowan, the agitators drew special attention
2
to road and inland water transport projects in the development plan. The 
major criticism of the agitators was that, compared with the hinterland bloc, 
not only did the riverine bloc benefit more from the riverine transport project, 
but most of the road projects which ought to be concentrated in the hinterland 
areas were located in the riverine areas. In short, their argument was that 
if the riverine people should benefit more from the water transport projects, 
the hinterland bloc expected equal benefit from road projects#
Therefore in the opinion of the agitators it is only in a state of their 
own (a Port Harcourt State) that their interests would be adequately protected;
^Ibid#
2The petitioners also alleged that most of the other projects, namely, 
new schools and new hospitals are located in the riverine areas.
See The Case for Creation of Port Harcourt State within tho Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, Op, cit. p.5
P-l^6 *
besides, the pace of development would be faster in a new state» In short 
their argument was that the creation of a Port Harcourt State was the only 
cure for the relative underdevelopment of the hinterland communities.
However, in Nigeria (and in most parts of Africa) the agitation for new 
states is a common phenomenon. Among the different groups, allegations 
regarding imbalance in the distribution of resources are also common. No 
matter the number of states created - especially in Nigeria whore there are 
several minorities - some groups will still consider themselves minorities 
and claiïiour for separate states of their own. In short there can be no end 
to the question of minorities®
Yet as will be shown in what follows, the demand for a Port Harcourt State 
is not just centred on the distribution of resources. There are other issues 
concerning (i) the 'location of power' in the cabinet, and (ii) good conduct 
in administration.
Firstly, it is implicitly alleged that an important military figure, 
notably the Governor, has placed the interests of his people (the Nembes) above 
State interest. It is a].leged that particular attention has been paid to the 
development of Nembe in spite of the fact that all other areas need to be 
developed. Obviously, as will be seen in the next chapter, the people expect 
higher standards of political conduct from the military (compared with the 
civilians) especially as the military say theirs is an impartial and corrective 
government. The question is: if the military are as'parochial as the
petitioners suggest, which future civilian government would correct the ills 
of the former civilian administration? There is little hope that a civilian 
administration would do better than a military government - at least, the 
people think in this way.
Secondly, as shown already, the petitioners are led by three cabinet 
ministers. It is therefore clear that the three ministers (from the 
hinterland bloc) who form the 'opposition party' differ politically with 
their cabinet colleagues on an important political issue. But normally one
2l^ r,
would have assumed that decisions about the execution of the development plan 
were taken by the cabinet acting as a team. In the light of the present open 
split in the cabinet - regarding the allocation of resources and the 
agitation for a Port Harcourt State - it appears that the principle of
I
collective responsibility is weakly enforced or non-existent in the Rivers 
State administration. It will also be seen (both in this chapter and the next) 
that, in the cabinet, power is concentrated in the hands of some dominant 
figures.
Thirdly, regarding the distribution of resources, the allegations about 
injustice are complex. Certain questions arise from these allegations. Should, 
or can^each of the two blocs be developed in isolation from the other? If the 
two blocs are an integral part of one state, should resources be distributed on 
the bases of population statistics, need, or any other criteria? Generally 
it will be seen later on in this chapter that the political arithmetic is a 
difficult one to work out.
Finally, a major question is: as far as the hinterland people are
concerned,, would the promise of an equitable distribution of resources (as 
implicitly promised by the agitators) give the Port Harcourt State movement 
an appeal which the present Rivers State administration has allegedly lost?
This question will be examined briefly in the later sections of this chapter, 
EXAMINING TIffi COMPLAINTS
I shall now examine the question of injustice in the allocation 
resources regarding transport projects in particular.
There is no doubt that in view of its ’'"topography^ (see Chapter 2), the 
Rivers State requires an effective coordinated road and water transport 
network, not only to ease the transport problems but for purposes of produce 
evacuation and facilitating internal trade among the various communities. Hence 
I in the first development plan period, seven major state roads^ (See Table
^The roads referred to are either Trunk A or B roads; they are 
therefore distinct from the county council roads discussed in 
Chapter 4.
TABLJJ _ 3^
CAPITAL EXPzh'DITURE GH BTATE ROAD PR0C5;L1IE
Name of Road Expenditure
1, Port Harcourt - Elel8 - Ahoada £ 620,000
2, Elelemva - Pori - Kono 600,000
3, Ahoada - Legema - 560,000
4, Ahoada - Yenagoa 720,000
5, Ahoada - Omolcu - Okvaisi 440,000
6, Yenagoa - Oloihiri - Remhe 1,000,000
7, Ighogene - Polaku - Odi 450,000
*8« Survey of new roads (in Riverine area) 500,000
* 9* Plant and Equipment ■ 200,000
Total; £5,490,000
NOTE: Names of roads do not go beyond item 7*
The mark * refers to expenditure only.
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TABLE 4
AREAS (Hinterland and Riverine) in which ROADS ARE LOCATED
AREA
HINTERLAND
1. Port Harcourt ~ Elele - Ahoada road 
2* Elelenwa - Bori - Kono road 
3* Ahoada - Omoku - Okwuzi road
TOTAL
EXPENDITURE
£ 820,000 
800,000 
440,000
£2,060,000
RIVERINE
4. Ahoada - Degema - Buguma road
5. Ahoada - Yenagoa road
*6, Yenagoa - Oloibiri » Nembe road
*7* Igbogene - Polaku - Odi road 
Survey of new roads
£ 560,000 
720,000 
1,000,000
450.000
500.000
£3,230,000
NOTE: i) The mark * stands for new roads.
ii) The two roads, namely, Ahoada - Degema - Buguma 
and Ahoada - Yenagoa are grouped as belonging 
to the riverine areas because Ahoada (a hinter­
land town) serves only as the terminus.
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TABLE 5
EXPENDITURE ON INLAND WATER TRANSPORT
ITEMS EXPENDITURE
i) Construction of Jetties £ 500,000
ii) Purchase of Training Launches 500,000
iii) Rivers State Transport Corporation's Projects: 1,200,000
TOTAL: £2,000,000
SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURE
Hinterland Bloc Projects: 
Riverine Bloc Projects:
TOTAL:
Hinterland bloc Projects 
Riverine bloc Projects
£2,060,000 
i) 5,230,000
ii) 2,000,000
£2,060,000 
5,230,000
(Roads)
(Roads)
(Inland Waterways)
SOURCE (Tables 3 - 5)
Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction* 
August 1970.
For data, see Rivers State First Development Plan, 
op. cit. pp. 54-59.
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were either constructed or reconstructed. Of this number, only two roads were 
newly constructed all of which are in the riverine areas, namely, the 
Y’enagoa-Oli'O'ibiri • ~ Nembe road and the Igbogene ~ Polaku - Odi road. The 
other five roads were constructed prior to the creation of the Rivers State. 
Therefore, in the first plan period, these roads were only reconstructed.
In the first plan period, the capital expenditure on these state road projects 
totalled £5,4-90,000. (See Table 3).
If one were to divide these roads strictly into their areas of location 
(hinterland or riverine), it will be seen that three roads were located in 
the hinterland areas, as against four in the riverine areas. (See Table 4)
The capital expenditure on roads in the hinterland and riverine areas totalled 
£2.,060,000 and £3,230,000 respectively. In short, about 40 per cent of the 
capital expenditure incurred on road projects was spent <pn the hinterland 
areas^as against 60 per cent for projects in the riverine areas. The capital 
expenditure on inland water transport projects totalled £2,000,000, (See Table 5)• 
From these two sets of expenditure - road and inland water transport projects - 
it appears that projects in the riverine and hinterland areas claimed 
approximately 70 per cent and 30 per cenb respectively of the total capital costs.
Again, if one were to take the population of the different communities into 
account in distributing the resources of the state, inevitably most of the 
projects will be located in the riverine areas since the riverine jrople 
constitute about two-thirds of the population of the state. Therefore, it will 
be seen that even if the agitators argued that population statistics should be 
one of the key indices for determining the proportion of group benefits, the 
percentage benefits received by the two groups appears to be an equitable deal*
I am, however, aware that group benefits cannot be calculated in such strict 
arithmetical proposions. Nevertheless, as seen in Chapter 1, if a representative 
bureaucracy'is sought, the benefits for each group must be determined partly by 
population statiS^ticjs and partly by other considerations, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 8,
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However,a difficult question arises at this stage. How can one talk 
as if state transport projects belong exclusively to either the riverine 
or hinterland people? After all, roads, jetties and river crafts cannot 
be used exclusively either by the hinterlanders or the riverine people. Both 
groups benefit from the use of the projects. Nevertheless, by the nature of 
their geographical settlements, riverine and hinterland people tend to 
patronise and use such projects which have a direct bearing on the immediate 
transport needs in their localities* Hence one v/ould expect people in the 
riverine and hinterland areas to benefit more from transport projects in 
their respective areas. However, in terms of the overall benefits derived 
from the use of transport projects, it is misleading to classify people into 
hinterland and riverine blocs - as if both riverine and hinterland people do 
not jointly benefit from these projects*
OFFICIAL REASONS
Contrary to the allegations of injustice in the distribution of resources,
for its part, the government has given some reasons for the execution of the
1transport projects. According to the government  ^the roads selected for 
construction or reconstruction are the rnaip.'^ vterial roads in the state, and the 
projects were executed to ensure quick evacuation of produce from the 
hinterland to the ports. Furthermore, the roads were constructed or 
reconstructed to ensure direct road links between the state capital and the 
divisional headquarters, and also to facilitate the movement of heavy 
construction plants and equipment for the improvement of secondary roads and 
general development work in the rural areas.
Indeed, efforbs have to be made in linking the various villages and towns 
in the State not only for economic reasons but also for purposes of 
facilitating communication. The transport network in either of the two blocs 
cannot be developed without considering the needs of the other. The need for
^See Rivers State First Developmenb Plan. Op, cit, pp. 53-57
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improving the general transport network is self-evident, hence projects 
in the transport sector had the highest priority in the first development 
plan, with a vote of about £7.5 million. This sum of money accounted for 
about 22 per cent of the total expenditure on projects in the plan,
Besides, if the Rivers State is to exist as an integral part of the Nigerian 
Federation, the State will be linked with other states in the federation.
The Port Harcourt - Elele - Ahoada road and the Yenagoa - Oloibiri - Nembe 
road link the Rivers State with the East Central State and the hid Nest State 
respectively. From the foregoing, it is misleading to give cash values to 
the projects in each of the two blocg as if the projects are exclusively the 
property of any of the two blocs. Therefore one cannot refer to the projects 
in terms of the percentage benefits derived by the people in each of the two 
blocs.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
There appear to be certain considerations inherent in the allegations 
about the maladministration in the State and the parochialism of the Governor.
It is suggested that the Governor is parochial largely because Nembe, his 
home tovm, is one of the major beneficiaries in the road projects. Hitherto,
Nembe was only accessible by water (see Chapter 2). For the Nembe people, 
the Yenagoa - Oloibiri - Nembe road reduces to a minimum the tedious journeys 
along the creeks, rivers and swamps. Therefore, the construction of the Yonc^-oa - 
Oloibiri - Nembe road, at a cost of £1 million (the costliest project in the 
plan), appeared to have angered the agitators who might possibly have preferred 
such a large sum of money to be spent on other projects in the hinterland areas. 
The allegations of maladministration appear to be directed at the Governor, 
possibly because of the supreme position he occupies - a position which, it is 
believed, has been expl^ifcd to the advantage of the Nembe people.
However, given the general need for improving the communication network 
in the State, it is difficult to prove that the construction of a road^or roads,
in any particular locality reflects parochialism on the part of the policy-maicors,
As I have argued earlier on, roads are constructed for the benefit of all 
towns and villages in the State*
QUESTIONS AND COI-CTJJSICNS ON THE CASE FOR A KE'.' STATE
If the major reason for the agitation for a Port Harcourt State centres 
on imbalance in the distribution of resources between the two blocs, why 
should the three cabinet ministers^ who are leading the new state movement 
not be able to sort out these questions of imbalance with their colleagues 
in the cabinet? If the three ministers are in positions of responsibility 
why have they petitioned General Gov/on rather than sorting out their differences 
with their colleagues internally?
One is inclined to think that major political differences between 
communities or blocs are not easily resolved in the cabinet because first and 
foremost, most cabinet ministers see themselves as their people's solicitors* 
Therefore it would be difficult for ministers to be objective and impartial 
while discussing matters in which their communities are interested parties, 
especially in view of the communal frenzies which are characteristic of 
Nigerian politico* Because of the difficulties in formulating 'consensus 
politics', the three cabinet ministers might have considered it necessary to 
ask Governor GoWUU to intervene in the matter. In federal constitution^^ 
it is only a Head of State who can mediate when there are major political 
differences between regional/state cabinet ministers. Therefore by inviting 
General Gowon, the three commissioners appeared to have adopted a constitutional 
approach in the matter*
1
In May 1975, the three commissioners were detained in Port Harcourt 
for alleged subversive activities - the demand for a Port Harcourt 
State. Gee West Africa. 2nd June 1975• p. 646,
Also in June and July 1975, the three commissioners resigned their 
cabinet appointments when the misunderstanding between them and 
the Governor deepened,
Fpr details about Nv/anodi's (Attorney General) resignation, see 
West Africa. l6th June 1975. p. 702; and for the facts about 
the other two commissioners, see West Africa, 7th July, 1975» 
pp. 793-94.
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There is cause to believe that, to a great extent, the Rivers Gtate
Executive Council is an impotent body. The Governor appears to enjoy an
unusual measure of autonomy in relation to his council whose members are his
personal appointees. If the Executive Council were not an impotent body,
perhaps the major political differences between the three commissioners and
the Governor might have been resolved without showing open dissension*
Both Tsaro Wiwa (see Chapter 3) and Chief Biriye had pointed out this fact:
that the Executive Council is on itvpotan't body, and that the Governor is
not politically tolerant. In cases of political disagreement between the
Governor and his commissioners, the frequency with which the former dismissed
his cabinet ministers - notably Tsaro \/iw.a,^  Chief Orijl, Chief Biriye,
2Mr, Oriko, and Dr. Obi V/ali - also inclines one to agree with the views that
3the Governor is politically intolerant and that the Council is a powerless 
body.
At this stage, certain conclusions could be reached on the agitation for 
a Port Harcourt State. Firstly, like all politicians, most of the cabinet 
ministers ^ seek specific favours for their people, in response to local 
demands (see Chapter 7) for equity in the distribution of state resources.
^See Chapter 3*
^See Chapter 7*
3
By the nature of their superordinate authority, military governments
are perhaps in a stronger position (compared with their civilian 
counterparts) to reduce the powers of the cabinet ministers.
Again, the Military Governors are powerful beceuse they can only be 
removed from office by the Head of State, not the people. At least 
in the (pwcn regime, the Governors have enjoyed such immense power.
In fact, the Governors were believed to have ruled the states as their 
personal estates.
4
As already discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, the patrons champion their 
people's causes because they are the key policy makers in Port Harcourt. 
For their people too, the patrons are often the main source of protection 
and security - for a discussion on this matter, see Scott's paper, 
"Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in S.E. Asia." AP3R Vol. 66
1972. pp. 91-94.
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Secondly, 'because the x^rimary issue which has generated the demand for
political autonomy concerns the distribution of resources - a matter which is
of great interest to the people - the agitators for a Port Harcourt State can
expect- support from their people. After all, in such political matters, the 
1patron is the chief spokesman for the community, and to a great extent the
patron defines and determines what constitutes the interest of his people.
?Besides, support for a new state' could he oxpooted partly 'because of the 
millenium which the people would expect in a new state and partly because of 
the common local assumption that political autonomy paves the way for people 
to have full control of their affairs. At least it would be hoped that in '
a new state, there would be no more 'hand-dovms' from Port Harcourt,
Thirdly, the recent political agitation shows that, for some time, the 
political relationships between the two blocs has been a delicate one.
The relationship between the two blocs has been one of convenience and uneasy 
compromise. Obviously, the people in the two blocs cannot coexist peacefully 
unless the principle of equity (see Chaptey* is seen to apply in
the allocation of resources.
The fourth conclusion is related to the third. The cultural and political 
differences between the riverine and the hinterland peo^To, coupled with the 
failure of the Executive Council to deal with matters regarding imbalance in the
■ It will be recalled that the patrons have become the manipulators 
of patronage offices, loans and contracts - resources which they 
distribute to their faithful followers.
2
If it is hoped that political autonomy would pave the way for 
accelerated development and an oven distribution of resources, 
some questions remain to bo answored. How many of the masses 
really understand the issues involved in these agitations, and 
of those who understand, how many can make independence work?
Or must independence be fought for just for the sake of it?
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distribution of resources,' have undoubtedly stimulated feelings of bloc 
particularisms. ' Therefore on© can conclude tdiat the greater the cultural 
differences between communities, ^  and the more these differences coincicie
with bloc particularisms, the greater the likelihood of vi-olent communal
i
strife, especially in conditions of rapid social, political ?md economic 
changes•
Having discussed the agitation for a Port Harcourt btate, resulting 
from disputes over the distribution of resources, I shall return now to 
examine what Biriye thinks about the future of the State ho helped to 
create.
In Nigeria, resource allocation has ténaea to reflect and 
reinforce the fra^yaented pattern of cultural loyalties.
This fact is well discussed by Post in his book
The'.;Nigeria,n Federal Elections of 1959• London, 1963. p, 5&*
2
Compare with Hichard Sklar's study of 'The Case for Ethnicity 
as a source of National Integration'. Bee Bklar's work 
"The Contribution of Tribalism to Nationalism in destern Nigeria." 
Journal of Human Relations. Vol. 6, 190U. pp. 407-415.
^The relationship between ethnicity and nation-building in Africa 
is succinctly discussed oy RSne Leraarchana in his paper 
'Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa :
Competing Solidarities in Nation Building.' APER. vol. ôb,
1972, pp. 50-90.
^Perhaps one can also argue that one of the effects of General 
Gowon's promise to create more states (a point outlined in 
his October 1, 1972 broadcast to the nation) has been to 
exacerbate communal tensions in most of the existing states.
In recent times, there had been strong agitations by some groups 
to break away from their present states — the Rivers, V/estern,
East Central and Hid V/estern States have been particularly affected 
by these agitations,
5^Biriye made no comments about the recent agitation for a Port Harcourt 
State, However, having fought very hard for the creation of the 
Rivers State, ooviously one would imagine that Biriye would be 
opposed to splitting his empire.
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THE FUTURE
In spite of Biriye's contributions, his views about the political
future of the State have become controversial in recent times. He is
not very optimistic^ of the future of the Rivers State. Why? He maintains
that the implementation of development projects in the State is slow, and
that the government is more interested in making promises to the people
than in fulfill ling these promises. Even before his dismissal, he often
spoke about the government as if he was not a partner. He refers to the
present military regime in the State as a 'government of promises'. He
is also very worried that the present regime cannot sustain the State,
because it has failed to infuse any political consciousness into the people*
2
To Biriye, the Rivers State has no 'political soul' at present because 
it has no life. He does not believe that under a military government, the 
people could derive any political satisfaction, A military government is 
ruling at present, he admits, but the sense of values (the placing of 
priorities) of the present Military Governor is defective. He makes further
3
allusions to the corruption of the Military Governor, arguing that the 
Governor serves himself, not the people, contrary to the ethics of a good 
and popular government.
Biriye emphasises this point arguing that because of these corrupt 
practices, no audited reports of Government House (the office of the Governor) 
account has been issued since the State was created.
'Hit will, however, be observed that Biriye's pessimism does not 
appear to be consistent with what he said earlier on: that the
'Rivers State has come to stay'.
2
'This is Biriye's expression,
^It is alleged that recently Biriye made a public statement at Aluu, 
Rivers State, accusing the Governor of maladministration and 
misappropriation of government funds meant for building Customary 
courts in the State. Biriye is to appear in court soon to testify 
to these charges. Gee West Africa, 13th January 1975* P*> 53•
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Considering recent political developments in the state, Chief 
Biriye's allegations on corruption appear to have some foundation.
Recently, some prominent Rivers State chiefs petitioned^ the Head of State, 
General Gowon, emphasising that the Rivers State government had made 
financial provision in its annual budget for non-existent bodies such as 
customary courts. The chiefs further called on public organs and 
functionaries (apparently referring to the Military Governor) to accommodate 
'fair comments’ whenever public functionaries were criticised.
In a State where people, especially most chiefs who hold office at the 
sufferance of the Governor, fear political reprisals if they accused top 
public servants of corruption, one may reasonably infer that highly placed 
officials such as the Governor are being reproached in these allegations.
Chiefs rarely participate in such public discussions, accusing Governors 
of maladministration and corruption, but when they openly defy the conventions 
of political neutrality (as in the recent accusations) it is difficult to 
dismiss these accusations as baseless. The chiefs must no doubt be aware of 
the implications of their accusations. Furthermore, diplomacy on the part 
of chiefs restrains them from mentioning names of corrupt officials. If the 
chiefs were not to exercise this restraint, it does appear that they were 
making implicit references to the Governor in these allegations.
In view of these allegations (on corruption) and.lack of faith in the
military, Biriye considers the worst of civilian rule better than the best of
military regimes, arguing further that civilian rulers understand the needs of
their people better and that civilian rulers also identify themselves more with 
/oc<a.4
the^political system. To Biriye, the military are alienated from the common 
people because of the differences between life in the barracks and in the 
villages where the common man lives. Therefore Biriye's suggestion is that if
^See West Africa. iGth December 1974. p. 1538
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the pace of social and economic development of communities is to be 
accelerated, the military should hand over power to the civilians in 
phases: starting with partial replacement, to a total disengagement of
soldiers in government* These are views Biriye claims to have discussed 
with the Head of State, General GowDn*
One may infer from the foregoing account that Biriye is very much
'politically minded'. In terms of leadership, he considers civilians to 
be intellectually superior to soldiers. Biriye is, in this sense, the true 
representative of the superior civilian loader. He is also proud of his 
contributions to the general welfare of the people. It is suggested that 
no solder can accomplish as much as he has done. This is the inevitable 
conclusion from Biriye's estimation of the military. It is also not very 
difficult to infer, as Biriye has expressed it, that he has little or no 
faith in the Rivers State government, much less its capacity for ministering 
to the important needs of the common people.
LAND-MARK
The politics of Biriye and the NDC have been the dominant theme of
this chapter.^ The politics of Biriye, since the creation of the State,
sugp;ests certain conclusions.
In the first place, as one would expect, Biriye's political struggles 
are understood by many Rivers people as anothex struggle for the social and 
economic development of the people. Biriye in this light, represents the NBC, 
and vice versa.
The second point deals with Biriye's perception of the military. I am 
inclined to believe that commissioners can serve in any regime even if they 
and the government (in which they are partners) are sharply dividec? on policy
^In this context, the agitation for a Port Harcourt State is
regarded as a movement arising from the politics of Biriye,
)
'The recent agitation 
split in the Cabdnet,
2
T for a Port Harcourt State confirms the
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matters and strategies. This appears to bo typical of military government 
where commissioners of different political persuasion may be chosen. The 
principle of collective responsibility in such a government is therefore 
bound to be loosely applied. Nor is the loyalty or the support of a 
commissioner to the government enforceable, not even by the promulgation of 
decrees or edicts.
The significance of this conclusion should not just be seen in the 
context of the degree of loyalty which military governments enjoy from 
ministers. Rather my argument is that there is intensive and divisive politics 
in a Cabinet which is responsible for accelerating the pace of community 
development. The major observation is that the Cabinet is divided because 
considerations of loyalty to a party are absent. Moreover, the Cabinet does 
not face the threat of losing elections. It appears they are accountable 
more to themselves than to the people they govern. If so, the question is 
how will a Cabinet which is politically divided on certain major issues (and 
not accountable to the people) quicken the pace of local developments?
Thirdly, as we would expect, most of the local people appear to be 
political opportunists. In the past when the NCNC government was in power 
the majority of the people identified themselves (at least in voting) with 
that government because of political gains in spite of their desire for 
political autonomy which the NDC stood for. In the present day circumstances 
of new statehood, most local people still hold Biriye and his NDC party in 
high esteem, apparently because the old political order (NCNC) has given way 
to the new (NDC and its policies and plans). It is striking that a change 
in the tide of political events corresponds with a shift in loyalties.
The fotirth conclusion as to why, in spite of the group rivalries, a 
patron will seek the downfall of his 'brother' from the same place is indeed 
a difficult question to answer. While it is my opinion that protective 
communalistic attachments are strong, my observation is that within a 
community, personality clashes do arise if the patrons are of different political
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persuasions. If so, because political victories are highly prized by
patrons, it will be difficult for a patron to forgive his political enemy,
even if they are 'brothers'. Patrons who desire to have a large following^
are not accomodative of other political views; their interest is in
building large clientelistic ties so that other competitors may not have
a great following in the same locality. After all, as Powell has observed,
at- the level of the village or town, the patrons usually compete for votes
and competition is an "essential ingredient in the process of aggregating
clienteles into a widespread network, and linking them to vertical patronage
2
structures in the political system," In the end, it is a question of the 
survival of the most able patrons. I draw this conclusion from my observation 
that there is very little political tolerance not only in Rivers State 
politics, but also in Nigerian politics in general.
Fifthly, either on the part of the politician, or the people, there 
is not much interest in statisra per se. Statism is only a means to accelerating 
economic and social development of the different communities. The present 
division of the state into two political blocs of supporters and non­
supporters of the Rivers state movement could be seen in one perspective.
1
In discussing the political operations of brokers (in this case, 
I refer to the patron) Eric Wolf writes that their success 
"depends on the size and strength of their personal following," 
See Eric Wolf "Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society : 
Mexico" in D. Health and R./Warns, eds. Contemporary Cultures 
and Societies of Latin America. New York, 1965* p. 97*
2
Duncan Powell "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics"
APSR vol. 64, 1970* p. 4l6, Adrian Mayer ("The Significance 
of Quasi-Groups in the Study of Complex Societies" in The 
Social Anthropology of Complex Societies. New York. I966, P.IO5) 
also observes that the aggregation of clienteles is a common 
feature of local politics.
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During the Rivers state movement, one ]iarl the improsr.ion that there was 
some degree of unity among the different people to aeiiieve political 
autonomy - because many people and groups were involved in the sbate- 
raovement. Today the millenium is thought to have arrived, and the oil^ 
profits are to be shared. Groups that were to some extent united in 
their demand for a separate Rivers state appear to be f.alling apart 
because of the oil profits to be shared. Relatively, there is therefore 
a transition from the politics of unity to the politics of disunity.
1
One could imagine that in an oil-rich independent Scotland, 
a government possibly headed by the SNP might face similar 
problems regarding revenue allocation.
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CHAPTER 7
THE CABINET AND PROJECT GRANTS TO COMMUNITIES
In this chapter I shall discuss three main things: (i) the role of the 
Military Governor and the Commissioners (the Cabinet) in the allocation of 
grants to the different communities, (ii) the formulation of policy and 
other guidelines in these grant allocations and (iii) the local perception 
of these policies and the policy makers.
BACKGROUND:
As I have discussed in other parts of this work, the Rivers State,as 
an integral part of Nigeria, is under military rule. The Military Governor 
of the State, Commander Alfred Diete- Spiff is a naval man. Diete-Spiff was 
appointed the Military Governor in May I967* In January I969 after the 
Lagos-based Rivers State Administration had moved to Port Harcourt, Commander 
Diete-Spiff appointed civilian commissioners to assist him in the task of 
government and policy-making. Yet ironically, in the opinion of the military 
government, the appointment of civilian commissioners did not detract from 
the fact that the Rivers State was still under a military regime which was 
(and is) opposed to the civilian concepts of good government. At least this 
was the pretext for military intervention in Nigerian politics in January I966.
During civilian rule, most of the local communities in the Rivers area 
often alleged that in the Public Service the distribution of grants and 
projects to communities was largely influenced by political considerations 
as opposed to the public service ethics of impartiality and merit. Patronage 
and nepotism, it was alleged, were primary considerations. As I have already 
discussed in the last chapter, the principal, allegations of the minorities 
against the former Eastern Nigerian government and the reasons advanced by them 
in support of a separate Rivers State point to this fact. The Rivers State 
Governor and the Commissioners were fully aware of these allegations. Since 
the Governor and his Cabinet assumed office under these conditions of civilian 
complaints, it is pertinent to ask some questions about the military’s new
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role and policies* Throughout this chapter, I shall therefore ask several 
questions along these lines. Some attempt will also be made to answer these 
questions.
MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ITS BELIEFS;
I It is clear at this stage that essentially the military government 
in the Rivers State is a corrective one, like many other military regimes? 
intended to remove most of the abuses of the old regime - especially in grant 
allocations - and to create a healthier community for the people. This is 
the military version of their new model of administration - a new regime for 
a people in a new state with new expectations. I shall therefore argue that 
both the Governor and his Cabinet took office on the clear assumption that 
in the past the politicians in power violated certain definable principles 
of good government. I am also assuming that they (the Governor and his Cabinet) 
considered themselves as more determined and better qualified, by the level 
of their commitment to Rivers State interest, to govern than those of the 
old order. Indeed, when the Port Harcourt administration started functioning, 
the people, especially those in the rural areas, were led to believe that the 
Governor and his Cabinet would be the examples of good government, a 
government dedicated to fairness, impartiality, and justice. As good governors, 
they (the rul^rg) could also reconstruct the government in their own image, 
in accordance with the beliefs of which they were thought to be the model.
I shall therefore deal with five related questions in this chapter, 
namely, (l) What are the main features of the local political environment 
in the Rivers State? (2) Are the local communities not inclined to exert 
political pressures on the Cabinet in policy matters, and are the cabinet 
ministers themselves not inclined to look at administration from a political^ 
viewpoint, -,if they are to reconstruct both their government and their 
communities as they want in the military image? (3) What policies have been
1Politics as the extraction of resources from government and 
sharing benefits - in a very competitive political atmosphere.
made in the allocation of grants and projects to communities in taking 
account of the Cabinet principles of good government? (4) Are there any 
differences in the concepts of good government as seen by both the governors 
and the governed? (5) From the policies which emerge and the local conception 
of these policies, what conclusions can one draw about the present Public 
Service in Port Harcourt? To what extent have local differences permeated 
the Public Service and what image of the Public Service has been created?
Most of the main characteristics of the Rivers State rural political 
environment have already featured prominently in this work. It will therefore 
suffice at this stage to mention only those aspects which are directly relevant 
to the present argument®
RURAL COMMUNITIES
The rural communities covered by this study do not constitute a 
homogenous society® As an initial formulation one can say that there are two 
groups of communities:' the riverine and the hinterland people. But even 
this division into two would seem an oversimplification, nor is it indicative 
of any homogeneity within each of these two blocs of communities when one 
examines their political background and interests* Within the riverine camp, 
the ancient inter community rivalries and feuds still persist®. These 
historical antagonisms still find expressions in the new administration of the 
State. For example, the Bonny people are angry with the Governor's recent 
dismissal of their only Commissioner, Chief Biriye, because they fear that 
without a Bonny Cabinet member, the dominance of other groups in the Cabinet 
will be further perpetuated. For their part, the Okrikans still regard the 
Kalaharis as formidable rivals (and vice versa) in the Public Service, 
especially ill the appointment of Commissioners into the cabinet ranks®
While the Okrikans are unhappy that a Kalahari, Dr. Alcobo, holds the 
distinguished post of Commissioner for Finance (a post ranked as second ! :
1 Chapter 2.
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in command to the Governor), the other Riverine communities view the
present ^ivers State Administration as a Nembe administration because the
Military Governor and Chief Kombo Igbetta, Commissioner for Trade and Industry
(and Chairman of the State Tender Board),^ are Nembe, Chief Igbetta is a
cousin of the Governor and so it is generally believed that by virtue of
their special relationship, Chief Igbetta belongs to the Inner Cabinet which
is believed to be influencing the Governor in the distribution of amenities
and grants to local communities. Also, it is often alleged that Chief Igbetta
2
in his capacity as the Chairman of the Tenders Board awards most of the 
contracts to his kinsmen, the Nembes. The Governor's position as the State's 
Chief Executive and the special official position of Chief Igbetta therefore 
incline local people to think that these two supreme positions of the Governor 
and the Chairman of the Tenders Board have been used to the advantage of Nembe, 
an advantage which is disadvantageous to all other communities. This is the 
subject of public gossip in Port Harcourt and its environs.
It can therefore be seen that within the riverine bloc, two levels of 
bitterness are generated. The first is among the different communities, 
while the second temporarily unites the three communities against the Nembe, 
who 'dominate' the top echelons of the State leadership. Yet what unites 
the three (Okrika, Bonny and Kalahari) against the fourth (Nembe) is that 
Nembe is a common enemy - even though the common front against the Nembes has 
in no substantial way reduced the antagonisms among Okrika and its clique.
On the other hand, the communities in the hinterland bloc live in fear 
of their riverine neighbours. They allege that the present regime is an 
Ijaw government because the Ijaws constitute the cream of the Rivers State 
government. (See Chapter 6), This is an obvious reference to the riverine 
(ijaw) people who were first associated with the name 'Ijaw*, The special 
cabinet positions occupied by the Nembe form the basis of their generalisations,
I
^The Board awards all major government contracts in the State,
2
The Tenders Board Secretariat in the Governor's office is often 
besieged with such complaints. (File (ÏIGO, TBS 1973/74)
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To the hinterlanders,th&. Nembes constitute a section of a homogeneous
Ijaw clique, and they fear that an Ijaw clique would always act in concert
against hinterlanders, 'Ijaw domination' has therefore become a theme
which .is current among the Ogbas, Qgonis and other hinterlanders. These
fears have largely been responsible for recent agitations^ for a separate
Port Harcourt State, comprising the hinterland people, withih the present
Rivers State geographical boundaries. It is believed that the present 
2dismissal of Dr, Obi Wli, a prominent hinterland politician and socialist,
as Commissioner was connected with the leading role Obi Wali was purported
to have played in encouraging political agitations for splitting the Rivers
State into at least two states. Dr, Obi Wali has denied these allegations,
yet these impressions have not been completely dispelled in the minds of
many people. In his letter of dismissal issued at Government House, Port
Harcourt, the government stated that it had "lost confidence in him and he
4
could no longer be retained as a member of the Cabinet", It is this loss
of confidence in him by the government that Dr. Obi Wali relates to recent
official allegations about his role in the agitation for more states,
5Dr, Obi Wali is one of the few intellectuals in the hinterland. No 
doubt he belongs to the hinterlanders modern elite class. Furthermore, his 
position as Commissioner reinforced his elite status; therefore in two 
respects he was a V.I.P.: a Commissioner as well as an intellectual. It is
obvious that his dismissal as Commissioner has strengthened the fears of his 
people that the aim of the Ijaws is to dominate the hinterlanders, more so as
^See West Africa, 13th January 1975*
^Ibid,
^West Africa, 20th January 1975* p. 83.
^West Africa* op. cit,
^Dr, Obi Wali holds a PhD. degree in English,
He was formerly a lecturer at University of Nigeria, Nsulcka,
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Obi Wali was dismissed by an Ijaw Governor and no attempt was made to replace 
Obi Wali bg another hinterlander. This is usually the pattern of local 
reaction to official dismissals or disgrace of local dignitaries. Local 
reaction is understandable because the fate of the community is tied up with 
the fate of the leader who is the ambassador in the Cabinet.
The foregoing discussion confirms my earlier argument that the Rivers 
State is not a homogeneous society. Apart from the historical community feuds, 
the present political relationships between the different communities is 
characterised by suspicion,fear, and conflict. No community trusts the other, 
the political divisions and antagonisms between the two blocs of communities 
and those within the Ijaw bloc point to this fact. This provides an understanding 
of the political framework of the present administration.
Turning to the second question, in this work, much has also been said 
about the individualistic interests of the different communities. This point 
does not need to be laboured. One can therefore draw an obvious and inevitable 
conclusion, as has been done before. Every community expects favours from its 
ambassadors in the Cabinet. Commissioners are expected to protect and promote 
the interests of their people. Local people do not see administration in 
accordance with the Max Weber and Herbert Simon models of administrative 
impartiality and rationality. State interests are secondary to community 
interests, unless both state and community interests coincide, because local 
understanding of politics is really in the direction of 'sharing benefits 
among communities'. There is no aggregate state interest,and at the local 
level discussions about state interests are clearly understood as the sum 
total of community interests. There are rarely any moral considerations of 
who loses in the allocation of projects and grants. What is more important 
is that as many as possible should benefit from the national cake. This is 
the political strategy of every community.
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THE CABINET
In discussing the role of the Cabinet in administration, a number of
general propositions and observations could be made on the relationship between
1
the Cabinet and the local oomnnmities. The Governor has often reminded his 
Commissioners that they are serving in a military regime and-so they should 
endeavour to look at administration from a military perspective. In certain 
respects, the supposed military perspective differs ifom a public administration 
perspective. In terms of administration, the military views diverge sharply from
p
Weber's" models which see bureaucracy as synonymous with governmental efficiency.
The military would endorse those popular stereotypes which see bureaucracy as 
synonymous with governmental inefficiency - inefficiency arising from bureaucratic
3
red-tape. Perhaps the military would describe the working of the Civil Service 
in the same way as Peter Enahoro did: "very elaborate steps have been carefully 
set dovm on paper amid a confusion of export bureau or 25% tic ambushes,"^ *' In short, 
there is excessive officialdom, and so the officials are 'bureaux crazy,' 
Furthermore, the military would confirm that most public servants are^tribalists^ 
even in their administration of public affairs. For the most part, the military 
tend to focus on thoirfi? contribution&which their training methods could make to the 
civil service. Tacitly, they claim that they are superior to other forms of 
administration because of their reliability, impartiality, prudence, rationality and 
the calculability of results in their operation^. Above all, they arc trained to
Building from Scratch, a Rivers State Information Service Publication,
Port Harcourt, I969. pp. U-9
2
For an interesting discussion of the Weberian concept of efficiency,
see Alvin Gouldner Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy. H.Y. 1954. pp.15-29,
3
See Alvin Gouldner "Red Tape as a Social Problem" in Robert Merton, 
et al,, eds.. Reader in Bureaucracy. Glencoe. 1952. pp. 410-418.
'^Peter knahoro. Mow to be a Higerian, Ibadan, 1966. p. 48.
^'Military attitude to work' (Text of a Speech by Governor Diete-Spiff to 
representatives of the Rivers Community in Lagos) Lagos, October, 1367.
Although civil servants claim to be impartial and rational in their 
administration, yet the military would..reject these claims.
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treat official matters with despatch* Therefore in view of their professional 
background, they believe that compared with the politicians and bureaucrats, 
they have more efficient techniques for realising their goals. Commissioners, 
more or less, have therefore been regarded as * soldiers in plain clothes.*
They are also * civilians with military minds'; and as the Governor described 
them when they took their oath of office, they are men of 'ability and 
capacity.’^  Even though Commissioners have had no military training, they 
have been expected to acquire these military attributes as speedily as the 
military supposedly did in their military establishments. I shall therefore 
ai'gue that because of these military expectations from the Commissioners and 
the fact that they serve in a military regime, the Cabinet is - or was 
expected to function like «■ a military one with its own ideas of what 
constitutes sound administration (at least in theory).
Hence the Governor and his Cabinet's view of the proper conduct of 
administration may be summarised in the form of four sets of related 
distinctions. These are distinctions in the sense that they run parallel to 
the different local expectations of their Cabinet ambassadors, and each group 
(the Cabinet versus the local people) considers its views on administration 
proper, and reasonable. At least in theory there are two sharp divisions in 
the concept of what policies should be formulated in the allocation of grants 
and projects to the local communities.
These closely related set of distinctions^ are: (i) impartiality 
versus favouritism; (ii) merit versus particularism; (iii) Rivers State 
interest versus the community interest and (iv) unity versus separatism.
I shall discuss each of these sets briefly, and will relate them to relevant 
quotations (official speeches) from the Governor who speaks for both his 
Cabinet and the government.
Building from Scratch, op. cit. p. 8.
2In each set of distinctions the model the military stand for is 
underlined. The local model and expectations are the other 
contrasts.
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The Cabinet has always condemned, and made clear references to, the 
clannish and nepotj^^^inclinations of former civilian politicians and 
administrators in relation to their local communities. The Governor in
particular often referred to such groups as political profiteers who
I
undermined the ethics of good government* The Cabinet, no doubt, shares
the views of the Governor, believing that they have assumed full responsibility
for the good government of the State,
The Governor in particular has always condemned 'clannishness, opportunism
and nepotism',^ stressing the importance of the principles of impartiality
and fairness in any good government, especially in the distribution of amenities
to communities. Like most other governments, the Rivers State Government also
2believes in the criteria of merit as the principal basis of allocating 
grants to local communities.
As one would also expect, the Cabinet has also been emphatic in its 
condemnation of placing local interests above that of the State* Therefore 
to the Cabinet, cleavages expressed in the form of differentiation of the 
State into separate collectivities, or anything suggesting that the State 
was not one political entity, are not only undesirable, they are also evils 
which must be destroyed.^ In short, state interest is superior to the medley 
of group interests - arguing that the Rivers State movement was, and is, 
essentially a movement in support of promoting the supremacy of state interests.
By the same logic - supremacy of state interests - the official sermon 
has always been: the unity of all the people in the State is essential in
order to maximise the realisation of State interests.4" As the Okrika/KalaSari 
saying goes: 'Unity is strength.'
^Address to the Rivers State Students Union of Great Britain by 
His Excellency, Lt-. Commander Diete-Spiff. London, 22 August I969.
2
See 'Major Issues' in Building from Scratch, op. cit. pp. 2-3 
3 . .■ It is necessary to ask: VJhy was Obi Wali dismissed?
4- '
4Py’<D r^esü and Developments in the Rivers State"
(End of Year Speech by Governor Diete-Spiff) Port Harcourt. I9680
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About these official appeals, one can say that neither the appeals of 
Diete-Spiff nor his Cabinet ministers to the people on the essence of 
'impartiality, unity and primacy of State interests' is very unique - even 
if these appeals impress the local people. The officials are only echoing 
popular administrative doctrines^ in other parts of the western world.
After all the people need to be assured that they have a good government, 
TESTING THE DISTINCTIONS.
In discussing these administrative principles of the Cabinet in relation
to their communities, it is important to ask one question: are these Cabinet
principles in tune with the political wishes and expectations of the local
people? The answer is 'No', The pattern of local expectation has already
been discussed both in this chapter and in Chapters 3 and ,5, llie know that
the Commissioner or Administrator must show special favour to his people if
he is to continue to enjoy his people's goodwill and support.
Furthermore, the mere fact that in selecting the Commissioners sufficient
account was taken of their divisions and communities of origin suggests that
it is difficult to ignore the influence of the communities on their Cabinet
ministers. In outlining these principles of selection, the Governor was also
aware that almost every community wanted its own Commissioner*.to act as its
spokesman in Cabinet. Hence he made it clear in his appointment that:
"I have taken into consideration the administrative divisions of the State
as well as the ethnic groupings within these divisions in making my selection
' 2^.
in order to ensure that a fair representation of all groups is achieved' ,
A stimulating discussion of these doctrines can be seen in
(i) Ludwig von Mises Bureaucracy. New Haven. 1944; and
(ii) Ordway Tead, The Art of Administration. New York. 1951.
%  e
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It is evident that to the local man,a Cabinet minister or Commissioner, 
in any regime, is not different from his military Counterpart. In short, 
men in 'Khalci uniform' or in 'plain clothes' are the same. Neither is the 
Commissioner in the. present military regime any less identified with his 
people in spite of military warnings to the contrary. Hence local 
expectations from Cabinet ministers are no less pronounced even in the 
present military regime. In these circumstances, it is difficult to expect 
that local people would not participate in the 'politics of demand'; so 
also would Cabinet ministers have important obligations to fulfill in the 
'politics of supply*. The political importance of these cleavages will be 
seen in the local assessments of government policies in the allocation of 
grants. It is against this background that the applicability of these four 
sets of distinctions may be tested, I shall therefore examine below what 
policies have been laid down for allocating grants to communities.
APPROVAL OF GRANTS TO COMMUNITIES: POLICIES AND COMMUNITY FEELINGS:
Cabinet policies on the allocation of grants to communities embarking
on local development schemes are clear and simple. In the words of the
Cabinet, their concern for the welfare of the rural communities is primary.
Chief Nzidee, as Commissioner for Rural Development and Social Welfare,
represented the policy of the Cabinet when he said: "the establishment of
a ministry responsible for rural development and social welfare is an
indication of the importance which the State Government attaches to the
1general development and welfare of the rural communities." Furthermore,
Chief Nzidee stressed thattSi6 self-help development strategy has been
formulated in order to discover 'how far the felt needs of the local people
can be catered for through closer coordination of both the local authorities
2
and the State government*'
1
The Rivers State Quarterly Journal, April-June 1973. 
Port Harcourt, p. 3.
2
Chief Nzidee. Personal Communication. August 1975*
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However, in the absence of elected councils under military rule, 
the local dignitaries, comprising mostly the commissioners, constitute 
the local authorities for effecting development in their vi.liages or towns 
hocause of their (Cabinet ministers) influential positions in the localities. 
(See Chapter 3)» In essence, therefore, a member of Cabinet has two levels 
of responsibility in community develo%)ment;: one at the local level and the
other at the Port Harcourt level. Honco these two involyements of Cabinet 
ministers encouraged an inflow of local politics into policy making in 
Port Harcourt.
This kind of local politics which penetrates into both the local and state 
administration of community dovelopmcnt a two-tier model of local development 
has therefore become tho principal machinery for community development. It is 
also significant that the Cabinet refors to this machinery as tho symbol of 
'good government in community development' because Cabinet ministers believe 
that this is the model which can stimulate positive action in community 
development, at both the local and Port Harcourt levels. Government concern 
for accelerating the pace of local development provides the background to 
its declaration of the 1972/73 financial year as 'Rural Development Year'. 
POLICY^LIAICIHG
The dawn of a Rural Development era in the State, dating from 1973y 
has also resulted in the reformulation of politics and guidelines affecting 
community development, before examining these reformulated policies, it is 
necessary to state these new policies and consider how far they have worked 
to the satisfaction of tho local people since 1973»
On the direction of the Cabinet, the Ministry of Rural Development and 
Social Welfare outlines the five main principles^' of grant aid as follows.
^Ministry of Rural Development and Social Welfare, 
Rural Development Division, Port Harcourt.
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(i) Only those projects which have already been started by the
community will be considered for grant aid.
(ii) Government assistance to approved projects will be in the
region of about one-third of the capital outlay on projects
 ^ that do not exceed N 6,000 (£3,000).
(iii) A community may submit one project only for consideration
during any one financial year.
(iv) Joint projects (involving two or more communities), for
example, roads, canals, bridges, health facilities, etc.,
will also be considered.
(v) Communities which have previously rg-ceived a grant must
produce evidence that the project has been completed and that
their accounts have been submitted for auditing before any
further application will be entertained.
ASSUMPTIONS AND WEAKNESSES IN POLICY:
It will be seen that there are three major assumptions implicit in
these principles. First, that any community interested in development schemes
will start the project by themselves. This is the strategy of the governmental 
1
'non-directive' approach to local development - based on the belief that in 
the execution of community projects, lineal communalism will act as the 
motivating force. Therefore, the official argument is that government should
only stimulate, but not persuade, local communities to define and identify
their own needs. Secondly, that every village ortovm has sufficient resources 
to raise at least two-thirds of the capital expenditure on any project they 
wish to embark on. This is inferred from policy (ii). Thirdly, policy (ii) 
also implies that the optimum resources of any town or village, in relation to 
the self help scheme, is about N4,000, because government aid amounts to only 
one-third of the capital outlay.
^This approach is succinctly discussed' by T.R. Batten in 
The Non-Directive Approach in Group and Community V/ork.
I mil* III II — I   nwijf
LondonTl^b?,
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It is clear from these, especially policy (ii), that the government 
places great emphasis on the importance of citizen involvement and self-help*
Yet it is not self-evident that every community interested in accelerating 
the pace of local development will start a development project in order to 
attract government aid because, apart from financial limitations, there are 
problems of selection (among a variety of projects), method and planning.
On the other hand, there are still a few communities which have the potential 
for raising development capitals far higher than the maximum amount stipulated 
by the government. Therefore, it is also suggested that while richer 
communities will attract more grants, poorer communities will attract lesser 
grants because the amount of government assistance is also determined by how 
much any community can raise by itself. Nevertheless, several villages and 
towns are interested in development, but because of financial constraints, 
lack of directive and initiative (especially in those villages where there are 
few or no modern elites and big men) cannot start a project; or if they do, 
embark on very small projects. This v/as the main complaint of many villages 
in Okrika, Bonny and Ogoni areas in my discussions with them.
There are other weaknesses inlierent in some of these principles of 
allocation. With regard to policy (i), it is clear that there are no 
restrictions on the type of projects which communities can initiate. In effect, 
this means that communities can initiate any project which they consider 
reasonable, even if such a project is considered bogus or unviable by the 
officials. Because this policy is an '•open-ended' one, a conflict^ will 
therefore arise as to who (the people or the official) has the ultimate right 
to determine whether a particular project should be initiated or not, and if 
so, when will a decision on this matter of desirability be taken: is it
before a project is initiated or after? If the decision or advice of the
For example, as will be seen later, many communities have built 
town halls. The officials have always persuaded the communities 
to take interest in other more 'profitable' type of projects.
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official prevails, why must the people accept it, and vice versa? Yet it 
is clear that no matter the pretence that these projects are comunnity 
projects and that the decisions are purely the responsibility of the people, 
the people.^no doubt, will rely heavily on government for grants. Ironically, 
not every project will qualify for grant. Then one is inclined to think 
that since it is the official who gives the grant, the official decision 
or advice (on the desirability of a project) will in many cases prevail - even 
if it is in conflict with local wishes. The question is then posed: in
situations of such possible conflict between local and official wishes, how far 
does the official principle of the ’non-directive' approach to local development 
apply?
It is also suggested by these Cabinet policies that equity is the goal - 
that is, fairness to all communities. But the problem is: what is equity in
these policies or how is it seen? As I have already argued all communities 
do not have equal resources, nor is there even an equal desire on the part of 
all communities to initiate projects. If grants are given to the richer 
communities that initiate projects (and approved by the officials) it is 
difficult for poorer communities which receive little or no grants to consider 
government's policy in the light of equity as seen by the official. What can 
the poorer communities do to attract government grant when there are no official 
agencies to give credit facilities to poorer communities that wish to 
initiate projects? Therefore, equity in this sense is impossible to achieve - 
at least from the horizons of the local man.
What is further suggested by the policies^ is that communities will 
compete with one another to attract government aid. Aid cannot therefore be 
given to communities as of right. Conscious and positive efforts must be 
made by local people to qualify for aid. Yet in localities where there are 
strong beliefs that only the local executive at Port Harcourt can influence
1
For example, see policy (i)
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government to approve and give aid to projects, it is clear, especially 
in the mind of the people, that communities without ’god fathers' v/ill 
stand to lose in these competitions for aid even if they qualify. Inevitably, 
it is in this perspective that local communities will interpret many 
government policies in allocating grants. This will be the pivot of my 
arguments in the later pages.
PROJECTS.
Since the declaration of the Rural Development era, several communities 
in the State have embarked on self-help projects, so as to qualify for 
government aid. Appendix 9 shows the list of beneficiaries, the type of 
projects embarked on, and the amount of grant approved for each project.
To some extent, these indicate the resources and enthusiasm of communities 
interested in development projects.
Depending on those needs identified by the local people, these 
projects range from the construction of feeder roads and bridges, town halls, 
latrines, markets, wells and local craft centres. The commonest and most 
popular project has been the village or town heill which many local people 
consider as the centre of civic pride.
Local people believe, with some justification, that certain weaknesses 
are inherent in some of the principles underlining the approval of grants.
For example, in the application of policy (ii) there is no uniformity in the 
amount of grant which may be approved for any particular project. In the 
1972/73 and 1973/7^ financial years, amounts approved for town halls ranged 
from N 300 to Nl,800, Hence, whereas the smallest amount may be approved 
for a particular project in one community, the highest amount may also be 
approved for a similar project in another community. These differences in 
amount approved also apply in different degrees to several projects in 
different villages and towns. These differences have also given rise to 
local gossip that certain communities receive special favours in the allocation 
of grants. Some difficult questions are therefore asked: besides the initial
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amount which a community may raise for a project, is it the size, 
usefulness (to whom?) or the importance (to whom?) of a project that 
determines how much grant may he approved for any particular project?
Or are there other considerations which depart from the notions (the 
distinctions) and principles of the Cabinet on the essence and nature of 
good government? Some of the answers to these questions abound in the 
local perceptions of policy.
However, the local communities, not the officials, finally decide
. 1which project is useful to them. Hence in spite of official advice that 
the construction of wells and latrines should not be given priority by the 
communities in their development plans, in 1973/74 villages in Bonny still 
considered these two projects useful and important. As I have argued earlier 
on in this chapter, since the officials take final decisions in respect of 
applications for grants, they invariably determine how much grant should be 
approved for any community project. Therefore, since communities depend on 
official grants to enable them to execute their projects, one would imagine 
that communities which refused to heed official advice (as regards which 
project is useful or important) would get smaller grants than those communities 
which are ’obedient’ to the officials. In effect then, one could argue that 
both the local communities and the officials play important roles in 
determining the usefulness and importance of projects to be executed. While
the officials persuade the people to get their priorities right, the people 
for their part, might also wish to persuade the officials to approve 
sufficient grants for projects which they (the people) consider important, 
in spite of possible official disagreement.
^Personal communication with the Rural Development Officers 
for Ogba/Egbema and Bonny, August 1973»
2Regarding the approval of grants, in 1973/74 Bonny people 
alleged that they received smaller grants (especially in 
respect of wells and latrines), compared with others, 
because they were not an obedient community. (Interview 
with the members of the planning committees in Bonny area. 
September 1973)•
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Comparisons of the allocation of grants in the 1972/73 nnd 1973/74 
financial years reveal certain facts. In 1972/73* v/hen the Rural Development 
year was declared, the Ogoni area (Khana) received the highest amomit of
government grants for local projects. Thirty-two projects in Khana received
I 1
grants totalling N 30,200' while the Oghas, 'Kalaharis and ITemhos came second,
third and fourth respectively, with a total of thirty •■•■one projects approved
for the Oghas, twenty for Kalahari c?aid nineteen for ÎTemhe, Each of these
three received grants totalling K 29,100; K 22,200 and H 11),600 respoctivefy'
(See Table 6).
In the following year, 1973/74, Khana took the loadin;; position again,
Khana people bad twenty-four projects apx^rovcd and received M Ibjl.pO,
Kalahari, Bonny and Okrika came second, third end fourth respectively.
Kalahari appeared to have competed keenly \/ith Khana because it had sixteen 
projects approved and received K 16,250, Bonny and Okrika which followed 
Kalahari had twenty and fourteen projects approved, while each of them received
N 13,700 and K 10.^ 350 r e s p e c t i v e l y i h U e  Gj
In these allocations of grants, two theraos are sifyiificant to the 
local people. These are: how many projects have been approved in any
particular area; and how much grant has been allocated to each project or c^ rea? 
As I have already argued in my first chapter, these local communities are much, 
more concerned with the numerical than the philosophical approach to local 
development. Therefore, government policy is often assessed in terms of nujubers, 
V/hy must the Khana or Kalahari man receive more grants (or projects approved) 
than the Olm’ika or Bonny man and by how many or much? These are the central 
questions. As far as the local man is concerned, it is this kind of assessment 
of policy which affects not only the image of the Cabinet ministers who make 
policy, but also that of the public service,
1H stands for Naira. One naira is the equivalent of the 
ol(d Nigerian ten shillings.
ÆABLE 6
APPROVED GRANTS FOR SELF-HELP PROJECTS 
in the 1972/73 and 1973/74 FINANCIAL YEARS
1972/73 Communities 
in
Khana (Ogoni)
Ogba
Kalahari
Nembe
Okrika
Bonny
1973/74
Khana
Kalahari
Bonny
Okrika
Nembe
Ogba
SUMMARY
Number of Total Amount
Projects Approved Approved (N)~
for Projects
32
31
20
19 
10 
14
24
16
20 
14 
18
7
30.200 
29,100
22.200 
14,600
9.800 
7,900
16,430
16,230
13,700
10,330
9.800 
6,600
SOURCE: Ministry of Rural Development and
Social Welfare, Rural Development 
Division, Port Harcourt.
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Local complaints^ arising from policy (ii) are that Kalahari and Nembe
in particular are being in-eated by the governi'^ ient as 'special communities'. 
These complaints are based on the allocation of grants. It is felt, 
especially by Okrika and Bonny people, that because both the Military 
Governor and one member of the Inner Cabinet, Chief Kombo Igbetta, are Nembe, 
projects in Nembe area have always been approved and grant aided. These 
local complaints also appear to have taken into account two factors: that
the Governor exercises veto power in the Cabinet and that Chief Igbetta often 
deputises for the Governor when the latter cannot attend council meetings in 
which major decisions are talcen. A similar interpretation is given to the 
allocations in Kalahari area. Another influential member of the Inner Cabinet, 
Dr. Nabo Gralian Douglas (Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice), is 
believed to be the brain behind Ka3,abari's large share of the grants. It is 
also believed that because the Ogonis are relatively backward communities in 
the State (see Chapter 3) they are being treated as 'special underdeveloped 
areas' which need to be encouraged to keep pace with the others in matters 
concerning local development schemes.
Complaints aiid gossip have therefore been mainly directed at the Nembes, 
Kalabaris and Ogonis as communities which are the principal beneficiaries of 
the Rivers State calce. These same communities have also been marked by others 
as privileged communities where large sums of money have been approved for all 
kinds of projects because there are 'god fathers' to speak for them in Cabinet.
It is further contended by the Okrikans and Bonny people that the 
Nembes contribute the least to government revenue and so they (the Nembes) 
should expect the least amount of grants. The thesis of the Okrika/Bonny 
argument is that the principle of revenue derivation should be a major 
determinant of how much benefit communities can derive or expect from the
^Based on interviews with local chiefs and elders in these communities, 
September and October, 1973*
2
Dr. Douglas is at present Nigeria's Attorney General.
He was replaced in the Rivers State Cabinet by another 
Kalahari, Dr. Akobo.
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government. It is emphasised that the needs of the Nembes do not exceed 
those of other communities, more especially as Nembe, Bonny and Okrika are 
all riverine communities with similar needs in similar environments. They 
also argue that in the struggle for the creation of the Rivers State, the 
Nembes did not make the greatest sacrifice* In short, in the distribution 
of government amenities, government should take into account the contributions 
of the different communities in attaining the new statehood since the theme 
of new statehood is about the distribution of benefits.
It is, however, interesting that almost all communities, not only 
Bonny and Okrika, complain about Injustice in these allocations. While 
the Okrikans and Ibanis (Bonny) stress that the 'principal beneficiaries' 
rejoice over their booty in the allocations, the Ogonis, Kalabaris and Ogbas 
argue in similar tones: that all others are principal beneficiaries.
Nevertheless, Nembe, the Governor's place of birth, remains principally accused 
because of the supreme powers the Governor is believed to exercise in policy 
making.
It is ironical that despite the assessments of policy, Nembe has never had 
the largest share of grants at any time. Yet the belief is both strong and 
persistent that the bulk of the tax payers money and the State revenue from 
the oil resources are used for the development of the Nembe people in particular. 
It is a Nembe regime, and it is a blessing to be a Nembe. This is the popular 
saying everywhere in the State.
ASSESSMENTS OF THE COMPLAINTSc
In the preceding pages, I have discussed the principles of allocation 
and the widespread local complaints about the alleged irregularities and 
favouritism in these allocations. I now ask: have these complaints any
real foundation? Is there in fact any injustice in these allocations or
can these complaints be dismissed merely as local gossip?
From these quantitative records of project allocations, an attempt to 
judge whose interests are reflected in them is difficult to operationalise
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because it is essentially a 'post mortem* political exercise. Even in my 
interview with cabinet ministers, none ever admitted (and who would?) that 
in these policy matters, particular interests were protected. The protection 
of interests and the influences which may be exercised in policy making are 
usually 'behind the scene' tussles. Then how can one know how and when
certain interests are protected in these allocations, more especially alter
allocations have been made? However, despite these problems in fact-finding, 
some suggestions could be made*
In general, it is possible to make one principal comment about the
policies on grant allocation. There is no substantial evidence of any 
systematic or calculated discrimination against any community. No community 
was ever given a grant for a non-existent project. Complaints are about 
projects which were started yet received no government grants because the 
Cabinet was not satisfied that all the necessary conditions had been fulfilled.
The question^ which the local people ask is: beyond the prescribed principles
of allocation, how and when is the Cabinet satisfied that a project qualifies 
for grant? The local answer is that all members of the Cabinet are partisan 
in distributing grants to communities. These are local impressions which 
are difficult to erase in the people's minds.
THE PRINCIPLES OF NEED AND DERIVATION
Again, it ic not disputed that in the early years of the State 
administration, 1967-71, the former Brass division, in which the Nembes were 
an integral part, contributed the least to government revenue through 
taxation (see Table 7) even though on divisional basis they constituted 
the largest percentage of the State population (see Chapter 2), In terms of 
territory. Brass division was also the largest in size. It is also a riverine 
division, with typical riverine problems of development as discussed in Chapter 2.
This question was asked by many chiefs in Ogba, Okrika, Bonny 
and Ogoni areas. The chiefs also provided the answer even 
though they gave no convincing evidence on this point.
TABLE 7
C)
STATE REVENUE FROM TAXATION ON DIVISIONAL BASIS:
Division Estimated 
Revenue
1969-70
Actual
Revenue
1969-70
Estimated
Revenue
1970-71
Actual
Revenue
1970-71
Ahoada £ 9^,000 £ 4,830 £100,000 £ 9,680
Brass 18,000 3,710 32,000 3,030
Degema 19,000 3,840 29,000 4,300
Ogoni 20,000 6,410 . 26,000 10,860
Port Harcourt l8l,88o 7,300 173,000 18,160
£324,880 £26,110 £362,000 £46,030
STATE REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES:
1969-70
■ »il . 1 hi 1 Mii* 1970-71
Personal Income Tax: £218,121 £ 489,337
Other Income Tax: 7,276 144,326
Lincenses, Fees and Fines: 33,087 462,471
Earnings and Sales by
Government Departments:
2,933 18,063
Interests: 2,817 2,326
Miscellaneous Local Revenue: 
Reimbursements:
26,301
2392,333
163,796
1,211
£1,285,930
TOTAL ST:ATE REVENUE:
1969-70 1970-71
State Revenue from Taxation: £ 26,110 £ 46,030
State Revenue from Other Sources: 392,333 1,283,930
£418,643 £1,329,980
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance, Treasury Division, Port Harcourt,
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Therefore, if in riverine conditions, local development needs were 
determined solely by the criteria of size and population, the Brass people 
would obviously require the largest amount of development capital from the 
government* Indeed, of the riverine communities, the Brass territories are 
the most distant from Port Harcourt. There are enormous problems of land 
and sea transport to facilitate communication with their neighbours, 
as well as other development needs: reclamation of land for other physical
development projects. The list of development needs is endless. It is in 
this sense that the needs of the Brass pgople can be said to be enormous.
Yet it is also because the needs of the Brass people are great and 
their population is the largest that the other communities, especially the 
major complainants, expect^ the highest amount of tax revenue from them.
Arguments about the application of the principle of derivation in sharing 
state benefits arise mainly from this. It is in this sense that■the local 
complaints against Nembe have some foundation even though it is difficult 
to expect equal amount of revenue from all communities. Moreover, the largest 
community may not necessarily have the largest resources exactly.
It is, however, difficult to define the needs of communities. Every 
local community has numerous needs, none of them can ever be reasonably 
convinced that neighbouring communities have more needs. Therefore, local 
complaints about injustice and favouritism are bound to arise no matter how 
the allocation of grants are made, especially if all communities do not receive 
equal amount of grants. After all, in the villages government is believed to 
have unlimited resources, resources which must be shared evenly to all 
communities. The local argument is that government cannot complain of inadequate 
resources because it can^and should, always mint as.much money as would meet 
the people's needs. Added to this is the local tax-payer's complaint of
^Based on the fac’t? there are more taxable adults in Brass ( and 
so more revenue should be derived); and that large territories 
require more development capital than smaller territories, 
especially in swampy areas where land has to be reclaimed before 
any project can be started. The beneficiaries of larger sums of 
development capital must therefore justify their larger share by 
contributing substantial amounts to the distributable pool.
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•over taxation’ despite (what they believe to be) government's reservoir 
of unlimited resources, and they ask why government fails to treat all 
communities on the basis of equality in allocating grants. These also 
provide important explanations to the kind of local complaints generated.
THE QUESTION OF THE NEW STATEf
In discussing the'struggle for the new state, the question is not 
whether this matter is relevant in providing a guideline to (or basis for) 
the distribution of grants to communities. The matter of creating a new 
state has become a very important political issue in recent times - as I 
argued in chapter 6. Indeed the division of the State into two political blocs 
of supporters and non supporters of the Rivers State movement has a peculiar 
foundation: distribution of benefits based on the amount of sacrifice each
community made in the struggle for new statehood - that is, to each 
according to his industry in the state movement. This is the common argument* 
The obvious rationale behind this argument is that in the political 
struggle, certain communities and personalities were victimised by the NCNC 
party and that some Rivers people v/ho did not support the State movement took 
sides with the NCNC party in victimising their kinsmen. Today the millenium 
has arrived, and the oil wells are flowing: the state is generally known as
'The oil-rich Rivers State'. What is argued is that the new state would not 
have materialised if the supporters of the State movement relaxed their efforts 
amidst victimisation by the NCNC party. In the opinion of the supporters of 
the State movement, the war of political survival is over and a new state is 
created. Booty of war is now to be shared. Why should 'soldiers' who did not 
participate actively in the battle, or support the cause of the battle, share 
in the booty? Even if the 'enemies' of the State should share in the benefits, 
their proportion of benefits should be far smaller than those of the supporters 
of the State movement. Indeed this is a very difficult arithmetic to work out.
^brhaps these issues - 'the why of state benefits' - may appear irrelevant 
to an observer, but considering the emergence of the two political blocs in
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the State, it is difficult to dismiss these demands as foolish and baseless.
One also wonders whether those who demand sharing benefits in this way 
are not influenced by Biriye's moral philosophy: why should people reap 
where they have not sown?
Yet in discussing the struggle for the new state, it is not easy to 
assess which of the communities contributed most or made the greatest 
sacrifice. At no time was there any systematic stock-taking of losers and 
beneficiaries, neither of victors and vanquished. The Rivers State movement 
involved different personalities and communities at different times. The 
different phases of the struggle cannot be easily identified with particular 
communities; if anything, individuals such as Chief Biriye of Bonny deserve 
specific mention, even though Biriye's struggles cannot be described as efforts 
of the Bonny people. Moreover, new statehood is not only about sharing 
benefits, as it is locally understood. It is also concerned with other 
problems of effective administrative control, and the management of the economy,
Therefore, in discussing the policy of the military Cabinet in these 
allocations, a number of conclusions about these local feelings emerge.
There is one major area in which the local people are apprehensive of Cabinet 
policies. This is the behaviour of the military Cabinet. Whereas in their 
official speeches and pronouncements the Cabinet ministers are primarily 
concerned with the concepts and ethics of modern public administration - 
such as impartiality and fairness - in the opinion of the local people 
the men in 'uniform' or the civilians in the Cabinet have distinct identities. 
Every minister is a Nembe, Kalahari or any other. So also are policies 
identified with the 'ethnic' composition of the Cabinet. The 'god father* 
is associated with almost every policy matter. Hence the cabinet official 
emphasis on the ethics and concepts of modern public administration has little 
significance or meaning to the local man, not even the principle of 
collective responsibility.
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LOCAL FEARS ; THE BASES
In the opinion of the local people, as well as mine, there are possible 
sources of manoeuvre in some of the conditions which govern the allocation 
of grants. I do not, however, mean to %trgue that Cabinet ministers have 
always manipulated these principles. But these possibilities have given 
rise to local suspicions and fears that some influential members of Cabinet 
have a vested interest in allocating grants.
There are three main sources which strengthen local fears of the 
possibility of manoeuvre. In the first place, the Cabinet determines^ when 
a project has been started to qualify for grant. Secondly, the Cabinet 
decides what projects should be approved and how much should be allocated to 
any particular project. There is therefore the possibility that certain 
projects may not qualify for approval. Thirdly, since a community qualifies 
for only one grant in any financial year, it is also the Cabinet v/hich decides 
when a community may apply for another grant on the completion of other 
outstanding projects.
In such circumstances most of the communities which fail to receive or 
secure sufficient grants, as they desire, are prone to interpret their 
'misfortune' (in the allocation of grants) as the insidious machinations by 
the 'outsider' in the Cabinet; this outsider is a 'god father' or patron from 
other community. These styles of local interpretations also form a unique 
mechanism of 'patronal scapegoating', a mechanism by which the losers in the 
allocation of grants attribute their failure to the evil designs of the n&pdtlstc.
outsider. In any policy matter, this style of scapegoating maltes it 
difficult to differentiate between the real loser and the imaginary loser. 
FURTHER GROUNDS OF LOCAL COMPLAINTS
Having examined the nature of local complaints, it is necessary to 
categorise these complaints and state the other grounds which have given rise
^"Principles of Grant Aid to Communities", See policies (i),— (iii) and (v).
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to the complaints» The complaints fall into three main categories: 
those based on (i) local needs and interests; (ii) the application of 
the principle of revenue derivation, and (iii) the degree of commitment 
to the Rivers State movement (loyalty). All these three have already been 
examined in some detail.
But there are other causes and factors which are only indirectly covered 
by these complaints. First of all, complaints about inequality in the 
distribution of grants also relate to the geographical problems of transport, 
especially in the distant riverine districts. Not only are some communities 
poorer than others - and so there will be inequality in the amount of 
development capital raised for projects - but some communities are less central, 
less accessible and therefore more remote. This means that whereas some 
hinterland areas like Ogba and Ogoni are within easy reach of Port Harcourt, 
it will be more difficult to transport development materials to the distant 
and riverine territories like Bonny, In effect, even if equal amounts of 
grant were given to these hinterland and distant riverine areas, the latter 
(especially those without god fathers who cannot influence the use of 
government boats to transport materials to their areas at no cost to the 
community) will be placed at a disadvantage, because of the large amount of 
money they will spend in transporting materials to their areas. In fact, a 
grant may not even be sufficient to convey materials to these areas. By 
implication then, it appears that it will be difficult to bridge the gap 
between the poorer and the richer, and that between the more central and the 
less accessible areas.
The second point is that^of 'apparent discrimination'^ which is not 
necessarily directed at any community by government, but results from the 
application of the policies in general. Grants are not given to communities 
on the basis of population, not even on the basis of need (no matter how neeu 
is determined). This means that while the richer and the more populated
^As seen by the people.
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districts get more official, grants - by virtue of their numerical strength 
and wealth potentials - the poorer and the less populated district^ will get 
fewer official grants, as outlined in policies (i) and (ii) because grants 
are^  given to communities which have some development capital and are able to
f
initiate projects*
Yet one would imagine that the needs of the poorer, more .^>ampy, and 
less populated areas might be greater than those of the richer - assuming that 
population is an index of wealth potentials and that in terras of number, 
local needs are the same in all territories. Then the question is: do not
the poor get poorer and the rich get richer? Nevertheless., it is not easy 
to suggest a solution to this problem of imbalance between the poorer and the 
richer. Can, or should, the government penalise a richer and more populated 
community by refusing to give the community any grant, awaiting a time when 
the poorer ones will catch up the richer ones? While such a policy may 
appease the poorer ones, it is bound to lead to dissatisfaction among the 
richer areas. The other question is: can the poorer communities justifiably
attribute their poverty or even their remote geographical position to the 
machinations of the richer ones? These are geographical and economic factors 
over which any community or government has little or no control.
It is evident from these analyses that what the people consider as proper 
grounds of allocation are difficult to satisfy. To a considerable extent, tnis 
is how one could understand the insatiable desires of people in the locality.
Thirdly, it appears that some of these complaints of injustice in the 
distributions also arise from the fact that official policies are not seen to 
be very consistent. In fact, some of these inconsistencies relate to the 
conflicting interests of the, different areas. For example, if official policy 
as seen in policies (i) and (ii) is to assist all communities which initiate 
development projects, how can there be a limitation on the number of projects to 
be started in any financial year? (as seen in policy (iii)). On the other hand 
i^vthere sjtg no limitation in the number of projects, can the government really
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afford to assist as many projects as are initiated, especially when bogus 
projects are started? Clearly, it cannot.
Fourthly, policy (v) is also striking. Granted that all projects 
which have been started will receive grants, are there no difficulties in 
producing satisfactory evidence that proper account of expenditure on any 
project is given? The rule is that such accounts must be submitted for 
■official auditing before any further application for a project can be 
entertained. The question of submitting a satisfactory account is itself 
not an unreasonable one - at least in the eye of the official. It is a check 
on the misuse of government funds (who audits the accounts of the V.I.P. 
official?),but in illiterate societies where there are very few or none 
versed in 'book-keeping and accounts', how can government demands in this 
direction be met? And in a society where a few V.I.P.'s want to get rich 
by misappropriating government fund, will strict auditing of accounts be in 
the interest of such defrauders who are likely to stir up trouble in the 
locality against the government if they are probed? But must government 
condone such frauds by relaxing the rules of auditing? These are major 
problems and contradictions which are inherent in the official policies; 
as expressed either explicitly or implicitly by some of the local complaints. 
The patron, as I said, is the scapegoat in these complaints. Why is this 
the case? This is the query I shall deal with briefly.
INTERESTS OF THE PATRONS. _
It appears to me that certain local values and practices have helped 
to build up this system of patronal identification. These values relate to 
the interests of the patrons in Cabinet. On the average, the patron 
maintains close links with, and is a member of, his community union in 
Port Harcourt, To mention tv/o examples, Governor Diete-Spiff belongs to the 
Nembe Union in Port Harcourt while Graham Douglas is also a member of the 
Abonnema (Kalahari) union. Others see these union memberships as patronal 
identifications with their communities. Hence it is believed that the patron
i
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is bound to fulfill certain traditional obligations to his people; and in 
fulfilling these particular obligations it is also argued that the interests 
of other communities are bound to be neglected even in official matters.
Furthermore, the patron wants prestige and goodwill in his locality
f
so as to mobilise sufficient political support. The local value system 
encourages this because the local men spealc highly of patrons who show 
favours to their people. Patrons from less developed localities also desire 
that their localities keep pace with others in the field of community 
development. Moreover, the local pressures to achieve this balance with 
others become greater when local people realise that their men hold positions 
of ministerial responsibility. There is therefore a kind of exchange model: 
the patron depends on his people for support while his people depend on him 
for rewards. That the patron, no matter his status or position in life, 
is strongly attached to the moT^s of his local society is a well known fact 
and so others are inclined to see him first and foremost as a Nembe or Kalabai'i 
man and only secondly as a Rivers State Administrator. It is, therefore, 
inevitable to conclude that the average Rivers State patron, while changing 
substantially in response to overall state needs and interests, has also 
changed the least because he still maintains strong ties with his people. 
CONCEPTS OF GOOD GOVERNMENT.
The foregoing leads us to the fourth major question I have asked in 
this chapter about the concepts of good government as seen by the governors 
and the governed. Finally, it also touches on the image of the Rivers 
State Public Service.
I have already discussed the content of the Cabinet's policies and 
principles. It is therefore important to ask: how did these affect the
Cabinet's administrative and political performance? In attempting answers 
to this question, there will be no comparison between the present military 
Cabinet's performance and that of any civilian regime. Apart from the 
general difficulties in establishing the bases for comparisons, it it not
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very clear how much better or worse the present Cabinet is. Circumstances - 
both political and economic - are different.. Moreover, the present Rivers 
State Cabinet did not directly succeed any government. In many respects, 
it is-a pioneer Cabinet. My answers will therefore be purely contextual 
and I shall suggest a number of ways in which some differences have arisen 
between the governors and the governed in the concepts of good government.
There is nothing unique about the cabinet policies^ and principles.
They are largely similar to Herbert Simon's and the Weberian administrative 
principles and models; impartiality, neutrality, efficiency, national 
objectives and modern administrative principles. Whether or not the Cabinet 
really believed in these principles is difficult to say, at least one may 
hazard a guess, indeed a difficult and risky guess.
It is clear that Cabinet Ministers have close connections with their 
people; therefore it is difficult for the Ministers to be completely 
insensitive to political demands of their peopi.e, especially when local 
needs are great and the pressures persistent. This model of expectations 
between the people and their ministers male es it very difficult for a non­
committed executive to function.
The political background of some of the Cabinet Ministers also gives 
some understanding of how far they can be committed to state or community 
interests. Chief Biriye is described as a career politician. He has been 
in politics since the 1940*s. It is speculated in some circles in Port Harcourt
1
In examining these policies of the Cabinet, perhaps one might say 
that there is a confusion of political and administrative roles. 
However, the fact is that in policy-making, it is difficult to 
draw a sharp distinction between the politicians and the senior 
civil servants because the latter advise the former. Hence the 
line between making end administering policy is a shadowy one.
As Richard Rose argued, "the difference between ministers and 
senior civil servants is not that between policy makers and 
administrators. It is a distinction between those who are 
primarily partisan and those who are primarily non-partisan.
Both are deeply involved in politics."
See Richard Rose Politics in England. London. 1965. p. I83.
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that he may seriously consider returning to politics (whenever the army 
hand over power to civilians) so as to vindicate his commitment to the 
Rivers State cause and also to take vengeance^ on his critics. There are 
similar speculations concerning Governor Diete-Spiff who is ranked as Nembe's 
'number one citizen' by virtue of his present political status. The Ogoni 
Commissioners, Edward Kobani and Chief Nsidee, were also politicians before 
military rule in 19^6, Kobani was a university politician at Ibadan 
University where he studied, while Nzidee was a county council politician 
who later became the Chairman of the Khana County Council, That both 
Kobani and Nzidee may return to politics is also a speculation rife in 
Port Harcourt, These men, including Dr® Obi Wall, are believed to be 
organising intense secret political activities and finalising their party 
blue prints in anticipation of the resumption of politics*
Most of these local speculations have arisen from one theory. At present 
most of the Cabinet Ministers are too prominent in their localities to be able 
to live as private citizens on return to civilian rule. They have been 
chairmen of local gatherings. They have been known and addressed as V.I.P.'s 
and Honourable Commissioners in a society where titles of distinction are 
highly prized. They have also built up large clientelistic ties: clients who
will always sing their praise. How easy is it to fall from such heights, and 
if there is a fall, hov/ easy is it to adjust? Having tasted power in the 
present regime, they may find it difficult to relinquish it happily and 
voluntarily. What else can they do other than to aspire to stay in office? 
Therefore almost every Cabinet minister is suspect of being a political 
aspirant. Basically politics in the local societies, and the relationships of 
sponsor and protege, is one of mutual benefit. It is based on 'give and take'. 
The speculation therefore is that these ex-politicians must be paving the way 
for their political career by building up large clientelistic ties now that they 
are in office. What has given further credence to these impressions and
^The belief as seen in Chapter 6, is that he is already taking vengeance.
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speculations is the fact that at present these Cabinet posts are denied to 
some local people with credible political bases, and so the present 
incumbents have to demonstrate their political competence and their ability 
to outwit other future rivals* They can outwit other rivals by conducting 
themselves as 'able patrons'*
In the light of these, one possible suggestion emerges - that the 
political ambitions - real or imagined - of most of these Cabinet ministers 
will malce it difficult for them to ignore the interests of their people in 
these allocations of grants* After all, what can policies and principles 
achieve unless these are enforced by non-committed ministers; and indeed 
sometimes actual performances depart from policies or even edicts especially 
when the policies are of a general nature. These are the practical limits 
to the official concepts of good government.
Nevertheless, the Cabinet ministers are satisfied^ that the practical 
implementations of policies is in consonance with their beliefs on the 
supremacy of State interests and unity, merit and impartiality (see the 
distinctions). Yet this does not suggest that the Cabinet ministers are 
able to escape the local identification of policy implementation with 
Machiavellianism, a kind of Machiavellianism in which the vested self 
interests of patrons incline them to be nepotistic or communal!stic,
LOCAL EDICTS:
At the other pole stand the local people. What they expect from their 
patrons has been extensively discussed in this work; basically these are 
the anti“thesis of the Cabinet's official principles » though not the anti­
thesis of what might be expected of a politician. The local understanding 
of good government can therefore be summarised as three interrelated 'MUSTS'
1
Based on interview findings with the Commissioners: Mr. Kobani, 
Dr, pVj^ oho, Chief Igbetta, Chief Nzidee and also Government House 
spokesmen. September 1973• Port Harcourt,
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which arc better described as edicts. These are as follows.
The good government must satisfy their wishes by allocating as much grants 
as the people want. Government must advance no policies which will provoke 
the people; the people are provoked if official policy implementation 
does not favour them. If there is any genuine local complaint, the Cabinet 
must abandon all such policies which are unpopular to the people. That is, 
the government must be responsive to local demands, and the local people have 
the right to determine what is genuine, and how and why any policy is 
unpopular, including the right to explain what constitutes unpopularity.
In short, just as a military government has the right to promulgate edicts and 
expect conformity, the local people reserve similar rights; their edicts are 
their wishes and demands.
It is against this background that the Cabinet and local concepts of 
good government can be examined. On the surface, the two concepts may appear 
different and perhaps irreconcilable; yet it is misleading to argue that 
these are two opposites. In general, the interests and inclinations of the 
average Cabinet minister are not completely different from those of his people, 
except in so far as official policies may appear on a theoretical basis in 
the context of the Weberian model. Both the Cabinet ministers and his local 
people belong' to the same local society, share similar values and views 
regarding what constitutes the primary interest and welfare of their local 
community.
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This is not to suggest that the Cabinet ministers, ab least in a military 
regime, are inseparable from their local civilian counterparts. Their status 
as top executives is clearly recognised* My argument is that because there 
is a plurality of goals (among the different communities) in many aspects of 
policy, their separation from the ordinary local man is not in such a degree 
that will be dysfunctional to the patron's people. Furthermore, one can 
distinguish between two models of policy interpretation*. The first relates 
to policy as seen by the Cabinet minister in his capacity as a policy-maker 
in Port Harcourt; and the second relates to policy as seen by both the 
policy-maker and the local people outside the Port Harcourt context where the 
primacy of local interest is little in dispute.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE^- IMAGE?
Finally, from these discussions on grant allocations, some other 
generalisations, no less significant, come to mind. These generalisations 
relate to the image of the Port Harcourt Public Service.
It may be emphasised that group politics in and outside the locality is 
inevitable because of the different group cleavages in the State. As I argued 
in Chapter 2, these group differences, especially between the Kalahari and 
Okrika, are historical. The present nature of state politics in which the 
Nembesand Kalabaris have come to occupy prominent political and ministerial 
positions has only helped to reinforce the past historical differences in the 
minds of the people. Outside the localities these differences have also become 
manifest in the public service, thereby providing anf;^ rena (the Public Service) 
where group cleavages have become noticeable features.
Local complaints arising from the distribution of grants also suggest 
an obvious conclusion. No government can satisfy everybody all the time, not 
even at any time. It appears that what the Rivers people want is a government 
of 'saints', saints who must be seen to be above partisan politics. Local
^As is reflected by the relationship between the Cabinet and local people.
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people see Cabinet policies as either advantageous or disadvantageous to 
them. A policy is seen as advantageous when it serves a good purpose for 
the people, and vice versa® Against these local models of good and bad 
policies, one may consider the official principles of the Cabinet which 
stress that the implementation of policies will, or should, work out well 
in the interest of all groups in the State.
In these circumstances, the dissidents’, view would be that if the 
Cabinet goes on interpreting its policy principles as at present, the 
result would be a further divergence from their (communal) interests, 
especially given that there are conflicting and divergent political demands 
from the citizens, as is typically the case in the Rivers State* The 
dissidents therefore constitute a de facto pressure group in public service 
matters* Nevertheless, it is misleading to imply that these conflicting group 
demands amount to bitter rivalries; it is a less aggressive competition in 
which each group directs its grievances to the public service patrons.
Some other conclusions more directly related to the Cabinet may also be 
made at this stage. In the first place, beside the Cabinet, local people have 
been able to identify the existence of a small coterie of insiders in the 
Cabinet, a body known as a more significant power centre. These two cabinets 
(the main and inner Cabinets), and the identification of its members with 
certain communities, have been associated with two levels of particularisms 
v/ithin the public service where all sorts of coalitions with particular 
communities are possible. These identifications are largely responsible for 
strong allegations that a Nembe and Kalahari government is in power in 
Port Harcourt. The critics^ of the Cabinet, comprising mostly the youths and 
chiefs in the localities, accuse the Cabinet of excessive parochialism in the 
allocation of grants to communities. Such critics dismiss the official
]
'Especially among communities which are either unrepresented or 
under-represented in the Cabinet.
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policies of the Cabinet as hypocritical and misleading. One can therefore 
argue that whether these local accusations are true or false, there is a 
local awareness of public service politics ~ a kind of politics which is 
believed to be perpetuating its legitimacy in the public service. This 
can be explained by the local calculations of 'profit - loss' in almost 
every Cabinet policy on grants; and these calculations largely account 
for the current Uniting of policies with Machiavellianism* It is in this 
respect that the concept of Cabinet politics is based or a peculiar definition: 
situations in which the principal relations are those between the manufacturer 
(Cabinet) and the consumer (the local people), such situations in which the 
manufacturer decides what quantity or quality of commodity is desirable.
There is a second suggestion largely derived from the first. That 
because, community development has become a fetish of long standing among 
Rivers State patrons in their localities, a public service which is very 
conscious of 'development' is emerging. It is argued that the emergence of 
this consciousness makes the public service into an arena for expressing 
local particularisms because the public service is the main source of 
dispensing public benefits* This also provides the basis on which to understand 
Nembe/Kalabari and other community groupings in the Port Harcourt political 
system.
Thirdly, there is that strong belief, also arising from the second, that 
Cabinet men when considering grant allocations almost inevitably adopt a 
strategy of 'self-interest' because they are aware of local expectations, 
expectations which stress that 'you must have a patron in order to get public 
service benefits.' Behind these expectations, there are also local comparisons 
of marginal losses or gains in grant allocations. The question often asked 
on the comparative model is: which are the communities benefitting modtly
from grants (and vice versa)?
Fourthly, it could be inferred from the local demands and expectations 
that the local people suggest that it is difficult for even a military Cabinet
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to argue that it has a monopoly of patriotism in allocating grants. From 
this notion of patriotism, the question is whether patriotism means the 
ability of officials to malce official pronouncements on 'fairness and 
impartiality' to all groups in the allocation of grants (as the Cabinet does) 
or whether it means giving priority to self interest (as the local people 
believe that Cabinet men have vested interests). In this context, patriot is
.has two edges, incorporating both the official and local versions, since both 
versions are legitimate expressions of political thought.
From these four related conclusions and the Cabinet's promises, an 
observer would expect two exclusive pictures of the public service:
(i) the 'rational and impartial' implementation of policies - the Cabinet's 
model, and (ii) the prevalence of local interests as covered by my observations 
and comments on the nature of local pressures. In spite of these two exclusive 
pictures, two concepts of the Rivers State Public Service have become prevalent 
both in the localities and in Port Harcourt. The first is that the Port 
Harcourt Public Service is a service of particularisms. Each group is for 
itself and God is for all. This stems from the cleavages and the alleged 
self-interest I have already discussed. The second is that the Public Service 
is a 'free-for-all' arena, an arena in which almost every policy maker should 
strive to cut a large share of the national cake for his people. One can argue 
that the second concept refers more or less to a warning to policy makers tc 
abandon the principles of impartiality and equity - principles which have 
almost become meaningless to the local man - and protect the interests of 
their people, using all available state resources. Indeed, in view of the 
earlier arguments and observations in this chapter, it is difficult to question 
the bases of these two complementary concepts of the Port Harcourt Public 
Service - concepts which are opposed to the 'rational view of modern 
administration' espoused in the western world.
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CHAPTER Q 
CONCLUSION.
A major theme running through this work is that local people have made 
efforts to develop their communities - either using their own resources or in 
partnership with the State government. This study has also shown that 
though these communities have used their own resources for development, 
they are greatly dependent on the Port Harcourt administration for money, 
equipment and personnel*
The dependence of the local communities on the Port Harcourt 
administration could be explained largely in rerms of the notion of 
distributive politics which examined in Chapter 1, The Port Harcourt
government is the major distributing agent. And given the limited resources 
of the local communities, it is only natural for these communities to be 
greatly dependent on the central administration. Furthermore, because all 
the communities want precisely the same scarce resources, we have also 
observed that there is tense rivalry and cpmpetition among groups for 
benefits, as well as scramble for power in the Port Harcourt arena.
This competition further suggests that in a political market - as 
the Rivers State experience has shown - the government must be able to offer 
a sufficient amount of goods to the people, if massive support for the 
regime is to be obtained. In the Rivers State, the 'failure* of the 
government to deliver enough goods to some of the communities has led to 
accusations that the policy-makers have been nepotistic and communalistic 
in their implementation of policy,
THE INTERMEDIARIES.
How have the political goods been delivered and through whom? It is in 
answering this question that the indispensability of the role of 'cultural 
brokers' in the political system becomes apparent. In the case of the
Rivers State, this study has shown that the patron is a 'cultural broker' 
who acts on behalf of his people at the Port Harcourt level. He is not 
only a broker, but also an astute politician. Because the patrons are 
the principal political actors in the Port Harcourt arena, they are people 
who function as intermediaries, thereby protecting their peoole's interests#
In a society where the patrons who are local notables are expected to act 
as 'guardians of the people', it is clear that the protective role of these 
intermediaries is culturally aoproved. Understandably, in their 
capacities as community influentials and senior administrators in Port 
Harcourt, these patrons participate in the two sub systems - the locality 
and the centre - which overlap* Hence as Doland put it, the patrons 
"engage in integrative transmissions" between the two sub systems, "as well 
as integrative manipulation in order to optimise their status"^*
Of course since the Port Harcourt government is an instrument of 
disbursement via an intermediary elite to the peonle (as we noted in 
Chapter l), it is not surprising that it is the patron who clays such an 
intermediary role, 'dihat is, however, striking about his role is that, given 
the communal particularisms in the Rivers State, as a senior administrator, 
the patron is expected to influence policies to the advantage of his people - 
thus creating a conflict of values^ since formally speaking, administrative 
structures are supposed to be 'non-political*. That the patron is indifferent 
to rules of political neutrality shows the mythical character of this claim 
to be 'above politics' at least in the case of the Rivers State,
1Robert T. Daland, ed. Comparative Urban Research: the Administration and 
Politics of Cities, California 1969, p. 46,
For his part, the patron appears to have accepted happily his inter­
mediary and protective roles. At least this is the picture of the patron
which emerges in this study. The case study on Tsaro liiiwa provides a
typical example of how patrons act as protectors of group interests and 
champions of their people's cause. Tsaro UJiwa's people saw him as a 
patriotic citizen who worked consistently in the interest of the common man. 
In this respect he made representations to the state government concerning 
their interests. Obviously, Tsaro lUiwa did not deny the protective and 
intermediary roles he played in the Ogoni political system. He confirmed 
that whenever the need arose, he discussed his people's problems with his 
colleagues in the Executive Council. And in fact Tsaro Üliuja's question - 
"what is wrong if a commissioner presents his people's problems to the 
government?" - leads me to believe that he saw himself as the Ogoni 
representative in Port Harcourt,
Furthermore, in launching his book, Ogoni Nationality,obiously Tsaro 
IJJiwa identified himself strongly with the interests of his people. In 
identifying himself with his people's interests, Tsaro Wiwa was merely 
fulfilling a promise he made in 1967 to his people that he would restore 
the 'dignity of the Ggonis', It would therefore not be surprising if he 
protected his people's interests in the Port Harcourt arena when he became 
a cabinet minister, the more so since he believed that his people deserved 
fairer treatment in the Rivers State,
Tsaro Uliwa is only one of several high status patrons who play inter­
mediary roles in the Rivers State, Like Tsaro Wiwa, other people are 
interested in building up large followings in their communities. Several 
factors seem to affect the ability of a patron to obtain a large following. 
First, in his position as an administrator and politician in Port Harcourt, 
he is able to offer at least political protection to his clients.
Secondly, because the patron and most of his clients are citizens of the 
same community, his followers naturally believe him to be working for the 
general good* Besides, since the patron himself needs the political support 
of his clients (see Chapters 3 & 6) it is advantageous for him to maintain 
his relationship with his clients. It is largely because of these 
advantages which accrue to both parties that clientelism pervades the 
Rivers State Society,
Patrons also see themselves as local ambassadors in Port Harcourt, As 
such their obligations to their peoole are clearly defined. In a wider 
sense, these natrons are seen not only as liaison officers, but as astute 
politicians who are watchful for every opportunity to advance their 
particular communal interests. Hence the patron is seen as an arch- 
communalist by those groups which do not profit from his activities.
THE POLITICS OF COMMUNALISM.
It is clear from the foregoing that Rivers State politics is basically 
one of clientelism and communalism. Local peoole at any rate see politics 
largely in terms of communalism. Certainly, in the course of inter-community 
competition, the disadvantaged groups perceive their competitive world 
through communal prisms and hence believe all other groups to be equally 
communalistic.
Instances in which people see politics in a communalistic perspective 
are legion. It will suffice at this stage to give two examples. Firstly, 
in elections, people vote for those candidates who are most likely to protect 
local interests, A prominent politician such as Biriye, who suffered defeat 
in the Degema East (Okrika-Bonny) constituency, was certainly a victim of 
Okrika communalism (as Bumbo was a victim of Ibo communalism - See Chapter l). 
The point is that a rule of communal solidarity applies whenever the 
citizens ocf the community find themselves facing outsiders and involved in
the larger political world.
Secondly, whenever the implementation of policy is unfavourable to any
group, members of that group see other patrons as the architects of their
misfortune. In short,the outsider is always seen as "nepotistic",
"parochial", "vindictive" and "communalistic", and therefore as "uninterested
in ensuring justice and fairness" in implementing policy. Clearly,
communalism is, in short, the dominant political idiom in the Rivers State, 
CONCLUSIONS.
Having dealt with policy-making and the nature of the Rivers State
political environment, what conclusions- can one draw from this study? Three
major conclusions may be noted. Firstly, the Rivers State experience suggests
that communal particularism^ - at both the local and official levels - may
2
be a persistent feature of modernity , and the dynamics of communalism in 
the State are to be found, at least, in part,in the political realities of 
a fragmented social order. Secondly, the boundary of politics between the 
locality and Port Harcourt is thin because the major participants in local 
politics are also senior state officials. Therefore there is in infiltration 
of local politics into the Port Harcourt arena. Thirdly, the assessment of 
policy is made within a very limited, localised framework of reference.
H^.ll/olpe, 'Port Harcourt : Ibo Politics in Microcosm* in DMAS. Vol.?, 1969
p. 492 also argues that (i) communal particularism may well be a persistent 
and eurhythnic feature of modernity - this runs counter to the view that 
communal particularism is essentially an historic anachronism, ultimately 
destined to be submerged by the 'universalistic* tidal wave of modernity
(ii) models which dichotomise 'tradition' and 'modernity* --- do little to
further our understanding of the process of change in any particular society,
2
,For an explanation of the paradoxical persistence of communal sentiments 
and communal conflicts within modernising and modernised societies, see 
R.Melson and H. lilolpe 'Modernisation and the politics of communalism -— '
APSR Vol. 64, 1970, p.1126. The implication of their argument is that there 
is no necessary incompatibility between functioning as a modern economic man, 
on the one hand, and performing as a communal political actor on the other.
PROGNOSIS.
What can one say about the future of the Rivers State in the light 
of these conclusions and our findings in this study.
Clearly, the Rivers State experience suggests that communalism pervades 
the whole society. And even among the Port Harcourt officials, we have 
suggested that there is indifference to rules of political neutrality.
Undeniably, in Port Harcourt, the pervasiveness of communalism poses 
a serious problem for the observance of official administrative rules.
The problem arises because if the patron succumbs (as we have suggested) to 
constant pressures to use his good offices to the advantage of his people, 
it is obvious that the official ethics of impartiality and inscrutability 
will be cast aside.
The question is : can communalism be curbed in the Rivers State
especially in view of recent experience? It appears that it is with great 
difficulty that communalistic practices can be curbed. Why? Firstly, the 
policy-makers themselves have few or no effective ways of insulating central 
bureaucratic institutions from political incursion, even if they wish to do 
so. The protection of group interests is the primary concern for most people, 
especially the patrons. The part played by cabinet ministers such as 
iNwanodii and lilachuku (of the hinterland bloc) in the agitation for a Port 
Harcourt State offers a concrete example of how patrons act as their people's 
spokesmen (see Chapter 6), even to the extent of working to dismantle the 
very arena in which they at present operate.
Secondly, as local dignitaries, the patrons are interested in maintaining 
large followings in their localities ,and whether they do so or not depends 
on satisfying the appetites of their clients. It is therefore difficult for 
any patron wishing to keep his position to renounce the idiom of communalism.
Thirdly, uie have observed in this study that informal patronal
segments exist within the Rivers State administration, and patrons who are
public servants see their positions as client-creating assets. It should
therefore be expected that the patrons would exoloit the opportunities in
the new state as long as it yields benefits for both themselves and their
people. Mo structural reform of the public service seems likely to change.
this situation in the foreseeable future. Equally, there is no evidence of
any real (as distinct from rhetorical) public rejection of communalism- as
a tactic in state politics#
For even if some attempt were made to curb these communalistic practices,
since the government is not the only political actor, it would be necessary
to enlist the cooperation of the other actors -- the local people. Our
observation in this study suggests that, at both the official and the local
levels, only a few 'saints' (if any) opposed to communalism can be found,
Most people appear to profit from communalism since it serves their purposes.
Hence, communalism is more of a cultural than an administrative problem#
It has become an endemic disease which is likely to eat deep into the whole
administrative fabric.,
. ____________
we have seen, it is not a condition from which only the Rivers 
State suffers. However reluctantly, we may plausibly suggest th^t this study 
exemplifies a phenomenon to be found throughout (and, indeed, outside) the 
developing world and hope that we have here indicated at least some of the 
dynamics underlying communalism in one, not atypical, Nigerian State,
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A P P E N D I C E S
APPENDIX 1
NUMBER OF SCHOOLS AND ISMROINENT
Year Type of School Number of Schools
i
Enrolment
1969 a) Primary 361 112,638
b) Secondary/Commercial 15 4,437
c) Teacher Training 1 23,232
d) Technical/Vocational 1 352
,1970 a 409 131,000
b 21 7,872
c 3 470
■ 2 627
1971 a 360 160,000
b 36 11,000
c 5 900
d 2 630
1972 a 365 180,000
b 38 16,000
c 6 1,000
d 3 1,500
1973 a 570 233,000
b 39 17,000
c 10 1,330
d 6 1,630
1974 a 388 244,000
b 48 18,000
0 10 2,000
d 6 1,600
K^: The letters: a, b, c, and d stand for;
Primary
Secondary/Commercial 
Teacher Training and 
Technical/Vocational, respectively*
SOURCE: Ministry of Education, Planning and Research Division,
Port Harcourt*
APPENDIX 2
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SUMMARY OF SCHOLARSHIP AWARDS
Year
Number and Levels of Award
Post Graduate Post Secondary Post Primary
1970 19 296 1,978
1971 20 288 2,060
1972 100 409 2,203
1973 23 493 2,440
. 1974 —— —
NOTE; A dash (— ) indicates that the figures were 
not available#
SOURCE; Ministry of Education, Scholarship Division, 
Port Harcourt#
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APPENDIX
(i) HIGH LEVEL (ADMINISTRATION AND GENERAL CLASSES) MANPOWER 
SITIDVriON IN TirË'pIVERS 'STATE"GOVERNMENT SERVICE (as at" 
31st March I969, 1970 & 1971
1969 1970 1971
Occupational Group
Author
ised
Strength
1 1 ....
! Establ- : Vacan-
: ished j cies
Strength;
A B C : A B C
ADMINISTRATIVE CLASS 1 !i - I
Permanent Secretaries 3 '5
!
i 9 7
2 ! 1 6 3 1
Under . " 3 3 I 3 1 2| 2 1 1
Senior Asst. " (Group 7) 13 8 i ^ 18 12 6 i1 9 4 5
Assistant " 31 7 : 24! 31 16 13 21 10 11
TOTAL (All Grades) 52 23 29 61 36 2 3 ;38 20 18
EXECUTIVE CLASS (ADMIN.)
Principal Executive Officers -
i
- - 2 “ 2
Senior " ’* 4 5 1 3' 2 1 1
Higher " " 13 13 16 6 1 0 , 9 2 7
Executive Officers 38 7 31 44 18 26 50 15 13
TOTAL (All Grades) 37 10 47 3 4 2 3 39 43 18 23
AUDITORS AND ALLIED
Auditors 12 - 12 9 4 10 3 7
Executive Officer's^Audit^ 4 2 2 6 6 - 8 6 2
TOTAL (All Grades) 16 2 Ï4 15 10 5 18 9 9
STORES OFFICERS
Coaches 7 3 4 7 3 4 10 9 1
REGISTRARS
Court Registrars 24 4 20 20 9 11 14 10 4
TRADE & INDUSTRIAL OFFICERS
Trade Officers 3 5 - 3 3
Industrial Promotion Officers ■ - — - 8 3 3
Technical Industrial Officers — — 12 2 10
TOTAL (All Grades) 3 3 23 10 13
KEY: Use of ^.etters: A, B and C; A for Authorised Strength
B for Established Strength 
C for Vacancies 
/ No Records Available*
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APPENDIX 3 (Continued)
Notes and Remarks:
(i) Certain occupational groups of a quasi-professional nature have been 
included and the occupational groups shown are those considered to 
be outstanding.
(ii) Figures for all Ministries and Departments .have not been included 
because of the persistent failure of some ministries and departments 
to send their staff disposition returns to the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Reconstruction. In some cases, full staff lists 
were not kept by some Government Departments and at times staff lists 
were not regularly updated because of too frequent transfer of 
officers who were directly responsible for these matters.
(iii) Government Departments included on the Table
1969: 3 Ministries (out of 7), the Sports Council, Audit Department,
Military Governor's Office, and Judicial Department.
I97O: 7 Ministries (out of 9), the Sports Council, Audit Department,
Military Governor's Office, Public Service Commission, and 
Judicial Department.
I97I: 7 Ministries (out of 10), the Sports Council, Audit
Department, Judicial Department, and Public Service Commission,
(iv) For convenience, posts filled in Acting capacities are not regarded 
as vacant. The distinctions between Acting and Substantative 
appointments were not (and are not) easily made in the Service 
because of the preponderance of Acting appointments.
SOURCE: Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction. Port Harcourt,
APPENDIX 3
(ii) HIGH LEVEL TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONAL MANPOWER SITUATION 
IN RIVERS STATE GOVERFl jlNT SERVIClT (as at 
"31st March 1969, TpVO'
1969 1970
Occupational Group Author- IEstabl- iVacan- 
ised ;ished jcies A
Strength : Strength ;
MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
Medical Officers 
Pathologists 
Dental Surgeons 
Pharmacists 
Radiographers 
Nursing Suptds, 
Nursing Sisters 
Lab. Technologists 
TOTAL [All TypesT
/
A
/
/
/!
MINISTRY OF WORKS 
LAND AND TRANSPORT '
i1
ii
Architects 5 5 1 3 3 2 3 3 2:
Surveyors 8 8 10 - 10 11 2 9
Engineers (Electrical, 
Civil and Mechanical) 24 1 23 23 2 23 23 7 16
Town Planners 7 7 7 — 7 —
Technical Officers 106 7 99 106 14 92 111 67 44
Works Suptds. 51 2 49 31 16 33 68 17 53
TOTAL T aII Types) 211 10 191 204 33 169 218 96 122
JUDICIAL DEPT. AND 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
High Court Judges 4 — 4 3 — 3 3 4 I
Magistrates 21 2 19 14 7 7 17 10 7
Other Legal Officers 
(state Counsels of all ' 
Grades)
21 2 19 23 3 18 27 11 16
TOTAL (All Types) 46 ""It- 42 "fio 12 28 49 23 24
1971
f
c A B C
/ 106 24 82/ 4 1 "ZV
3 1 4
36 6 30
12 2 10
36 4 32
62 14 48
! 10 =•■ 10
,271 32 219
APPENDIX 3 (Continued)
3XÙ.
1969 1970 1971
Occupational Group
Author­
ised
Strength
Establ­
ished
Strength
Vacan­
cies A B C A B C
MINISTRY OF AG.RIC- 
CULTURE, FISHERIES AND 
NATURAL RESOURCES
Agriculture^Officers 13 6 9 13 12 3 1 20 18 2
Fisheries Officers 12 7 ■ 5 12 7 3 I 7 9
Conservators of Forest 6 ** 6 6 2 4 I '
3 3
Veterinary Officers - 6 2 4 ! 6 3 3
Agric. Suptds, 28 6 : 22 , 28 8 20 ! 18 24
Fisheries Suptds. 7 - 7 7 3 4 I 3 3 —
Forest Suptds, 8 - i ^ 8 “ 8 1 ^
2 6
TOTAL (All Types) 76 19 ..
82 34 48 77 60 23
KEY: Same as shown on Appendix 3 (i)
Notes and Remarks:
(i) The identifications and groupings of these professional and 
technical fields are not water-tight.
Generally, those occupational groups shown are those considered 
to be outstanding.
Posts filled in Acting capacities are not regarded as vacant.
SOURCE; Ministry of. Economic Development and Reconstruction. 
Port -Harcourt.
APPENDIX 4
STATE GOVERNMENT SUBSIITES AND GRANTS TO THE DIVISIONAL COUNCILS
County Council Financial Year
1971/72 1972/73
Port Harcourt £100,000 £ 20,000
Ikwerre 18,113 6,000
Ohio 10,882 6,000
Ekpe ye/Engenni 11.330 . 6,000
Etche 12,123 6,000
Ogba/Egbema 12,340 6,000
Abua 9,960 6,000
Kalahari 28,803 6,000
Okrika 19,670 6,000
Bonny 17,343 6,000
Nembe 14,040 6,000
N, Ijaw 13,089 6,000
S, Ijaw 13,313 6,000
Ogbia 13,323 6,000
Khana 19,228 6,000
Gokana 16,987 6,000
El erne 13,048 6,000
TOTAL; £330,000 £116,000
NOTE; Figures for the other years (1973/74 and 1974/73) 
could not be given by any of the ministries.
SOURCE: Military Governor’s Office, Field Administration
and Rural Development Division, Port Harcourt.
APPENDIX 5
COMPOSITION OE THE RIVERS STATE RURAL DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE
i) The Permanent.Secretary, Field Administration and Rural 
Development Division, Military Governor’s Office;
ii) The Chief Planning Officer, Ministry of Economic Development 
and Reconstruction; 
iii) The Chief Rural Development Officer, Field Administration and 
Rural Development, Military Governor’s Office; 
iv) The Controller of Works Services, Ministry of Works and 
Transport ; 
v) The Divisional Officers; 
vi) The Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Ministry of Trade 
and Industries? 
vii) The Rural Health Officer, Ministry of Health; 
viii) The Chief Fisheries Officer, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Natural Resources; 
ix) The Chief Agricultural Officer (Extension Services),
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Natural Resources; 
x) 16 Unofficial members eaeh representing each of the 
16 County Councils, and 
xi) The Principal Rural Development Officer as 
Secretary to the Committee*
SOURCE; Military Governor's Office,
Field Administration and Rural Development Division, 
Port Harcourt#
APPENDIX 6
REVENUE OF THE LOCAL COUNCILS:
(A) FROM TAXATION
Division Financial Year
1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/73
Ahoada £ 4,830 £ 9,680 — - -
Brass 3,710 3,030 *•
Degema 3,840 4,300 » « —
Ogoni 6,410 10,860 — -
Port Harcourt 7,300 18,160 • - -
TOTAL: £26,110 £46,030
(B) FROM LICENCES, FEES AND FINES:
Year
1969/70
1970/71
(C) MISCELLANEOUS LOCAL REVENUE:
Year
1969/70
1970/71
Amount
£ 35,087 
&462,471
Amount
£ 26,301 
£163,796
Notes and Remarks:
i) The County Councils in the different divisions are as follows:
Ahoada Division: Ikwerre; Ekpeye/Engenne; Etche; Ogba/Egbema;
Abua; Obio,
Brass Division; Nembe; N, Ijaw; S. Ijaw; Ogbia,
Ogoni Division: Eleme; Gokana; Khana.
Degema Division: Okrika; Kalahari; Bonny.
Port Harcourt Division: Port Harcourt.
ii) A dash (-) indicates that the ministerial sources did not 
provide the figures.
iii) The ministry kept no records of revenue derived on County Council 
basis. The items under (B) and (C) do not show figures on 
divisional or county council basis. It is regretted that the 
ministerial sources could not provide particularistic data.
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance, Treasury Division, Port Harcourt.
APPENDIX 7
THE PATTERN AND RULES OF SUCCESSION TO AMANYANABOSHIP IN OKRIKA
Both the Konijus and Tubonijus accept one principle: there is a
ruling family; so also are there King makers* Yet as will be shown in 
what follows, there are problems of recruitment to the office of Amanyanabo,
The King makers are members of the ruling family, though they are not 
eligible to become Kings. Usually the King makers are elders who are appointed 
by a joint-committee of elders and chiefs in the ruling house. When the 
.’Amanyanabo stool' is vacant, the King makers meet; thereafter they ask the 
ruling section within the ruling house to present a candidate or candidates 
to them for consideration,
an
It is customary that/aspirant to the stool must be a chief - in Okrika 
it is believed that if a man is a very good leader, the V/ari (house) would 
normally elect him a chief. In short chiefs are good leaders. Furthermore, 
it is expected that the aspirant should be nominated by some elders in his 
quarter or compound, a nomination which should be supported by the majority 
of the people in the quarter or compound. Later on, candidates who have been 
nominated are presented to the King makers who rnalce their own choice. 
Nevertheless, the verdict of the King makers is not final, because both the 
King makers and the ruling section must reach an agreement on the selection 
of the candidate - to ensure that an Amanyanabo-elect is acceptable to a 
majority of the two groups of participants (the King makers and the ruling 
section)•
However, besides the foregoing qualifications for Amanyanboship, there 
are some other less important considerations - such as intellectual capacity, 
wealth and distinguished social status - which count in the selection of an 
Amanyanabo. This means that the qualifications'for Amanyanaboship are not 
as clear cut as might appear to an ordinary observer.
As could be seen from these qualifications for Amanyanaboship, there are 
three main participants in the elections: the King makers, the ruling feimily,
and the aspirants. Even when a stool is vacant, it takes a long time for the 
aspirants to canvass for support. Besides, usually there are many aspirants, 
each canvassing for support.
Among the different contestants, the choice of the most eligible 
candidate is a difficult one because of the complex nature of the considerations 
involved. Certain important questions arise: i) of the different contestants,
who is the most suitable, and how is his suitability determined? ii) who is the 
wealthiest of the lot to be able to influence people and gather support, in a
3 %
society where it is not unusual for people to accept bribes before casting 
their votes? iii) of the nominees, who is the most intelligent to be 
able to attract supporters? and iv) would the nominees accept the ruling 
of the King makers at all times? Obviously, in recent times all these 
difficulties in assessing the credentials of the different contestants have 
made the election of an Amanyanabo not only problematic, but highly political*
APPENDIX 8
The Ijaw Rivers Peoples* League (Presidential Address, August 19^9)
My Comrades of the Ijaw Rivers,
It is with the same feeling as possessed the Biblical father at the 
return of his run-agate son after his long sojourn in the world of indiscretion 
and whoredom that I address myself as President-General to this August body 
of people, the Ijaw Rivers Peoples’ League, at this unique occasion. I am 
happy that the Ijaw Rivers Peoples’ League has returned, may I prophesy, to 
stay, from its rather long sojourn in the land of lethargic sleep, and inertia, 
amidst the roaring torrents and waves and splashes of progressive march of the 
various peoples of our country, to the top. I say unto you all, "welcome 
and well-done, so far!"
May I dare to say, gentlemen, that these are no times that need extra­
ordinary powers of oration and charm of words to arouse us, the proud sons and 
daughters of our brave and gallant progenitors of the Ijaw Race to concert 
measures and pool our resources for a tremendous, forceful, and lively drive 
towards self-determination as along with other virile tribes in our beloved 
country, Nigeria, in matters affecting education, health, economic stability, 
good sense of government, and other kindred factors which, together, constitute 
the pivot round which spins the glorious mechanism of .modern civilization and 
progress.
We have lost the enviable niche carved for us of old by our forefathers, 
in the corridor of fame in the old Oil Rivers Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, 
Like dogs, we are today assigned to pick the ignoble crumbs that fall from the 
master's table, which mean place is even sometimes and in some respects denied 
us. We are today so wholly given a prey to disintegrating forces of 
individualism and clannishness that we cut our noses to spite our faces, to the 
extent of appearing ludicrous to the eye of the world; and we have by this 
means, ignobly and without feeling invited to ourselves the application of the 
saying, "the first shall be last, and the last, first,"
The surf of the dashing shallow water rolls laughing over our heads, and 
we remain as still and silent as real deep water. If these facts and others 
natal to the people of the Ijaw tribe be not motives enough to spur us to 
continued activity towards rising once more to keep our proud pace along with 
other tribes of our country, then let us break off even now, and let our memory 
be forever a monument of shame to generations to come; but if these be fire 
enough to kindle in us a feeling to retrieve our lost ground in the march of the 
times, then let us, one and all, here resolve to use might and main to pull
ourselves together, our people together, forgetting petty differences 
amongst us to recall, once more, the glory and grandeur that belonged to the 
Rivers People#
We learn, gentlemen, from yesterday the things to do today. Yesterday, 
we I did resolve in this same strain, but did later rest on our oars. One 
and perhaps the only salient achievement of this League was getting a province 
of our own, the Rivers Province, A delegation of this League, led by ray
humble self did interview the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nigeria,
here at Port Harcourt in 194?, through the Chief Commissioner, Eastern 
Provinces, in this concern; and soon after our aspiration materialised, we 
fell into sleep. This of course, was caused chiefly by a lack in our Secretariat# 
As this lack, I am glad to say, has been provided for by our amended constitution, 
it is nothing but hope that swells in our breasts. Let us now onwards sail 
smoothly on the troubled waters#
Our country calls us; the dictates of the times cry aloud unto us,
"Arise,, thou sleeping Ijaw giant! Free yourself of thy disrupting entangle­
ments, and take thy wonted giant strides, and march unto progress!" it is only 
dynamic, fearless but tactful and selfless leadership that will take us far in 
our journey; leaders who are free and independent in profession re a desideratum. 
We need a faithful and loyal following; not a following saturated with fault­
finding spirit, not a following like dumb-driven cattle. Let us adjust our 
ranks by a general election of officers, and then, let us bid ourselves, "Godspeed’
Countrymen, we are faced with problems of very intricate and frustrating 
complexity in our drive for self-realisation. And brains must be seated in 
rubber not to appreciate our difficulties. I shall be doing great dis-service
to our tribe if X gloss over our faults which militate against our progress;
and if we, through infatuation refuse to ov/n these faults, and determine to üîake 
amends, we shall be wasting our powder in empty air#
I have been President-General of this League foi- five years since# I took 
over in April 1944, from our beloved father of the League, Mr, R.T. Wilcox, B.L, 
the first General President, and I have discovered within this period certain 
traits of character which fight against us# Here are a few of them: We lack
the spirit of live and let live# By this lack we fail to stretch a helping hand 
to others who particularly do not belong to the same clcxn or town as we do, 
though of the same tribe. Many of us refuse to see anything good in others 
who, though of the same tribe do not belong to our clan, .A good many of us 
have eyes only for ourselves and not for others, no matter to what clan or tribe
they may belong. A lack of the spirit of generosity towards one another 
amongst the peoples of the Rivers, stiînts the coeval progress of our youth. We 
are far too prone to thinly in terms of clan and town, a rather narrow and circum­
scribed concept of nationalism*
Compatriots, before us lies the turbulent sea filled with such traits that 
wedge our common progress. There is nothing of general importance to be gained 
by the disproportionate rise of any single clan. We meet to plan and scheme, 
we strive, qe strain, not in terms of clans, although these constitute the 
integral units in the superstructure of our Ijaw State, but in terms of the whole 
area as a State to be. Our policy should be equal, common and contemporaneous
development of the area concerned.
The voice of the Ijaw race in the field of politics has been silent for 
long; his place has been left void for so long that even his existence is no 
longer felt. The recent,successive political waves that swept so windily over 
the whole country show the Ijaw man where he places himself. In the past we 
had Kings, Chiefs and Leaders who treated on comparatively equal terms with 
rulers in Europe through their representatives; but what foul turn of events, 
oh Countrymen, that has so levelled us with the mire! Let us therefore rise
and sleep no more until we have reached our goal!.
I thank you gentleraent for listening to me patiently and for so long.'
I now take leave of you to end my address.
Thanks,
E.D. WOLSELY
Ijaw Rivers Peoples' League 
President-General.
APPENDIX 9
APPROVED GRANTS FOR SELF HELP PROJECTS 
for 1972/73 and 1973/74
1972/73
Name of Community Project
   —  1 —
Amount Approved i Total
NEMBE
l) Agbata-Biriya Village Hall 800
2) Okoroba Town Ball 1,000
3) Twni -Brass Bridge 1,000
4) Egwema Village Hall 800
3) Fantuo Latrines (3) 400
6) Ewelesuo Reclamation and 800
Embankment
7) Okokokiri Village Hall 800
8) Tereke Market 1,500
9) Okoroma/Ologoama Town Hall 800
10) Agrisaba Village Hall 800
11) Otunrakiri Town Hall 800
12) Tengelekiri Jetty 400
13) Basambiri Town Hall 1,000
l4) Iseleogomo Latrines (3) 400
13) Benkiri Jetty 300
16) Odioma Town Hall 800
17) Etiema Town Hall 800
18) Liema Town Hall 600
19) Otatubu Latrines (3) 600
BONNY
1)' Green Iwoama Village Hall 1,300
2) Borokiri Village Hall 400
3) Kuruama Latrines 400
4) Nar^^biye Village Hall 4oo
3) Agbanama Embankment 600
6) Epelema Wells 200
7) Jumbo Iselegono Village Hall 4oo
8) William Jumbo Wells 400
14,600
330.
GRANTS I’OK SELF HELP PROJECTS for 1972/73 (Continued)
Name of Community [ Project Amount Approved ! Total
BONNY (Continued) N N
9) Oloma ; Village Hall 8oo 1
10) Polokiri ! Village Hall 4oo
11) Abalamabiye ! Bridge 600
12) Bonny Town i Latrine 1,000
13) Georgekiri ! Well: 400
l4) Finiraa ; Bridge 4 00 7,900
OKRIKA :'
1) Ederemabiri : J etty 1,000
2) Amadiama : Latrines (2) 600
3) Abuloma Market 600
4) Ogbogbo Reclamation 
1 (of land for Town Hall) 1,200
3) Ogu i Bridge 1,300
6) Amadi/Abuloma Pipe Borne Water 6oo
7) Wakama Village Health Centre 1,300 1
8) Obuv/oeima/Opuado Market
;
1,000 1
9) IbaJca 1 Town Hall 800 I
10) Ibuluya Ama : Motor Park 1,800 9,800
KALAHARI
;i1
;
1
1) Degeme Town i Market 1,300
2) Kala Degema 1 Town Hall 1,000
3) Sangama 1 Town Hall 1,000
4) Oporoama . -, i Health Centre 1,300
3) Obonnoma 1 Town Hall 1,000
6) Eme3.egho Road 800
7) Emago Kugbo Town Hall 1,000
8) Omekwe Tariama Town Hall 1,300
9) Minaraa Town Hall 1,300
10) Angulama Town Hall 1,300
11) Abalama Maternity 1,300
12) Idama Town Hall 1,300
GRANTS FOR SELF HELP PROJECTS for 1972/73 (Continued)
Name of Community
f !
1 Project ;Amount Appi
KALAHARI (Continued) i i
1 i
N
13) Sokin
1
i Maternity 1,000
l4) Tema j Town Hall j 1,000
15) Orusangama 1 Town Hall i1 1 1,000
16) Adada I Town Hall | 1,200
17) Alcalaga/Emadon/Oda ; Road | 800
18) Tema j Latrines ' | 800
19) Okpo 1 Town Hall | 800
20) Okolomade Town Hall i 800
KHANA (OGONI)
1) Ban-Ogoi Tai Market 1,000
2) Teka-Sogho Health Centre 1,000
3) Kegbara-Chara Road 1,000
4) Akporo Sogho 1 Library 1,000
3) Lekuma Tai Health Centre; 1,000
6) Sime Tai Road 1,000
7) Deeyor Chara Tai Town Hall 1,000
8) Norpivs^ Postal Agency 800
9) Taabaa Market 1,000
10) Bunu Tai Poultry 800
11) Kono Town Hall 1,000
12) Kpite Marke t 600
13) Jor Sogho Market 1,300
14) Kaani Town Hall 800
15) Ueken-Kaani Road 1,300
16) Korokoro Tai Bridge 800
17) Luubara Mat Weaving Industry 800
18) Kono Boue Poultry 600
19) Wiiyakara Road 1,000
20) Uegwere Boue Weaving Centre 1,000
21) Gwara Health Centre 1,300
22) Tern Lueku Town Hall 800
23) Bara Obara Town Hall 800
total
22,000
GRANTS FOR SELF HELP PROJECTS for 1972/73 (Continued)
Name of Community Project Amount Approved Total
KHANA (OGONI) (Continued)
1 ^
24) Kabangha ; Market . 600
23) Luawi Town Hall - 600
26) Kporgho : Road 1 1,300
27) Sii Market ; 1:,000
28) Tuatua Tai : Graft Centre 1 600
29) Bane ; Health Centre 800
30) Pue ! Road 1,000
31) Nyobe Bangha i Road 1 1,000
32) Kapnor i Town Hall 1,000
OGBA/EGBEMA !i
1) Obrikom . Market 1,400
2) Okwuzi i Market 800
3) Mgbede ! Market 600
4) Idu I ■ Town Hall Î 800
3) Av/a Ikiri : Road 800
6) Umuadima 1 Poultry 800
7) Obigwe ; Town Hall 1,000
8) Okpurukpuali Town Hall 800
9) Ama Town Hall 800
10) Elehia Town Hall 600
11) OraOku Town Hall 2,000
12) Kreigani Town Hall 1,000
13) Ede Town Hall 700
14) Elieta Town Hall 600
13) Osiakpu Road 800
16) Okansu Bridge 1,000
17) Ikiri Town Hall 1,000
18) Ogbogu Town Hall 1,000
19) Obite Town Hall 1,200
20) Okposi Market 800
21) Oboburu Market 1,300
22) Egita Town Hall 600
N
30,200
GRANTS FOR SELF mîLP PROJECTS for 1972/73 (Continued)
Name of Community Project Amount Approved To tai
OGBA (Continued) N N
23) Obor Town Hall 1,000
24) Erema Market 1,200
23) Agbada Town Hall 800
26) Obulcegi Bridge & Access Road 1,300
27) Obiosimini Village„Hall 800
28) Ohale-Usomini Village Hall 1,000
29) Ikri/Ama/Elieta Road 800
30) Ubete Postal Agency 600
31) Omoku/Onita Canal (Creek) 800 29,100
O
GRANTS FOR SELF HI^ LP PROJECTS for 1975/74
Name of Community 1 Project Amount Ap;^
OGBA- ii N
1) Ohali Usomini Library ! 800
2) Ibewa Village Hall ; 1,000
5) Idu-Osobile Village Hall i 1,000
4) Aggah Market | 1,000
3) Ohiouga Village Hall i 1,000
6) Obukegi Road ! 800
7) Obiebe Village Hall 1,000
BRASS (DŒMBE) ;
1) Kongho Market 1,000
2) Aparanbio Road and Bridge 500
5) Akassa Market 1,000
4) Minibelen Road and Bridge 300
3) Minibio Road and Bridge 300
6) Ben Kiri Village Hall 300
7) Sangama Road 400
8) Sabatoru Town Hall 1,000
9) Kalaibileama Latrines (3) 300
10) Enyuvmama Town Hall 600
11) Obiata Latrines 300
12) Oruokolo/Fununu Road and Bridge 400
15) Sangapiri Jetty 600
l4) Dumoebikuma Jetty 600
15) Fekorukiri Jetty 600
16) Iwoama Latrines 300
17) Agada Latrines 300
18) Dienra Latrines 300
BONNY
1) Borokiri Village Hall 600
2) Dan Jumbo Bridge 1,500
5) Banigo Iselegono Bridge 500
4) Degema Abbey Embankment 300
Total
6,600
9,800
3âS*
GRANTS FOR SELF mCLP PROJECTS for 1975/74 (Continued)
Name of Community Porj ect Amount Approved Total
BONNY (Continued)
3) Green Iwoama Town Hall 300
6) Kalaibiama Latrines (2) 400
7) Oloma Town Hall 300
8) Sangamabie Village Hall 1,000
9) William Jumbo Village Hall 1,300
10) Agbalama Oko Jumbo Wells (3) 500
11) Polokiri Village Hall 600
12) Egelebie Latrines (2) 200
15) Peterside Bridge 1,300
14) Halliday Latrines 200
13) Oluokolo Wells (3) 200
16) Beresiri Latrines 200
17) Kuruama/Ew oama Bridges 1,300
18) Abalamabie Town Hall 1,000
19) Jumbo's Iseleogono Village Hall 600
20) Georgekiri Jetty 400
KALAHARI
1) If oko Town Hall 1,000
2) Krakrama Town Hall 300
5) Bille Health Centre 1,730
4) Obuarna Jetty 300
3) Old Bakana Town Hall 1,000
6) Kala Degema Town Hall 300
7) Kula Town Hall 1,000
8) Angulama Town Hall/ 
Postal Agency
1,000
9) Abonnema Town Hall 1,800
10) Minama Town Hall 1,000
11) Ke Health Centre 1,300
12) Sama Town Hall 1,000
15) Tema Wells (7) 400
14) Tombia Bridge 1,000
N
15,700
33&.
GRANTS FOR SELF HELP PROJECTS for 1973/74 (Continued)
Name of Community Project I Amount Approved Total
KALAHARI (Continued) 1 1 W
13) Degema Town I Market \ 300
16) Buguma j Market/Town Hall : 1,800
OKRIKA I
1) Okuru-Ama
1 ;
i Latrine ;1 1 400
2) Orim-Polo 1 Canal (Creek) ; 300
3) Ogan-Ama 1 Town Hall ' !{ 1 600
4) Amadi Ama
} : 
1 Pipe Borne Water ; 1,000
3) Ibuluya Ama ; Motor Park i 300
6) Abuloma 1 Pipe Borne Water ; 1,000
7) Dikibo Ama Î Pipe Borne Water 1 1,000
8) Daica Ama i Road 1 300
9) George Ama i Pipe Borne Water ’ 1,800
10) Ogoloma
11) Ogu
1 Jetty Causeway and : 
I Public Latrines j 
1 Bridge j
1,730
300
12) Bolo 1 Road j 300
13) Ogbogbo ! Reclamation of Land- 300
l4) Ozuboko-Ama I Town Hall 600
KHANA (OGONI)
1) Bianu 1 Town Hall 1,000
2) Bianu/Deebere/Keo : Road 300
3) Nyogor Lueku Town Hall 1,000
4) Nyobe Baghu Town Hall 300
3) ; Nyowii/Kpai Road 400
6) Yae/Die Road 400
7) Baalueku Town Hall 730
8) Ka-Lorri Road 400
9) Nyonuku/Tam-Lueke Road 400
10) Kpong Barakon/ 
Korogbere
Road 400
11) Kpong Town Hall 1 1,000
12) Luebe Road * K^)0 
■
16,230
10,350
GRANTS FOR SELF HELP PROJECTS for 1973/74 (Continued)
Name of Community
KHANA (OGONI) (Continued)'!
13) Nwokuru I
14) Luusue Sogho j
13) Bunu-Bagha |
16) Okv/ali I
17) Here
18) Le-ekeere Tae
Yee Society
19) Pue
20) Duburo/Luukpora/
Luutem
21) Taabaa
22) Bane
23) Baen
24) Opuoko
Project Amount Approved
Town Hall 
Town Hall 
Town Hall 
Town Hall 
Road 
Poultry
Town Hall 
Road
Market
Health Centre
Poultry
Market
N
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
200
400
1,000
200
1,000
1,000
300
1,000
Total 
N
16,430
SOURCE: Ministry of Rural Development and Social Welfare. '
Port Harcourt,
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